11 April 2007
Supreme Court
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DIRECTORATE OF FILM FESTIVALS Vs GAURAV ASHWIN JAIN .

Case number: C.A. No.-001892-001892 / 2007
Diary number: 27540 / 2006
Advocates: V. K. VERMA Vs PRASHANT BHUSHAN


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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1892 of 2007

PETITIONER: Directorate of Film Festivals & Ors

RESPONDENT: Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/04/2007

BENCH: Tarun Chatterjee & R V Raveendran

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) NO. 19706 OF 2006)

R. V. RAVEENDRAN, J.

       Leave granted.

       The judgment dated 27.7.2006 of the Bombay High Court in W.P.  No.1448 of 2006 is under challenge in this appeal.  

2.      The Directorate of Film Festivals under the Ministry of Information &  Broadcasting organizes National Film Awards (’NFA’ for short) every year,  on behalf of the Government of India. The awards are given to feature films  as also non-feature films. The respondents who are documentary film  makers, intended to enter their Non-Feature Films for the 53rd National film  Awards for the year 2005. Respondents were aggrieved by the following two  eligibility requirements prescribed by the Directorate, for non-feature films,  in clause (e) of Regulation 10 of the 53rd NFA Regulations : (i) that the  films should have been certified by the Central Board of Film Certification  (’Board’ for short); and (ii) that the films should have been released only on a  film (celluloid) format, even if they were shot in digital format. Clause (d) of  Regulation 10 stipulated similar requirements in regard to feature films. The  Respondents, therefore, filed WP No.1448/2006, seeking a declaration that  Regulations 10(d) and (e) of the 53rd National Film Award Regulations  were violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. They also  sought a consequential declaration that films made and released on either  ’film format’ or ’digital format’ are eligible for entry, without any  certification by the Board.   

Reasons for the First Grievance

3.      The Respondents submitted that films are works of art, made in  exercise of the fundamental right of speech and expression. Films are  accepted as entries for awards and for exhibition in International Film  Festivals all over the world, without any kind of censorship so that the select  audience can view the films in their pristine form and appreciate the creative  talent of the film makers as also the theme and content of the films.  Recognizing the said tradition, the Ministry evolved a policy in respect of  non-commercial Film Festivals and exempted all entries from the  requirement of certification by the Board. As the entries for National Film  Awards did not involve any public exhibition, and were viewed only by a  select jury (consisting of persons distinguished in the fields of cinema and  allied arts and humanities), there was no need for certification by the Board  under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (’Act’ for short). If films could be  entered in Film Festivals (where the audience consist of not only Juries, but  also film-makers, film media students, critics, film theorists, film lovers)  without certification from the Board, there is no reason why they should not

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be so entered for NFAs (where the audience consisted of only the Jury).  

4.      It was also submitted that films made by the Film Institutes and films  entered by Doordarshan for NFAs were exempted from the requirement of  certification by the Board.  The logic for exempting  those films applied  equally to other films also. The action of the Directorate in exempting films  produced by Film Institutes and entries made by Doordarshan from  certification while insisting on such certification by the Board in the case of  other films for entry for NFAs amounted to hostile discrimination.     

Reasons for the Second Grievance

5.      According to the respondents, most non-feature films are shot and  released in digital format, a far superior technology when compared to film  format. Non-feature films, being non-commercial, are rarely screened in  cinema theatres. They are mostly screened on television or to select  audiences, which does not require conversion into film format. It is,  therefore, a sheer waste of resources to convert non-feature films shot in  digital format into film format, only for the purpose of entry in National  Film Awards. Conversion from digital to a film (celluloid) format involves  huge expenditure and most of the independent documentary film-makers,  who operate on a tight budget, cannot afford the expense of conversion. It  was submitted that restricting entry to only films released on film format,  would prevent most of the non-feature films from being entered for National  Film Awards.

Decision of the High Court  

6.      When the said writ petition was taken up for hearing by the High  Court, the appellants herein (respondents in the writ petition) submitted that  the Directorate had decided to accept the entry of non-feature films on  digital format. Therefore, the sole issue that required consideration related to  the requirement of a certificate by the Central Board for NFA entries.  

7.      The High Court held that there was no difference between films  entered for awards in Film Festivals and films entered for National Film  Awards; that there was also no difference between films produced by Film  Institutes/Doordarshan and films produced by others, for purposes of entry  for National Film Awards; and that the requirement relating to certification  by Board in respect of film makers other than Film Institutes and  Doordarshan amounted to hostile discrimination. It, therefore, allowed the  writ petition by its judgment dated 27.7.2006 holding that the words "and  certified by the Central Board of Film Certification" in Regulations 10(d)  and (e) were violative of Article 14 and void, and the said two clauses  should be read without those words. The High Court however, reserved  liberty to appellants to impose a condition similar to Regulation 8 of the  Mumbai International Film Festival, 2006 (’MIFF-2006’ for short) which  read as follows :

"Selection of films/videos for Competition will be made by a Committee  whose decision will be final. However, Festival Authorities reserve the  right to accept or not to accept any film, if it is likely to offend the feelings  and sensibilities of any country and/or promote racism or any other reason  Festival Authority consider to be sufficient for acceptance or non- acceptance of a film/video."          

The High Court directed the Appellants to permit film-makers to enter their  films in digital format without any certification from the Central Board of  Film Certification. As the High Court found that the requirement relating to  certification by the Board was violative of Article 14 and therefore, invalid,  it did not examine the issue with reference to Article 19(1)(a).

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Questions for consideration  

8.      Being aggrieved by the said decision of the High Court, the  Directorate of Film Festivals (NFA), Ministry of Information &  Broadcasting, Government of India, have filed this appeal by special leave.  On the rival submissions, the following three questions arise for  consideration:  

(i)     Whether restricting the entry, for National Film Awards,  to only films certified by the Central Board of Film  Certification, is an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental  right of film makers, violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the  Constitution.   

(ii)    Whether the Directorate, having permitted entry of films  in an uncensored format for awards in Non-Commercial Film  Festivals, should do so in respect of National Film Awards also.  

(iii)   Whether exempting films made by Film Institutes and  films entered by Doordarshan from the requirement of  certification by the Board, while requiring certification by the  Board in the case of others, is discriminatory, violating Article  14 of the Constitution.

Legal Provisions  

9.      The relevant provisions of the 53rd National Film Award Regulations,  which regulated the eligibility for entry for awards and the procedure for  selection for Awards, are:

"Aims  

2.      The Awards aim at encouraging the production of films of  aesthetic, and technical excellence and social relevance contributing to the  understanding and appreciation of cultures of different regions of the  country in cinematic form, thereby also promoting integration and unity of  the nation."

Eligibility

"10.(a) Only those persons whose names are on the credit titles of the film  and are normally residing and working in India shall be eligible for the  Awards. The film should have been produced in India. In the case of co- productions involving a foreign entity, the following conditions should be   fulfilled :-

(a)     \005\005\005\005..

(b)     The film should have been certified by the Central Board of  Film Certification between 1st January 2005 and 31st December 2005.

(c)     The Director of the film should be an Indian national.

(d)     Films made in any Indian language, shot on 16 mm, 35 mm or in a  wider gauge or digital format but released on a film format and certified  by the Central Board of Film Certification as a feature film or featurette  are eligible for feature film section. In the case of award for Best  Children’s Film only such films shall be eligible as have been certified by  the Central Board of Film Certification as Children’s films\005\005.  

(e)     Films made in any Indian language, shot on 16 mm, 35 mm or in a  wider gauge or digital format but released on film format and certified by  the Central Board of Film Certification as a  Documentary/Newsreel/Non-Fiction/Short-Fiction are eligible for non- feature film section. \005

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(f)     A film produced by a film institute running diploma/degree  courses run by it which are recognized by the Government of India shall  be eligible even without certification by the Central Board of Film  Certification, provided a specific certificate from the Head of the  organization to the effect that the film has been produced within the  eligibility period, is sent along with the entry form.

(g)     Entries made by Doordarshan for the non feature film section  shall be eligible without certification by Central Board of Film  Certification provided that a specific certificate, from Director General,  Doordarshan to the effect that the non feature film has been produced  within the eligibility period, is sent along with the entry form.  

(h) & (i)  \005\005\005..        

(j)     All entries should be in the version certified by the Central Board  of Film Certification, except films as per provisions of clause (f) and  Clause (g) above."     

Last date for receipt of entry : 13.     Last date for receipt of the application along with the print in the  Directorate of film Festivals shall be the 19th May, 2006.

Procedure for selection :

"19. (a) The Awards shall be decided by two juries, one for feature films  and other for non-feature films, duly constituted by the Directorate with  the approval of the Government of India.

(b)     The Jury for Feature films shall comprise a Chairperson and not  more than 16 members distinguished in the field of cinema, other allied  arts and humanities.

(c)     The Jury for Non Feature Films shall comprise a Chairman and not  more than 6 members distinguished in the field of cinema, other allied arts  and humanities.

       xxxxx

25.     The juries shall have the discretion to recommend that an award in  any particular category may not be given if they are of the opinion that the  entries in that category are not of the required standard."

10.     Certification of films for exhibition and regulation of exhibition by  means of cinematograph is governed by the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (’Act’  for short). Part II of the Act relates to certification of films for public  exhibition. Section 3 provides for constitution of the Board of Film  Certification (earlier known as Board of Film Censors). Sections 4 and 5A  provide for examination and certification of films. They require any person  desiring to exhibit any film, to make an application to the Board for a  certificate. The Board, after examining the film, can sanction the film for  unrestricted public exhibition, or for public exhibition restricted to adults, or  for public exhibition restricted to members of any profession or any class of  persons, having regard to the nature, content and theme of the film. The  Board can also direct the applicant to carry out excisions or modifications or  even to refuse sanction of the film for public exhibition. Section 5B lays  down the principles for guidance in certifying films. Sub-section (1) thereof  provides that a film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the  opinion of the authority competent to grant the certificate, the film or any  part of it is against the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the  security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,  decency or morality, or involves defamation or contempt of Court or is

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likely to incite the commission of any offence. Sub-section (2) authorizes the  Central Government to issue such directions as it may think fit setting out  the principles which shall guide the authority competent to grant certificates  under the Act in sanctioning films for public exhibition subject to the  provisions of sub-section (1). Section 9 relates to power to exempt and is  extracted below :

"The Central Government may, by order in writing exempt, subject  to such conditions and restrictions, if any, as it may impose, the  exhibition of any film or class of films from any of the provisions  of this Part or any rules made thereunder."     

Re : Point (i)

11.     The object of the National Film Awards is to encourage the  production of films of aesthetic and technical excellence and social  relevance contributing to the understanding and appreciation of cultures of  different regions of the country in cinematic form, and thereby, also to  promote nation’s integrity and unity. This object is sought to be achieved by  selecting the best of Indian films made for public exhibition in various  categories and giving them National Awards.  As this is an annual event, the  entries are restricted to films certified by the Central Board of Film  Certification during the previous year. The 53rd National Film Awards were  thus restricted to films certified by the Central Board of Film Certification  between 1.1.2005 and 31.12.2005. The last date for entries for NFA was  19.5.2006. This means that most of the films that were entered, would have  been released for public exhibition before the last date prescribed for entry  (except those which are not released for public exhibition due to non- availability of distributors, exhibitors, theaters or other reasons).  

12.     Under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, a film can be released for public  exhibition only if it has been examined and certified by the Central Board of  Film Certification as being suitable for public exhibition under the  categories ’unrestricted’ or ’restricted to adults’ or ’restricted to members of  any profession or class of persons’. The decision to consider for awards, only  those films which are certified by the Board for public exhibition is a policy  of the Ministry. This policy has two underlying objectives. The first is to  consider only films which have been released or capable of being released  for public exhibition. The second is to consider the films in the form in  which they will be seen by the public.  

13.     The right of a film maker to make and exhibit his film, is a part of his  fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)  (a) of the Constitution. A film is a medium for expressing and  communicating ideas, thoughts, messages, information, feelings and  emotions. It may be intended either for public exhibition (commercial or  non-commercial) or purely for private use. The requirement under sections 4  and 5A of the Act relating to certification by the Board, where the film is  intended for public exhibition, by applying the guidance principles set out in  section 5B,  is a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the said right of  speech and expression contemplated under Article 19(2), and therefore,  constitutional [vide K. A. Abbas vs. Union of India (AIR 1971 SC 481),  S.Rangarajan v. P.Jagjivan Ram (1989 (2) SCC 574), and Life Insurance  Corporation of India vs. Manubhai D. Shah (1992 (3) SCC 637)]. But the  question here is not whether the requirement that films can be released for  public exhibition, only if they possess a certificate issued by the Central  Board of Film Certification, is a reasonable restriction. The question is  whether the Government can impose a condition that the entry of films for  awards will be restricted to only those which possess a certificate issued by  the Board under section 5A of the Act. Whether the government should  encourage the production of films with aesthetic and technical excellence  and social relevance, whether such encouragement should be by giving  awards periodically or annually, and if it decides to give such awards,  whether the field of competition should be restricted only to films which

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have been certified by the Board, are all matters of policy of the  Government.

14.     The scope of judicial review of governmental policy is now well  defined. Courts do not and cannot act as Appellate Authorities examining  the correctness, suitability and appropriateness of a policy. Nor are courts  Advisors to the executive on matters of policy which the executive is  entitled to formulate. The scope of judicial review when examining a policy  of the government is to check whether it violates the fundamental rights of  the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution, or opposed to  any statutory provision or manifestly arbitrary. Courts cannot interfere with  policy either on the ground that it is erroneous or on the ground that a better,  fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the  wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review [vide :   Asif Hameed v. State of J&K - 1989 Supp (2) SCC 364; Shri Sitaram Sugar  Co. Ltd., v. Union of India - 1990 (3) SCC 223; Khoday Distilleries v. State  of Karnataka - 1996 (10) SCC 304, Balco Employees Union v. Union of  India - 2002 (2) SCC 333), State of Orissa vs. Gopinath Dash - 2005 (13)  SCC 495 and Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh vs. State of Andhra Pradesh -  2006 (4) SCC 162].  

15.     The Government’s policy for National Film Awards is to restrict entry  to only those films which have been certified by the Board for exhibition,  that is films intended for public exhibition. The government is not interested  in evaluating or giving an award to a film which may never be seen by the  public, or at all events never be seen in an ’uncensored’ form. Its object is to  select the best from among those which the public can see and enjoy or gain  knowledge. The said policy neither relates to nor interferes with the right of  a film maker either to make films, or to apply for certificate or to exhibit the  films. There is nothing illogical, unreasonable or arbitrary about a policy to  select only the best from among films certified for public exhibition. We  cannot, in judicial review, change that policy by requiring the Government  to select the best from among ’films made’ instead of ’films made and  certified for public exhibition’. We, therefore, hold that the requirement that  films  should have been certified by the Central Board of Film Certification  between 1.1.2005 and 31.12.2005 for entry for the 53rd National Film  Awards is not an unreasonable restriction of any fundamental right of the  respondents or other film makers.  

Re : Point (ii)

16.     We will next consider whether requirement relating to certificate from  the Board in regard to entry for National Film Awards is discriminatory, as  the Ministry has permitted films to be entered in Film Festivals (non- commercial), without any certification. The Respondents referred to the  Regulations governing the 9th Mumbai International Film Festival (for  Documentary, short and animation films), popularly known as MIFF 2006.  The said regulations provide that  films shot and produced in India by an  Indian national between 1.9.2003 and 31.8.2005 are eligible for entry in  ’national competition’. Regulation 15 provides that censorship will not be  applicable to any films entered in the festival. Thus, the policy of the  Government is to give exemption from certification by the Board for  entering films (both Indian and foreign) in Film Festivals which are non- commercial in nature and where viewership is confined to delegates and  select audiences (subject to the condition that the Ministry will have the  power to reject any film which in its opinion would impinge on the security  and integrity of the country or affect law and order or affect relations with  other countries). The respondents contend that when films can be entered in  the national competition section of Film Festivals without the requirement of  certification by the Board, requiring certification by the Board as a condition  for entry for National Film Awards is ex facie discriminatory and arbitrary.  It is submitted that a provision for rejection of any film, similar to  Regulation 8 (extracted at Para 7 above) would be sufficient safeguard even  for National Film Awards and there is no need for requiring a certificate  from the Board. It is also pointed out that the Jury for National Film Awards

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consists of distinguished persons from the field of cinema and other allied  areas and humanities, selected by the Directorate with the approval of the  Government of India, and such a body of Jurists can be expected to act  responsibly and weed out films which may offend the feelings and  sensibility of any country or which promote racism, or otherwise  unacceptable/objectionable.  

17.     The Government can no doubt make a policy permitting entry to all  films including those which have not obtained certificates from the Board,  for National Film Awards. But that is a matter to be decided by the  Government. The question is not whether films should be permitted to be  entered for National Film Awards, in an uncensored form. The question is  whether the Government’s policy restricting entry to only films certified by  the Board is so unreasonable or manifestly arbitrary as to warrant  interference in Judicial review. Nothing prevents the Government from  having different policies for National Film Awards and for Film Festivals.  

18.     The High Court wrongly proceeded on the assumption that the objects  of the Film Festivals and National Film Awards are the same and therefore  when permission was granted for entering films in Film Festivals without  certification by the Board, a similar treatment should be extended to entries  for the National Film Awards. The object of Film Festivals and the object of  National Film Awards are different. Film Festivals are held, to provide a  platform for film makers from all over the world to meet, exchange ideas,  explore the possibility of co-production, market films and to broaden the  vision of film makers. On the other hand, the object of National Film  Awards is to encourage the production of films of aesthetic and technical  excellence and social relevance, which will contribute to the understanding  and appreciation of  cultures of different regions of the country and promote  national integration and unity. When the purpose and object of Film  Festivals and National Film Awards are completely different, the conditions  that are made applicable, or the exemptions that are granted, in respect of  Film Festivals, cannot automatically be applied to National Film Awards.  The two being unequal and dissimilar, the question of applying the same  standards or norms does not arise. Nor can application of different norms to  Film Festivals and National Film Awards, lead to a complaint of  discrimination. Applying different yardsticks to different events, to achieve  different objects cannot be considered as discriminatory.  

Re : Point (iii)  

19.     The next question is whether exemption in respect of films made by  Film Institutes and films entered by Doordarshan entitles others also to claim  a blanket exemption in respect of all films to be entered in National Film  Awards.

20.     When a grievance of discrimination is made, the High Court cannot  just examine whether someone similarly situated has been granted a relief or  benefit and then automatically direct grant of such relief or benefit to the  person aggrieved. The High Court has to first examine whether the petitioner  who has approached the court has established a right, entitling him to the  relief sought on the facts and circumstances of the case. In the context of  such examination, the fact that some others, who are similarly situated, have  been granted relief which the petitioner is seeking, may be of some  relevance. But where in law, a writ petitioner has not established a right or is  not entitled to relief, the fact that a similarly situated person has been  illegally granted relief, is not a ground to direct similar relief to him. That  would be enforcing a negative equality by perpetuation of an illegality which  is impermissible in law. The principle has been stated by this Court in  Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh [1995 (1) SCC 745] thus  :

"Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has  passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated  can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the  plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be

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legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it  can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in  favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted  in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or  unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling  the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another  unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High  Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the  respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not  entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over  again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can  be done according to law - indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court  should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in  accordance with law - but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to  see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the  respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the  earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a  legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would  be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to  public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course,  if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful  and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the  petitioner if it is found that the petitioners’ case is similar to the other  persons’ case. But then why examine another person’s case in his absence  rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the  Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to  examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief  asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the  correctness of the order made or action taken in another person’s case,  which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered  opinion, such a course - barring exceptional situations - would neither be  advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the  law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say  that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a similar  action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact  whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case  must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with  relevant legal principles."

In Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee [1996 (2) SCC  459], this Court observed :

"There appears to be some confusion in respect of the scope of Article 14  of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens.  This guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and it cannot be  enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. To put it in other  words, if an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any  individual or a group of individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction  of the High Court or of this Court, that the same irregularity or illegality  be committed by the State \005.. so far such petitioners are concerned, on  the reasoning that they have been denied the benefits which have been  extended to others although in an irregular or illegal manner. Such  petitioners can question the validity of orders which are said to have been  passed in favour of persons who were not entitled to the same, but they  cannot claim orders which are not sanctioned by law in their favour on  principle of equality before law. Neither Article 14 of the Constitution  conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226  empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If  such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and  perpetuated an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar  benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it  must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal,  has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in the  process there has been a discrimination."

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21.     In this case, we have already found that the NFA policy restricting the  entry to only films certified by the Board is valid and does not violate  Article 19(1)(a). It therefore follows that a film maker does not have any  right to claim that he is entitled to enter his films without certification by the  Board. When a film maker complains of discrimination on the ground that  films made by Film Institutes and films entered by Doordarshan have been  exempted from the requirement of certification, and claims similar  exemption, the question that requires examination is whether the exemption  that has been granted to Film Institutes and Doordarshan is legal. If it is  illegal, he cannot claim a similar illegal exemption in his favour.  

22.     The appellants point out that only films produced by the Film  Institutes running diploma/degree courses which are recognized by the  Government of India and certified by the Head of such film institutes, as  having been produced within the specified period, are exempted from  certification by the Board. The appellants contend that when a film is made  by a Film Institute running diploma/degree courses recognized by  Government, the persons in charge of the Film Institute would ensure due  compliance with the principles and guidelines relating to certification of  films under section 5B of the Act. Regulation 10(f) does not even require the  Head of the film institute to certify that the film has been made by him or  under his supervision or that the film complies with the principles and  guidelines relating to certification under section 5B of the Act. Regulation  10(f) requires the Head of the Institute to only certify that the film has been  produced within the eligibility period. There is no basis for the assumption  that merely because a diploma or degree course of a film institute is  recognized by the Government of India, any film made by such film institute  would have complied with the principles for certification of films contained  in section 5B of the Act.

23.     Insofar as films entered by Doordarshan, the appellants rely on a  notification dated 16.10.1984 issued by the Government of India in exercise  of power of exemption under section 9 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952,    exempting all Doordarshan programmes from the the provisions of the Act  relating to certification of films, subject to the condition that while clearing  programmes for telecast the Director General Doordarshan or the concerned  Director, Doordarshan Kendra shall keep in view that the film certification  guidelines issued by the Central Government to the Board of Film  Certification under section 5B(2) of the said Act. What the said notification  exempts are programmes telecast by Doordarshan (in respect of which the  Director General, Doordarshan or the Director of the concerned  Doordarshan Kendra are required to keep in view the principles and  guidelines relating to film certification issued by the Central Government  under section 5B). But we are not concerned with telecasting by  Doordarshan. We are concerned with entry for National Film Awards  certified by the Board between 1.1.2005 to 31.12.2005. The Notification  dated 16.10.1984 does not grant any exemption in respect of entries made by  Doordarshan for Film Awards. Therefore, the notification dated 16.10.1984  is not relevant. It is not necessary to examine the further question whether  the Central Government can invest in the Director General and the Directors  of Doordarshan Kendras the power and authority of the Central Board for  Film Certification and thereby create virtually a parallel body.  

24.     If the notification dated 16.10.1984 is excluded, there are no special  circumstances for exempting the films entered by Doordarshan. The  exemption given under Regulation 10(g) is not for films made by  Doordarshan, but films entered by Doordarshan. This means that any film  made by any independent film maker when entered by Doordarshan  becomes eligible without certification by the Board. It is also to be noted  that Regulation 10(g) requires a certificate from the Director General,  Doordarshan that the non-feature film has been produced within the  eligibility period, but does not require a certificate from the Director General

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that the film entered has been viewed by him and it complies with the  principles/guidelines relating to certification under section 5B. In the  circumstances, we do not find any basis for a classification treating entries  by Doordarshan as a special class requiring exemption.  

25.     There are innumerable Film Institutes and several Doordarshan  Kendras. The exemptions in favour of films made by Film Institutes and  films entered by Doordarshan will amount to recognizing the Heads of such  Institutes or institutions as equal to Central Board for Film Certification and  entrusting the Heads of such institutions with the power of Central Board for  film certification. Appellants have not placed any material justifying   reposing of such confidence in persons other than the Central Board for Film  Certification. Nor can such parallel authorities be recognized, having regard  to the provisions of the Cinematograph Act. Further exemption under  Regulations 10(f) and (g) cannot be equated to exemption under section 9 of  the Act. We are, therefore, of the view that exemptions in favour of Film  Institutes and entries made by Doordarshan were illegal and other film  makers cannot claim similar exemption.  

CONCLUSION

26.     A film-maker can challenge an illegal exemption in favour of Film  Institutes and Doordarshan under clauses (f) and (g) of Regulation 10, but  cannot claim a similar exemption by placing reliance on such illegality.  Therefore the challenge to the words "and certified by the Central Board of  Film Certification" in Regulation 10(d) and (e) has no merit. The  respondents have not challenged the validity of Regulation 10(f) and (g)  granting exemption to films made by Film Institutes or films entered by  Doordarshan. Therefore, no relief can be granted to respondents in that  behalf.  

27.     In view of the foregoing, we allow the appeal in part and set aside the  Judgment of the High Court except the direction to permit entry of non- feature films in digital format.