http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: DEWAN SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA & ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/05/1976

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. KHANNA, HANS RAJ KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 1921            1976 SCR  630  1977 SCC  (1)  46

ACT:      Natural    jusitce-Meaning    of-If    mandatory-Punjab Panchayat Samitis  and Zilla  Parishad Act 1961-Sec. 124(2)- Reasonable opportunity before dismissing an employee.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant was a Veterinary Compounder serving under the Panehayat  Samiti, Hansi.  The Zilla  Parishad Tribunaul tranferred him  from Hansi  to Singhani. The Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti.  Hansi requested  the  Chairman  of  Zilla Parishad Tribunal  served a  notice on the appellant to show cause why  he should  not be dismissed for not having handed over the  charge of  the dispensary  to the  person who  was appointed in  his place and also on the ground that when the Secretary of  the Zilla  Parishaod Tribunal with the help of the compounder,  who was  directed to  take charge  from the appellant, was prepaering a list of stock, the appellant and others entered  the office and one of the persons out of the appellant’s group  snatched the papers from the Secretry and manhandled  him.   The  appellant   submitted   an   interim explanation and  reserved his  right to submit a final reply after inspection  of certain  records was  given to him. The Zilla Parishad  Tribunal did not give any opportunity to the appellant  for   inspecation  of   record   nor   sent   any communication  to  him  rejecting  the  request  giving  any justifiable reasons.  However, the appellant was served with a letter dismissisng him from service. Section 124(2) of the Punjab Panchayat.  Samitis  &  Zilla  Parishad.  Act,  1961, authorises the   Tribunal to impose any punishment including the punishment  of dismissal on any servant of the Panchayat Samiti or Zilla Parishad. The proviso,howvever. requires the Tribunal before passing any order of dismissal or removal to give a  notice to  the servant  to show  cause  against  the action proposed to be taken against him      The appellant  filed a  writ petition in the High Court challengaing the  dismissal order.  The High Court dismissed the writ petition.      Allowing the appeal by special leave, ^      HELD: (1)  A perusal  of s.  124(2) goes  to show  that before any  action is  taken for  dismissal or removal of an

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

employee the  Tribunal  has  to  enquire  into  his  conduct justifying such  action. This  enquiry must  necessarily  be made  in   the  presence  of  the  employee  giving  him  an opportunity to rebut the allegations made against him. It is only after  affourding him a reasonable opportunity to rebut the allegations  in the  charge and  after the  Tribunal  is satisfied that  the misconduct  is established, the question of final  punitive action either of dismissal or removal has to be  considered. The  employee must  be given  a full  and fair. reasonable opportunity to meet the charges. [633D-E]      (2) In  the instant  case apart  from giving  the  show cause  notice   no  other  communication  was  made  to  the appellant except  the order  of dismissal.  This is  a clear case where  the reasonable  opportunity envisaged  under  s. 124(2) has  not been afforded to the appellant for making an effective   representation to  establish his innocence. Even in respect  of the  incident of 15-8-1967, the appellant was acquitted in  a criminal  case lodged  against him.  In  the instant case  the provisions  of s.  124(2) which embody the principles of  natural justice  and which are of a mandatory character  have   been  violated   vitiating  the  order  of dismissal. [633G. 634A-C]      (3) In  the ordinary  course it would have been open to the  authority  to  institute  a  fresh  enquiry  after  the reinstatement. But  in this  case, that  procedure  was  not permitted because  the appellant  was dismissed in December, 1967, and 631 has been  out of  employment for  over 8 years. Secondly, he does not  have many  years to  serve. Thirdly,  the  serious allegations regarding  the incident  of 15-8-1967  have  not been found to be established in a judicial trial. The Court, therefore, quashed  the order of dismissal and directed that the appellant  should be  treated on  leave without  pay and further  directed   that  no   further  enquiry   into   the allegations forming  the subject  matter of charge should be made. [634C-E]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No.  27 of 1971.      (Appeal by  special leave  from the  judgment and order dated 21st  May 1970  of the  Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in civil writ No. 197 of 1968)      J. Ramamurthi, for the appellant..      Naunit Lal  and R.  N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.      Bishamber Lal, for respondent No. 3.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      GOSWAMI, J.-This  appeal by  special leave  is directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High  Court by  which  the  appellant’s  application under article 226 of the Constitution was rejected.      The appellant  was a  veterinary compounder  serving at the material  time under  the  Chairman,  Panchayat  Samiti, Hansi-I. The  Zila Parishad  Trihunal transferred  him  from Hansi-I Block  to Singhani  (Loharu Block) by its resolution of June 30, 1967. The order appear to be transmitted by Memo No. 3201-A  of July 6, 1967. On July 27, 1967,  the Chairman of the  Panchayat Samiti, Hansi-I, requested the Chairman of the Zila  Parishad, Hissar,  to reconsider  the decision  of transfer and to allow him to continue at his village Umra in public interest.  A copy  of this  letter writen to the Zila

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

Parishad was forwarded to the appellant. Since the appellant did not  comply with  the order  of transfer,  the Chairman, Zila Parishad  mal, served  a notice  upon him on August 13, 1967., to  show cause  as to  why he should not be dismissed from service  on the  grounds mentioned in the notice. It is mentioned in  the notice  that this  action has  been  taken under section  124 of  the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act,1961 (briefly the Act).      The particulars  of charge  described in the show cause notice are briefly as under:-           (1)  You did  not hand  over charge  of veterinary                dispensary  to   Balwan   Singh,   Veterinary                Compounder, on  25-7-1967. in compliance with                the transfer order dated 6-7-1967.           (2)  You also  did not  hand over  charge  to  the                District Animal  Husbandry  officer  who  was                ordered to  personally take over charge  from                you on 26-7-1967.           (3)  You were  again asked  by letter dated 2-8-67                to  hand   over  charge   to   Balwan   Singh                Veterinary Compounder,  but you  did not hand                over the charge. 632           (4)  When Ch.  Bir Singh  Lamba,  Secretary,  Zila                Parishad Tribunal,  along with  Balwan  Singh                reached Umra on 10-8-67 between 4.30 and 5.00                P.M. in  order to  take charge  from you they                found you absent and the dispensary locked.           (5)  That on  15-8-67  at  about  4.00  P.M.  when                Balwan Singh  went to  take charge  from  him                along with  Ch. Bir  Singh Lamba,  Secretary,                Zila Parishad Tribunal, along with Ch. Balbir                Singh, Chairman,  Zila Parishad,  Hissar  and                Kali Ram,  Member, Panchayat  Samiti, Hissar,                you refused  to hand  over charge  to  Balwan                Singh Veterinary Compounder.           (6)  When  on   15-8-67  Ch.   Bir  Singh   Lamba,                Secretary Zila  Parishad Tribunal,  with  the                help of Balwan Singh, was preparing a list of                stock in  the presence  of the  Chairman  and                others, you with Rattan Singh, Sarpanch, Gram                Panchayat,  Umra,   Giani  Ram   of   village                Majahadpur and  three or  four other  unknown                villagers entered  the office.  Giani Ram out                of your group snatched the paper from Ch. Bir                Singh   Secretary, Zila Parishad Tribunal and                threatened  them   to  leave  the  dispensary                before they  manhandled him.  You are thus at                the root of all this incident.      The appellant  submitted a reply on September 13, 1967, describing it  as an  interim explanation  and reserving his right to  submit a  final reply  after inspection of certain records and  he requested  for a  date for inspection of the records. In  this reply  he admitted  to have  received  the transfer order  and pleaded that he did not hand over charge to Balwan  Singh on  25-7-1967 under  instructions from  the Chairman, Panchayat  Samiti, who,  according to him, was the appointing authority  and he was carrying out his orders. He particularly denied  the incident  of August  15, 1967,  for which he  was held principally responsible in the show cause notice.      It does not appear that the Zila Parishad Tribunal gave any opportunity  to the appellant for inspection of records, nor sent  any communication  to him  rejecting  the  request giving any  justifiable reason. The appellant seemed to have

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

been waiting  for some communication to his interim reply in order to  submit final  explanation when on December 5, 1967 he  received   the  order  of  the  Zila  Parishad  Tribunal dismissing  him   from  service  with  immediate  effect  in pursuance  of  its  resolution  of  December  1,  1967.  The resolution states:           "The Tribunal  has come  to a conclusion that your      reply is  not a  satisfactory one.  And the allegations      made against him (sic) seemed to be correct". That led  to the  appellant’s writ  application in  the High Court resulting in the impugned order.      The short  question that arises for decision is whether the order  of dismissal is in conformity with section 124 of the Act, or, in 633 other words,  whether  the  same  is  in  violation  of  the principles of natural justice.      We may,  therefore, read  the material  provision under section 124(2) of the Act:           124(2): "The  tribunal may suo motu or on the move      of the  Panchayat Samiti or the Zila Parishad or on the      application of  any servant  of a  Panchayat Samiti  or      Zila Parishad other than a government servant placed at      their disposal  enquire into the conduct of any servant      of the  Panchayat Samiti or the Zila Parishad and after      making such enquiry as it may deem fit pass such orders      imposing any  punishment including dismissal or removal      as it may deem proper;           Provided that the tribunal shall not pass any such      order in  respect of a servant having a right of appeal      under section 116;           Provided further  that the  tribunal shall  before      passing any order of dismissal or removal give a notice      to  the  servant  to  show  cause  against  the  action      proposed to be taken against him".      A persual  of section  124(2) goes  to show that before any action  is taken for dismissal or removal of an employee the Tribunal has to enquire into his conduct justifying such action. This enquiry must necessarily have to be made in the presence of  the employee giving him an opportunity to rebut the allegations  mentioned against  him. It  is  only  after affording  him   a  reasonable   opportunity  to  rebut  the allegations in the charge and the Tribunal is satisfied that the misconduct is established the question of final punitive action either of dismissal or removal has to be considered.      Unlike as  in article  311 of the Constitution, section 124(2)  does   not  in   terms  mention   two  stages  of  a departmental enquiry  for misconduct  against  an  employee. Even so,  the nature of an enquiry with an object to dismiss an  employee  is  such  that  a  full  and  fair  reasonable opportunity must  be given  to him  to meet the charges. The second proviso  to section  124(2) provides  in unmistakable terms that  before passing any order of dismissal or removal a notice  has To  he given  to the  employee to  show  cause against the  proposed action.  The action  of  dismissal  or removal cannot  be proposed,  in all  fairness,  unless  the Tribunal had  reached a  conclusion about  the  guilt  after making a  proper enquiry  giving the  employee a  reasonable opportunity to defend.      In the  instant case,  apart from giving the show cause notice, no  other communication  was made  to the  appellant except the  order of  sal. This  is a  clear case  where the reasonable opportunity  envisaged under  section 124(2)  has not been  afforded to the appellant far marking an effective representation to establish his innocence. It is easy to see

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

that  the   summary  order   of  dismissal  must  have  been influenced by  the allegations appreciation  to the incident of August 634 15,1967 for  which, we  understand, even a criminal case was instituted against the appellant. That criminal case, we are told, ended in acquittal of the appellant and others on June 10, 1970.  At any  rate the  said incident being included in the articles of charge against the appellant he did not have any opportunity  whatsoever to  establish his innocence when he had  clearly denied  the allegations  even in his interim reply.      The principles of natural justice are clearly ingrained in the  provisions of  section 124(2).  It is  a clear  case where the  provisions of  section 124(2),  which  are  of  a mandatory character  in a  departmental enquiries  have been violated vitiating  the order  of dismissal. The High Court, therefore,  should   have  accepted   the  petition  of  the appellant under  article 226 of the Constitution and quashed the order of dismissal.      Although in the ordinary course it would have been open to  the   authority  to   institute  a   fresh  enquiry  his reinstatement, after  the order  of dismissal  has been  set aside, we  are clearly  of opinion  that this  is not a case where that procedure should be permitted. For one reason the appellant was dismissed in December 1967 and he had been out of employment  for over  eight years.  He has  also not many years to  serve. Besides,  the serious allegations regarding the incident  of August  15, 1967,  which, according  to us, must have  influenced the  authority to  pass the  order  of dismissal, have  not been  found  to  be  established  in  a judicial trial.  While,  therefore,  quashing  the  impugned order of  dismissal, which  we hereby do, we direct that the appellant shall  be reinstated  in  service  with  immediate effect  and  there  shall  be  no  further  enquiry  to  the allegations forming  the subject  matter of  charge  against him. The period of absence shall be treated as leave without pay so  that the  appellant will  not lose continuity of his service.      In the  result the  judgment of  the High  Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed with costs. P.H.P.                                       Appeal allowed. 635