1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5815   OF 2008

(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 17820/2006)

DISTRICT PROGRAMME CO-ORDINATOR, MAHILA SAMKHYA AND ANR.

... APPELLANT(S)

:VERSUS:

ABDUL KAREEM AND ANR. ... RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

Mahila Samkhya, Karnataka, is  a society registered under the Karnataka

Societies Registration Act, 1960.  

This  society  is  engaged  in  various  activities,  like  encouraging,  assisting,

promoting,  decision making and encouraging group action by women as means of

their  empowerment  and  equal  participation  in  the  process  to  bring  about  social

changes and to empower the women. The activities of the said society is being carried

out in the districts of Gulbarga, Bidar, Raichur, Bijapur, Bellary, Koppal and Mysore

in  the  State  of  Karnataka.  It  has  been  receiving  funds  from the  Government  of

Netherlands for the aforementioned activities.

2

The  services  of  respondent  No.1  herein  as  a  driver  were  hired  by  the

appellants. He was initially appointed in the year 1992 on fixed tenure basis. On or

about  20th October,  1997,  his  services  were  again  hired  inter  alia  for  the  period

1.11.1997 to 31.10.1999. Appellants were, however, entitled to terminate his services

with 30 days notice on either side or by payment of compensation of  one month's

honorarium in lieu of notice.   

It is now not much in dispute that some acts of omission and commission on

the part of  the 1st respondent  were  brought to the notice of the authorities of  the

Society and some purported oral enquiry was conducted at Bangalore in connection

with some vehicle bearing No. KA-39 M-42.  

By reason of a letter dated 3rd July, 1998, however, the services of respondent

No.1 were terminated in terms of para 14 of the offer of appointment, stating:

“Vide the above referred letter, you were appointed as a driver in MSK, Gulbarga as per the terms and conditions mentioned therein. In  accordance  with  para  XIV  of  your  appointment  letter,  your services are no longer required in this organization and hence your services are terminated with immediate effect, i.e. with effect from 3.7.98 with one month notice in lieu of which you are being paid one month's honorarium.”

An industrial dispute was raised by the 1st respondent before the Labour

Court at Gulbarga.  Both the parties adduced their respective evidences before the

Presiding  Officer,  Labour  Court.  Having regard to  the  deposition  of   Ms.  Jyothi

Kulkarni examined on behalf of the appellants as NW-1, the Labour Court opined:

3

“The main contention of the 2nd party is that the termination of the workman 1st party was only a termination simplicitor and the same cannot  be  disturbed by the  Court.  In  this  case the  2nd party  has produced the letter dt. 3.7.98. Of course the said letter shows that the appointment was only temporary in nature. This statement as reflected in the letter cannot be accepted. In fact the 1st party has produced before  the court  the  letter issued  by  the establishment. The said letter issued by the officials of the 2nd party marked as W1 clearly indicates that the service of 1st party was terminated not on account of temporary work but it was due to the fact that the same was not proper.”   

Holding  that  as  no  disciplinary  enquiry  was  conducted,  the  termination

order dated 3.7.1998 was illegal, an award of reinstatement in service with full back

wages was made.  Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said award the appellants

filed writ petition in the High Court. The High Court while upholding the award of

reinstatement in service reduced the back-wages to 30 per cent.  

Appellants are, thus, before us.   

Mr. Nath, learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the Labour

Court  and  consequently  the  High  committed  a  serious  illegality  in  passing  the

impugned award and the judgment, in so far as they failed to take into consideration

that the order of termination did not attract the provisions contained in Chapter VA

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 inasmuch as the termination of services of the 1st

respondent came within the purview of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947.  

Mr. Naik, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the

4

other  hand,  would  urge  that  from the  letter  dated 6th August,  1997 issued by  the

Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of Education, Government of

India,  it would appear that the Project during the 9th Plan period was to continue

from 1997-98  to  2001-2002  and  in  that  view  of  he  matter,  the  services  of  the  1st

respondent should not have been terminated before the Project came to an end.  

From the  deposition  of  Ms.  Jyothi  Kulkarni  herself,  the  learned  counsel

submitted,  it  is  abundantly  clear  that  the  services  of  the  1st respondent  were

terminated by way of punishment in lieu of dismissal from service as his behaviour

was not proper and, thus, this Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under:

“termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the  workman  concerned  on  its  expiry  or  of  such  contract  being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein;”

It is not a case where the termination of the services of the  1st  respondent

emanated  from  non-renewal of contract of employment. Under the general law, the

appellants might have been entitled to take recourse to clause XIV of the offer of

appointment dated 20.10.1997, but in view of the fact that the terms and conditions of

services  of  the  1st respondent  were  governed  by  the  provisions  of  the  Industrial

Disputes Act, the order of termination must  satisfy the requirements thereof.  

We may place on record that although a contention has been raised both

5

before the Labour Court as also the High Court that the society does not satisfy the

test of an 'industry' as contained in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.

Mr. Nath did not raise any such contention before us.   

A finding has been arrived at by the Labour Court that the termination of

the services of the 1st respondent, relying on or on the basis of clause XIV of the offer

of appointment, is a camouflage and the said finding has been  affirmed by the High

Court. We are not inclined to interfere therewith, being a finding of fact.  

It is, however, not a case where an award of reinstatement could be made.

The Society runs the project. The project came to an end in 1999. The plea that the

tenure of the project was extended by the Government of India was not put to the

Management.  Such a plea cannot be raised for the first time before us.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that as the services of the 1st respondent

could be terminated on or about 31.10.1999, i.e. at the end of the tenure of the project,

interest of justice will be subserved if in stead and place of upholding the award of

reinstatement in service, we direct the appellants to pay a sum of Rs. 56,000/- to the 1st

respondent by way of compensation which would cover the amount of honorarium to

which he would have been entitled to for the period July, 1998 to October, 1999. We

direct accordingly.  

The said payment shall be made within a period of eight weeks from the date

of communication of this order, failing which the same shall bear interest at the rate

6

of 12 per cent per annum.  

The appeal is allowed in the above terms.

..........................J (S.B. SINHA)

..........................J   (CYRIAC JOSEPH)    NEW DELHI, SEPTEMBER 18, 2008.