REPORTABLE             

   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.              OF 2010   (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11363 of 2008)

Dharmarth Trust J&K Jammu & Ors.       .... Appellant(s)

Versus

Dinesh Chander Nanda                               .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  judgment  and  

order  dated  18.10.2007  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  

Jammu & Kashmir at Jammu in Civil Revision No. 177 of  

2005 whereby the High Court dismissed the revision filed  

by the Dharmarth Trust  (hereinafter  referred to  as “the  

Trust”)-appellants herein.  

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3) Brief facts:

(a)  The Respondent, a qualified, registered and licensed  

Architect, is engaged in his professional business in the  

name  of  M/s  Nanda  Designers  Consortium  having  its  

office at 60 Purani Mandi,  Jammu.  On 19.10.1992, he  

was  engaged by  the  Trust  for  the  purpose  of  providing  

professional  consultancy  services  as  an  architect  for  

various projects at different sites in Jammu.  As per the  

terms of the said contract, a fee of 2.5% of the total project  

cost was fixed for providing such services.

(b)  On  14.12.1993,  the  appellants-Trust  telephonically  

communicated  the  respondent  not  to  work  further  for  

their projects and terminated his services as an Architect.  

A formal communication was also served on 16.01.1994  

regarding the termination of his services.  

(c)  On 16.10.1996, the Respondent served a legal notice  

to  the  Trust  claiming  compensation  amounting  to  

Rs. 38,77,263.75 towards professional charges including  

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interest  thereon  for  various projects.   After  not  getting  

any reply  from the Trust,  after  a  gap of  four  years,  on  

29.01.1998,  a  suit  was  filed  by  the  Respondent  in  the  

Court  of  the  Ist  Additional  District  Judge,  Jammu,  

claiming  an  amount  of  Rs,  43,30,797/-.   During  the  

pendency of the suit, on 08.02.1999, the Respondent filed  

an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil  

Procedure for amendment in the Plaint.  On 22.09.1999,  

the Trust filed their reply objecting to the maintainability  

of  the  application.  By order  dated 08.10.1999,  the  trial  

Court allowed the application.  Challenging the said order,  

the Trust filed Civil Revision No. 162 of 1999 before the  

High Court praying that the trial Court had committed an  

error  in  law  by  allowing  the  amendment  in  the  plaint  

without  addressing  the  legal  issue  regarding  its  

maintainability.   The  High  Court,  vide  order  dated  

19.07.2001, disposed of the civil revision petition filed by  

the Trust and remanded the matter back to the trial Court  

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to  address  the  legal  issue  regarding  

maintainability/limitation.  Thereafter, on 27.09.2005, Ist  

Additional District Judge framed the issue and passed an  

order holding that the case is governed by Article 119 and  

not by Article 56 of the Jammu & Kashmir Limitation Act,  

1995  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  Act”)  and  

consequently, allowed the amendment to the Plaint.

d) Challenging  the  said  order,  the  Trust  filed  Civil  

Revision  No.  177  of  2005  before  the  High  Court.  Vide  

order  dated  18.10.2007,  the  High  Court  dismissed  the  

revision and upheld the order dated 27.09.2005, passed  

by the Ist Additional District Judge.  Aggrieved by the said  

order,  the Trust has filed this appeal  by way of  special  

leave before this Court.

4)   Heard  Mr.  Ashok  Mathur,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellants  and  Mr.  V.  Giri,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

respondent.

5)   The  short  question  that  arises  for  consideration  in  this  

appeal is whether the suit filed by the respondent-Architect is  

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covered under Article 56 of the Act or whether the said suit is  

covered under Article 119 of the Act.

6)  The Trial Court and the High Court have held that the suit  

is  covered  by  Article  119  of  the  Act.   According  to  the  

appellants,  the  suit  filed  by  the  respondent-Architect  is  

governed  by  Article  56  of  the  said  Act  and  the  same  was  

barred  by  limitation  on the  date  of  its  institution.   On the  

other hand, the submission of the respondent is that the same  

was covered by the residuary Article 119 which provides for a  

period of 6 years on the ground that the nature of services  

provided was professional services and the remuneration for  

the  same being  termed as  ‘fee’  and the  same does  not  fall  

within the expression ‘price’ for ‘work done’.

7)  Article 56 and Article 119 of the Schedule to the Jammu  

and Kashmir Limitation Act, 1995 provides as follows:-

Article  56

For  the  price  of  work  done  by  the  Plaintiff  for  the  Defendant  at  his  request, where no time has been fixed  for payment.

Three  Years

When the  work is done.

Article  119

Suit for which no period of limitation  provided elsewhere in the Scheduel.

Six  Years

When the  right to sue  accrues.

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8)   The  term  ‘price’,  as  appearing  in  Article  56,  is  to  be  

understood in common parlance/ordinary or normal sense.  It  

takes it colour from the meaning attached to the term ‘price’ in  

the Articles immediately preceding ‘Articles 52 to 55’.  ‘Price’  

does not cover the services provided by the professionals such  

as  Architect,  Lawyer,  Doctor  etc.,  as  professionals  charge  a  

‘fee’.   Also,  the  term  ‘work  done’  in  Article  56  will  not  be  

applicable to professionals such as Architect, Lawyer, Doctor  

etc. as these professionals render services to their clients.  The  

remuneration of  a  professional  is  in the form of  a ‘fee’  and  

therefore,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  professional  earns  a  

‘price’.  In common usage, the term ‘price’ refers to goods sold.  

For illustration, the term ‘price’ is defined in Section 2 (10) of  

the  Sale  of  Goods  Act,  1930  as  “price”  means  the  money  

consideration for a sale of goods.   

9)   The  word  ‘price’  according  to  Websters  Encyclopedic  

Unabridged Dictionary means:

“Price- 1. the sum or amount of money or its equivalent for  which anything is bought, sold, or offered for sale  2. a sum  offered  for  the  capture  of  a  person  alive  of  dead:  The  authorities put a price on his head. 3. the sum of money, or  other consideration, for which a person’s support, consent,  etc.,  may  be  obtained,  esp.  in  cases  involving  sacrifice  of  

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integrity: They claimed that every man has his price.  4. that  which must be given, done, or undergone in order to obtain  a thing: He gained the victory, but at a heavy price.  5. Odds  (def.2).  6. Archaic,  value or worth: The price of  an honest  man is  beyond measure.  7.  Archaic,  great  value  or  worth  (usually prec by of): Among the inventory were many articles  of price. 8. at any price, at any cost, no matter how great:  There were no bananas to be had at any price. He would  have his own way at any price. 9. beyond or without price, of  incalculable value;  priceless:  The crown jewels are beyond  price.-v.t. 10. to fix the price of.  11. to ask or determine the  price of: We spent the day pricing furniture at various stores.  

“Chambers  Twentieth  Century  Dictionary defines  

“price” to mean:

“The amount, usually in money, for which a thing is sold or  offered; that which one for goes or suffers for the sake of or  in gaining something: money offered for capture or killing of  anybody;  that  for  which one can be bribed;  betting  odds;  value.”

According to P. Ramanatha Iyer, Law Lexicon (2nd Edn.  

1997),  

“the term ‘price’ is the value which a seller places upon his  goods for sale.  It is not a fixed or unchangeable thing.  It  may  be  one  thing  today  and  another  tomorrow  and  one  valuation to one customer and a different one to another on  the same day or hour.  Whether a seller asks any one to give  is the price until he changes it for another.  The price asked  is changed to another price, the former price is no longer an  existing fact. “

The Law Lexicon also defines the term ‘price’ as  

“the  sum or  amount  of  money  or  its  equivalent,  which a  seller asks or obtains for goods in market—the exchangeable  value  of  a  commodity—and  hence,  as  used  in  a  contract  providing for the sale of articles at a fixed price, and that if  

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the  price  falls  below  such  fixed  price,  a  rebate  will  be  given…”

“The term ‘price’ is sometimes also used for “work done” in  the context of work done by masons such as land filling etc.  or  engineering  contracts.   In  view of  the  above,  the  term  ‘price’ is in common usage used in correlation to either goods  bought or sold or work done.”

There is further indication of this word in the Act itself.  The  

setting of Article 56 i.e. immediately after Articles 52 to 55 is  

important.  Articles 52 to 55 uses the expression ‘price’.  These  

are reproduced hereinbelow:-

Article  52

For the price of goods delivered where  no  fixed  period  of  credit  is  agreed  upon.

Three  years

The date of the  delivery  of  goods.

Article  53

For  the  price  of  goods  sold  and  delivered to be paid for after the expiry  of fixed period of credit.  

Three  years

When  the  period  of  credit  expires.

Article  54

For  the  price  of  goods  sold  and  delivered  to  be  paid  for  by  a  bill  of  exchange, no such bill being given.

Three  years

When  the  period  of  the  proposed  bill  elapses.

Article  55

For the price of trees or growing crops  sold  by the  plaintiff  to  the  defendant  where  no  fixed  period  of  credit  is  agreed upon.

Three  years

The date of the  sale  

The  term  ‘price’  has  been  used  in  Articles  52  to  55  in  

correlation to goods delivered, goods sold and delivered and  

trees or growing crops sold.  In this way, ‘price’ would take a  

similar meaning when used in Article 56.   

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10)  The intention of the Legislature can also be ascertained by  

referring to Article 114 of the Act where the Legislature has  

specifically provided for the period of Limitation for suits filed  

by an attorney/vakil. Article 114 is as follows:-

Article  114

By an attorney or vakil for  his  costs  of  a  suit  or  a  particular  business,  there  being  no  express  agreement  as  to  the  time  when such costs are to be  paid.

Six  Years

The date of the termination  of  the  suit  or  business,  or  (where the attorney or vakil  properly  discontinues  the  suit or business) the date of  such discontinuance.

11)  As rightly pointed out by Mr. Giri, learned senior counsel  

for  the  respondent  that  the  specific  treatment  of  

attorneys/vakils  who  provide  professional  services  is  a  

reflection  of  the  intention  of  the  Legislature  to  treat  the  

services provided by professionals differently from work done  

by others.   The word ‘price’  was never intended to be used  

synonymously  with  the  word  ‘fee’  and,  therefore,  the  fee  

charged by an Architect for services rendered by him would  

not be covered under Article 56 of the Act.  In the case on  

hand, the Trial Court as well as the High Court have made a  

clear distinction between the terms ‘work done’ and ‘services’.  

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The ‘work done’  would refer work done by masons such as  

land filling or engineering projects etc.   

12)   It  is  useful  to  refer  to  the  tax  treatment  of  Architects  

under the Service Tax Law.  Chapter V of  the Finance Act,  

1994, which contains the law relating to Service tax in India  

defines an “architect” in Section 65(6) as:-

“any person whose name is, for the time being, entered in  the register of architects maintained under section 23 of the  Architect Act, 1972 and also includes any person engaged in  any  manner,  whether  directly  or  indirectly,  in  rendering  services in the field of architecture.”

It  is brought to our notice that the services provided by an  

architect are taxable under the Service Tax law.  Under the  

Service  Tax  Laws,  the  architects  are  considered  as  persons  

providing a service and are liable to pay service tax.  The term  

‘work done’ has not been defined anywhere.    We have already  

pointed out the dictionary meaning to the definition of ‘work‘.  

The Law Lexicon defines ‘work’ as:-

“the word “work” has a very wide meaning.  It is really used  in  two  senses  of  bestowing  labour  and  that  upon  which  labour has been bestowed.  When used in plural the word  certainly  means some outstanding or important result of the  labour  that  has  been  bestowed  and  large  industrial  and  scientific establishment are called works”

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We have already referred to Articles 52 to 55 which are placed  

above  Article  56.   It  is  clear  that  the  term ‘work  done’  as  

appearing in Article 56 does not apply to the respondent, who  

is an architect providing services for a fee.   

13)   It  is  also  pointed  out  that  Article  56  of  the  Act  is  a  

verbatim  of  Article  18  of  the  Indian  Limitation  Act,  1963.  

Article 18, in turn is the same as Article 56 of the old Indian  

Limitation Act, 1908.   

14)  The High Court of Allahabad in  Kaviraj Baroda Kant  

Sen  vs.  Court of Wards in Charge of Baraon Estate, AIR  

1931 All. 752, as early as in 1931, while interpreting Article 56  

of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 has stated as follows:

“…..it is difficult to apply Article 56 which relates to a suit  for the price of work done by the Plaintiff for the Defendant  at his request.  No special article appears to be applicable to  a claim by a medical practitioner for recovery of his fees for  attendance on a patient.  The residuary Article 115 which  applies to all breaches of contract, would therefore apply, for  there was undoubtedly a contract, at east, an implied one, to  pay the fee, and the non-payment of that fee amounted to a  breach  for  which  the  plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to  compensation.   In  Harish  Chander  Surmah  vs  Brojonath  Chackerbutty  [1870]  13  W.R.  96  a  suit  for  recovery  of  compensation for the fees of a medical practitioner was held  to lie under the corresponding article of the Limitation Act  then in force”

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15)  The High Court of Gauhati in Kakodonga Tea Estate vs.  

J.N. Saikia, AIR 1973 Gau. 27, has also held that “a suit to  

recover unpaid professional  fees by a Chartered Accountant  

falls  under  Article  113  and  not  under  Article  18  or  Article  

55…”. The High Court of Gauhati further specifically held as  

follows:

“8. It is easy to assume that very deep thought must have  been  devoted  by  the  Legislature  in  giving  shape  to  the  various Articles of the old as well as the new Limitation Act.  It  is  equally  legitimate  to  assume that  the  words  of  each  Article  must  have  been  used  in  their  commonly  accepted  connotation  unless  contrary  intention  is  expressed  in  the  body of the Act just as is apparent from Section 2 wherein  certain  expressions have been defined to  mean something  less  or  more  than what  their  commonly  known attributes  are.   The  expression  “price”  used  in  Article  18  must,  therefore, be taken to convey the commonly accepted sense  implicit in it.  According to the Chambers Twentieth Century  dictionary the word “price” means: the amount, usually in  money, for which a thing is sold or offered; that which one  forgoes or suffers for the sake of or in gaining something:  money  offered  for  capture  or  killing  of  anybody:  that  for  which one can be bribed; betting odds; values.  In common  parlance what a client pays to a professional person like an  Advocate  and  a  CA is  described  as  “fee”  and  not  “price”.  Likewise,  what  a  patient  pays  to  a  medical-man  for  the  services rendered to him by the latter is called “fee” and not  “price”.   Therefore,  it  would  be  unduly  straining  the  expression  “price”  used  in  Article  18  if  it  were  held  synonymous in connotation with the fee paid to an Advocate,  a Medical-man or a CA.  For this reason alone, I  believe,  Article 18 does not provide for a suit for the professional fee  of the nature just stated…..”

16)  We agree with the ratio laid down by the Allahabad and  

Gauhati  High  Court  relating  to  Article  56  of  the  Indian  

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Limitation Act, 1908 that the term “price of work done” cannot  

be  made  applicable  to  professions  where  the  professionals  

merely provides services for a “fee”.   We accept the claim of  

the respondent that the profession of an Architect is one such  

service, hence Article 56 is not applicable to the present case.  

Both the Trial  Court  as well  as the High Court  has arrived  

correct conclusion.

17)  In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any  

error  in  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  the  Trial  Court  and  

affirmed by the High Court.   Consequently,  the appeal  fails  

and the same is dismissed with no orders as to costs.   We  

further make it  clear that our conclusion is confined to the  

interpretation relating to limitation and we have not expressed  

anything on the merits of the claim made by the parties.   

.….…….………………..………J.                                                   ( P. SATHASIVAM )

...…………………………………J.  NEW DELHI;                  (ANIL R. DAVE)  SEPTEMBER 8, 2010.                 

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