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PETITIONER: DR. BOOL CHAND

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE CHANCELLOR, KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/09/1967

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M. SHELAT, J.M.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  292            1968 SCR  (1) 434  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1971 SC1828  (5)  RF         1971 SC2242  (21)  D          1992 SC1872  (15,16)

ACT: Kurukshetra  University  Act,  1956,  Sch.   I  CC.4(vi)   & (vii)--Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898--s. 14.   Chancellor given power to appoint Vice-Chancellor but not to  determine employment--whether   such   power  implied  in   power   to appoint--Nature  of  Vice-Chancellor’s   employment--whether contractual--whether rules of natural justice required to be followed when determining his employment.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was a member of the Indian Administrative Ser- vice  in  the  Madhya Pradesh  Cadre  and  was  compulsorily retired  from the Service for misconduct by an order of  the President in February, 1963.  In June, 1965 he was appointed Vice-Chancellor  of the Kurukshetra University, by the  then Chancellor  of  the University.  On March 31, 1966  the  new Chancellor  who  Was  in office at  the  time,  ordered  the suspension  of the appellant from the office  of  Vice-Chan- cellor and also issued to him a notice to show cause why his services I should not be terminated.  The appellant filed  a petition  in the High Court seeking a writ in the nature  of mandamus to quash the Chancellor’s order of suspension.   In the meantime the Chancellor passed an order on May 8,  1966, in  exercise of the power under Clause 4(vi). of Schedule  I to  the Kurukshetra University Act, 1956, read with s.14  of the  Punjab  General  Clauses  Act,  1898,  terminating  the services  of  the  appellant  with  immediate  effect.   The appellant  then  amended his petition and sought a  writ  of certiorari  to  quash the order of May 8,  1966.   The  High Court rejected the petition. In  appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of  the appellant, inter alia, (i) that the Chancellor had no  power under  the  Act or the Statutes to terminate the  tenure  of office  of a Vice Chancellor; and (ii) that  the  Chancellor was bound to hold an enquiry in accordance with the rules of natural  justice before determining the appellant’s  tenure, but the appellant had not been given a proper opportunity to

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explain  why  his  services should not  be  terminated  and, furthermore,  the  Chancellor had taken  into  consideration evidence which was not disclosed to the appellant. On the other hand, it was contended for the respondent  that since the claim for relief by the respondent was founded  on an alleged breach of contract, the remedy of the  appellant, if  any, lay in an action for damages and not in a  petition for a high prerogative writ. HELD, dismissing the appeal: (i)The absence of a provision setting up the procedure for determining the employment of the Vice-Chancellor in the Act or the Statutes or Ordinances does not lead to the inference that  the tenure of office of Vice-Chancellor is not  liable to be determined. [439H] A  power to appoint ordinarily implies a power to  determine employment  and  this rule is incorporated in  s.14  of  the Punjab General Clauses Act I of 1898. [437H-438A] S.R. Tiwari v. District Board, Agra, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 55  and Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N. M. Shah, Deputy  Custodian- cum-Managing Officer, Bombay, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 120;  referred to. 435 An  intention contrary to the rule was not evidenced  either by  the  fact that under Clause 4(vii) of the  Statutes  the appointment  of  a  Vice-Chancellor is for  three  years  or because   there  was  no  express  provision  covering   the determination of service of a Vice-Chancellor for misconduct as there was in the case of teachers.  Clause 4(vii) of  the Statutes does not purport to confer upon a person  appointed Vice-Chancellor an indefeasible right to continue in  office for three years; the clause merely places a restriction upon the  power of the Chancellor, when fixing the tenure of  the office  of  Vice-Chancellor.  It could not be  held  that  a person  appointed a Vice-Chancellor is entitled to  continue in office for the full period of his appointment even if  it turns  out that he is physically decrepit, mentally  infirm, or grossly immoral. [438E-F; 439G-H] S.14  of the General Clauses Act is a general provision:  it does  not  merely  deal  with  the  appointment  of   public servants.   It deals with all appointments, and there is  no reason  to hold, having regard to the context in  which  the expression  occurs,  that the authority  invested  with  the power  of appointment has the power to determine  employment as a penalty, but not otherwise. [438G-H] (ii)The new Chancellor did issue a notice upon the appellant requiring  him to show cause why the tenure of  his  service should   not  be  terminated  and  the  appellant   made   a representation  which  was  considered;  the  appellant  was informed  of the grounds of the proposed termination of  the tenure  of his service and an order giving detailed  reasons was  passed by ’the Chancellor.  The High Court had  rightly held  on  the  facts  that the  appellant  had  the  fullest opportunity  of  making  his  representation  and  that  the inquiry  held by the Chancellor was not vitiated because  of any violations of the rules of natural justice. [443D; 446C] (iii) The power to appoint a Vice-Chancellor has its  source in the University Act: investment of that power carries with it the power to determine the employment but that power  may not  be exercised arbitrarily; it can be only exercised  for good cause, i.e. in the interests of the University and only when  it  is  found  after due  enquiry  held  in  a  manner consistent  with  the  rules of natural  justice,  that  the holder  of  the  office  is  unfit  to  continue  as   Vice- Chancellor. [441G] A.Francis v. Municipal Councillors of Kuala Lumpur, [1962] 3

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All  E.R. 633; Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital  Board and  Anr.,  [1958]  All E.R. 322;  Vidyodaya  University  of Ceylon  and Ors. v. Silva. [1964] 3 All E.R. 865;  State  of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ridge v. Baldwin and Ors. [1964] A.C. 41; referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 246 of 1967. Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 19, 1966 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 739 of of 1966. N. C. Chatterjee, S. C. Agarwala, R. K. Garg, K.M.K. Nairand L. M. Singhvi, for the appellant. Niren  De, Additional Solicitor-General, Chetan  Das  Dewan, Deputy  Advocate-General for the State of Haryana and N.  H. Hingorani, for the respondent. 436 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. The State of Madhya Pradesh held an enquiry against the  appellant  Dr.’  Bool Chand--a  member  of  the  Indian Administrative Service-on charges of- "gross misconduct  and indiscipline"  in  respect of the conduct of  the  appellant when he was Collector District Rajgarh.  The Enquiry Officer held   that   in  recording   certain   remarks   "regarding association  of  tile Commissioner of Bhopal with  one  B.L. Gupta a pleader of Zirapur", the appellant was "actuated  by malice"   and   his  conduct  "offended   against   official propriety,  decorum and discipline", and that the  appellant had  without  permission  removed a safe  from  the  Rajgarh Treasury.  The President of India served notice upon the ap- pellant  requiring  him to show cause against the  order  of compulsory  retirement  proposed to be passed in  regard  to him.  The President also consulted the Union Public  Service Commission.  The Union Put",- Service Commission was of  the view  that  "in the light of the  findings  and  conclusions stated  by them and having regard to all  the  circumstances relevant  to the case. the penalty of compulsory  retirement on  proportionate  pension  should  be  imposed  upon"   the appellant.  and they advised the President accordingly.   By order  dated February 28, 1963. the President directed  that the,  appellant  be  compulsorily retired  from  the  Indian Administrative Service with immediate effect. In March 1965 the appellant was appointed Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science in the Punjab Univer- sity.   On June 18, 1965, the appellant was appointed  Vice- Chancellor  of  the Kurukshetra University by order  of  Mr. Hafiz Mohd Ibrahim-who was the Chancellor of the University. After   Mr.Hafiz  Mohd.   Ibrahim  vacated  the  office   of Chancellor  of the University, Sardar Ujjal Singh,  Governor of  Punjab.  held the office of Chancellor.   On  March  31, 1966,  the  Chancellor Sardar Ujjal Singh ordered  that  the appellant  be Suspended from the office of  Vice-Chancellor, and  by  another  order  the  Chancellor  issued  a   notice requiring  the appellant to show Cause why his  services  as Vice-Chancellor   of  the  Kurukshetra  University  be   not terminated.  The appellant submitted his representation, and shortly  thereafter  filed a petition in the High  Court  of Punjab  for  a writ in the nature of mandamus  quashing  the order and the notice dated March, 31, 1966.  On May. 8, 1966 the  Chancellor  passed an order in exercise  of  the  power under  sub-cl. (vi) of cl. 4 of Sch.  1 to  the  Kurukshetra University Act, 1956, read with s. 14 of the Punjab  General Clauses  Act, 1898, terminating with immediate  effect  "the services"  of  the  appellant  "from  the  office  of  Vice-

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Chancellor of the Kurukshetra University".  The petition was then  amended by the appellant. and a writ of certiorari  or appropriate  writ  calling for the record and  quashing  the order  dated  May 8. 1966, terminating the services  of  the appellant  was  also claimed.  The High Court  rejected  the petition filed by the appellant.  Against that 437 order,  with  certificate granted by the  High  Court,  this appeal has been preferred. The first argument raised on behalf of the appellant is that the  Chancellor  had  no power to terminate  the  tenure  of office   of   a  Vice-Chancellor.   It  is   necessary,   in considering  the validity of that argument, to read  certain provisions of the Kurukshetra University Act 12 of 1956.  By s. 4 the University is invested with the power, inter  alia, to  do  all such things as may be necessary,  incidental  or conducive to the attainment of all or any of the objects  of the  University.  By s. 7. amongst others,  the  Chancellor, the  Vice-Chancellor  and the Registrar are declared  to  be officers  of the University.  By s. 8 the powers, duties  of officers,  terms of office and filling of  casual  vacancies are  to  be  prescribed  by  the  statutes.   Section  14(1) provides that the statutes in Sch.  I shall be the  statutes of  the  University and that the "Court  of  the  University shall have the power to make new or additional statutes  and to  amend or repeal the statutes.  By s. 21 it  is  provided that  every salaried officer and teacher of  the  University shall be appointed under a written contract, which shall  be lodged  with the University.  By cl. 4 of Sch.  I the  Vice- Chancellor is declared the principal executive and  academic officer of the University, and also the ex-officio  Chairman of  the  Executive Council, the Academic  Council,  and  the Finance  Committee,  and is invested with authority  to  see that   the  Act.  the  Statutes,  the  Ordinances  and   the Regulations are faithfully observed, and to take such action as  he deems necessary in that behalf.  The  Vice-Chancellor is  also  authorised to exercise general  control  over  the affairs  of  the  University  and  to  give  effect  to  the decisions of the authorities of the University.  Sub-clauses (vi) & (vii) of cl. 4 provide:               "(vi)  The  ’Upa-Kulapati’   (Vice-Chancellor)               shall   be   appointed   by   the   ’Kulapati’               (Chancellor)  on  terms and conditions  to  be               laid by the ’Kulapati’ (Chancellor).               (vii)  The  ’Upa-Kulapati’   (Vice-Chancellor)               shall  hold office ordinarily for a period  of               three years which term may be renewed.’.’. From  -a  review of these provisions it is  clear  that  the Vice-Chancellor  is  an officer of the  University  invested with  executive  powers  set out in  the  Statutes  and  his appointment  is to be made ordinarily for a period of  three years  and  on  terms  and  conditions  laid  down  by   the Chancellor. There is no express provision in the Kurukshetra  University Act  or  the  Statutes  thereunder  which  deals  with   the termination of the tenure of office of Vice-Chancellor.  But on  that  account we are unable to accept the  plea  of  the appellant  that  the tenure of office of  a  Vice-Chancellor under the Act cannot be determined before the expiry of  the period  for  which  he is appointed.  A  -power  to  appoint ordinarily implies a power to determine the 438 employment.  In S. R. Tiwari v. District Boarel, Agra,(1) it was observed by this Court at p. 67:               "Power  to appoint ordinarily carries with  it

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             the  power  to, determine appointment,  and  a               power  to  terminate may in  -the  absence  of               restrictions express or implied be  exercised,               subject  to the conditions prescribed in  that               behalf,   by   the  authority   competent   to               appoint." A  similar  view was also expressed  in  Lekhraj  Sathramdas Lalvani   v.  N.  M.  Shah,  Deputy   Custodian-cum-Managing Officer, Bombay (2) . That rule is incorporated in s. 14  of the  Punjab  General Clauses Act I of  1898.   That  section provides:               "Where, by any Punjab Act, a power to make any               appointment  is  conferred,  then,  unless   a               different  intention  appears,  the  authority               having  for the time being power to  make  the               appointment shall ’also have power to  suspend               or  dismiss  any person appointed  whether  by               itself  or  any  other  authority  by  it   in               exercise of that power." Counsel for the appellant urged that since the general  rule is   given a statutory form, the validity of the exercise of the power to   determine  the  tenure of the office  of  the appellant  must  be found in s. 14 of  the,  Punjab  General Clauses Act.  Counsel says that s. 14 has no application  to the  interpretation  of  the  Kurukshetra  University   Act, because cl. 4(vii) of the Statutes which prescribes that the appointment  of a Vice-Chancellor shall ordinarily be for  a period of three years discloses a different intention.   But cl. 4(vii) of the Statutes does not purport to confer upon a person  appointed Vice-Chancellor an indefeasible  right  to continue in office for three years: the clause merely places a restriction upon the power of the Chancellor, when  fixing the tenure of the office of Vice-Chancellor. Counsel also urged that under s. 14 of the Act power to  ap- point  includes  power  to dismiss,  but  not  to  determine employment.  In support of that contention he urged that  in relation  to the tenure of service of a public servant,  the expression  "to  dismiss"  has come  to  mean  to  determine employment  as  a measure of punishment.  But s. 14  of  the General  Clauses  Act is a general provision:  it  does  not merely  deal  with the appointment of public  servants.   It deals with all appointments, and there is no reason to hold, having regard to the context in which the expression occurs, that  the authority invested with the power  of  appointment has the power to determine employment as a penalty, but  not otherwise.   The  expression  "dismiss"  does  not  in   its etymological  sense necessarily involve any such meaning  as is urged by counsel (1)  [1964] 3 S.C.R. 55. (2)  [1966] 1 S.C.R. 120. 439 for  the  appellant.  The implication that  dismissal  of  a servant  involves determination of employment as  a  penalty has been a matter of recent development since the Government of  India  Act,  1935, was enacted.   By  that  Act  certain restrictions were imposed upon the power of the  authorities to  dismiss  or remove members of the civil  services,  from employment.   There is no warrant however for assuming  that in  the General Clauses Act, 1898, the expression  "dismiss" which was generally used in connection with the  termination of appointments was intended to be used only in the sense of determination of employment as a measure of punishment. The  expression "Punjab Act" is defined in s. 2(46)  of  the Punjab  General  Clauses Act as meaning an Act made  by  the Lieutenant  Governor  of  the Punjab in  Council  under  the

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Indian Councils Acts, 1861 to 1909, or any of those Acts, or the  Government  of  India  Act,  1915,  or  by  the   Local Legislature  or  the  Governor  of  the  Punjab  under   the Government of India Act, or by the Provincial Legislature or the Governor of the Punjab, or by the Provincial Legislature or  the  Governor. of East Punjab under  the  Government  of India Act, 1935, or by the Legislature of Punjab Linder  the Constitution.  By s. 14(1) of the Kurukshetra University Act 12 of 1956, it was declared that on the commencement of  the Act,  the Statutes of the University shall be those  as  set out  in  the Schedule 1. The Statutes  incorporated  in  the First Schedule were made by the Legislature and must for the purpose  of  s.  14 of the Punjab  General  Clauses  Act  be regarded  as "Punjab Act".  They do not cease to be  "Punjab Act"  merely  because they are liable to be altered  by  the University  Court in exercise of the power conferred  by  s. 14(2) of the University Act. It  was also urged that whereas provision was made by cl.  6 of  the  Annexure to Ordinance XI that the services  of  the tea-hers  may  be  summarily determined  on  the  ground  of misconduct, .here was no such provision for determination of the   employment  of  the  Vice-Chancellor  and  that   also indicated an intention to the contrary within the meaning of s.  14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act.  We are unable  to agree with that contention.  It is true,. the office of  the Vice-Chancellor   of   a   University  is   one   of   great Responsibility and carries with it considerable prestige and authority.   But  we  are  unable  to  hold  that  a  person appointed  a  Vice-Chancellor  is entitled  to  continue  in office  for the full period of’ his appointment even  if  it turns  out that he is physically decrepit, mentally  infirm, or  grossly  immoral.   Absence of a  provision  setting  up procedure  for  determining  the  employment  of  the  Vice- Chancellor  in  the Act or the Statutes or  Ordinances  does not, in our judgment, lead to the inference that the  tenure of office of Vice-Chancellor is not liable to be determined. The  first  contention raised by counsel for  the  appellant must therefore fail. It  was  then urged by counsel for the  appellant  that  the Chancellor  was  bound  to  hold  an  enquiry  against   the appellant before 440 determining  his  tenure, and the enquiry must  be  held  in consonance   with  the  rules  of  natural   justice.    The Additional Solicitor-General submitted that since the  claim for relief by the appellant was founded on an alleged breach of contract, the remedy of the appellant, if any, lay in  an action  for  damages,  and  not in a  petition  for  a  high prerogative writ.  The Additional Solicitor-General  invited our attention to the averments made in the petition filed by the  appellant that the Chancellor "was bound by the  letter of  appointment which created a tenure of office  for  three years"  and  which  the Chancellor  could  not  unilaterally determine in the purported exercise of an assumed power, and that  in any event no such circumstances had been  disclosed which would entitle the Chancellor to avoid the contract  of service  which was binding on the University, and  submitted that since it was the appellant’s case that his  appointment as   Vice-Chancellor   was  purely  contractual,   and   the Chancellor  had  no  power  unilaterally  to  determine  the contract,  no relief of declaration about the invalidity  of the  order of the Chancellor may be granted in  exercise  of the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue high prerogative writs,  and the only remedy which the appellant is  entitled to  claim is compensation for breach of contract, in  action

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in a Civil Court. It is true, as pointed out by the Judicial Committee of  the Privy  Council  in A. Francis v.  Municipal  Councillors  of Kuala   Lumpur(1),  that  when  there  has  been   purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration that the contract of service still subsisted would rarely be made and would  not be made in the absence of special  circumstances, because  of  the  principle that the  Courts  do  not  grant specific performance of contracts of service.  The same view was  expressed  in Barber v.  Manchester  Regional  Hospital Board  and Anr(2) and in Vidyodaya University of Ceylon  and Ors. v. Silva(3).  In these cases the authority appointing a servant  was acting in exercise of statutory  authority  but the  relation between the person appointed and the  employer was  contractual, and it was held that the relation  between the  employer and the person appointed being that of  master and  servant, termination of relationship will  not  entitle the  servant to a declaration that- his employment  bad  not been validly determined. If  the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor gave rise to  the relation  of  master and servant governed by  the  terms  of appointment,  in the absence of special  circumstances,  the High  Court would relegate a party complaining  of  wrongful termination Of the contract to a suit for compensation,  and would  not  exercise  its  jurisdiction  to  issue  a   high prerogative  writ  compelling the University to  retain  the services of the Vice-Chancellor whom the University does not wish to retain in service.  But the office of a (1) [1962] 3 All E.R. 633. (2) [1958] 1 All E.R. 322 (3) [1964] 3 All E.R. 865. 441 Vice-Chancellor is created by the University Act: and by his appointment  the Vice-Chancellor is invested with  statutory powers  and authority under the Act.  The petition filed  by he  appellant  in  the High Court is  a  confused  document. Thereby  the appellant did plead that the  relation  between him and the University was contractual, but that was not the whole  pleading.   The  appellant also  pleaded,  with  some circumlocution that since he was appointed to the office, of Vice-Chancellor which is created by the Statute, the  tenure of  his appointment could not be determined  without  giving him an opportunity to explain why his appointment should not be  terminated.   The University Act, the Statutes  and  the Ordinances  do  not  lay down the conditions  in  which  the appointment  of the Vice-Chancellor may be  determined,  nor does the Act prescribe any limitations upon the exercise  of the  power  of the Chancellor to determine  the  employment. But once the appointment is made in pursuance of a  Statute, though  the  appointing  authority  is  not  precluded  from determining  the employment, the decision of the  appointing authority  to  terminate the appointment may be  based  only upon  the result of an enquiry held in a  manner  consistent with the basic concept of justice and fairplay.  This  Court observed in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani(1) -it p. 1271:               "It  is  one of the fundamental rules  of  our               constitutional  set-up that every  citizen  is               protected   against  exercise   of   arbitrary               authority by the State or its officers.   Duty               to act judicially would, therefore, arise from               the  every nature of the function intended  to               be  performed,  it  need not be  shown  to  be               super-added.  If there is power to decide  and               determine  to the prejudice of a person,  duty

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             to act judicially is implicit in the  exercise               of  such power.  If the essentials of  justice               be ignored and an order to the prejudice of  a               person is made, the order is a nullity.   That                             is  a  basic  concept of the rule  of  law  and               importance thereof transcends the significance               of a decision in any particular case." The power to appoint a Vice-Chancellor has its source in the University Act: investment of that power carries with it the power to determine the employment; but the power is  coupled with  duty.  The power may not be exercised arbitrarily,  it can be only exercised, for good cause, i.e. in the interests of  the  University  and only when it  is  found  after  due enquiry held in manner consistent with the rules of  natural justice, that the bolder of the office is unfit to  continue as Vice-Chancellor. In Ridge v. Baldwin and Others(1) a chief constable who  was subject  to the Police Acts and Regulations was, during  the pendency  of  certain criminal proceedings in which  he  was arrested (1)   [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625. (2)  [1964] A.C. 41. 442 and charged together with other persons, with conspiracy  to obstruct  the course of justice, was suspended from duty  by the  borough  watch  committee.   The  chief  constable  was acquitted  by the jury on the criminal charges  against  him and  he applied to be reinstated.  The watch committee at  a meeting decided that the chief constable had been  negligent in the discharge of his duties and in purported exercise  of the powers conferred on them by S. 191(4) of the Act of 1882 dismissed   him  from  office.   No  specific   charge   was formulated against him, but the watch committee in  arriving at their decision, considered his own statements in evidence and the observations made by the Judge who acquitted him. in support  of  the order of dismissal.   The  chief  constable appealed  to  the  Home Secretary who held  that  there  was sufficient  material  on  which the  watch  committee  could properly exercise their power of dismissal under s.  191(4). The  decision  of  the Home Secretary  was  made  final  and binding  on  the parties by s. 2(3) of the,  Police  Appeals Act,  1927.  The chief constable then commenced’  an  action for  a  declaration that the purported  termination  of  his appointment as chief constable was illegal, ultra vires  and void,,  and for payment of salary.  The action was taken  in appeal  to  the House of Lords.  The House  of  Lords  (Lord Evershed  dissenting)  held that the decision of  the  watch committee to dismiss the chief constable was null and  void, and  that accordingly notwithstanding that the  decision  of the  Home  Secretary  was  made final  and  binding  on  the parties,  that  decision  could not  give  validity  to  the decision  of the watch committee.  Lord Reid observed at  p. 65:               "So   I  shall  deal  first  with   cases   of               dismissal.   These appear to fall  into  three               classes: dismissal of a servant by his master,               dismissal  from office held  during  pleasure,               and dismissal from an office where there  must               be  something  against a man  to  warrant  his               dismissal.               The law regarding master and servant is not in               doubt.   There cannot be specific  performance               of  contract  of service, and the  master  can               terminate the contract with his servant at any

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             time  and for any reason or for none.  But  if               he  does so in a manner not warranted  by  the               contract  he  must pay damages for  breach  of               contract.   So the question in a pure case  of               master  and servant does not at all depend  on               whether  the master has beard the  servant  in               his  own  defence: it depends on  whether  the               facts  emerging at the trial prove  breach  of               contract.               Then there are many cases where a man holds an               office  at  pleasure.  Apart from  judges  and               others  whose tenure of office is governed  by               statute,  all  servants and  officers  of  the               Crown  hold office at pleasure, and  this  has               been  held even to apply to a  colonial  judge               (Terrell   v.  Secretary  of  State  for   the               Colonies  (1952) 2 Q.B. 482).  It  has  always               been held, I think rightly, and the reason  is               clear.   As  the person having  the  power  of               dismissal need 443 .lm15 not have anything against the officer, he need not give  any reasons. So  I  come to the third class, which includes  the  present case.   There  I find an unbroken line of authority  to  the effect that an officer cannot lawfully be dismissed  without first  telling him what is alleged against him  and  hearing his defence or explanation." The  case  of  the appellant falls within  the  third  class mentioned  by Lord Reid, and the tenure of his office  could not  be interrupted without first informing him of what  was alleged against him and without giving him an opportunity to make his defence or explanation. The  Chancellor Sardar Ujjal Singh did issue a  notice  upon the appellant requiring him to show cause why the tenure  of his service should not be terminated.  The appellant made  a representation  which  was considered, and  his  tenure  was determined because in the view of the Chancellor it was  not in  the  public interest to retain the  appellant  as  Vice- Chancellor.   The appellant was informed of the  grounds  of the proposed termination of the tenure of his office and  an order giving detailed reasons was passed by the Chancellor. But  the  appellant  contended  that  in  arriving  at   his decision. the Chancellor misread the order of the  President and took into consideration evidence which was not disclosed to  the  appellant, and failed to consider evidence  in  his favour which was on the, record.  It is true that the  order of  the  President  only  recites  that  the  appellant  was compulsorily  retired  as an officer of the  Madhya  Pradesh Cadre  of  the Indian Administrative Service:  it  does  not expressly state that the order of compulsory retirement  was imposed  as  a penalty.  But a review  of  the  disciplinary proceedings  against the appellant which culminated  in  the order of the President leaves no room for doubt.  The  order of compulsory retirement was passed against the appellant as a penal order. There  is  no substance in the plea that the  order  of  the Chancellor   was   vitiated,   since   the   Chancellor   in ascertaining the true. effect of the order of the  President took   into  consideration  a  letter  from  the   Secretary (Services), Government of India, Ministry of’ Home  Affairs, dated May 6, 1966.  The letter which has been set out in the order of the Chancellor merely catalogues the various, steps taken by the different authorities which considered the case

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of  the appellant before the order of compulsory  retirement of the appellant from the Indian Administrative Service  was passed  by  the  President.  That  letter  contains  no  new material. The  plea  that the -Chancellor was influenced  by  evidence which  was  not disclosed to the appellant is  also  without substance. 444 It appears that before he passed the order of suspension the Chancellor  had received letter from Prof.  D.C. Sharma  and Dr. A. C. Joshi in answer to enquiries made by him  relating to the circumstances in which the appellant was appointed to the post of Professor of Political Science in the University of  Punjab,  and  these letters were not  disclosed  to  the appellant.   Counsel  for  the  appellant  says  that  these letters  indicate  that  the  University  authorities  fully knowing that the appellant was compulsorily retired from the Indian  Administrative Service, appointed him as  Vice-Chan- cellor.   But  the appellant did not specifically  plead  or make  out  the  case that the  Chancellor  Mr.  Hafiz  Mohd. Ibrahim   was  made  aware  of  the  order   of   compulsory retirement.   The Chancellor Sardar Ujjal Singh  in  passing the  impugned  order considered the grounds set  up  in  the representation  and  then  posed the  question  whether  his predecessor in office, when he made the appointment -of  the appellant was aware of the fact that the appellant had  been compulsorily  retired  as a measure of punishment  from  the Indian  Administrative Service, and came to  the  conclusion that  there  was nothing to show that he--Mr.   Hafiz  Mohd. Ibrahim-was aware of the order of compulsory retirement.  In paragraph  .13  of his -order, the Chancellor  Sardar  Ujjal Singh observed:               "At  the  time  of his  appointment  as  Vice-               Chancellor,   the  fact  of   his   compulsory               retirement was not known to the Chief Minister               or the then Chancellor.  The alleged knowledge               of  the fact of compulsory retirement  on  the               part  of  the Chief Minister, Cabinet  or  the               previous Chancellor is, therefore, without any               basis." Unless  he was moved in that behalf by the appellant it  was not the duty of the Chancellor Sardar Ujjal Singh, before he passed  the  order  against the  appellant  determining  the tenure  of  his appointment, to enquire of Mr.  Hafiz  Mohd. Ibrahim  who  passed -the order of appointment  and  of  the Chief Minister, Punjab, whether they had come to know of the order  of the President.  In the petition filed  before  the High Court the petitioner merely averred in ground (iv)  (d) that "the order of the Chancellor was vitiated, inter  alia, because  the Chancellor had without any material come  to  a conclusion  that there was no basis to allege  knowledge  of the  fact of compulsory retirement on the part of the  Chief Minister or the Cabinet or the previous Chancellor": he  did not  set  up the case that the  Chancellor  had  information about  the order of the President.  His principal  plea  was that  he  was under no obligation to disclose  that  he  was compulsorily retired from the Indian Administrative Service. In the affidavit filed by Sardar Ujjal Singh, the  assertion made in ground (iv) (d) is denied.  Affidavits of Mr.  Hafiz Mohd.  Ibrahim and Mr. Ram Kishan.  Chief Minister.  Punjab, were  also filed before the High Court. and it  was  averred that  neither of them knew at the time when the  appointment was made that the appellant bad been compulsorily retired by the President from the Indian Administrative Service. 445

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Mr.   Hafiz  Mohd.   Ibrahim  further  averred  that   "this information  did  not  also come to his notice  so  long  he remained Chancellor of the Kurukshetra University", and that if  the fact of compulsory retirement of the appellant as  a penalty had been within his know-. ledge, he would not  have appointed the appellant as Vice-Chancellor.  Even after  the affidavits  by Mr. Hafiz Mohd.  Ibrahim and Mr.  Ram  Kishan were  filed,  the appellant by his  supplementary  affidavit which was filed on July 27, 1966, did not contend that,  Mr. Hafiz  Mohd.  Ibrahim or the Chief Minister had  information about  the  determination of his employment  in  the  Indian Administrative  Service.  His plea was that the  members  of the  syndicate.  the  members of the senate  and  the  Vice- Chancellor  of  the Punjab University  had  knowledge  about determination  of  his employment. when  lie  was  appointed Professor of Political Science; and that plea. we agree with the High Court, was wholly irrelevant. It  is true that the Chancellor in his order  recorded  that Mr. Hafiz Mohd.  Ibrahim did not know at the time of  making the  appointment  of the appellant to the  office  of  Vice- Chancellor that he was compulsorily retired from the  Indian Administrative  Service.  But no inference arises  therefrom that Sardar Ujjal Singh before he passed the orders made any enquiries or had access to evidence which was not  disclosed to  the appellant.  We are unable to agree with counsel  for the appellant that before a conclusion could be recorded, it was  the  duty of Sardar Ujjal Singh to ascertain  from  Mr. Hafiz  Mohd.  Ibrahim and Mr. Ram Kishan whether  they  were aware before the appellant was appointed Vice-Chancellor  of the order passed by the President.  The Chancellor, Sardara Ujjal  Singh.  was, in Our judgment,  under  no  obligation. unless moved by the appellant, to hold such enquiry.  It was for  the  appellant to take up the defence  that  Mr.  Hafiz Mohd.   Ibrahim was informed of the order of  the  President and  to take steps to prove that fact.  He did not  take  up that defence, and he cannot no,,\ seek to make out the  case that  the order was vitiated because the  Chancellor  Sardar Ujjal Singh did not make an enquiry which the Chancellor was never  asked to make.  The reference to the letter of  Prof. D.  C. Sharma in the order of the Chancellor has no  bearing either  on the true effect of the order of the President  or on the question whether the Chancellor was cognizant of  the order passed by the President. The argument that when considering the letter of Prof.  D.C. Sharma,  the  Chancellor  should have  also  considered  the letter of Dr. A.C. Joshi requires no serious  consideration. The letters of Prof.  D. C. Sharma and Dr. A. C. Joshi  are. in  our  judgment.  irrelevant in  considering  whether  the Chancellor  Mr. Hafiz Mohd.  Ibrahim was aware of the  order passed  by  the  President.  It is impossible  to  raise  an inference  that  because  the order  of  the  President  was gazetted  and  certain members of the syndicate  and  senate were  aware of tile order of the President,  knowledge  must also be attributed to the Chancellor. 446 The proceeding resulting in the order passed by the Chancel- lor does not suffer from any such infirmity as would justify this Court in holding that the rules of natural justice were not  complied with.  It is unnecessary in the  circumstances to   consider  the  argument  advanced  by  the   Additional Solicitor-General that even if Mr. Hafiz Mohd.  Ibrahim  was aware  of  the  order  passed  by  the  President   ordering compulsory  retirement  of  the appellant  from  the  Indian Administrative  Service, it was still open to his  successor Sardar Ujjal Singh to determine the tenure of office of  the

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appellant  as Vice-Chancellor, if in his view  it  appeared, having regard to the antecedents of the appellant, that  the appellant was unfit to continue as Vice-Chancellor. We  agree  with the High Court that. the appellant  had  the fullest  opportunity of making his representation  and  that the enquiry held by the Chancellor was not vitiated  because of violation of the rules of natural justice. In the very scheme of our educational set-up at the  Univer- sity  level,  the post of Vice-Chancellor is of  very  great importance,  and  if the Chancellor was of the  view,  after making due enquiry, that a person of the antecedents of  the appellant was unfit to continue as Vice-Chancellor, it would be  impossible,  unless the plea that the  Chancellor  acted maliciously or for a collateral purpose is made out, for the High Court to declare that order ineffective.  The plea that the  Chancellor  acted  mala fide was raised,  but  was  not pressed before the High Court. The  appeal therefore fails.  There will be no order  as  to costs. R. K. P. S.                        Appeal dismissed. 447