15 July 2005
Supreme Court
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DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION Vs VED PRAKASH JOSHI .

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT,S.H. KAPADIA
Case number: C.A. No.-003713-003713 / 2005
Diary number: 6936 / 2004
Advocates: JATINDER KUMAR BHATIA Vs E. C. VIDYA SAGAR


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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3713 of 2005

PETITIONER: Director of Education, Uttaranchal & Ors

RESPONDENT: Ved Prakash Joshi & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/07/2005

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

       Leave granted.

       Order passed by learned Single Judge of the Allahabad  High Court giving certain directions while dealing with  application filed under Sections 14 and 15 of the Contempt  of Courts Act, 1971 (in short the ’Act’) read with Article  215 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the  ’Constitution’) is challenged in this appeal. The foundation  of such application was alleged non-compliance of the  directions given by the learned Single Judge of the High  Court in Writ Petition no.129/84 by order dated 16th  September, 1997.  By the impugned order learned Single Judge  has given certain directions while disposing of the Contempt  Petition.   

       According to the learned counsel for the appellants  such directions could not have been given while dealing with  application for contempt.  Such exercise of power is not  authorized in law.  During the hearing of the application by  the High Court the respondent no.1 (applicant before the  High Court) had contended that in view of the judgment  passed by the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition the  applicant was entitled to arrears of salary etc. The  appellant and the functionaries of the State who were  impleaded as respondents in the contempt proceedings took  the stand that there was no positive direction for giving  arrears of salary and, therefore, non-payment would not  constitute wilful violation to attract action in terms of  Section 12 of the Act.   

The High Court was of the view that no positive  directions could have been issued for arrears of salary.   The Competent Committee was yet to consider the question of  regularization under the U.P. Regularization of Adhoc  Appointments (on posts outside purview of U.P. Public  Service Commission) Rules, 1979 (in short the ’Rules’).   Reference was made also to certain decisions to hold that  once the order of termination is set aside, it is to be  deemed that incumbent had continued in service and would be  entitled to salary and allowances as if there was no break  in service.  It was also held that when an authority acts in

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disregard to a settled position in law, the commission or  omission would amount to contempt even if such an act may  not amount to wilful disobedience. The contempt court can  act like an executing Court and can issue further directions  to compel the authority for taking action which is in  consonance with settled law.  It was accordingly held that  respondent no.1-the applicant was entitled to arrears of  salary from the date of his termination upto the date of  reinstatement in service.  The contempt petition was  accordingly disposed of.

       In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the  appellant submitted that it is not in dispute that no  specific direction was given regarding arrears.  In fact, by  office order no.NI(Lecturer)Yojana/1693-1/83/98-99 dated  10.8.1998, it was clearly stipulated that the respondent  no.1 shall not be paid salary for the distributed period but  shall be entitled for the benefit of increments earned  earlier as usual.  

       Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 submitted that  the High Court had rightly taken note of the fact that as  order of termination was set aside, and the natural  consequence is payment of back wages.  Merely because the  earlier order of the High Court did not specifically deal  with this aspect, that cannot be a ground to deny the  benefits to him.                  

While dealing with an application for contempt, the  Court is really concerned with the question whether the  earlier decision which has received its finality had been  complied with or not.  It would not be permissible for a  Court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision  which had not been assailed and to take the view different  than what was taken in the earlier decision.  A similar view  was taken in K.G. Derasari and Anr. V. Union of India and  Ors. (2001 (10) SCC 496). The Court exercising contempt  jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of  contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have  committed default in complying with the directions in the  judgment or order. If there was no ambiguity or  indefiniteness in the order, it is for the concerned party  to approach the higher Court if according to him the same is  not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be  agitated before the higher Court. The Court exercising  contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to  decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with  by the Court passing the judgment or order.  Right or wrong  the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the Court  would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing  with an application for contempt the Court cannot traverse  beyond the order, non-compliance of which is alleged. In  other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or  what should have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the  order. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order  or give additional direction or delete any direction. That  would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with  an application for initiation of contempt proceedings.  The  same would be impermissible and indefensible.  In that view  of the matter, the order of the High Court is set aside.

       If the appellant has any grievance so far as the order  dated 10.8.1998 is concerned denying him the arrears of

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salary, he may, if so advised, approach the appropriate  forum for such remedy as is available in law.  

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no  order as to costs.