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PETITIONER: M/S JAIN MOTOR CAR CO., DELHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. SWAYAM PRABHA JAIN & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       15/02/1996

BENCH: AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J) BENCH: AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J) RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (3)  55        JT 1996 (4)   479  1996 SCALE  (2)197

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T S.Saghir Ahmad,J.      These are tenant’s appeals. 2.    Prem  Chand  Jain,  who  is  since  dead  and  is  now represented by  respondent No.1, had filed a petition before the  Rent   Controller,  Delhi,  for  the  eviction  of  the appellant from  the premises  no.XI/4239-A, Raj Kishan, Jain Street, Municipal  Ward No.XI,  Darya Ganj,  Delhi,  on  the ground of  default in  payment of rent and sub-letting. This petition came to be tried by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, who passed an order on 24th March, 1971 under Section 15(1) of  the Delhi  Rent Control  Act, 1958 (for short, the ’Act’, requiring the appellant to deposit all the arrears of rent due  for the period from 1.6.1970 within one month from the date of the order and to deposit the future rent also at the rate  of Rs.200/-  p.m., every month by the 15th of each succeeding month  after adjusting  an  amount  of  Rs  800/- which, admittedly,  was received  by Prem Chand Jain as part of the arrears of rent. 3.   While  the   proceedings  were   pending   before   the Additional Rent  Controller, Delhi,  Sh.Prem Chand Jain made an application  dated 22.3.1972  under Section  15(7) of the Act for  striking out  the defence  to the  appellant on the ground that the appellant had not deposited the rent for the month of February, 1972, by 15th March, 1972 and had instead deposited it  on 30th  March,  1972.  This  application  was rejected on  24th April,  1979  and  the  appeal  which  was thereafter filed  by Sh.Prem  Chand Jain  against this order was dismissed  by the  Rent Control  Tribunal by order dated 19.4.73. Sh.  Prem Chand  Jain then filed a second appeal in the High Court which was registered as S.A.O.No.198 of 1973. 4.    In the meantime, the Third Additional Rent Controller, Delhi,  by  his  order  dated  27.10.75,  allowed  the  main petition of  Sh. Prem  Chand Jain  for the  eviction of  the

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appellant from  the premises  in question on the ground that the appellant  had committed  default in  not depositing the rent for  the month  of February,  1972, by 15th March, 1972 and thus  the order  dated 24.3.71  for regularly depositing the future monthly rent by the 15th of each succeeding month was not  complied with  the further finding that he, namely, the  Rent Controller had no power to condone the delay or to extend the  time for  depositing the rent. Consequently, the appellant was  held not entitled to protection under Section 14(2) of  the Act and he was directed to be evicted from the premises in Question. 5.    This  order was challenged by the appellant before the Rent Control  Tribunal before  whom Sh. Prem Chand Jain also filed cross-objections on the question of sub-letting as the Additional Rent  Controller had  held that the appellant had not sublet any part of the premises and had thereby rejected one of  the grounds  on which  the appellant’s  eviction was sought. By  order dated  20.3.78, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal of  the appellant  as also the cross-objections filed by  the   landlord.  The  Tribunal  reiterated  the  finding recorded by  the Rent  Controller that  it had  no power  or jurisdiction to  condone the delay or to extend the time for depositing the rent and the order passed under Section 15(1) had to be strictly complied with. The appellant then filed a second appeal in the High Court (S.A.O.No.125 of 1978) which was taken  up for  hearing along with landlords S.A.O.No.198 of 1973. The High Court by its judgment and order dated 19th August, 1982  dismissed the  appellant’s second appeal while landlord’s S.A.O.No.198 of 1973 was allowed with the finding that the  appellant had  committed default in not depositing the rent for month of February, 1972 by 15th March, 1972 and was, therefore,  liable to be premises in question. The High Court was  also of  the opinion  that the Rent Controller as also the  Tribunal were  not justified in refusing to strike off the  defence of  the appellant  which  was  consequently struck off by it. 6.    It  is in these circumstances that the present appeals have been  filed and  have now come up for hearing which are being disposed of by this judgment. 7.    Mr.  Sachhar, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that  the interpretation  placed by the Delhi High Court on  the  relevant  statuary  provisions  contained  in Section 15(1)  and 15(7)  was erroneous  and contrary to the decisions of  this Court  and, therefore,  the judgment  was liable to be set aside. 8.    We  may examine  the submission  in the  light of  the relevant provisions  of the Act providing protection against sudden eviction of tenants. 9.    Section  14(1) together  with its  proviso provides as under :      "14. Protection  of tenant  against      eviction.    (1)    Notwithstanding      anything to  the contrary contained      in any  other law  or contract,  no      order or decree for the recovery of      possession of any premises shall be      made by  any court or Controller in      favour of  the landlord  against  a      tenant:           Provided that  the  Controller      may, on  an application made to him      in the  prescribed manner,  make an      order   for    the   recovery    of      possession of  the premises  on one      or more  of the  following  grounds

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    only, namely                (a) that  the tenant  has           neither paid  nor tendered the           whole of  the arrears  of  the           rent legally  recoverable from           him within  two months  of the           date on which a note of demand           for the  arrears of  rent  has           been  served  on  him  by  the           landlord   in    the    manner           provided in Section 106 of the           Transfer of Property Act, 1882           (4 of 1882);      10. Section 14(2) provides as under      :           "14.(2)  No   order  for   the           recovery of  possession of any           premises shall  be made on the           ground specified in clause (a)           of the  proviso to sub-section           (1),  if   the  tenant   makes           payment or deposit as required           by Section 15:                Provided that  no  tenant           shall  be   entitled  to   the           benefit under this subsection,           if,   having   obtained   such           benefit once in respect of any           premises  he   again  makes  a           default in the payment of rent           of those  premises  for  three           consecutive months."      11. Section 15(1) provides as under      :      "15. When  a  tenant  can  get  the      benefit   of   protection   against      eviction -  (1) In every proceeding      for the  recovery of  possession of      any   premises    on   the   ground      specified  in  clause  (a)  of  the      proviso  to   sub-section  (1)   of      Section 14,  the Controller  shall,      after   giving   the   parties   an      opportunity of being heard, make an      order directing  the tenant  to pay      to the landlord or deposit with the      Controller within  one month of the      date  of   the  order,   an  amount      calculated at  the rate  of rent at      which it  was  last  paid  for  the      period for which the arrears of the      rent were  legally recoverable from      the  tenant  including  the  period      subsequent thereto up to the end of      the month previous to that in which      payment or  deposit is  made and to      continue to  pay or  deposit, month      by month,  by the fifteenth of each      succeeding month,  a sum equivalent      to the rent at that rate."      12. Section 15(7) provides as under      :      "15(7). If  a tenant  fails to make      payment or  deposit as  required by      this section  , the  Controller may

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    order the  defence against eviction      to be  struck out  and proceed with      the hearing of the application." 13.  A perusal  of the  above provisions  will indicate that the Act  provides two  opportunities to  he tenant  to avoid eviction. The  first is  contemplated by the proviso to sub- section (1)  of Section 14 under which if the tenant pays to the landlord  the entire  amount of arrears of rent demanded from him  by the landlord within two months from the date on which a notice of demand is served upon him, it would not be possible for  the landlord  to institute the proceedings for his eviction  on the ground under section 14 of the Act. The second opportunity  is provided to him after the institution of the  proceedings, by  Sec. 14(2)  which provides  that no order for  the recovery  of  possession  on  the  ground  of default in  payment of  rent shall be made is the tenant has deposited or made payment of the rent in accordance with the provisions of section 15 under which the Rent Controller can call upon the tenant to pay to the landlord or to deposit in his court, within, one month from the date of the order, the arrears of  rent calculated  at the rate at which it was 1st paid for  the whole of the period for which the arrears were legally recoverable from him including the period subsequent thereto and further to pay or deposit continuously, month by month,  by   the  15th  of  each  succeeding  month,  a  sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. 14.   The  consequence of  non-deposit or  non-compliance of the order  made under  section 15(1) is indicated in section 15(7) wherein  it is  provided that the Controller may order the defence  of the tenant to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the landlord’s petition for eviction. 15.   Apparently,  the terms  of Section  15(1) appear to be imperative.  There   was  a  controversy  whether  the  Rent Controller  had   any  jurisdiction   to  extend   the  time contemplated by Section 15(1) for the deposit of rent or its payment to  the landlord.  A Full  Bench of  the Delhi  High Court in Delhi, Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Hem Chand & Anr.  AIR  1972  Delhi  975  (F.B.)  held  that  the  Rent Controller had  no jurisdiction  to  condone  the  delay  in deposit of  the rent under Section 15 of the Act and it also held that  once a  default is  committed by  a  tenant,  his defence is  liable to be struck out under Section 15(7) with no alternative  but to  order his eviction. This decision to the extent  that the  time for depositing the rent cannot be extended or  the delay cannot be condoned was upheld by this Court in  Hem Chand vs. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr.  AIR 1977 SC 1986, but it did not agree with the Full Bench on  the second  aspect of  the matter that the default must result in the striking out of defence and passing of an order of  eviction. This  Court also held that to strike out or not  to strike  out the  defence was  a matter within the discretion  of  the  Rent  Controller  and  the  decree  for eviction could not ipso facto be passed merely on the ground of default in depositing the rent under Section 15(2) of the Act. The relevant observations of this Court are thus :      "Now the  question that  remains is      whether the Rent Controller has any      discretion  to   extend  the   time      prescribed in  Section 15(1).  This      Section  requires   the  Controller      after hearing  the parties, to make      an order  directing the  tenant  to      pay to the landlord or deposit with      the Controller  within one month of      the date  of the  order the arrears

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    of rent  with a direction that they      continue to pay or deposit month by      month,  a  sum  equivalent  to  the      rent. This  is a second opportunity      given to  the tenant to pay arrears      of  rent.  Without  the  protection      given under  the Act  the  landlord      can on  15  days’  notice  get  the      tenant evicted.  The  Rent  Control      Act protects  the tenant  from such      eviction   and    gives   him    an      opportunity to  pay the  arrears of      rent within  two  months  from  the      date  of   notice  of   demand   as      provided in  Section 14(1)(a). Even      if  he  fails  to  pay,  a  further      opportunity is  given to the tenant      to  pay   or  deposit  the  arrears      within  one   month  under  Section      15(1). Such  payment of  deposit in      compliance  with  the  order  under      Section 15(1)  takes away the right      of the  landlord to  claim recovery      of  possession  on  the  ground  of      default in  payment  of  rent.  The      legislature  has   given  statutory      protection   to   the   tenant   by      affording him an opportunity to pay      the  arrears  of  rent  within  one      month from  the date  of the order.      This statutory  provision cannot be      modified  as   rights  of   parties      depend on  the compliance  with the      order under  Section 15(1).  In the      circumstances  we  agree  with  the      Full Bench that the Rent Controller      has no  discretion  to  extend  the      time   prescribed   under   Section      15(1)." 16.   A  Three Judge  Bench (Hon’ble V.R. Krishna Iyer, R.S. Pathak and  O.  Chinnappa  Reddy,  JJ.)  of  this  Court  in Shyamcharan Sharma  vs. Dharamdas AIR 1980 SC 587 = 1980 (2) SCC 151,  on a  consideration of  the provisions of the U.P. Accommodation Control  Act (41  of 1961), which were similar to Delhi  Act, laid  down that  since Section 13(6) vests in the court  the discretion  to order  the striking out of the defence, it  does not  clothe the landlord with an automatic right to  a decree for eviction nor does it visit the tenant with the  penalty of a decree for eviction being straightway passed against him. It further observed as under :      "If S.13  were to  be construed  as      mandatory  and  not  as  vesting  a      discretion in  the Court,  it might      result  in  the  situation  that  a      tenant  who   has   deposited   the      arrears of  rent  within  the  time      stipulated by S.13(1) but who fails      to deposit  thereafter the  monthly      rent on  a single  occasion  for  a      cause beyond  his control  may have      his  defence   struck  out  and  be      liable  to   summary  eviction.  We      think  that   S.13  quite   clearly      confers a discretion, on the court,      to strike  out or not to strike out

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    the defence,  if default is made in      deposit  or   payment  of  rent  as      required by  S.13(1 ). If the court      has the  discretion not  to  strike      out  the   defence  of   a   tenant      committing default  in  payment  or      deposit as required by S.13(1), the      court  surely   has   the   further      discretion to  condone the  default      and extend  the time for payment or      deposit. Such  a  discretion  is  a      necessary   implication    of   the      discretion not  to strike  out  the      defence. Another  construction  may      lead,   in   some   cases,   to   a      perversion of  the  object  of  the      Act,    namely,    ’the    adequate      protection of the tenant’. S.12 (3)      entitles   a    tenant   to   claim      protection against  eviction on the      ground specified  in S.12(1)(a)  if      the tenant makes payment or deposit      as  required   by  S.13.   On   our      consideration  of   S.13  that  the      Court has  the power  to extend the      time for payment or deposit it must      follow  that   payment  or  deposit      within  the   extended  time   will      entitle the  tenant  to  claim  the      protection of S.12(3)." 17.   Both  these decisions  came to  be considered  by this Court in  Ram Murty vs. Bhola Nath & Anr. AIR 1984 SC 1392 = 1984 (3)  SCC 111),  which was  a case  under the Delhi Rent Control Act,  1958, and  it was laid down that so far as the provisions relating to the striking out of defence contained in  Section 15(7)  are concerned, they are in pari   materia with  the provision  contained in  the M.P.  Act and since a Three Judge Bench in Shyamcharan’s case (supra) had  already held  that it   was   within  the  discretion  of   the Rent Controller to  strike or  not to strike out the defence, the Two Judge  decision in  Hem Chand  vs. Delhi Cloth & General Mills AIR 1977 SC 1986 shall be treated as overruled. It was laid down as under :      "15. We  must confess  that the two      decisions   in    Hem   Chand   and      Shyamcharan  (AIR   1980  SC   587)      supra, are irreconcilable.      16. It would be incongruous to hold      that even  if the  defence  of  the      tenant is  not  to  be  struck  out      under  S.15(7),   the  tenant  must      still   be    visited   with    the      punishment of being deprived of the      protection under  S.14(2).  In  Hem      Chand’s case (AIR 1977 SC 1986) the      Court went  to the extent of laying      down that  even if  the defence  of      the  tenant  is  struck  out  under      Section 15(7),  the Rent Controller      could not straightway make an order      for  eviction   in  favour  of  the      landlord  under   S.14(1)(a).   The      Court held  that the High Court was      wrong  in   its   assumption   that      failure   to    comply   with   the

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    requirements of  S.15(1)  vests  in      the   landlord   an   ’indefeasible      right’ to  secure an  order for the      eviction  of   the   tenant   under      S.14(1)(a). The Court set aside the      judgment of  the High  Court taking      that view  and remanded the matters      to the  Rent  Controller  observing      that there was still an issue to be      tried. If  that be so, the question      at once  arises "What  is the issue      to be  tried?". If the landlord has      still to make out a case before the      Rent   Controller   that   he   was      entitled to  an order  for eviction      of the tenant under S.14(1), surely      the  tenant   has  the   right   to      participate in  the proceedings and      cross-examine the landlord. It must      logically  follow  as  a  necessary      corollary that  if the  defence  is      not to  be struck out under S.15(7)      it means  that the tenant has still      the defences  open to him under the      Act.   In    the   premises,    the      conclusion is  irresistible that he      has the  right to  claim protection      under S.14(2).  What is  of essence      of  S.14(2)   and  of   S.15(6)  is      whether   there    has    been    a      substantial  compliance   with  the      order  passed  under  S.15(1).  The      words as  required  by  S.15(1)  in      these provisions  must be construed      in a reasonable manner. If the Rent      Controller has the discretion under      S.15(7)  not   to  strike  out  the      defence   of    the   tenant,    he      necessarily has the power to extend      the time for payment of future rent      under S.15(1)  where the failure of      the tenant  to make such payment or      deposit was  due  to  circumstances      beyond his  control.  The  previous      decision  in   Hem   Chand’s   case      interpreting S.15(7) and S.14(2) in      the context of S.15(1) of the Delhi      Rent Control  Act,  1958,  although      not  expressly   overruled,  cannot      stand with the subsequent, decision      in Shyamcharan’s case, interpreting      the analogous  provisions  of  the,      Madhya    Pradesh     Accommodation      Control Act,  1961 as  it is  of  a      larger Bench.                      (emphasis supplied) 18.  Another Three  Judge Bench  of this  Court in  a recent decision in  Kamla Devi  (Smt) vs.  Vasdev (1995) 1 SCC 356, which was  also a case under the Delhi Act, has affirmed the decisions  rendered   in  Ram   Murty’s  case   (supra)  and Shyamcharan’s case (supra). The learned Judges (Hon’ble J.S. Verma, S.R. Bharucha & Suhas C.Sen) were of the opinion that the provisions of this Act were similar to the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Act. They observed as under :      "20. On  behalf of the appellant it

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    has   been   contended   that   the      principles laid  down in  this case      should not  be extended  to a  case      governed by the provisions of Delhi      Rent Control  Act. We  do not  find      any  material  distinction  between      the provisions  of  Section  12(1),      (3) and  Section 13(1)  (5) and (6)      of the  Madhya Pradesh  Act and the      corresponding       provisions   of      Section 14(1), and Section 15(1) of      the  Delhi   Act.  In   fact   this      argument was  rejected in  the case      of Ram  Murti vs.  Bhola  Nath.  In      that    case,     construing    the      provisions of the Delhi Act, it was      held that Section 15(7) conferred a      discretionary  power  on  the  Rent      Controller  to   strike   out   the      defence of  the tenant.  That being      the position,  the Rent  Controller      had, by legal implication, power to      condone the  default on the part of      the tenant  in  making  payment  or      deposit of future rent or to extend      time for such period or deposit."                      (emphasis supplied)      At another  place, they observed as      under :      "21.  In  coming to this conclusion      reliance was placed on the decision      in the  case of  Shyamcharan Sharma      case, it  was argued  on behalf  of      the  respondent   that  Shyamcharan      Sharma case  was decided  under the      Madhya    Pradesh     Accommodation      Control  Act,   1961  which  had  a      different scheme altogether and had      no application  to  a  case  to  be      decided under the provisions of the      Delhi  Rent   Control   Act.   This      argument was  repelled by  pointing      out  in   that  judgment  that  the      scheme  of   the   Madhya   Pradesh      Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was      almost similar to that of the Delhi      Act with regard to the claim of the      landlord  for   eviction,  of   the      tenant on failure to pay, rent. The      only difference  was that under the      Madhya Pradesh Act the landlord had      to bring a suit for eviction before      a   Civil   Court   under   Section      12(1)(a), whereas  under the  Delhi      Act an  application had  to be made      before the  Rent  Controller  under      Section 14(1)(a)."                      (emphasis supplied) After noticing  the similarities  in the  Delhi Act  and the Madhya Pradesh Act, the Court finally observed as under:      "In our  view, sub-section  (7)  of      Section  15   of  the   Delhi  Rent      Control   Act,    1958   gives    a      discretion to  the Rent  Controller      and does  not contain  a  mandatory

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    provision  for   striking  out  the      defence  of   the  tenant   against      eviction. The  Rent Controller  may      or may  not pass  an order striking      out the  defence. The  exercise  of      this discretion  will  depend  upon      the facts and circumstances of each      case. If  the Rent Controller is of      the view  that in  the facts  of  a      particular case  the time  to  make      payment or  deposit pursuant  to an      order passed  under sub-section (1)      of Section  15 should  be extended,      he may  do so by passing a suitable      order.  Similarly,  if  he  is  not      satisfied about  the case  made out      by the  tenant, he  may  order  the      defence  against   eviction  to  be      struck  out.   But,  the  power  to      strike  out   the  defence  against      eviction is  discretionary and must      not   be   mechanically   exercised      without any  application of mind to      the facts of the case." 19.  Shyamcharan’s case  (supra) was  cited before the Delhi High Court  in the  instant case, but it distinguished it on the ground that it was a case under the M.P. Act and was not applicable. It  consequently proceeded  to  strike  out  the defence of the appellant on the ground that it had committed a default in depositing the rent for the month] of February, 1972 by the 15th of March, 1972. For doing this, it followed the decision  of this  Court in  Hem Chand vs. Delhi Cloth & General Mills  AIR 1977  SC 1986. It would be seen that even in that case this Court had observed as under:      "While we  agree with  the view  of      the Bench  that the  Controller has      no power  to condone the failure of      the tenant  to pay  arrears of rent      as required under Section 15(1), we      are satisfied  that the  Full Bench      fell into  an error in holding that      the right  to obtain  an order  for      recovery of  possession accrued  to      the landlord.  As we  have set  out      earlier in  the event of the tenant      failing to  comply with  the  order      under Section 15(1) the application      will have  to be  heard  giving  an      opportunity to  the tenant  if  his      defence is  not  struck  out  under      Section 15(7)  and without  hearing      the tenant if his defence is struck      out. The Full Bench is therefore in      error in  allowing the  application      of the landlord on the basis of the      failure of  the  tenant  to  comply      with an order under Section 15(1)." 20. In  view of the above discussion, the High Court was not justified in  relying upon the decision of this Court in Hem Chand’s case  as it  shall be  deemed to have been overruled or, in  any case, lost its efficacy as a binding decision in view of  the Three  Judge  Bench  decisions  in  Shyamcharan Sharma vs.  Dharamdas AIR  1980 SC  587 and Kamla Devi (Smt) vs. Vasdev  (1995) 1  SCC 356.  The two  Judge Bench  in Ram Murty vs.  Bhola Nath  & Anr.  AIR 1984  SC 1392 has already

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critically examined  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Hem Chand’s case  (supra) and  has held it to be contrary to the three Judge Bench decision in Shyamcharan Sharma’s case. 21. Applying  the above  principles to  the instant case, it cannot  but  be  held  that  the  view  expressed]  by  Rent Controller, the Rent Control Tribunal as also the High Court that the  time under  Section 15(1)  for depositing the rent could not  be extended  nor could  the delay be condoned was wholly erroneous.  The whole  approach, therefore  from  the beginning, was  based on wrong premises. The High Court went a step  further. While  the Rent  Controller  and  the  Rent Control Tribunal  had not  struck out  the  defence  of  the appellant on  the ground that 15 days’ default in depositing the rent  for February, 1972 was not wilful or contumacious, the High  Court,  on  an  erroneous  view,  struck  out  the defence. We  have already noticed above that striking out of defence under  Section 15(7) of the Act is in the discretion of the Rent Controller. Since the discretion appears to have been properly  exercised by  the Rent  Controller as also by the Rent Control Tribunal, the High Court, in the particular circumstances of  the case, was not justified in interfering with that  discretion and  striking out  the defence  of the appellant. The  High Court, while considering this question, has observed as under :      "In other  appeal S.A.O. no. 193 of      1973 of  the  landlord  challenging      the  Judgment   and  order  of  the      Tribunal dismissing his application      under Section  15(7)  of  the  Act,      defence of the appellant tenant was      not struck  off by  the Controller.      In  other   words  the  tenant  was      allowed  to   defend  the  eviction      case.  He   was  allowed   to  lead      evidence and  take part  during the      trial of  the eviction proceedings.      The    appellant     had    claimed      condonation  for   the  purpose  of      Section 15(7)  of  the  Action  the      ground that  the  attorney  of  the      appellant had  fallen ill  and  the      partner of the firm Ajit Prasad had      forgotten the  date of  deposit  on      account of being busy in connection      with  the  election  in  which  his      brother was also a candidate. These      facts are not sufficient to condone      the delay in deposit of rent. These      acts amount  to negligence  on  the      part of  the appellant  which is  a      partnership firm.  The attorney had      fallen  ill  and  one  partner  had      forgotten  the   date  of  deposit,      there were other partners and other      officials of  the firm who ought to      have taken  steps to deposit within      time. I  am, therefore, of the view      that it  was not  a  fit  case  for      refusing to  strike off the defence      of  the   appellant  tenant   under      Section  15(7)   of  the   Act.  I,      therefore, set  aside the  Judgment      and order  of the  Tribunal and the      Controller  and   strike  off   the      defence of the appellant."

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22.  The   High  Court   thus  struck  out  the  defence  by substituting  its  own  discretion  in  place  of  the  Rent Controller and  the Tribunal  both of whom had held that the default by  the appellant  was not wilful. The main question was whether  appellant was  entitled to extension of time in depositing  the  rent  or  should  he  be  evicted  for  not depositing the  rent for only one month in time particularly when the  default was  not wilful  or contumacious.  At  one time, we  were inclined  to remand  the  case  to  the  Rent Controller so  that the appellant’s plea regarding extension of time  in depositing  the rent  for the month of February, 1972 may  be considered  but having  regard to the fact that the appellant  had already  pleaded those  facts which  have already been  considered by  the High Court, we feel that it would not  be in  the interest  of justice now to remand the case as  the High Court appears to be justified in coming to the conclusion that the appellant was negligent and careless as the  rent could  still be deposited by any other partner, if the  attorney had fallen ill or one partner had forgotten the date  of deposit.  Any other  explanation offered by the appellant  would   be  obviously   an  after   thought  and, therefore, as  pointed out  earlier, it  will not  serve any purpose to  remand the  case to  the  Rent  Controller.  The result is  that the appeal has to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed but  without any  order as to costs allowing-three months time  to the  appellant to  vacate  the  premises  on failing the  usual undertaking  to this effect in this Court failing which  the respondent-landlady  will be  entitled to recover possession from the appellant through police force.