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PETITIONER: DR. (MRS.) SUSHMA SHARMA ETC. ETC

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/03/1985

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1985 SCR  (3) 243        1985 SCALE  (1)523

ACT:      Rajasthan   Universities    Teachers   (Absorption   of Temporary  Lecturers)   Act  1979,   Section   3   Rajasthan Universities Teachers  (Absorption of  Temporary  Lecturers) Ordinance  1978,  Clause  3  &  The  Rajasthan  Universities Teachers and  Officers (Special  Conditions of Service) Act, 1974.      Temporary Lecturers  in the  service of  the University for  long   years-June  25,   1975  fixed  as  the  date  of appointment, to  be eligible  for  absorption  in  permanent service-Choice of date-Whether arbitrary and discriminatory.      Constitution of India 1950 Articles 14 & 16.      June 25,  1975 fixed  as the  date of  appointment  for temporary   lecturers   to   be   eligible   for   permanent appointment-Presciption of  date-Whether  has  a  prescribed rational nexus or arbitrary.

HEADNOTE:      The  Rajasthan   Universities  Teachers   and  Officers (Special Conditions  of Service)  Act, 1974  provided for an elaborate procedure for recruitment of teachers and officers in the  universities but  no selection  had been made on the basis of  that Act  and all  appointments  were  made  on  a temporary basis.  Section 3 of the Act provided that no stop gap or  part-time arrangement  can be made for more than six months. The temporary appointments of lecturers by the Vice- Chancellor could  not be  made for  more than  one  academic year. It  further  provided  that  notwithstanding  anything contained in  any other  law, no  teacher or  officer in any University in  Rajasthan should  be appointed  except on the recommendation of  the Selection Committee constituted under section 4.      For a  long time since the inception of the University, there had  been no  regular selections  and appointments  of lecturers in  the University and the teachers’ organisations were  pressing  for  absorption  on  substantive  posts,  of temporary lecturers  who were  working for  long years.  The Government of  Rajasthan therefore promulgated the Rajasthan Universities Teachers  (Absorption of  Temporary  Lecturers) Ordinance, 1978.  Clause 3  of the  said  Ordinance  had  an English version as well as a Hindi version. Hindi version in Roman script read as follows:      "Samast asthai  pradhyapko ke sambandh me jo is roop me

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    25 June,  1975 ko  ya usse  purve niyukat kiye gaye the      aur  jo   Rajasthan  Vishvavidhyalay  Adhyapak  (Asthai      Pradhyapki Ka Amelan) 244      Adhyadesh, 1978   (1978  ka Adhyadesh s. 5) ke prarambh      ke samaya  is roop  me karya  kar rahe hein, unki apni,      apni.......      The English version of the Ordinance reads as follows:-      "All temporary  lecturers as  were appointed as such on      or before the 25th day of June, 1975 and are continuing      as  such   at  the   commencement  of   the   Rajasthan      Universities   Teachers    (Absorption   of   Temporary      Lecturers Ordinance, 1978 Ordinance No. 5 of 1978)."      On 18th  April, 1978  the Ordinance  was replaced by an Act namely  the Rajasthan  Universities Teachers (Absorption of  Temporary   Lecturers)  Act,  1979  in  which  identical language was used.      The  appellants  in  the  appeals  who  were  temporary lecturers and  teachers, were  appointed temporarily  by the Vice-Chancellor by virtue of section 20A of the Universities of Rajasthan Act, 1946.      It was  the contention  of the appellants in their writ petitions that  lecturers had been temporarily appointed and continued from  time to  time but  there were  no rules  for their absorption  into permanent  cadre. The services of the lecturers were  terminated from time to time before vacation and they  were reappointed  so as  to deprive  them  of  the continuity of  service which  would have  entitled  them  to Permanent absorption or regularisation of their service.      The Single  Judge allowed  the writ  petitions  holding that (1) the judgment in Yogendra Kumar Tiwari v. University of Rajasthan  and Others  had become final as no appeals bad been preferred  therefrom, and  (2) clause  3  of  the  1978 Ordinance means  that in  order to be eligible for screening for absorption  a lecturer must be in the appointment of the University any  time or  for any period before 25-6-1975 and must be  a temporary  teacher on  12-6-1978 even  though  in between he or she might not have been at all in service.      The Single Judge followed the interpretation of Section 3 as  made in  Tiwari’s case  and, was of the opinion that a clear differentiation  had been  made between  pre-emergency and post-emergency  appointees of  teachers and there was no basis or  nexus for  such differentiation with the object of the Act  and such differentiation amounted to discrimination and violated  Articles 14  and 16  of the  Constitution. The Single Judge  struck down the consequential part of Sections 6 and 7 of the Act.      The Universities of Rajasthan preferred appeals against the aforesaid  judgment. The  State Government  did not. The Division Bench was of the opinion that what was required was continuous employment  from prior to 25th June, 1975 to 12th June, 1978  to be  eligible for screening for absorption and that 25th  June, 1975  was chosen such as any other date and there was no differentiation between pre-emergency and post- emergency  appointees   for  absorption  as  lecturers.  The Division Bench set aside the decision of the Single Judge. 245      In the  Appeals to this Court on the question: (i) what is the  true   meaning of  Section 3 of the Act of 1979, and (ii) whether  by choice  of the  date of 25th June, 1975, an invidious distinction  has been  made between  pre-emergency and post-emergency  appointees, which  has no nexus with the purpose of  the Act,  and as  such that  Act is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.      Dismissing the Appeals,

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^      HELD: 1.  The  object  of  the  Rajasthan  Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Ordinance, 1978 which was  replaced by  the Rajasthan  Universities Teachers (Absorption of  Temporary Lecturers) Act 1979 was to provide for absorption  of temporary  lecturers of long standing. So therefore  experience   and   continuous   employment   were necessary ingredients.  The Hindi  version of  the Ordinance used the expression " Ke prarambh ke samaya is roop me karya kar rahe hein" is capable of meaning "and are continuing" to work as  such  at  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the Ordinance Keeping  the background  of the purpose of the Act in view that would be the proper construction and if that is the proper  construction which  is in  consonance  with  the English version of the Ordinance and the Act as well as with the object of the Act, then the Act and the Ordinance should be construed  to mean  that only those would be eligible for screening who  were appointed  prior to  25.6.1975 and  were continuing at  the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. 12.6.1978  i.e. approximately about three years. [259B- D]      2. The  English  version  of  clause  (3)  presents  no difficulty. Those  who are  appointed before  25.6.1975  and "are continuing"  on the  date when  the Ordinance came into effect i.e.  12.6.1978. So  therefore  "were  continuing  as such.... "  in the  Act must  mean that  to be  eligible for absorption these  temporary lecturers  should have  been  in continuous employment  from a date prior to 25.6.1975 to the date of  the commencement  of the  Ordinance  of  1978  i.e. 12.6.1978. [258H; 259A]      3. The interpretation of clause (3) of the Ordinance of 1978  in   Tiwari’s  case   could  not   in  the  facts  and circumstances  be   treated  to  be  such  an  authoritative pronouncement which  will  bind  the  courts  in  subsequent decisions in  the interpretation  of an Act which was passed soon  thereafter,   if  on  a  proper  construction  of  the subsequent enactment, it appears that the expression had not been correctly interpreted. [258G-H]      The criterion  fixed for  screening for  absorption was not an  irrational criteria a criterion not having any nexus with the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the criticism that a teacher who  was working  even for  two or three months only before 25.6.1975  and then  with long  interruptions was  in employment of the University at the time of the commencement of the  Ordinance would  be eligible  but a  teacher who had worked continuously from 26.6.1975 i.e. after the date fixed i.e. 25th  June, 1975  for three  years would be in-eligible and  as  such  that  will  be  discrimination  against  long experience, cannot be accepted. Such a construction would be an unreasonable  construction unwarranted  by  the  language used in the provisions concerned. [260A-C] 246      5(i) If  a particular period of experience is fixed for screening or  for absorption, it is within the wisdom of the legislature, and  what period  should be  sufficient  for  a particular job  or a particular employment is not subject to judicial review. [260C]      (ii) Improper  application of law in certain cases does not make  the law  had per  se. Useless law similarly is not always arbitrary law. [261A]      (iii) Wisdom  or lack  of wisdom  in the  action of the Government or  legislature is  not justifiable  by court. To find fault  with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidity. Mere errors  of  Government  are  not  subject  to  judicial review. What is best is not always discernible.

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    Metropolis Theater  Company  v.  City  of  Chicago  and Ernest J.  Magerstadt, 57  Lawyers’ Edition 730., Prag Ice & Oil Mills & Anr. Etc. V. Union of India, [1978] 3 SCR 293 at 333., D.S.  Nakara and Others v. Union of India [1983] 2 SCR 305=[1983] 2 SCR 165 referred to.      6.  If   25th  June,   1975  was   taken  in  order  to differentiate  between   pre  emergency  and  post-emergency appointees  for  consideration  for  absorption  then  there cannot be any doubt that such a differentiation would amount to are  arbitrary discrimination.  Because the  fact whether one was pre-emergency appointee and another a post-emergency was wholly  irrelevant to  the object  of the  Act  and  the Ordinance i.e  absorption of  temporary  lecturers  of  long standing  working   in  the  university.  Therefore  to  the question  of  absorption  of  temporary  lecturers  of  long standing  imposition   of  emergency   in  the  country  and appointment prior or subsequent thereto is wholly irrelevant and has  no nexus.  Differentiation on  a  ground  which  is irrelevant amounts to discrimination.                                                     [261B-D]      In Re  The Special  Courts Bill  1978, [1979] 2 SCR 476 Gopalan vs.  State  of  Madras  [1950]  SCR  88.,  State  of Travencore Cochin  vs. Bombay Company Limited, [1052] 1112., State of  West Bengal  vs. Union of India, [1964] l SCR 371, referred to.         7. According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the  Ordinance and  bearing in  mind the  preamble of the Act, the  main object  was to  make a specific provision for the selection  of teachers  and officers in the universities which  had   not  been  done  for  a  long  time.  Temporary appointments against  vacant posts  had  been  made  by  the universities and  such posts  had been  continuing  in  some cases for  ten years.  The preamble  to the Act of 1979 is a key to  unfold the intention of the legislature to make this law. It  lays down  that the  Act was  to  provide  for  the absorption of  temporary lecturers  of long standing working in the universities of Rajasthan. [264C-D]      8.A certain  tenure  of  service  for  the  purpose  of absorption was  the object  to be  achieved and  this has  a rational nexus with the object. The prescription of the date from which  the period should begin and the date on which it should end  were merely  incidental to the purpose. Any date perhaps could 247 have served  the purpose  which took into consideration long tenure. What  was   intended by  the use  of the  expression ’appointed on  or before  25.6.1975’ and must have continued until 12.6.1978  being the  date of coming into force of the Ordinance indicated  that there  should have been near-about three years  experience for  being eligible  for absorption. The date  was a  handy date.  Handy in  the  sense  it  came quickly in  the minds  of some  people. At least there is no evidence that  there was any attempt to separate or penalise pre-emergency appointee  and no  decision was  taken by  any appropriate authority and no  such evidence is there to make a  distinction   between  pre-emergency  and  post-emergency appointees. Being  in the  employment at  the time of coming into operation  of the  Ordinance was the pre-condition i.e. 12th June,  1978. Naturally  some day  anterior to that date had to  be indicated to ensure long tenure of experience and 25th June,  1975 was chosen because it was as good a date as any other. [266B-D]      9. It  may be  that 25th  June, 1975  has some odour to some people.  It may  be that  it revised many attitudes but this is  wholly irrelevant.  Any other  date might have been

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chosen.A particular  period  was  taken  to  make  a  person eligible   for    being   screened    for   absorption   and regularisation and if the beginning date happens to coincide with a  particular date  about which  some people  have some memories, the law would not become bad. That would be taking too sensitive a view of human expressions. [267B-C]      10. For  the regularisation of teachers, experience was the object to be found out. Certain period of experience was necessary for  the basis  for making the regularisation. The period of  experience would  be how  much and  the  date  of experience should  begin  from  what  time  are  within  the legislative wisdom  and there  is nothing  in this  case  to indicate that the starting point i.e. to be in service on or before 25.6.1975 was an arbitrary choice, [269D-E]      State of  Mysore &  Anr. v.  S.V. Narayanappa, [1967] 1 SCR 128, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal Nos. 3285, 3284, 3286 & 3287-89182      From the  Judgment dated 17.2.1982 of the High Court of Judicature for  Rajasthan,  Jaipur  Bench,  Jaipur  in  D.R- Special Appeal  Nos. 192/81, 191/81, 196/81, 194/81, 193/81, 195/81 respectively.      Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Sobhagmal Jain and S.K Jain for the  Appellants.      G.L. Sanghi, R.K. Garg, Manoj Swarup, Ms. Lalita Kohli, B.D. Sharma and Aruneshwar Gupta for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by: 248      SABYASACHI MUKHARJI,  J. These appeals by special leave arise out  of the  judgment of  the Division  Bench  of  the Rajasthan High  Court.  The  appeals  are  by  the  original petitioners before the learned single judge of the Rajasthan High Court  and who  having  succeeded  before  the  learned single judge  became respondents in the appeals filed by the University before  the Division  Bench.  The  appellants  in these appeals  and other  connected appeals  were  temporary lecturers  and  teachers  on  various  subjects.  They  were appointed temporary  lecturers  by  the  Vice-Chancellor  by virtue of  section 20A  of the  University of Rajasthan Act, 1946.      Section 4  of the  Rajasthan Universities  Teachers and Officers  (Special   Conditions  of   Service)   Act,   1974 hereinafter referred  to as 1974 University Act provides for regular selection  by Selection Committees. Section 3 of the 1974 Act  provides that no stop gap or part-time arrangement can  be  made  for  more  than  six  months.  The  temporary appointments of  lecturers by  the Vice-Chancellor cannot be made for  more than  one academic  year. Further sub section (1)  of   section  3   of  the   said  Act   provides   that notwithstanding anything  contained in  the relevant  law as from the commencement of the said Act, no teacher or officer in any University in Rajasthan should be appointed except on the recommendation  of the  Selection Committee  constituted under section  4. Section  4 of  the Act  provided  for  the constitution of  the Selection  Committee for  selection  of lecturers and  officers in  the University,  and dealt  with certain  other  aspects  and  section  5  provides  for  the procedure to  be followed  by the  Selection Committee.  The other provisions  of the  said Act  are not  necessary to be referred to.  It appears  that for  along time, indeed since the inception of the University, there have not been regular

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selections and  appointments of  lecturers in the University and as  such the  teachers’ organisations  were pressing for absorption on  substantive posts  of temporary lecturers who were working  for long years. It is not necessary to deal in detail on  this position,  One Shri Y.K. Tiwari filed a writ petition before  the Rajasthan  High  Court.  The  case  was disposed of  by a learned single judge of the Rajasthan High Court on 30th August, 1978 being Civil Writ Petition No. 446 of 1978-Yogendra Kumar Tiwari v. University of Rajasthan and Others. The  petitioner in  that case  was  appointed  as  a lecturer in  Law on  temporary basis after being selected by the Selection  Committee by  an earlier  order dated 10th of January, 1975.  The said  petitioner had  worked  upto  19th June, 1975 but he was allowed his salary upto 29th May, 1975 as his term was not extended there after. He was not allowed any salary for vacation also as he had 249 not completed  six months’  service on  the last  day of the session. The   petitioner was reappointed as a lecturer on a temporary basis  by an  order dated 13th September, 1975. As mentioned hereinbefore, there was long standing grievance of the temporary  lecturers and  therefore  the  Government  of Rajasthan promulgated  The Rajasthan  Universities  Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Ordinance, 1978 which is hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance of 1978. It was the case of  the petitioner  that he was eligible for screening. It was  further contended  that the previous Vice-Chancellor before handing over charge of his office had passed an order dated 2nd July, 1977 condoning the break in service of about 25  temporary  lecturers  in  University  belonging  to  the various departments  including the  faculty of  law- Para or clause 3  of the  said Ordinance  of  1978  had  an  English version as  well as  Hindi version. In view of the fact that certain controversy  is there,  it is  necessary to  set out both these  versions. Hindi  version written in Roman script reads as follows:      "Samast asthai  pradhyapko ke sambandh me jo is roop me      25 June,  1975 ko  ya usse  purve niyukat kiya gaye the      aur  jo   Rajasthan  Vishvavidhyalay  Adhyapak  (Asthai      Pradhyapko  Ka   Amelan)  Adhyadesh,   1978  (1978   ka      Adhyadesh S  5) ke  prarambh ke samaya is roop me karye      kar raha  hein, unki  apni apni  asthai  niyukatiyo  ki      tarikho ko  lagoo susangat   vidhi  ke adhin sambandhit      vishvavidhyalaya  dwara   vihit  nuntam   ahartaon   ko      sammilit karte hue patrta ki sharto ki unke dwara purti      ke adhyadhin  aur sambandhit  vibhag me  pradhyapko  ki      adhishthai riktiyon  ki  uplabhyata  ki  bhi  adhyadhin      rehte hue,  dhara 4  ke anhin gathit anuveekshan samiti      ki sifarish  per unke amelan aur adhishthai niyukti per      sambandhit vishvidhyalay dwara vichar kiya jayega."                                           (underlined by us)      English version of the Ordinance reads as follows :-      "All temporary  lecturers as  were appointed as such on      or    before  the  25th  day  of  June,  1975  and  are      continuing as such at the commencement of the Rajasthan      Universities   Teachers    (Absorption   of   Temporary      Lecturers) Ordinance,  1978 (Ordinance  No. 5  of 1978)      shall be  considered by  the University  concerned  for      their absorption  and substantive  appointment  on  the      recommendation of the Screening 250      Committee constituted  under section 4 subject to their      fulfilling  the  conditions  of  eligibility  including      minimum qualifications  prescribed  by  the  University      concerned under  the relevant  law as applicable on the

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    respective dates  of their  temporary appointments  and      subject  also  to  the  avail  ability  of  substantive      vacancies of lecturers in the department concerned."                                           (underlined by us)      The learned  single judge  in his judgment out of which appeals were  taken to  the Division  Bench and  from  which appeals arise  came to  the conclusion that (i) the judgment in Tiwari’s  case had  become final  as no  appeal had  been preferred therefrom  and (ii) clause 3 of the 1978 Ordinance means that  in  order  to  be  eligible  for  screening  for absorption a  lecturer must  be in  the appointment  of  the University any  time or  for any period before 25.6.1975 and then again  she  or  he  must  be  a  temporary  teacher  on 12.6.1978 even  though in  between he  or she might not have been at all in service.      The learned judge found that if Hindi version of clause 3 be given effect to then, to be eligible one must have been appointed before  25th June,  1975 and must have been in the employment as  such at the commencement of the Ordinance- In the English  version of  this Ordinance,  the words used are "and are  continuing." This, according to the learned judge, was not  the correct  translation of  the Hindi  version and according to  his reading, instead of the words used as "and are continuing as such", words such as "and are continuously in service or have been continuously in service" should have been used  if continuous employment from prior to 25th June, 1975 to  the 12th  of June,  1978 was  required. The learned judge came  to the  conclusion that  in the Hindi version of the Ordinance,  only two  conditions  were  required  to  be fulfilled for  absorption i.e. appointment before 25th June, 1975 and  continuing as such at the time of the commencement of this Ordinance i e. 12th June, 1978. Taking that in view, the learned  judge made  the rule  absolute and directed the respondents to  appoint the  petitioner to  his  substantive post as  the screening  had already been done. This decision was not appealed from and it has been contended on behalf of the appellants before us that 106 lecturers who were working temporarily have  all become  permanent. On  18th of  April, 1978 the  Ordinance was  re placed  by  an  Act  namely  The Rajasthan Universities  Teachers  (Absorption  of  Temporary Lecturers) Act, 1979 in which identical 251 language was  used. It  was  contended  that  interpretation given in   Tiwari’s  case was accepted by the legislature as correct. We  shall deal  with this contention later. But the fact that  there was  no appeal  preferred by the State from judgment in  Tiwari’s case  might be  that the  judgment was delivered by  the learned  single judge on 30th August, 1978 and the  Ordinance expired  on 31st August, 1978. On 18th of April, 1979 however the Ordinance was replaced by 1979 Act.      So far  as the present appeals before us are concerned, the following questions fall for our consideration:      (1) whether,  fixing of  the date here namely 25.6.1975 which happens to be the date on which emergency was clamped, for considering  the lecturers of the University as eligible for screening  under section 3 of the Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption  of  temporary  Lecturers,)  Act,  1979 makes the  Act invalid  on  the  ground  of  differentiation between pre-emergency  and post-emergency  appointments,  in other words  whether the  date  25th  June,  1975  when  the emergency was  clamped on the country had any nexus with the purpose of this Act ?      (2) what  is true  meaning of  the expression  used  in section 3 of the Act ?              The  short facts  are that there were irregular

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appointments in  the Rajasthan University as lecturers for a very  long   time.  In   other  words,  lecturers  had  been temporarily appointed  and continued  from year  to year but there were  no rules  for their  absorption  into  permanent cadre. Furthermore it is undisputed that the services of the lecturers were  terminated from time to time before vacation and they  were reappointed  so as  to deprive  them  of  the continuity of  service which  would have  entitled  them  to permanent absorption or regularisation of their services.      The  Rajasthan   Universities’  Teachers  and  Officers (Special  Conditions   of  Service)   Act,  1974-hereinafter referred to as the 1974 Act had provided elaborate procedure for  recruitment   of   teachers   and   officers   in   the universities. But  no selections  had been made on the basis of that  Act and  all appointments  were made  on  temporary basis. In  1978 as  noted before  the Ordinance  of 1978 was promulgated with the object to provide for the absorption of temporary 252 lecturers of  long standing  working in  the universities of Rajasthan. According  to the  University only  those who had been appointed before 25th June, 1975 and continued to be in service on  the date  of the  coming into  operation of  the Ordinance  i.e.  12th  June,  1978  were  eligible.  As  the practice of the University, it was alleged, was to break the service, one Tiwari moved the High Court and the decision of the High  Court and the basis of the said decision have been set out hereinbefore      The learned single judge in this case on examination of the materials  came to  the  conclusion  that  the  original petitioners,  the   appellants  herein   had  succeeded   in establishing the  fact that  the date of 25th June, 19 5 was arbitrarily fixed  which had no nexus with the object or the purpose of  the  said  Act.  Therefore  he  made  the  rules absolute. The  learned single  judge came  to the conclusion that under  the said  Ordinance and  under the said Act, the date of  25th June,  1975 offended Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.      The learned single judge had dealt in his judgment with the petition  of Dr.  Rukmani. He  has set  out the facts in detail It  is not  necessary to  set these out in detail but briefly these are: She passed her M.A. in Hindi in 1969, she did her  Ph D.  in Hindi  in 1973  from  the  University  of Rajasthan. On  28th June,  1976 she  was appointed  tutor in Hindi on  a temporary  basis for a period of three months in the University  of Rajasthan.  She was  permitted to work as tutor on  account of  various extensions  and ultimately she became lecturer.A  Selection  Committee  of  the  University selected her  for lecturer.  She was  appointed as such with effect from  9th October. 1977. Her services were terminated with effect  from 5th  August, 1979 by an order of the Vice- Chancellor.      The screening  done as  per order  of the High Court in Tiwari’s case  resulted in absorption of about 106 lecturers who were  working temporarily.  Orders to  this effect  were issued on  17th August,  1978. Since  the present appellants being  the  petitioners  before  the  High  Court  were  not appointed as  lecturers on  or before  25th June, 1975, they were treated  as ineligible  for being  screened  under  the provisions of  the Ordinance  of 1978.  It may  be mentioned that some of them appeared in the selection subsequently and were found  eligible except  two  of  them,  who  have  been absorbed  as  lecturers.  The  said  Ordinance  of  1978  as mentioned hereinbefore  expired on  31st August,  1978 and a Bill was  introduced and  which after  having undergone some

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amendments became the Act 253 Of 1979  and is  known as  Rajasthan  Universities  Teachers (Absorption of  Temporary Lecturers)  Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to  as the Act of 1979). Having received the assent of the  Governor on 17th April, 1979 it was published in the Rajasthan Gazette  on 18th  April, 1979. The main alteration and  amendment  was  that  whereas  the  entire  process  of screening of  appointment had to be finished by 31st August, 1978, the  time was  thereafter extended  till 31st  August, 1979.      Dr. Rukmani  and others  applied in  pursuance  of  the advertisement  issued   by  the  University.  The  Selection Committee held  the interviews  on 16th and 17th July, 1979. She was considered by the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee did  not select  the said  petitioner and  she was accordingly rejected by the Selection Committee. Dr. Rukmani had challenged  the Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979 on the one  hand and also the Selection Committee’s decision by which she was assessed on the other and the respondents were selected under the Act of 1974.        The  point that was canvassed mainly on behalf of the petitioners before  the learned  single judge related to the validity of the Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979, since both the Ordinance as well as the Act had got common feature of making  a  teacher  eligible  for  consideration  by  the Screening Committee, only if he or she was in the service of the University on or before 25th June. 1975 and further that he or  she was also in the service of the University on 12th June, 1978,  the date when the Ordinance became effective by publication in the Gazette.      Section 3 of the Act of 1979 reads as follows:-      "3. Substantive  appointment of  temporary  lecturers.-      All temporary lecturers as were appointed as such on or      before the  25th day  of June, 1975 and were continuing      as  such   at  the   commencement  of   the   Rajasthan      Universities   Teachers    (Absorption   of   Temporary      Lecturers) Ordinance,  1978(Ordinance No.  5  of  1978)      shall be  considered by  the University  concerned  for      their absorption  and substantive  appointment  on  the      recommendation of  the Screening  Committee constituted      under section 4 or section 5, as case may be subject to      their fulfilling the condition of eligibility including      minimum qualifications  prescribed  by  the  University      concerned under the relevant law as applicable on the 254      respective dates  of their  temporary appointments  and      subject  also   to  the   availability  of  substantive      vacancies of lecturers in the department concerned."      Sections 5 and 6 were as follows:-      "5-    Re-Screening.(1)    Notwithstanding    any-thing      contained in  section 7  or any  other provision of the      Rajasthan   Universities    Teachers   (Absorption   of      Temporary Lecturers)  Ordinance, 1978  (Ordinance No. 5      of 1978),  the services  of temporary lecturer, who was      considered for  substantive appointment  by a Screening      Committee but  was not  found suitable, shall be deemed      not have  terminated and  he shall  continue  to  be  a      temporary lecturer  till he  is  again  considered  for      substantive  appointment  under  section  3  after  his      rescreening under sub-section (2) of this section.      (2)  A   temporary  lecturer  who  was  considered  for      substantive  appointment  by  the  Screening  Committee      referred to  in section  4, but  was not found suitable      shall be  again considered  by the  Screening Committee

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    reconstituted in the same manner as is provided in that      section.      6. Appointment to be under the Act No. 18 of 1974.- The      lectures  appointed   to  the   substantive  posts   in      pursuance  of   the   provisions   of   the   Rajasthan      Universities   Teachers    (Absorption   of   Temporary      Lectures) Ordinance,  1978 (Ordinance No. 5 of 1978) or      of this  Act shall  be deemed  to have  been  appointed      under the  provisions  of  the  Rajasthan  Universities      Teachers and  Officers (Special  Conditions of Service)      Act, 1974 (Act No. 18 of 1974)."      Section 8  provides for the termination of the services of the  temporary lecturers  not substantively appointed and stated that  the services  of a  temporary lecturer  who was considered for  substantive appointment  under sections 3, 4 and 5  but was  not substantively appointed on or before the 31st day  of August,  1979 would,  stand terminated  on  the expiry of that day.      The learned  single judge  was of the view that the Act had application  to all  the temporary  lecturers  who  were working in  the various  universities in  Rajasthan  on  the relevant dates and unless 255 they were selected by the screening committee under the said Act,   their services  were to be terminated by 31st August, 1978. The object of the Act, according to the learned judge, was to  regularise the  services of  those  who  were  found suitable after  screening and  to fulfil  the conditions  of section 3  and then  terminate the  services  of  all  other temporary teachers on expiry of 31st August, 1978.      The main  controversy raised  before the learned single judge of  the High  Court related to the fixation of the two dates namely  25th June,  1975 and  secondly the date of the commencement of  the Ordinance  namely 12th  June. 1978. But what was pressed was about the validity of the date fixed as 25th June,  1975 as  the date on or before which the teacher should have  been functioning  as a  teacher in a particular University. Was this date arbitrary ?      It is  stated by  the  learned  judge  that  the  court enquired from the Advocate-General who appeared on behalf of the State  and from  the learned  counsel of  the  Rajasthan University as to what had prompted the fixing of the date as 25th June, 1975.      It may be mentioned as it is well-known that 25th June, 1975 was  the date on which last emergency was introduced in the country.  The  learned  Advocate-General  had  submitted before the  learned single judge that it was at the instance of the Rajasthan University and the Vice Chancellor that The date was  so selected.  The standing  counsel,  the  learned judge recorded, took the stand that so far as the University was concerned,  it had never suggested the above date and he had got  no reason  to justify  the fixing of that date. The learned judge summoned the secretariat file. It was revealed that  the  date  was  fixed  precisely  on  account  of  the suggestion  of   the  Vice-Chancellor   of   the   Rajasthan University. The  learned judge extracted from a portion of a letter dated  30th  January,  1978  from  the  file  of  the University which reads as follows:-      "It  is  proposed  that  all  the  temporary  lecturers      appointed on  or before  25.6. 1975  be screened  by  a      Screening  Committee   appointed  by   the   University      concerned  and   on  the  recommendation  of  screening      committee they  be absorbed  subject of  course to  the      availability of the vacancies in the department and the      candidate  fulfilling  the  prescribed  qualifications.

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    25th day of June, 1975 has been suggested 256      as crucial  date taking  into account  the fact that we      could take  care of  all appointments  made before  the      national emergency  which was  clamped with effect from      25.6.1975."      The two  drafts of  the Ordinance  which were sent with the letter  also contained  the alteration in the date which had been  changed from  1st day  of September,  1973 to 25th June, 1975. This was also noted by the learned single judge. It was  submitted  before  the  learned  single  judge  that certain representations were made by the University teachers and their  associations to change the date from 1973 to 1975 and to  substantiate that  allegation, the  above  file  was placed  before   the  Court.  However,  the  recommendations contained in  the file,  according  to  the  learned  Single judge, nowhere  contained 25th June, 1975 as the date of the Ordinance. In  their representations there was a demand that the  earlier   Government  decision   to  fix  the  date  of eligibility as 1st of September, 1973 should be altered to a date so  as to  cover cases  of all  other lecturers who had been appointed  later on  also. It is evident, therefore, in view OF  the history  of appointment of temporary lecturers, that the intention was to regularise the appointments taking into consideration  certain tenure  of experience  or office into consideration,  It was  initially suggested  that  1973 should be taken as the date to begin with i.e. who should be on the  roll of  lecturers on  that date  in 1973 but due to representations on behalf of the associations of teachers so as to  include subsequent  appointees, it  was changed.  Why this particular date was chosen, there is no specific answer but  there  is  a  letter  from  the  Vice-Chancellor  which indicated that such date should be taken, because 25th June, 1975 was the date of emergency, that date should be taken as he said ’ we should take care of all appointments before the national emergency".  In order  to appreciate the problem of regularisation, the  learned single  judge  noted  that  the University of  Rajasthan had  been adopting  a  practice  of appointing temporary  lecturers for a fixed period and after a gap to reappoint. It had created a controversy and several teachers were  found ineligible  on account of this break in service and  this had led to the earlier writ petition which we have mentioned hereinbefore.      The earlier  writ petition  (Tiwari’s) had  interpreted clause (3)  now section 3 of the Act to mean that continuity of service  between 25.6.1975 to 12.6.1978 was not necessary and all that was required was that one must be in service on or before 25.6.1975 and then 257 again on 12 6.1978 This is a point on which we would have to express our  opinion as  to whether the learned single judge was correct in his interpretation.      On the  basis of the interpretation of section 3 of the Act as  made by  Tiwari’s case  (supra) by which the learned single judge  felt himself  bound and with which the learned single judge  agreed, he  accordingly made the rule absolute The learned  single judge  was of  the opinion  that a clear differentiation had  been  made  between  pre-emergency  and post-emergency appointees of teachers and there was no basis or nexus for such differentiation with the object of the Act and such  differentiation  amounted  to  discrimination  and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The learned single <:  judge also  struck down the consequential part of section 6 and 7 of the Act as mentioned hereinbefore.      The universities of Rajasthan preferred appeals against

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the judgment  and order  of the  learned single  judge.  The State Government  did not.  The Division Bench was unable to accept the interpretation of section 3 of the Act as made by the learned  single judge  and was  of the opinion that what was required  was continuous  employment from  prior to 25th June, 1975  to 12th  June, 1978 to be eligible for screening for absorption  and the  Division Bench was of the view that 25th June,  1975 was chosen such as any other date and there was  no  differentiation  between  pre-emergency  and  post- emergency  appointees   for  absorption  as  lecturers.  The Division Bench  therefore set  aside  the  decision  of  the learned single judge.      Being aggrieved  by the  said  decision,  the  original petitioners have preferred these appeals by special leave to this Court.      As   mentioned    hereinbefore   two   points   require consideration by  us -  (i) what  is  the  true  meaning  of section 3  of the  Act of 1979 and (ii) whether by choice of the date  of 25th  June, 1975,  an invidious distinction has been  made   between  pre-emergency   appointees  and  post- emergency appointees, which has no nexus with the purpose of the Act  and as such the Act is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.      As mentioned  hereinbefore, the learned single judge of the Rajasthan High Court in these appeals had relied heavily on the  interpretation made in Y. K Tiwari’s case (supra) of clause (3)  of 1978  Ordinance.  Before  us  also  in  these appeals this was reiterated. 258 It  was   contended  that   that  was   the  only   possible construction of clause (3) of 1978 Ordinance and necessarily of section  3 of 1979 Act. We shall presently deal with this contention. It was further contended that this clause (3) of 1978 Ordinance  having received  judicial interpretation and when the  legislature enacted  the 1979 Act, the legislature had before it this interpretation and when a particular form of  legislative   enactment   had   received   authoritative interpretation whether  by judicial  decision or  by a  long course of  practice is  again adopted  in framing of a later statute, it  is sound  rule of construction to hold that the words so  adopted were  intended by  the legislature to bear the meaning  which had been so put upon them. (See Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition p. 139).      This  argument,   however,  cannot   in  this  case  be accepted. As  we have  noted before, the fact that there was no appeal perferred from the learned single judge’s decision in Y.K  Tiwari’s case  is of  not much  significance in  the facts and  circumstances of  this case because the Ordinance which was  the  subject  matter  of  interpretation  by  the judgment expired  within two  days of  the delivery  of  the judgment and  perhaps on  this ground  it  was  not  thought necessary to  pursue this matter. Secondly, the new Act came very soon  thereafter within  a period  of about six months. Therefore it  could not  be said  that there  was  any  long practice or of any judicial interpretation of long standing, Indeed this  aforesaid rule  of interpretation which we have noted hereinbefore should be used in a careful manner It was observed by  Lord Scarman  in the  case of  R v. Chard (1984 A.C.  p.   295)  that   the  theory  which  has  been  noted hereinbefore was  not a  canon of  construction of  absolute obligation but only a presumption in the circumstances to be taken  in   judicial   interpretation.   This   proposition, according to Lord Scarman, is well-settled.      In the  aforesaid view  of the  matter, we  are of  the opinion  that  the  interpretation  of  clause  (3)  of  the

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Ordinance of  1978 in  Tiwari’s case  could not in the facts and circumstances  be treated  to be  such an  authoritative pronouncement which  will  bind  the  courts  in  subsequent decisions in  the interpretation  of an Act which was passed soon  thereafter,   if  on  a  proper  construction  of  the subsequent enactment, it appears that the expression had not been correctly  interpreted. We have noted the Hindi version of clause  (3) as  well as  the English version. The English version  presents   no  difficulty   namely  those  who  are appointed before  25.6.1975 and "are continuing" on the date when the Ordinance came into effect i.e. 12.6.1978. 259 So therefore  "were continuing  as such .. " in the Act must mean   that to  be eligible  for absorption  these temporary lecturers should  have been  in continuous employment from a date prior  to 25.6.1975  to the date of the commencement of the Ordinance of 1978 i.e. 12.6.1978.      The object  of this  legislation  was  to  provide  for absorption of  temporary  lecturers  of  long  standing.  So therefore  experience   and   continuous   employment   were necessary ingredients.  The Hindi  version of  the Ordinance used the  expression "ke pratambh ke samaya is roop me karya kar rahe hein" is capable of meaning "and are continuing" to work as  such  at  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the Ordinance. Keeping  the background of the purpose of the Act in view that would be the proper construction and if that is the proper  construction which  is in  consonance  with  the English version of the Ordinance and the Act as well as with the object  of the  Act then  in our opinion the Act and the Ordinance should  be construed to mean that only those would be eligible  for  screening  who  were  appointed  prior  to 25.6.1975  and   were  continuing   at  the   time  of   the commencement  of   the  Ordinance   i  e.   12.6.1978   i.e. approximately about  three years.  If that  is  the  correct reading, then  we are  unable to  accept the  criticism that those who  were  for  a  short  period  appointed  prior  to 25.6.1975 then  again with interruption were working only at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. 12.6.1978 would also  be eligible.  In other  words people  with  very short experience  would be  eligible  for  absorption.  That cannot be  the purpose  of the  Act. It  cannot be  so  read reasonably. Therefore on a proper construction it means that all temporary  lecturers who  were appointed  as such  on or before  25.6.1975   and  were  continuing  as  such  at  the commencement of  the Ordinance  shall be  considered by  the University for  screening  for  absorption.  The  expression "were continuing  is significant. This is in consonance with the object of the Act to ensure continuity of experience and service  as   one  of   the  factors  for  regularising  the appointment of the temporary lecturers. For regularising the appointment  of   temporary  lecturers,  certain  continuous experience  is  necessary.  If  a  legislature  considers  a particular period  of experience to be necessary, the wisdom of such  a decision  is  not  subject  to  judicial  review. Keeping the  aforesaid reasonable  meaning of  clause (3) of the Ordinance  and section  3 of  the Act in view, we are of the opinion  that the  criterion  fixed  for  screening  for absorption was  not an  irrational criterion  not having any nexus with  the purpose  of the Act Therefore, the criticism that 260 a teacher  who was working even for two or three months only before 25.6.1975  and then  with long  interruptions was  in employment of the University at the time of the commencement of the  Ordinance would  be eligible  but a  teacher who had

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worked continuously from 26.6.1975 i.e. after the date fixed i.e. 25th June, 1975 for three years would be ineligible and as such that will be discrimination against long experience, cannot  be   accepted.  Such  a  construction  would  be  an unreasonable construction  unwarranted by  the language used in the  provisions concerned.  It is  well-settled that if a particular period  of experience  is fixed  for screening or t‘or absorption, it is within the wisdom of the legislature, and what period should be sufficient for a particular job or a particular  employment is  not subject to judicial review. We need  not refer  to a  large number  of decisions on this point.      Another contention  was urged  before us that if it was held that  the proper interpretation of section 3 of the Act of 1979  is that  in order  to be eligible for screening for absorption one  should be  appointed before  the 25th  June, 1975 and  continued to be a teacher on the day of the coming into  operation   of  the   Ordinance  i.e.  12.6.1978  i.e. continuously for  a period of about three years then the Act cannot apply  to anyone.  It was submitted that in Rajasthan universities  there  was  the  practice  to  keep  temporary teachers with  breaks and nobody could continuously hold the post for  a continuous period of three years indeed not more than six months. It was urged that the practice prevalent in the universities  was to  break the service of the temporary lecturers and  not to  allow them  continuously to work. The proper interpretation  would be  that these  breaks  i.e.  a break for a month or so during vacation should be considered as  ’functional   gaps’  and   temporary  teachers  who  had functional gaps  but were  in  fact  in  continuous  service should be  treated for  all  practical  purposes  to  be  in continuous service.  It  was  submitted  on  behalf  of  the universities as  well as the State Government before us that the universities  as well as the State Government had always taken the  stand that  continuous service was covered by the Act and continuous service included those temporary teachers who had  ’functional gaps’  but were  in fact  in continuous service. Looked  at from  that point  of view  there was  no question of  the Act  not being  of any  use. It was further submitted that none of the respondents who had been absorbed had that  qualification If  that is so, the appointments may be bad and these facts may be looked into if appropriate 261 applications are made by the appellants and others. Improper application of  law in certain cases does not make the law b ad per  se. Useless  law similarly  is not  always arbitrary law.      Next comes  the question  whether the  choice  of  25th June, 1975  as the  date prior  to which  temporary teachers must have been in employment to be eligible for screening is bad as  such. If  25th June,  1975 was  taken  in  order  to differentiate  between   pre-emergency  and   post-emergency appointees  for  consideration  for  absorption  then  there cannot be any doubt that such a differentiation would amount to an arbitrary discrimination. Because the fact whether one was a  pre-emergency appointee  and another a post-emergency appointee was wholly irrelevant to the object of the Act and the Ordinance i.e. absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing  working   in  the  university.  Therefore  to  the question  of  absorption  of  temporary  lecturers  of  long standing,  imposition   of  emergency  in  the  country  and appointment prior or subsequent thereto is wholly irrelevant and has  no nexus.  Differentiation on  a  ground  which  is irrelevant amounts  to discrimination.  This is well-settled by numerous  decisions of this Court. It is not necessary to

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refer to these decisions. It is sufficient if we mention the decision of  this Court  In  Re  The  Special  Courts  Bill. 1978(1) where  at page  534 the  learned Chief Justice inter alia laid  down the  following principles  to judge validity under Article 14 of the Constitution:-      1.   The first  part of  article 14,  which was adopted           from the  Irish Constitution,  is a declaration of           equality of the civil rights of all persons within           the territories  of India.  It enshrines  a  basic           principle of republicanism. The second part, which           is a  corollary of  the first  and is based on the           last clause of the first section of the Fourteenth           Amendment of  the American  Constitution,  enjoins           that equal protection shall be secured to all such           persons in  the  enjoyment  of  their  rights  and           liberties without  discrimination of  favouritism.           It is  a pledge  of the  protection of equal laws,           that is,  laws that  operate alike  on all persons           under like circumstances.      2.   The State,  in the  exercise of  its  governmental           power, has  of necessity  to make  laws  operating           differently on (1) [1919] 2 S.C. R. 476. 262           different groups  or classes of persons within its           territory to  attain  particular  ends  in  giving           effect to  its policies,  and it  must possess for           that purpose  large powers  of distinguishing  and           classifying persons  or things  to be subjected to           such laws.      3.   The Constitutional  command to the State to afford           equal protection  of its  laws  sets  a  goal  not           attainable by  the invention  and application of a           precise formula.  There fore,  classification need           not be  constituted  by  an  exact  or  scientific           exclusion or  inclusion of  persons or things. The           Courts should  not insist on delusive exactness or           apply  doctrinaire   tests  for   determining  the           validity of  classification  in  any  given  case.           Classification is  justified if it is not palpably           arbitrary.      4.   The principle  underlying the guarantee of article           14 is  not that  the same  rules of  law should be           applicable  to   all  persons  within  the  Indian           territory or that the same remedies should be made           available to  them irrespective  of differences of           circumstances. It  only  means  that  all  persons           similarly circumstanced  shall  be  treated  alike           both  in   privileges  conferred  and  liabilities           imposed. Equal  laws would  have to  be applied to           all in  the same situation, and there should be no           discrimination between  one person  and another if           as regards  the subject  matter of the legislation           their position is substantially the same.      5.   By the  process of  classification, the  State has           the power of determining who should be regarded as           a  class   for  purposes  of  legislation  and  in           relation to a law enacted on a particular subject.           This power,  no doubt, in some degree is likely to           produce some  inequality; but  if a law deals with           the liberties of a number of well-defined classes,           it is  not open  to the  charge of denial or equal           protection  on   the  ground   that  it   has   no           application to  other persons. Classification thus           means segregation  classes which have a systematic

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         relation, usually  found in  common properties and           characteristics. It  postulates a  rational  basis           and does  not mean  herding  together  of  certain           persons and classes arbitrarily. 263      6.   The  law  can  make  and  set  apart  the  classes           according   to the  needs and  exigencies  of  the           society and  as suggested  by experience.  It  can           recognise   even   degree   of   evil,   but   the           classification   should    never   be   arbitrary,           artificial or evasive.      7.   The classification  must not be arbitrary but must           be rational  that is  to say,  it must not only be           based on  some qualities  or characteristics which           are  to  be  found  in  all  the  persons  grouped           together and  not in  others who  are let  out but           those qualities  or characteristics  must  have  a           reasonable  relation   to  the   object   of   the           legislation.  In  order  to  pass  the  test,  two           conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the           classification must  be founded on an intelligible           differentia which  distinguishes  those  that  are           grouped  together   from  others   and.  (2)  that           differentia must  have a  rational relation to the           object sought to be achieved by the Act."      In support  of the  contention that 25th June, 1975 was chosen because  of the  emergency. reliance  was  placed  on certain communications  from the  Vice-Chancellor which have been noticed by the learned single judge. The learned single judge came  to the  conclusion that  was the  basis  i.e  to differentiate between pre and post emergency appointees. The Division Bench did not accept this view. We are in agreement with the views of the Division Bench.      It appears  to  us  that  the  primary  object  of  the Ordinance as  well as  of the  Act was  to provide  for  the absorption and regularisation of temporary lecturers of long standing in the universities in Rajasthan. What was intended was that  the temporary  teachers of long standing should be screened and  25th June,  1975 was taken r because it was as convenient a  date as  any  other.  While  interpreting  the provisions of any Act, what is necessity is the intention of the, legislature  and that  has to  be found  out  from  the language used,  it is not the view of the Vice-Chancellor or of an officer or authority who might or might not have put a note to  the Bill.  Was there  anything  to  spell  out  the intention of the legislature in fixing a particular date? It Is well-settled  that speeches  of the  Members of the House could at  best be  indicative of the subjective intention or the speaker  but would  not reflect  the inarticulate mental processes 264 lying behind  the majority  of those who voted which carried the bill  to become  an Act. The objective must be seen. The objective was  to fix some tenure to make temporary teachers eligible for  screening for  absorption. In  this connection reference may  be made  to the observations of this Court in Gopalan v.  State of  Madras. (1)  The same  view  was  also reiterated in  the case of (2) State of Travancore Cochin v. Bombay Company  Limited and State of West Bengal v. Union of India.(3)      It appears  to us  that according  to the  statement of objects and reasons of the Ordinance and bearing in mind the preamble of  the Act, the main object was to make a specific provision for  the selection of teachers and officers in the universities which  had not  been  done  for  a  long  time.

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Temporary appointments against vacant posts had been made by the universities  and such posts had been continuing in some cases for  ten years.  The preamble  to the Act of 1979 is a key to  unfold the intention of the legislature to make this law. It  lays down  that the  Act was  to  provide  for  the absorption of  temporary lecturers  of long standing working in the universities of Rajasthan. The objects and reasons of the Ordinance of 1978 read as follows:-      "An  Ordinance   to  provide   for  the  absorption  of      temporary lecturers  of long  standing working  in  the      Universities in Rajasthan.      In the  Rajasthan Universities  Teachers  and  Officers      (Special Conditions  of Service)  Act, 1974  (Rajasthan      Act No.  18 of 1974) specific provisions have been made      for the  selection of  teachers  and  officers  in  the      Universities. But  for one reason or the other, regular      selection committees  in the  Universities  should  not      meet to  hold regular  selections before  and after the      commencement   of   the   Act.   Therefore,   temporary      appointments against such vacant posts were made by the      Universities. Such appointments have been continuing in      some cases  for the last ten years with a view to solve      this long standing problem, (1) [1950] S.C.R. 88. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 1112. (3) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 371. 265      it  was   considered  necessary   to   regularise   the      appointments   through specially  constituted Screening      Committees-      Since, the  academic session  was about to commence and      since the  Rajasthan Legislative  Assembly was  not  in      session   and   the   Governor   was   satisfied   that      circumstances existed  which rendered  it necessary for      him to  take immediate  action, he made and promulgated      the  Rajasthan   University  Teachers   (Absorption  of      Temporary Lecturers)  Ordinance, 1978  on  8th  day  of      June, 1978."      If the  intention of  the legislature  in  fixing  25th June, 1975  in the  impugned section  of the Act was to make differentiation on  the basis  of  pre-emergency  and  post- emergency temporary  lecturers then  there was no difficulty in agreeing  with the view taken by the learned single judge of the  Rajasthan High  Court and  accepting the submissions advanced on  behalf of the appellants before us. However, as noted before, the division Bench of the High Court could not spell out  such an  intention from  any of the provisions of the Ordinance as well as the Act. We respectfully agree. The Court can  only search  for  the  objective  intent  of  the legislature primarily  in the  words used  in the  enactment aided  by   such  historical  material  as  reports  of  the statutory committees,  preamble etc. It was laid down in the case of  Stale of West Bengal v. Union of India (supra) that a statute, as passed by the Parliament, is the expression of the collective  intention of  the legislature as a whole. It may be  borne in  mind  that  in  this  case  there  was  no particular point  of view in mind of the University. We have noted the objects and reasons of the Ordinance.      The problem,  for the  solution of which this Ordinance was passed  and this  Act was enacted, was to regularise the appointments   through   specially   constituted   Screening Committees for temporary teachers of long standing. There is a further  fact which  is important  that initially  it  was proposed to cover the cases of temporary lecturers appointed on or  before June,  1973 but representation was made by the

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temporary  lecturers  that  would  deprive  many  subsequent appointees and  therefore the  benefit was extended to those temporary teachers  who were  appointed on  or before  25-6- 1975. It  appears that  the intention was that those who had continued from  a date  prior to  1975 upto June 1978 should get the  benefit. Such  benefit had  to be  fixed  giving  a particular period and from, the mere 266 fact that 25th June, 1975 was fixed which also happens to be the date  on which  emergency was clamped on the country, it cannot be said that emergency was the nexus.A certain tenure of service  for the  purpose of absorption was the object to be achieved  and this  has a rational nexus with the object. The prescription  of the  date from  which the period should begin and  the date  on which  it  should  end  were  merely incidental to  the purpose.  Any  date  perhaps  could  have served  the  purpose  which  took  into  consideration  long tenure. What  was intended  by the  use  of  the  expression ’appointed on  or before  25-6-1975’ and must have continued until 12-6-1978  being the  date of coming into force of the Ordinance indicated  that there  should have been near about three years  experience for  being eligible  for absorption. The date  was a  handy date.  Handy in  the  sense  it  came quickly in  the minds  of some  people. At least there is no evidence  that  there  was  any  attempt  to  separate  pre- emergency appointees  and  no  decision  was  taken  by  any appropriate authority  and no such evidence is there to make a  distinction   between  pre-emergency  and  post-emergency appointees. Being  in the  employment at  the time of coming into operation  of the  Ordinance was the pre-condition that is 12th  June, 1978.  Naturally, some  day anterior  to that date had to be indicated to ensure long tenure of experience and 25th June, 1975 was chosen because it was as good a date as any other.      It may  be borne  in mind that wisdom or lack of wisdom in the  action of  the  Government  or  legislature  is  not justiciable  by   court.  See   in   this   connection   the observations of  the U.S.  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of Metropolis Theater  Company v. City of Chicago and Ernest J. Magerstadt.1 To  find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidity.  There the learned judge Mr. Justice Mckenna observed as follows:-      "It may  seem unjust  and oppressive,  yet be free from      judicial interference.  The problems  of government are      practical ones and may justify, if they do not require,      rough  recommendations,   illogical,  it  may  be,  and      unscientific. But  even such  criticism should  not  be      hastily  expressed.   What  is   best  is   not  always      discernible, the  wisdom of  any choice may be disputed      or condemned. Mere errors of Government (1) 57 Lawyers’ Edition 730. 267      are not  subject to our judicial review. It is only its      palpably   arbitrary exercises  which can  be  declared      void...." This passage has been quoted with approval by      Chief Justice  Chandrachud in  Prag Ice  & Oil  Mills &      Anr. Etc. Vs. Union of India.      We must bear in mind that mere errors of Government are not subject  to judicial  review. What is best is not always discernible. It  may be  that 25th June, 1975 has some odour to some people. It may be that it revised many attitudes but this is  wholly irrelevant.  Any other  date might have been chosen.A particular  period  was  taken  to  make  a  person eligible   for    being   screened    for   absorption   and regularisation  and   if  the  beginnings  date  happens  to

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coincide with  particular date  about which some people have some memories,  the law  would not become bad. It seems that would be taking too sensitive a view of human expressions.      Great deal  of reliance  was placed  on a  five judges’ Bench decision  of this Court in the case of D.S. Nakara and Others v.  Union of  India.(1) There  it was  found that the Central Government  servants on retirement from service were entitled to receive pension under the Central Civil Services (Pension Rules,  1972. Under  the earlier pension scheme the pension was  related to  the average  emoluments  during  36 months just  preceding retirement.  On 25th  May, 1979,  the Government of  India,  Ministry  of  Finance  issued  Office Memorandum whereby  the formula  for computation  of pension was  liberalised   but  made  it  applicable  to  government servants who  were in  service on  or after  that  specified date. By another Memorandum of the Ministry of Defence dated 28th  September,   1979,  the  liberalised  pension  formula introduced for  the government servants governed by the 1972 Rules was  extended to the Armed Forces personnel subject to limitations set  out in the memorandum with a condition that the new  rules of pension would be effective from 1st April, 1979 and  might be  applicable to  all service  officers who become/became non-effective  or  on  after  that  date.  The liberalised scheme  introduced a slab system for computation of pension,  raised pension ceiling and provided for average emoluments with  reference  to  last  ten  months’  service. Consequently,  the  pensioners  who  retired  prior  to  the specified date had to earn pension on the average emolu- (1) [1978] 3 S.C.R. 293 at 333. (2) [1983] 1 S C.C. 305=[1983] 2 S.C.R. 165. 268 ments of  36 months’  salary  just  preceding  the  date  of retirement. Thus  they suffered  triple jeopardy  viz. lower average emoluments absence of slab system and lower ceiling, and being so aggrieved they filed the writ petitions in this Court contending  that the  memoranda were  in violation  of Article 14.  Petitioners I  and 2 were retired pensioners of the  Central   Government  who  had  retired  prior  to  the specified date  and petitioner  3 was  a society  registered under the  Societies  Registration  Act,  186(),  formed  to ventilate the legitimate public problems and consistent with its objective  it was espousing the cause of the petitioners all over the country.      This Court held that pension was neither a bounty nor a matter of  grace  depending  upon  the  sweet  will  of  the employer, nor an ex gratia payment. It was a payment for the past service  rendered. The most practical raison d’etre for pension is  the enability to provide for one self due to old age It  created a  vested right  and  was  governed  by  the statutory rules such as the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules which  were enacted  in exercise of power conferred by Articles 309 and 148(5) of the Constitution.      The expression  ’pensioner’ was generally understood in contradistinction to  the  one  in  service.  In  that  case Article 14 was wholly violated inasmuch as the pension rules being statutory  in character,  the amended rules, since the specified  date,   accord  differential  and  discriminatory treatment to equals in the matter of commutation of pension. Pensioners being  all. equal,  no date  could be  chosen  to separate one  group getting  more benefit  than other.  If a particular benefit  is to  be given  to all  then  making  a classification between  them is  discriminatory. Pension was the right  of all  retired  persons.A  particular  date  was chosen by the Government and that date had no nexus with the purpose of the Act i.e. give relief to them.

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    There are  some cases where choice of date has not been questioned. For  instance Union  of India  &  Anr.  v.  M/s. Parameswaran Match  Works Ltd,  (1) wherein  by notification dated 21st  July, 1967,  benefit to  a concessional  rate of duty was made available if a manufacturers of matches made a declaration that  the total  clearance  of  matches  from  a factory would not exceed 75 million during a financial year. There the  date chosen was 21st July, 1967. It was contended before this Court by the Union of India that the (1) [1975] 2 S.C.R. 573, 269 concessional rate  of duty  was intended for small bona fide units who  were in the field when the notification dated 4th September, 1967  was issued.  The concessional  rate of duty was not  intended to benefit the large units which had split up into  smaller units  to earn  the concession.  There this Court observed at a page 579 as follows:-      "The choice  of a  date as  a basis  for classification      cannot  always  be  dubbed  as  arbitrary  even  if  no      particular reason  is forthcoming for the choice unless      it is  shown to  be  capricious  or  whimsical  in  the      circumstances. When  it is  seen that a line or a point      there must  be and  there is no mathematical or logical      way  of  fixing  it  precisely,  the  decision  of  the      legislature or  its delegate must be accepted unless we      can say that it is very wide of the reasonable mark."      But as  we have  mentioned hereinbefore;  Nakara’s case (supra) dealt with the problem of benefit to all pensioners. The choice  of the date of 1st April, 1979 had no nexus with the purpose  and object of the Act. The facts in the instant case are,  however, different.  For  the  regularisation  of teachers, experience was the object to be found out. Certain period of  experience was necessary for the basis for making the regularisation.  The period  of experience  would be how much and  the date of experience should begin from what time are within  the legislative  wisdom and  there is nothing in this case to indicate that the starting point i.e., to be in service on or before 25.6.1975 was an arbitrary choice.      Reliance in  this connection  may also be placed on the case of  State of  Mysore & Anr. v. S.V. Narayanappa.(1) For the purpose  Of the  instant case it is not necessary to set out in  detail all the facts of that case. The facts of that decision have  a ring  of familiarity  with the facts of the present case.  There also choosing a particular date did not make the  Act bad  for the  purpose of regularisation of the appointments in the Mysore Government.      Various  submissions  and  some  other  decisions  were placed before us in aid of rival submissions. In the view we have taken as indicated hereinbefore, it is not necessary to refer to these. (1) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 128. 270      For the  reasons aforesaid,  we are of the opinion that the learned  judges of  the Division  Bench of the Rajasthan High Court  were right.  The appeals  therefore fail and are dismissed. There  will be  no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case.      We are  told that except two, all other appellants have already been  absorbed. It has also to be borne in mind that in considering  whether lecturers  are eligible or not those who  are   functioning  since   prior  to   25.6.1975  until 12.6.1978, functional gaps as we have indicated hereinbefore should be  ignored and if possible some arrangements be made where after  appropriate screening  or selection as the case may  be,  those  who  have  been  functioning  as  temporary

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teachers for  long period  might be  absorbed including  the appellants, subject to the rules of the University. N.V.K.                                     Appeals dismissed 271