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PETITIONER: DR. RAM KRISHAN BHARDWAJ

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF DELHI AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/04/1953

BENCH: SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) BENCH: SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) MUKHERJEA, B.K. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN HASAN, GHULAM BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.

CITATION:  1953 AIR  318            1953 SCR  708  CITATOR INFO :  D          1955 SC 631  (3,4)  E          1957 SC 164  (2,3)  D          1967 SC 908  (10)  R          1968 SC1509  (8)  RF         1970 SC 852  (15)  RF         1973 SC 295  (8)  RF         1973 SC2469  (5)  R          1974 SC 183  (15,58A,59)  RF         1974 SC 806  (10)  R          1975 SC 550  (6)  R          1979 SC1925  (17)  RF         1982 SC1315  (27)  R          1983 SC 444  (12,14)  RF         1990 SC 231  (23)

ACT: Preventive Detention Act, 1952, s. 3-Constitution of  India, 1950, Arts. 21,22(5)-Detenu’s right to be supplied with full particulars-Vague  ground-Right to be released-Vagueness  of one of several grounds--Effect of.

HEADNOTE:  Under Art. 21 (5) as interpreted by an earlier decision  of this court a person detained under the Preventive  Detention Act is entitled, in addition to the right to have the ground of his detention communicated to him, to a further right  to have  particulars as full and adequate as the  circumstances permit  furnished  to  him  as  to  enable  him  to  make  a representation  against  the  order  of  detention  and  the sufficiency   of   particulars  conveyed   in   the   second communication is a justiciable issue, the test being whether they are sufficient to enable the detained person to make  a representation  which  on  being  considered  may  give  him relief.    The constitutional requirement that the grounds must  not be  vague  must  be satisfied with respect to  each  of  the grounds  communicated to the person detained subject to  the claim  of  privilege  under  el.  (6)  of  Art.  22  of  the Constitution.

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  Where  one  of the grounds mentioned was "you  have  been organising   the  movement  (Praja  Parishad  Movement)   by enrolling volunteers among the refugees in your capacity  as President of the Refugee Association of Bara Hindu Rao":   Held, that this ground was vague and even though the other grounds  were not vague the detention was not in  accordance with  the  procedure established by law  and  was  therefore illegal.     Dictum:    Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal   liberty  and  such  meagre  safeguards   as   the Constitution  has provided against the improper exercise  of the  power  must be jealously watched and  enforced  by  the Court.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION:  Petition No. 67 of  1953.  Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. Veda  Vyas (V.  N. Sethi and S. K. Kapur, with him) for  the petitioner. M.   C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G.  N.  Joshi, with him) for the respondents. 709 1953.  April 16.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the  Constitution for the issue of a writ in the  nature  of habeas  corpus directing the release of the  petitioner  Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj who is a medical practitioner in  Delhi and is now said to be under unlawful detention. The  petitioner was arrested on the 10th March, 1953,  under an  order  of the District Magistrate of  Delhi  made  under section  3 of the Preventive Detention Act as amended.   The grounds of detention were communicated to the petitioner  on the 15th March, 1953.  The first paragraph of that  communi- cation states that " the Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha  and the Ram Rajya Parishad have started an unlawful campaign  in sympathy  with  the Praja Parishad movement of  Kashmir  for defiance  of the law, involving violence and threat  to  the maintenance  of  public  order " as evidenced  by  the  sub- paragraphs which follow.  The incidents referred to in  sub- paragraphs  (a) to (1) are said to have ranged from the  4th to  the 10th March, 1953, the date on which  the  petitioner was  arrested,  but  they  do  not  directly  implicate  the petitioner.   They merely - give particulars of the  alleged unlawful  activities  of the three  political  organizations referred to above.  Subparagraph (m) is important, as, on it is  founded  the  first contention of  Mr.  Veda  Vyas,  the learned counsel for the petitioner.  It runs as follows:- "(m)  On  the evening of 11th March, 1953,  there  was  very heavy brick-batting indulged in by or at the instance of Jan Sangh  and Mahasabha workers in Sabzimandi when  the  police dispersed  a  Jan Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha  procession  and several  persons including policemen, journalists and  other non-officials  were  injured.  An assault was made  on  Miss Mridula  Sarabhai  and Sri Dan Dayal one of  her  associates received a stab injury." 710   It will be noticed that the incidents related in the sub- paragraph are alleged to have taken place on the 11th March, the day after the petitioner was arrested and detained.  Mr. Veda  Vyas  relies  upon it -as showing  that  the  District Magistrate  did not apply his mind to the alleged  necessity for  the detention of the petitioner as, if he had done  so,

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he could not possibly have referred to what happened on  the 11th  March as a ground of justification for what he did  on the  10th  The so called grounds on which the  detention  is said  to have been based must, it was suggested,  have  been prepared  by  some  clerk or  subordinate  in  the  District Magistrate’s  office  and mechanically signed by  him.   The learned Attorney-General explained that the incidents of the 11th  March were referred to not as a ground for the  arrest and  detention of the petitioner, but merely  as  evidencing the unlawful activities of the movement organized by the Jan Sangh and the other political bodies of which the petitioner was an active member.  The explanation is hardly  convincing and we cannot but regard this lapse in chronology as a  mark of  carelessness.   Notwithstanding repeated  admonition  by this Court that due care and attention must be bestowed upon matters  involving  the  liberty of the  individual,  it  is distressing  to find that such matters are dealt with  in  a careless  and  casual  manner.  In  view,  however,  of  the statements in the affidavit filed by the District Magistrate before  us  that  he carefully perused  and  considered  the reports.  and  materials placed before  him  by  responsible Intelligence  Officers and that he was fully satisfied  that the  petitioner  was assisting the  movement  and  agitation started by the Jan Sangh, etc., we are not prepared to  hold that the District Magistrate failed to apply his mind to the relevant  considerations before he made the detention  order as suggested for the petitioner.  The  second  contention raised by Mr. Veda  Vyas  is  more formidable.   As already stated, the first paragraph of  the statement.  of  grounds,  while it  sets  out  the  unlawful activities of the, three political bodies, 711 does not directly implicate the ’petitioner in any of  them. The second paragraph shows how the petitioner was  concerned in  those activities.  It begins by stating " The  following facts  show-that  you are personally  helping  and  actively participating  in  the above mentioned  movement  which  has resulted  in  violence and threat to maintenance  of  public order".   Then follow four sub-paragraphs (a) to  (d)  which refer  to private meetings of the Working Committee  of  the Jan  Sangh  in  January and February,  1953,  where,  it  is alleged, it was decided to launch and intensify the campaign and   the  petitioner  made  inflammatory  speeches.    Sub- paragraph (e) on which this contention is based runs thus :  "(e)  You have been organising the movement  by  enrolling volunteers among the refugees in your capacity as  President of the Refugee Association of the Bara Hindu Rao,"  a local are& in Delhi.  It is argued by Mr. Veda Vyas that this  ground is extremely vague and gives no particulars  to enable  the  petitioner to make an  adequate  representation against  the  order  of detention  and  thus  infringes  the constitutional   safeguard  provided  in  article  22   (5). Learned counsel relies on the decision in Atma Ram  Vaidya’s case(1) where this Court held by a majority that the  person detained  is entitled, in addition to the right to have  the grounds  of his detention communicated to him, to a  further right  to  have particulars " as full and  adequate  as  the circumstances permit " furnished to him so as to enable  him to make a representation against the order of detention.  It was  further  held that the sufficiency of  the  particulars conveyed  in the "  second communication " is a  justiciable issue, the test being whether it is sufficient to enable the detained  person to make a representation " which, on  being considered,  may  give relief to the detained  person".   On this  interpretation of article 22 (6) two  questions  arise

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for  consideration : first, whether the ground mentioned  in subparagraph (e) is so vague (i)  [1951] S.C.R. 67. 712 as to render it difficult, if not impossible, for the  peti- tioner to make an adequate representation to the appropriate authorities,  and second, if it is vague, whether  on  vague ground  among  others, which are clear and  definite,  would infringe  the constitutional safeguard provided  in  article 22(5). On the first question, the Attorney-General argued that  the grounds  must  be read as a whole and so  read,  the  ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) could reasonably be taken  to mean,  that  the petitioner was organizing the  movement  by enrolling volunteers from the 4th to 10th March in the  area known as Bara Hindu Rao.  This interpretation is  plausible, but  the petitioner, who is a layman not experienced in  the interpretation of documents, can hardly be expected  without legal  aid, which is denied to him, to interpret the  ground in  the sense explained by the AttorneyGeneral.  Surely,  it is  up to the detaining authority to make his meaning  clear beyond doubt, without leaving the person detained to his own resource for interpreting the grounds.  We must,  therefore, hold  that the the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e)  of paragraph 2 is vague in the sense explained above.    On   the  second  question,  there  is   no   considered pronouncement  by this Court, though in some cases it  would appear to have been assumed, in the absence of any argument, that one or two vague grounds could not affect the  validity of  the detention where there are other  sufficiently  clear and  definite  grounds to support the detention.   Mr.  Veda Vyas  now  argues  that even  though  the  petitioner  might succeed  in rebutting the other grounds to the  satisfaction of  the  Advisory Board, his representation  might  fail  to carry  conviction  so far as the ground  mentioned  in  sub- paragraph  (e) was concerned in the absence  of  particulars which   he  could  rebut  and  the  Advisory  Board   might, therefore, recommend the continuance of his detention.   The argument is not without force, as the possibility  suggested cannot  altogether be ruled out.  The Attorney-General  drew attention  to  the  recent amendment of section  10  of  the Preventive Detention 713 Act as a result of which the petitioner would be entitled to be  heard  in  person before the Advisory  Board  if  he  so desires  and,  it  was  said that he  would  thus  have  the opportunity  of getting - the necessary particulars  through the Board who could call upon the appropriate Government  to furnish particulars if the Board thought that the demand for them  was  in the circumstances just  and  reasonable.   The petitioner  would  thus suffer no hardship or  prejudice  by reason  of  sufficient particulars not having  been  already furnished  to him.  The question however is not whether  the petitioner  will in fact be prejudicially affected  in  -the matter  of securing his release by his  representation,  but whether  his  constitutional safeguard has  been  infringed. Preventive  detention  is  a serious  invasion  of  personal liberty  and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution  has provided against the improper exercise of the power must  be jealously watched and enforced by the Court.  In this  case, the  petitioner  has  the right,  under  article  22(5),  as interpreted  by  this Court by a majority, to  be  furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention "sufficient to  enable  him  to make a  representation  which  on  being considered  may give relief to him." We are of opinion  that

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this  constitutional  requirement  must  be  satisfied  with respect  to each of the grounds communicated to  the  person detained,  subject of course to a claim of  privilege  under clause  (6)  of article 22.  That not having  been  done  in regard  to  the  ground mentioned in  sub-paragraph  (e)  of paragraph  2 of the statement of grounds,  the  petitioner’s detention  cannot  be  held to be  in  accordance  with  the procedure  established by law within the meaning of  article 21.  The petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith. Petition allowed. Agent for the petitioner : Ganpat Rai. Agent for the respondent : G. H. Rajadhyaksha. 714