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PETITIONER: DEVATA PRASAD SINGH CHAUDHURI AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE  HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUDGES OF THE PATNA  HIGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/08/1961

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SARKAR, A.K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1962 AIR  201            1962 SCR  (3) 305

ACT: Mukhtar--Right    to   practise   in   Civil    Court--Legal Practitioners  Act, 1879 (XVIII of 1879), ss.9,  11--General Rules and Circular Orders of the Patna High Court, Ch.   III Part VII, r. 2.

HEADNOTE: Section  9 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, entitles  a duly enrolled Mukhtar to "Practise" in any Civil Court,  and s.  11  thereof  empowers  the  High  Court  to  make  rules declaring .what shall be deemed to be the ,functions, powers and  duties"  of  Mukhtars practising  in  the   subordinate Courts.  Rule 2 framed under s. 1 1 lays down that a Mukhtar shall  not be allowed to address any Civil Court except  for the  purpose  of  "stating the nature.  and  effect  of  his application or to offer any legal argument or to examine any witness"  without the leave of the Court.   The  petitioners contended  that r. 2 was in excess of the rule-making  power under  s. 1 1 and was an unreasonable restriction  on  their rights under Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. Held,  that ss. 9 and 1 1 of the Act must be  read  together and  the  right  to "practise" given under s.  9  cannot  be dissociated  from  the  "functions,  powers  and  duties  of Mukhtars"  as contemplated under s. 11.  In  declaring  what shall  be the functions, powers and duties of a Mukhtar  the High  Court may by its rules so delimit them as to  regulate their  right  of  practice in the  Civil  Courts,  and  such delimitation  is no violation of their fundamental right  to practise the profession as allowed under the Act. Aswini  Kumar  Ghosh  v. Arabinda  Bose,  (1933)  S.C.R.  1, explained and distinguished.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 11 7 of 1958. Petition  under  Art. 32 of the Constitution  of  India  for enforcement of Fundamental-Rights. R.K.  Garg,  M. K. Ramamurthi S. C. Agarwala  and  D.  P.

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Singh, for the petitioners. The respondent  did not appear. 306 1961 August 29.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.K.  DAs, J.--This is a writ petition oil behalf of  the Bihar  State  Mukhtars’  Association, Patna  and  the  Vice- President  and the General Secretary thereof.  The  petition has  been heard exparte as there, has been no appearance  on behalf  of  the Chief Justice and Judges of the  Patna  High Court who were cited as respondents to the petition. The petitioners contend that certain rules of the Patna High Court  made  as  far back as 1922 under s.11  of  the  Legal Practitioners  Act, 1879 (Act XVIII of’  1879),  hereinafter referred to as the Act, in respect of the functions., powers and duties of Mukhtars practising in the subordinate  courts are  now  invalid  and void,  because  they  contravene  the fundamental  right of the petitioners guaranteed under  Art. 19(1)(g)  of the Constitution of India and are not saved  by cl.  (6)  thereof.   The petitioners  have,  in  particular, challenged the validity of r. 2 made by the said High  Court under s. 11 of the Act and incorporated in Chapter III, Part VII  of  the General Rules and Circular Orders of  the  High Court of Judicature at Patna (Civil), 1922.  The petitioners pray that an appropriate writ, direction or order be  issued by   this   Court   declaring  that  r.   2   aforesaid   is unconstitutional  and there-fore, void and inoperative.   We shall  presently read the rule ; but before we do so  a  few facts which are not in dispute may be stated.  The  petitioners  state  that  the  Bihar  State  Mukhtars’ Association was formed some 30 years back with the object of generally  protecting the interests of the Mukhtars  in  the State  of Bihar practising in the courts subordinate to  the High  Court of Patna within the meaning of s. 3 of the  Act. At  its  various  annual conferences  the  said  Association passed resolutions to move the high Court for the removal of the restriction imposed by r. 2  aforesaid on the  right  of Mukhtars practising in 307 subordinate civil courts.  The High Court did not remove the restriction.   On  July 27, 1958 at  an  emergent  Executive Committee  meeting  of the Association it was.  resolved  to move’  the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the  Constitution. The  present  writ petition has been filed in  pursuance  of that resolution. The  enrolment of Mukhtars is made under certain  provisions of  the Act to which a reference must now be made Under  s.3 of   the  Act  "a  subordinate  Court"  means   all   courts subordinate  to  the High Court including  courts  of  Small Causes  established under Act IX of 1850 or Act XI of  1865. "Legal practitioner" means an advocate, vakil or attorney-of any  High  Court,  a  pleader,  Mukhtar  or   revenue-agent. Section  6 of the Act empowers the High Court to  make  from time  to  time rules consistent with the Act in  respect  of certain  matters  including inter alia  the  qualifications, admission and certificates of proper persons to be  Mukhtars of  the subordinate courts.  It appears that by a rule  made under  s.  6 of the Act, the High Court of Patna  laid  down that  any  person  who shall produce a  certificate  from  a committee  constituted by the High Court that he has  passed an examination in the subjects prescribed from time to  time by  the  High Court for the mukhtarship examination  may  be admitted. as a Mukhtar to practise in courts subordinate  to the High Court.  Rule 10 laid down the subjects in which the examination  was to be held.  This examination was known  as the Mukhtarship examination.  It was abolished some time  in

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the year 1947-48.  Under s. 7 of the Act the High Court made certain rules for the grant of certificates to Mukhtars  who had  passed  the  necessary  examination  for  admission  as prescribed  by the rules referred to above.  Section 7  also provided  for  annual  renewal of  such  certificates.   The argument of learned advocate for the petitioners is  rested. mainly  on the pro. visions of s. 9 and they must be  quoted in full, 308               "Every  mukhtar holding a  certificate  issued               under  section 7 may apply to be  enrolled  in               any Civil or Criminal Court mentioned  therein               and  situate  within the same  limits  ;  and,               subject  to such rules as the High  Court  may               from  time  to time make in this  behalf,  the               presiding Judge shall enroll him  accordingly;               and thereupon he may practise as a mukhtar  in               any such Civil Court and any Court subordinate               thereto, and may (subject to the provisions of               the Code of Criminal Procedure) appear,  plead               and  act  in any such Criminal Court  and  any               Court subordinate thereto."               Section  10  says  in effect  that  except  as               provided  by the Act or any other enactment  t               for  the time being in force, no person  shall               practise  as a Mukhtar in any Court unless  he               holds  a certificate issued under s.7 and  has               been  enrolled in such court or in some  court               to which it is subordinate.  Then come,% s.  1               1  under  which the impugned  rule  was  made.               This section is in these terms.               "Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the               Code  of civil Procedure, the High Court  may,               from  time  time, make  rules  declaring  what               shall  be deemed to be the  functions,  powers               and  duties  of  Mukhtars  practising  in  the               subordinate courts and, in the case of a  High               Court  not  established by Royal  Charter,  in               such Court."               The High Court of Patna made a number of rules               defining  the functions, powers and duties  of               Mukhtars practising in the subordinate courts.               One of these rules is r. 2 which is ’in  these               terms.               "Rule  2:  A Mukhtar shall not be  allowed  to               address any Civil Court except for the purpose               of   stating the nature , and. effect  of  his               application or to offer any legal argument  or               to  examine any witness without the  leave  of               the Court specially given." 309 The  argument  of learned Advocate for  the  petitioners  is ’this.   He  has submitted that s.9 of the Act  gives  every Mukhtar holding a certificate issued under s.7 the right  to apply  to  be  enrolled  in  any  Civil  or  Criminal  Court subordinate   to  the  High  Court  and  on  enrollment   in accordance with the rules-, he has the right to practise  as a  Mukhtar  in any Civil Court and  in  ’Courts  subordinate thereto and’ has further the right to appear, plead and  act in  any  Criminal  Court.  This right  of  practice  learned Advocate  for  the  petitioners  has  contended,  cannot  be curtailed  and s. 11 which empowers the High Court  to  Make rules  declaring what shall be deemed to be  the  functions, powers  and  duties  of  the  Mukhtars  practising  in   the subordinate courts does not empower- the High Court to  make

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a  rule which curtails the right given by s.9. His  argument further  is that the impugned rule curtails the right  of  a Mukhtar  to,  practise in the Civil Courts  inasmuch  as  it says,  that  a Mukhtar shall not be allowed to  address  any Civil  Court except for the- purpose of stating  the  nature and effect of his application or to offer any legal argument or  to  examine any witness without the leave of  the  court specially given.  He has contended firstly, that the rule is in excess; of the rulemaking power under s. 11 and secondly, is An unreasonable restriction on the right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The  simple  question for decision really is  this:  is  the impugned  rule  in excess of the powers given  to  the  High Court  under s. 11 of the Act ? If the rule is  intra  vires the Act, then clearly enough there has been no  violation of any, fundamental right of the-petitioners.  The right of the petitioners  to  practise  in the subordinate  court  a  was create  d by the act.  In the arguments before us there  was no challenge to the constitutional validity of s. 11 of  the Act   as  permitting.  an  unreasonable  restriction  of   a guaranteed  right, if on a proper construction that  section enabled the High Court to regulate the right 310 of  practice of Mukhtars.  The complaint before us was  that the  impugned  r. 2 was not justified by s. 11 of  the  Act. Therefore,  the  only  question which we  need  consider  is whether  the  impugned rule is in excess  of  the  authority given by s. 11 of the Act.  It seems to us that the impugned rule is clearly within that authority.  The learned Advocate for  the  petitioners  has. sought  to  make  a  distinction between  the  right  to practise as given by s.  9  and  the functions, powers and duties as mentioned in s. 1 1. Relying on the majority decision in Aswini’ Kumar Ghosh and  another v.  Arabinda  Bose & another(1) he has  submitted  that  the right  to  practise means the right to appear and  plead  as well  as  to act on, behalf of suitors  in  the  subordinate courts; the power of the High Court to make rules under  s.1 1 of the Act as respects the functions, powers and duties of Mukhtars  practising in the subordinate courts merely  means that the High Court may give effect to the right given under s.  9  by making rules, but it cannot curtail that  right  ; when  therefore  the  High  Court  made  the  impugned  rule restricting the right of Mukhtars to plead in civil  courts, it did something in excess of the power given by s. 11. We  are unable to accept this line of argument  as  correct. Sections  9 and 1 1 of the Act must be read together and  it would be wrong to treat the right to practise given by s.  9 as.  dissociated- from the functions, powers and  duties  of Mukhtars referred to in s. 1 1. The learned Advocate for the petitioners  is  reading  the two  sections  as  though  one section gives an absolute right and the other section merely empowers  the  making  of rules to  effectuate  that  right. That,  we  do  not think, is a proper  reading  of  the  two sections.   It  is worthy of note that under S. 9  itself  a distinction  is  made  between the right  of  a  Mukhtar  to practise in civil courts and his right to appear, plead  and act  in  any criminal. court.  In express terms s.  9  gives every (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1. 311 Mukhtar  the right to appear, plead and act in any  criminal court ; it does not, however, give such an   unlimited right in  a civil court.  On the contrary, it merely says that  on enrolment  a  Mukhtar may practise in any civil  court,  but under  s.  11 the High Court may make rules  declaring  what

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shall  be deemed to be the functions, powers and  duties  of Mukhtars practising in the subordinate courts.  It is  clear to  us  that in declaring what shall be  the  functions  and powers of mukhtars practising in the subordinate courts, the High  Court can so delimit them as to regulate the right  of practice.   It  will  be wrong to treat  the  functions  and powers as dissociated from the right to practise.  The right to practise ’Must depend on the functions and powers.  It is also worthy of note that the expression used in s. 11 of the Act  is much wider than the expression used in s. 15 of  the Indian  Bar Council Act, 1926, (Act XXXVIII of 1926),  which gives the Bar Council the power to make rules to provide for and regulate the rights and duties of Advocates of the  High Court.  We do not think that the majority decision in Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose (1) is of any assistance to the petitioners.   That decision depended on the  interpretation of  s.  2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice  in  High Courts)    Act,   1951.    That   section   provided    that "notwithstanding anything contained in the Bar Councils  Act or any other law regulating the conditions subject to  which a  person  not entered in the roll of Advocates  of  a  High Court may be permitted to practise in that High Court, every Advocate of the Supreme Court shall be entitled as of  right to  practise  in  any High Court whether or  not  he  is  an Advocate of’ that High Court".  It was held by the  majority that a rule made by a High Court which denied to an Advocate of the Supreme Court the right to exercise an essential part of  his  function, by insisting oil a, dual  agency  on  the Original Side was much more than a rule (1)  [1933] S.C.R. 1 312 of  practice  and  constituted a  serious  invasion  of  his statutory  right to practise and the power of making such  a rule, unless expressly reserved, was repugnant to the  right conferred by s. 2 aforesaid The point to be noticed is  that the  majority  held  that unless  the  power  was  expressly reserved by the statute, a rule could not be made  repugnant to  the  right  conferred by s. 2  of  the.   Supreme  Court Advocates  (Practice  in High Courts) Act, 1951.  If  it  be held that ss. 9 and 1 1 of the Act must be read together and functions and  powers mentioned in s.11 are not  dissociated from  the  right to practise mentioned in a. 9, then  it  is clear enough that s. 1 1 expressly reserves the power of the High  Court  to  make  rules declaring  what  shall  be  the functions,  powers and duties of Mukhtars practising in  the subordinate  courts.  If this be the correct  interpretation of ss. 9 and 11 of the Act, then the principle laid down  by the majority in Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Pose(,) is if no assistance to the petitioners in the present case. For  the reasons given above, we hold that r.2 of the  rules made  by  the High Court under s. 11 of the Act  is  not  in excess  of the rule-making power and the petitioners  cannot complain  of  any violation of their  fundamental  right  to practise  the  profession to which they have  been  enrolled under the provisions of the Act.  The petition fails and  is accordingly  dismissed.  As there has been no appearance  on behalf of the respondents, there will be no order for costs. Petition dismissed. (2) [1953] S.CR. 1 313