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PETITIONER: DHANNALAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: D.P. VIJAYVARGIYA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       07/05/1996

BENCH: SINGH N.P. (J) BENCH: SINGH N.P. (J) FAIZAN UDDIN (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (4) 652        JT 1996 (5)   601  1996 SCALE  (4)458

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T N.P. SINGH. J      Leave granted.      The appellant  while going  on read on 4.12.1990 became victim of  an accident,  because of  the rash  and negligent driving of  the  scooter  by  respondent  No.1  (hereinafter referred to  as the  ’respondent’). The  appellant  suffered serious injuries  and was  admitted in  Badwah Hospital, the same day.  On 7.12.1990  he was  shifted to  M.Y.  Hospital, Indore and  was treated as an indoor patient till 27.9.1991. Because of  the accident  the appellant  became  permanently disabled, as  his left  leg above  thigh and  hip  had  been fractured. He  also lost his services as a Driver. The claim petition for  compensation was  filed before  the Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Badwah (hereinafter referred to as the ’Tribunal’) on 7.12.1991 along with an application for condonation  of delay  which was  of four days only. The Tribunal by its order dated 18.11.1993 condoned the delay in filing the  claim petition.  The validity  of the said order was challenged  by the  respondent before  the High Court of Madhya Pradesh  at Jabalpur.  The High  Court by  its  order dated  31.7.1995   set  aside  the  order  of  the  Tribunal aforesaid condoning  the delay  saying that  in view of sub- section (3)  of Section  166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ’Act’’)  the  power  of condonation by the Tribunal has been withdrawn and any claim must be filed within the period prescribed therein. The High Court further  observed that by prescribing the fixed period for filing  the petition  for claim,  the intention was that the ’sword of liability of paying compensation in respect of accident caused  by motor vehicle should not be permitted to hover on  the head of the person owning the said vehicle and person driving  such vehicle.’  It was also pointed out that the position  was different  under the  Motor Vehicles  Act, 1939 in  which sub-section  (3) of  Section  110-A  although

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prescribed a  period of six months for filing an application for compensation  from the  date of the accident, but vested power in  Tribunal to  entertain such application even after the expiry of the said period of six months, if the Tribunal was satisfied  that the claimant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.      Sub-section (3)  of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provided:           "  No   application  for  such      compensation shall  be  entertained      unless it is made within six months      of the occurrence of the accident:           Provided   that   the   Claims      Tribunal    may    entertain    the      application after the expiry of the      said period  of six months if it is      satisfied that  the  applicant  was      prevented by  sufficient cause from      making the application in time."      The Act  which repealed  the earlier Motor Vehicles Act of  1939   came  in  force  w.e.f.  1.7.1989.  The  new  Act prescribed a  period of  limitation  for  filing  the  claim petition in  sub-section (3) of Section 166. Said subsection provided:           "No   application   for   such      compensation shall  be  entertained      unless it is made within six months      of the occurrence of the accident.           Provided   that   the   Claims      Tribunal    may    entertain    the      application after the expiry of the      said period  of six  months but not      later than  twelve months, if it is      satisfied that  the  applicant  was      prevented by  sufficient cause from      making the application in time."      According to  the High Court, as proviso to sub-section (3) of  Section 166 of the Act said that Claims Tribunal may entertain the  application after  the  expiry  of  the  said period of six months ’but not later than twelve months’, any application filed  beyond the  period of  twelve months from the date  of  the  accident  cannot  he  entertained  as  no discretion had  been left  with the Tribunal to consider the circumstances because  of which  the application  for  claim could not be filed within the period of twelve months of the occurrence of the accident.      Before the  scope of  sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act  is  examined,  it  may  be  pointed  out  that  the aforesaid sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act has been omitted by Section 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 which  came in  force w.e.f.  14.11.1994. The effect of the Amending  Act is  that w.e.f.  14.11.1994  there  is  no limitation for  filing claims before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. It can be said that Parliament realized the grave injustice  and injury  which was  being caused  to the heirs and  legal representatives  of the victims who died in accidents by  rejecting their claim petitions only on ground of limitation.  It is  a matter  of  common  knowledge  that majority of the claimants for such compensation are ignorant about  the   period  during  which  such  claims  should  be preferred. After the death due to the accident, of the bread earner of  the family,  in many  cases  such  claimants  are virtually on  the streets.  Even in  cases where the victims escapes death  some of  such victims  are  hospitalized  for months if  not for  years. In  the present.  case itself the

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applicant claims  that he met with the accident on 4.12.1990 and  he   was  being  treated  as  an  indoor  patient  till 27.9.1991. According  to us,  in its  wisdom the Parliament, rightly thought  that prescribing a period of limitation and restricting the  power of  Tribunal to  entertain any  claim petition beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident  was harsh,  inequitable and  in many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants. The present case is a  glaring example  where the appellant has been deprived by  the   order  of   the  High   Court  from  claiming  the compensation  because   of  delay   of  only  four  days  in preferring the claim petition.      In this  background, now  it has  to be  examined as to what is the effect of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of  the Act.  From the  Amending Act  it does not appear that   the   said   sub-section   (3)   has   been   deleted retrospectively. But  at the  same the Amending  Act to  show that benefit of  deletion of sub- section (3)  of Section 166 is not to be extended to pending claim petitions  where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect  of deletion  of sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the  Act can  be tested  by an  illustration. Suppose  an accident had  taken place  two years  before 14.11.1994 when sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason or the  other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the  heirs of  the victim  till 14.11.1994.  Can a  claim petition be  not filed  after 14.11.1994  in respect of such accident? Whether  a claim  petition filed  after 14.11.1994 can be  rejected by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that  the period  of twelve  months  which  had  been prescribed when  sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force having expired  the right  to prefer  the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be revived after deletion of sub-section (3)  of Section 166 w.e.f. 14.11.1994? According to us,  the answer  should be  in negative. When sub-section (3) of  Section 166  has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain  a claim  petition without  taking note  of the date on  which such  accident had  taken  place.  The  claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were  barred  by  time  when  sub-section  (3)  of Section 166  was in  force. It  need not  be impressed  that Parliament from  time to  time has  introduced amendments in the old  Act as  well as  in the new Act in order to protect the interest of the victims of the accidents and their heirs if the  victims die.  One such amendment has been introduced in the  Act by  the aforesaid  Amendment Act  54 of  1994 by substituting sub-section (6) of Section 158 which provides:           "As soon  as  any  information      regarding  any  accident  involving      death  or   bodily  injury  to  any      person is  recorded or report under      this  section  is  completed  by  a      police   officer,    the    officer      incharge  of   the  police  station      shall forward  a copy  of the  same      within thirty days from the date of      recording of information or, as the      case may  be, on completion of such      report  to   the  Claims   Tribunal      having  jurisdiction   and  a  copy      thereof to  the  concerned  insurer      and where  a copy is made available      to the  owner, he shall also within      thirty  days  of  receipt  of  such      report, forward  the same  to  such

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    Claims Tribunal and Insurer." In view  of sub-section  (6) of  Section 158  of the Act the officer incharge  of  the  police  station  is  enjoined  to forward a  copy of information/report regarding the accident to the Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy whereof has also to be  forwarded to  the concerned Insurer. it also requires that where  a copy  is made  available to  the owner  of the vehicle, he shall within thirty days of receipt of such copy forward the same to the claims Tribunal and insurer. In this background, the deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 should be  given full  effect so that the object of deletion of said  section by  the   Parliament is not defeated.  If a victim of  the accident  or heirs of the deceased victim can prefer claim  for compensation  although not being preferred earlier because  of the  expiry of  the period of limitation prescribed, how  the victim  or the  heirs of  the  deceased shall be  in a worse position if the question of condonation of delay  in filling  the claim  petition is  pending either before the  Tribunal, High  Court or  the Supreme Court. The present appeal  is one  such case.  The appellant  has  been pursuing from  Tribunal to  this Court.  His  right  to  get compensation in  connection with the accident in question is being resisted  by the respondents on the ground of delay in filling   the same.  If he  had not  filed any  petition for claim till  14.11.1994 in respect of the accident which took place on  4.12.1990, tn  view of  the Amending Act he became entitled  to   file  such  claim  petition,  the  period  of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition which has been filed  and is  being pursued  upto this Court cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation.      The matter  will be  different if  any claimant  having filed a  petition for  claim  beyond  time  which  has  been rejected by  the Tribunal  or the  High Court,  the claimant does not  challenge the  same and  allows the  said judicial order to  become final.  The aforesaid Amending Act shall be of no  help to  such claimant.  The reason    being  that  a judicial order saying that such petition of claim was barred by limitation has attained finality. But that principle will not govern  cases where  the dispute  as to whether petition for claim  having been  filed beyond  the period  of  twelve months  from   the  date   of  the   accident   is   pending consideration either before the Tribunal, High Court or this Court. In such cases, the benefit of amendment of subsection (3) of Section 166 should be extended.      Accordingly, we  allow this  appeal and  set aside  the order passed  by the  High Court.  We direct the Tribunal to entertain the  petition for  claim filed  on behalf  of  the appellant and to dispose of the same as early as possible in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.