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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  487      of  2000 Special Leave Petition (civil)  5361     of  2000

PETITIONER: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S.HALDOR TOPSOE A/S.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       20/07/2000

BENCH: S.N.Hegde, B.N.Kirpal

JUDGMENT:

SANTOSH HEGDE, J.

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     Leave granted in SLP © No.5361/2000.  The appellant in Civil  Appeal  No._____  of 2000 (arising out of  S.L.P.   Â© No.5361/2000)  had  filed a petition before  the  Designated Authority (Anti-Dumping) Ministry of Commerce (for short the Authority)  alleging  that  M/s Haldor Topsoe A/S  (to  be referred  to as the respondent) was indulging in dumping in  India  of six types of catalysts, particulars  of  which were  enumerated  in  the  said  petition.   Based  on  this petition,  the  Authority had initiated proceedings  against the  respondent  under  Section  9A of  the  Customs  Tariff (Amendment)  Act,  1995 (for short the Tariff  Act).   The Authority, on 6th of September, 1996, issued a public notice of  the  anti dumping investigation to be conducted  against the respondent for the export to India of the above-referred six  catalysts  from Denmark.  The Authority also heard  the parties  concerned including the respondent and on  7.5.1997 published  a preliminary finding holding that the export  of the   said  catalysts  amounted  to  dumping  and   proposed provisional  imposition of anti- dumping duties against  the respondent.   The  said determination of the  Authority  was accepted  by  the Government of India vide its  Notification No.56/97,  and  a provisional anti-dumping duty valid up  to 19th  of  December, 1997 was levied.  Respondent  challenged the   said  provisional   determination,  consequently   the Authority  proceeded to make the final determination of  the normal  value of the subject catalyst and final dumping duty leviable.   For  this  purpose, the  Authority  initiated  a public  hearing on 8th of July, 1997.  However, this hearing could  not  be completed because of a change in  the  person holding  the office of the Authority, hence, a fresh  public hearing  had  to be resorted from 5th of January, 1998.   On the  conclusion of the public hearing, the Authority by  its final  order  confirmed  its  preliminary  findings  on  the question  of  dumping as well as anti-dumping duty  payable. This  finding  of  the Authority was also  accepted  by  the Central  Government vide its Notification No.ADD/IW/39/95-96

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dated  5.1.1998,  and accordingly, anti-dumping duties  were imposed  on  the  respondents.   During the  course  of  the inquiry,  the Authority inter alia held that inspite of  the demand  made by it, the respondent had failed to furnish the necessary  information in regard to its export price of  the said  catalysts  to  other third  countries  which  failure, according  to  the  Authority,   significantly  impeded  the investigation.   Consequently, the Authority determined  the normal  value  of  the concerned catalysts on the  basis  of best  judgment  assessment.  Being aggrieved by  the  said decision  as  well  as  the   Notification  issued  by   the Government  of  India, the respondent preferred a  statutory appeal  before  the  Customs,   Excise  and  Gold  (Control) Appellate  Tribunal (for short the Tribunal) under Section 9C of the Tariff Act urging the following contentions :- (i) The investigation by the Authority was barred by time;  (ii) The  Authority  erred  in  fixing the normal  value  of  the catalysts   by  adopting  a   methodology  contrary  to  the provisions  of  the  Statute;  (iii) The Authority  did  not properly  find  out the injury margin nor did the  Authority take  into  consideration  the  fair selling  price  of  the catalysts  manufactured  by  the domestic  industries  while fixing the dumping duty;  (iv) The Authority erred in fixing two  dumping  margins  in  regard   to  the  same  catalysts depending on the end-use to which the imported articles have been put to.

     The  Tribunal rejected the first contention  regarding the  limitation  holding  that the Central Government  on  a request  made  by  the Authority had extended  the  time  to complete  the  inquiry which extension cannot be  questioned before  the Appellate Tribunal because the Tribunal being  a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction, it had no authority in law to sit in judgment over the extension of time granted by the Central Government.  It also held that the respondent having participated  in the proceedings during the extended  period without  objecting to the extension, it cannot be  permitted to  challenge  the  extension after the  decision  had  gone against it.

     However, in regard to the next ground based on Section 9A  of the Act as to the determination of the normal  value, the  Tribunal  came to the conclusion that the  anti-dumping duty  was exporter and exporting country specific.  On  this foundation, the Tribunal held that under clause © of Section 9A(1),  there  were  following   three  options  before  the Designated Authority :  (i) finding out the comparable price for  the  like article in the ordinary course of trade  when meant  for consumption in the exporting country or territory of  the same exporter;  (ii) if the exporter is not having a domestic  market in the exporting country then his price  of the  article to an appropriate third country;  (iii) in  the absence of such an export price of a specific exporter to an appropriate third country to find out the cost of production of the said article in the country of origin incurred by the said  exporter  and  add to it administrative,  selling  and general  costs and the profits.  The Tribunal also held that since   the  anti-dumping  duty  is  exporter  specific   or manufacturer   specific,  the  price   of  similar   article manufactured  by some other exporter/manufacturer cannot  be the  basis  for finding out the normal value.  Applying  the above  options,  the  Tribunal came to the  conclusion  that since  the  respondent did not have any domestic market  for the  subject  catalysts  in  Denmark,  and  there  being  no material  to  establish respondents export price  of  these

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articles  to appropriate third countries, the only basis  to determine   the  dumping  duty,  if   any,  would   be   the manufacturers  cost of production in its country of origin. The  Tribunal also found fault with the Authority for having relied  on  the list price of another manufacturer,  namely, M/s.  Sud Chernie of Germany to find out the normal value of the  respondents article which, according to the  Tribunal, was  in  violation of the mandate of Section 9A(1)©  of         the Act.   The Tribunal also doubted the correctness of the list price  of M/s.  Sud Chernie on the ground that this  Company was  closely connected with one of the appellants before us. It  also  did  not  accept  the  finding  of  the  Authority regarding   the   normal  selling   price  of   the   Indian manufacturers.   The  Tribunal  further held  that  the  two dumping  duties fixed by the Authority based on the  end-use of  the  catalyst  were also not acceptable.   The  Tribunal further  held  that  it had no jurisdiction  to  remand  the matter  to the Authority under Section 129-B of the  Customs Act.  Hence, it proceeded to determine the extent of dumping alleged  against  the  respondent   and  so  determined  the anti-dumping  duty on the basis of its own finding.  It held that  the  normal value of the catalysts in question  should have  been based on the cost of production as claimed by the respondent  and  based on such particulars provided  by  the respondent, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that two out of  the  six  catalysts viz., Zinc Oxide  De  Sulpherisation Catalyst (ZODS) and Low Temperature Shift Catalyst (LTS) had been  exported  below the normal value, and the  other  four catalysts had been exported above the normal value, hence it set  aside  the  dumping  duty imposed  on  the  later  four catalysts.  Regarding the anti- dumping duty imposed on ZODS catalyst,  it  held that though the export of that  catalyst was  below  the  normal value, no injury was caused  to  the domestic  market,  hence no dumping duty was to  be  levied; while  in regard to the LTS, it came to the conclusion  that the injury was caused to the domestic market but reduced the dumping  duty imposed by the Authority to Rs.22.82 per litre because,  according  to  the Tribunal, that was  the  margin between  the normal price and the export price.  Against the said order of the Tribunal dated 13th of December, 1999, the Government  of  India through the Designated  Authority  has preferred C.A.No.487/2000 and the original petitioner before the said Authority, namely, United Catalysts India Ltd.  has preferred  C.A.No.___/2000 (@ SLP © No.5361/2000).  We have heard  Mr.   Harish N.  Salve, learned Solicitor General  of India,  Mr.Joseph Vellapalli, learned senior counsel for the appellants  in  the above appeals  and  Mr.V.Lakshmikumaran, learned  counsel for the respondent in both the appeals.  On behalf  of the appellant, it is contended before us that the Authority  was justified in relying on the comparable export price of another exporter in the background of the fact that the  respondent  was withholding the most relevant  evidence and,  in a way, compelling the Authority to proceed with the determination  of  the normal value based on  the  selective evidence produced by it.  The respondent supported the order of  the tribunal by contending that its cost of  manufacture of   the  subject  catalysts   was  sufficient  material  as contemplated by the statute itself, therefore, the Authority was not justified in placing reliance on the export price of the  third parties while determining the normal value of the subject catalysts.

     In  the  instant case, the Authority proceeded on  the presumption  that  it had no obligation to accept per  force the  materials submitted by the respondent to establish  the

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normal  value  of  the article concerned;  more  so  in  the background of the fact that the respondent has not furnished the  information pertaining to its export price of the  said catalysts   to  an  appropriate   third  country.   In  this background,  it  preferred to determine the normal value  on the  basis of what it held to be a comparable price of other exporters.  It, in a way, drew adverse inference against the respondent for not producing its export price of the subject catalysts.   The  Tribunal,  on the contrary,  came  to  the conclusion that since anti-dumping duty is exporter specific or  manufacturer  specific,  the price of  similar  articles manufactured  by other exporters/manufacturers cannot be the basis  for  finding out the normal value.   For  determining this question, we find it necessary to reproduce some of the relevant  provisions  of the Tariff Act and the Rules  which are  as  follows  :  In Section 9A(1)© of the  Tariff  Act:- normal value, in relation to an article, means-

     (i)  the  comparable price, in the ordinary course  of trade,  for  the like article when meant for consumption  in the   exporting  country  or   territory  as  determined  in accordance  with  the rules made under sub-section (6);   or (ii)  when  there  are no sales of the like article  in  the ordinary  course  of  trade in the domestic  market  of  the exporting  country  or  territory, or when  because  of  the particular  market  situation or low volume of the sales  in the  domestic market of the exporting country or  territory, such  sales  do not permit a proper comparison,  the  normal value shall be either-

     (a)  comparable  representative  price   of  the  like article   when  exported  from   the  exporting  country  or territory  or an appropriate third country as determined  in accordance  with  the rules made under sub-section (6);   or (b)  the  cost  of  production of the said  article  in  the country  of  origin  along   with  reasonable  addition  for administrative,  selling and general costs, and for profits, as  determined  in  accordance  with the  rules  made  under sub-section (6):

     Provided  that  in the case of import of  the  article from  a  country other than the country of origin and  where the article has been merely transshipped through the country of  export or such article is not produced in the country of export  or  there is no comparable price in the  country  of export,  the normal value shall be determined with reference to its price in the country of origin.

     Rule  6(4)  of  the  Rules reads:-  Rule  6(4):   The designated  authority  may  issue a notice calling  for  any information,  in  such form as may be specified by it,  from the  exporters,  foreign  producers   and  other  interested parties  and  such  information shall be furnished  by  such persons  in  writing  within thirty days from  the  date  of receipt  of the notice or within such extended period as the designated  authority  may allow on sufficient  cause  being shown.

     Rule  6(8):   In  a case where  an  interested  party refuses  access to, or otherwise does not provide  necessary information  within  a reasonable period,  or  significantly impedes  the  investigation,  the designated  authority  may record  its findings on the basis of the facts available  to it  and make such recommendations to the Central  Government as it deems fit under such circumstances.

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     Rule  8:  Except in cases referred to in sub-rule (8) of  rule 6, the designated authority shall during the course of  investigation  satisfy itself as to the accuracy of  the information  supplied  by the interested parties upon  which its findings are based.

     From   a   perusal  of   the   provisions   reproduced hereinabove,  it is clear that the statute itself has  given sufficient  guidelines to the Authority to be adopted in the process  of determining the normal value.  To some extent, these   guidelines  have  been   placed  in  a  preferential sequence.   For example, if acceptable material is available in  regard to the comparable price in the ordinary course of trade  in the exporting country or territory itself then the normal  value  will have to be determined on that basis,  if such material in regard to comparable price is not available then  the  Authority has been given a choice  under  Section 9A(1)©(ii)(a)  and  (b).   The said choice  is between  the comparable   representative  export  price   and   cost   of production  in  the  country of origin of  the  goods.   The question,  therefore,  for our consideration is  whether  an Investigating  Authority  has any discretion to  reject  the material  produced by one of the party to the proceeding  in regard   to   the  alternatives    enumerated   in   Section 9A(1)(c)(ii)(a)  and  (b) and prefer any other  material  to establish  the  normal  value.  As noticed above  while  the Authority  proceeded on the basis that it had the discretion to  reject  the  evidence produced by  the  respondent,  the Tribunal  held that the Authority had no such discretion  in view of the fact anti-dumping duty is exporter specific.  It would  be  appropriate at this stage to extract  the  actual wordings of the Tribunal in regard to this finding ;  Since the  anti-dumping  duty is exporter specific or  manufacture specific,  price  of similar article manufactured  by  other exporters/manufacturers  cannot be the basis for finding out the normal value.  (Para 12 of the Tribunals order)

     With  respect, we are unable to accept this finding of the  Tribunal.  From a careful reading of Section 9A of  the Tariff  Act  and Rule 6 of the Rules, it is clear  that  the statute   has  nowhere  put  such   a  restriction  on   the Investigating  Authority.  On the contrary, a perusal of the said  provisions clearly shows the normal value will  have to  be  determined with reference to comparable  price,  the word  comparable  price  in the context can only  be  with reference  to  the  price  of similar  articles  sold  under similar  circumstances irrespective of the manufacturer.  By holding  anti  dumping  duty to be  exporter  specific,  the tribunal  could  not  have  restricted   the  scope  of  the investigation  only  to materials to be produced by a  party against  whom an investigation is being conducted.  Such  an interpretation of the statute is wholly contrary to the very scheme of the statute.  It is to be noticed that the statute has  given  much wider power to the Investigating  Authority than  what  is understood by the Tribunal which  is  evident from the language of Section 9A(1)©(i) of the Tariff Act and Rule  6(8) of the Rules.  As noticed hereinabove, Rule  6(8) of  the Rules specifically empowers the Authority to  record its  findings  on the basis of the facts available to it  in cases  where  an  interested  party  refuses  access  to  or otherwise  does not provide the necessary information to it. That apart, the use of the words sale of like articles and comparable  representative  price of the like articles  in Section  9(A)(1)(c) referred to hereinabove, also  indicates

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that  the statute intended that while determining the normal value,  the  Authority  has the discretion to rely  on  such material  as  is  available  before it  which  reflects  the comparable value of the articles concerned;  meaning thereby that  the  Authority is not bound to look into the  material which  is produced by the interested party.  Therefore,  any argument  which restricts the discretion of the Authority in the  area of appreciation of evidence on the ground that the anti-dumping  duty is manufacturer specific, will have to be rejected.

     In  the  instant case, the Authority has come  to  the specific conclusion that the respondent has preferred not to disclose  the  details of its export price of the  concerned catalysts  to an appropriate third country, even though  the same  was available with the respondent.  It has also  noted that  the  reasons  advanced  by   the  respondent  for  not furnishing  the  information are not worthy  of  acceptance. The  Authority has further observed that by withholding  the necessary information which the respondent was bound to have disclosed   under  the  statute,   the  respondent  has  not cooperated with the investigation and has caused impediments in   determination   of   the   normal  value.    In   these circumstances,  we are of the opinion that the Authority was justified in proceeding to determine the normal value of the subject catalysts on the basis of best judgment assessment as  contemplated  under Rule 6(8) of the Rules.  It is  next contended  before  us  that the material considered  by  the Authority  for  determining the normal value being  material referable  to an exporter from Germany, the same cannot be a comparable  price for the purpose of determining the  normal value  of the respondents catalysts which is exported  from Denmark.   Similar  argument addressed before the  Authority was  rejected holding that the members of the European Union which  includes  both Germany and Denmark, formed  a  single unified market without any customs barriers and the European Union  forms  a  unit  for   the  purpose  of   anti-dumping investigations,   therefore,  the  export   price  of   like catalysts  from  Germany  will  be  a  comparable  price  to determine  the  normal value of the respondents  catalysts. The Tribunal, per contra, held that the Designated Authority could  not  have adopted the export price from Germany as  a comparable  price for the simple reason that the proceedings before  the  Authority  were not in relation  to  the  goods originating  from  Germany.  The Tribunal further held  that this  is  because of the fact that anti-dumping is  country specific.  It also held that the European Union cannot be a territory  for the purpose of determining the normal  value. We  do  not agree with this view of the Tribunal also.   The use of the word territory in Section 9A(1)© indicates that the  Statute  empowered the Authority while determining  the normal value to take into consideration the comparable price of  the like article in the exporting country or  territory. The  placement  of  this  word territory  after  the  word country indicates that the Legislature intended to use the word  territory  with reference to a  larger  geographical area  than the exporting country which geographical area  or territory  has some commercial similarity with the exporting country  and  the  exporting country is a part of  the  said territory,  though  not  in the political sense but  in  the economic  sense of that word.  It is a well-known fact  that the  European Union was formed with an object of creating  a common  market among its member States.  The treaty  forming the  European  Union  commonly known as the Treaty  of  Rome provided  for elimination of commercial/customs barriers  to

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facilitate  free  movement of goods, workers,  services  and capital  among the member-States and the establishment of  a common tariff and commercial policy towards non-members.  To achieve  these  objects, the said Treaty also  provides  for common    policies   in     agriculture,   competition   and transportation.   It also provides for the harmonisation  of the  member-State laws generally to the extent required  for the  proper  functioning  of the common market.   There  are European  Union  legislations applicable in such  fields  as environment,   worker   and   consumer  protection,   gender equality,  corporate  law  and  securities  regulation,  and taxation.   (See  Legal Problems of  International  Economic Relations,  3rd Edition, page 188).  They also have a common anti-dumping  law.  In such circumstances, we hold that  the European  Union is a territory for the purpose of  Section 9A  of  the Act and the export price of like catalysts  from Germany  which  is  also  a part  of  that  territory  viz., European  Union would be a comparable price for the  purpose of   determining  the  normal   value  of  the  respondents catalysts.

     The respondent in this context has further argued that the  list price does not always reflect the correct  selling price  and that M/s.  Sud Chernie being an associate of  one of  the appellants before us, its export price ought not  to have been relied upon by the Authority while determining the normal  value  of  their  catalyst.   This  basically  is  a question  of  fact and we find that the Authority has  given cogent  reasons  for rejecting these contentions  while  the tribunal  on  a wrong application of law has reversed  these findings.   Once  we come to the conclusion that  the  legal basis  of the Tribunals order is erroneous then it is safer to  rely  on  the finding of fact arrived by  the  Authority which  is  not  shown  to be either  perverse  or  based  on irrelevant  material.  We also think that the respondent  is not  entitled to raise these objections about the comparable price of M/s.Sud Chernie before us for the following further reasons.   In  the instant case, the entire exercise  before the  Authority  would  have  been  simplified  if  only  the respondent  had produced its export price of its catalyst to an appropriate third country which information was available with  it,  which, if furnished, could have  established  the actual  normal value of their catalysts.  When it failed  to do  so  for no valid reason, the Authority was compelled  to rely  on  other material available to it and resort  to  the best  judgment valuation.  In such a situation we are of the opinion  that  the complaint of the respondent  against  the material   relied   upon   by   the  Authority   cannot   be countenanced.   In  this  context  we place  reliance  on  a judgment of this Court in Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v.  Mahomed Haji  Latif & Ors.  (1968 3 SCR 862) wherein this Court held as under :

     Even  if the burden of proof does not lie on a  party the  court  may  draw an adverse inference if  he  withholds important  documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts in issue.  It is not a sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of affairs to withhold from  the  court  the  best   evidence  which  is  in  their possession  which  could  throw  light upon  the  issues  in controversy  and to rely upon the abstract doctrine of  onus of proof.

     Though  the  above observation of this Court was  with reference  to  a proceeding in a court of law, we find  that

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the   same  is  equally   applicable  to  the  investigation conducted  by  the  Authority herein which has the  duty  of appreciating  the evidence placed before it and also has the statutory  authority  of  drawing adverse inference  in  the circumstances enumerated in Rule 6(8) of the Rules.

     It was next contended by the respondent before us that the  Authority erred in fixing two different injury  margins for  the  same catalyst based on different end-users of  the said  catalyst  which,  according  to  the  respondent,   is impermissible  in law.  This argument has also found  favour with  the  tribunal.   In  this regard,  we  note  that  the Authority  has come to the conclusion that the catalysts  in question  were imported to this country under two  different tariff  items based on its end-user for which the import was made.   It  is noticed that when the catalyst concerned  was imported  under a project import basis, the same was cleared under  Chapter  98 of the Act at NIL rate of customs  duty and  if imported for any other purpose, the same was cleared under  Chapter  38 at the prevailing duty.  Thus there is  a difference in import duty based on the user factor.  In this background,  the  Authority came to the conclusion that  the landed  value  of  the subject catalyst will vary  with  the applicable  customs  duty  and consequently  there  will  be difference  between  the cost of import and the  margins  of dumping  would  also  vary.  The Tribunal did not  give  any specific reason why the two different margins cannot be made applicable  based  on different import duties applicable  to the  concerned  catalysts.  In this regard, it accepted  the argument of the respondent in the following words :

     Designated  Authority has found two dumping duties on each  of  the catalysts depending on the use of which  these are  put  to  on  import.  This  action  of  the  Designated Authority  has  come  under  very   serious  attack  by  the appellant.  Learned counsel representing UCIL did not try to support  this  action  of  the  Designated  Authority.   The argument  advanced  by  the Designated  Authority  was  that depending  on  the  end-use  each catalyst  was  having  two different  export prices.  Consequently, they warranted  two anti-dumping  duties.  We are not able to uphold the  action of  the  Designated Authority.  During the  relevant  period duty  rates varied depending upon whether the importer was a fertiliser  unit of refiner, while for former enjoyed  total exemption  the latter was subjected to a lower rate of  duty than  the  duty for imports under Chapter 38.   Thus,  there were three effective rates and not two taken into account by the  Authority.   The fair selling price and injury  margins worked out were incorrect for this reason too.

     It,  however, did not give any finding why two dumping duties  based  on different injury margins cannot be  levied under the Act.  The margin of dumping is defined to mean the difference  between  its export price and its normal  value. The  Authority  while determining the margin of dumping  has come  to  a  definite conclusion that the  argument  of  the exporter  that  its export price has been more or  less  the same  irrespective  of tariff head under which the  catalyst was  imported,  was incorrect and the Authority has  further found  different  dumping margins based on clearances  under the  two different tariff heads.  Section 9A(1) contemplates levy  of  an anti-dumping duty not exceeding the  margin  of dumping  in  relation to such article.  If that be  so  then when the Authority on an investigation of facts comes to the

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conclusion  that  by virtue of two different customs  duties there  have been two different dumping margins in regard  to the  subject  catalyst  based on  customs  clearances,  ipso facto,  anti-dumping duty which is relatable cost of  import also  changes.  Therefore, the contention of the  respondent that  there  cannot be two anti dumping duties in regard  to the same catalyst, cannot be countenanced.

     It was next contended on behalf of the respondent that the  Authority  was statutorily bound to have completed  its investigation  within a period of one year from the date  of initiation  of  such investigation.  He contended  that  the investigation  in question was initiated by the  preliminary notification  of  6th  of  September,   1996  and  the  same concluded  only  by a Notification of 5th January, 1998  and though  there was an extension granted by the Government  of India under proviso to Rule 17, the same having been granted without  notice  to  the  respondent, the  extension  is  in violation  of principles of natural justice and consequently the  final determination made by the authority being  beyond the  period of one year specified by the Rules, the same  is liable  to  be quashed on the ground of  limitation.   Under Rule  17  of  the Rules, the Authority had to  complete  the investigation within a period of one year but this period is extendable  by a further period of six months by the Central Government  in  circumstances  of exceptional  nature.   The Tribunal on investigation of the concerned files produced by the  Central  Government came to the conclusion that  on  an application  made  by the Authority, the Central  Government had  extended  the  time within the limit  prescribed  under proviso  to  Rule 17 of the Rules and the final finding  was submitted  to the Central Government by the Authority within such  extended  period.   However,  as  noticed  above,  the respondent  contends that such extension of time is  opposed to  the  principles  of  natural  justice  inasmuch  as  the respondent  was not notified in regard to the request of the Authority  for  extension of time, nor was it  heard  before time  was  extended.   In support of  this  contention,  the respondent  has  relied  on two judgments of this  Court  in I.J.Rao,  Asstt.  Collector of Customs vs.  Bibhuti  Bhushan Bagh  (1989  42 ELT 338 SC) and The Assistant  Collector  of Customs   &  Superintendent,   Preventive  Service  Customs, Calcutta  and  Ors.  vs.  Charan Das Malhotra (AIR  1972  SC 689).  Per contra, on behalf of the appellants, it is argued that the extension of time contemplated under the proviso to Rule  17 is an administrative act based on exigencies of the case.   A decision taken in regard to the extension of  time to  complete the investigation does not in any manner effect the  right of the parties to the investigation.   Therefore, the requirement of the respondent being hurt before granting any  such  extension, does not arise.  We notice that  under the  provision  empowering  the  extension of  time  by  the Central  Government  (proviso  to  Rule  17),  there  is  no requirement  that the concerned parties to the investigation should  be  heard before extending the time.  We agree  with the  appellant  that  this  decision   in  question  is   an administrative  decision  based on exigencies of  the  case. The  statute governing the investigation into dumping by  an Authority  has provided an elaborate procedure and  wherever the  concerned  parties  are  entitled  to  notice,  it  has specifically  provided for the same.  In the absence of  any such  requirement to issue notice in proviso to Rule 17,  we are  of  the opinion that the contention of  the  respondent that  it is entitled to any notice prior to the exercise  of the  power  under  the  proviso to Rule 17  by  the  Central

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Government,  is  devoid of any merit.  In the instant  case, the investigation was completed within the stipulated period after  obtaining  the necessary extension from  the  Central Government.  The decisions relied upon by the respondent, in our opinion, have no bearing on the facts of this case since in those cases the proceedings were quasi-criminal in nature where  application  of  principles of  natural  justice  was inherent,  unlike the present case where the application  of principles  of natural justice is limited to the  provisions already  made in the statute.  Further, apart from the  fact the  respondent  is  not  entitled   to  any  notice  before extending  the  time for concluding the investigation  under Rule  17,  we  also  notice  that  the  respondent  has  not established  any prejudice suffered by it whatsoever.   Here we  notice with approval the observations of the Tribunal to the  effect  that the respondent, though, was aware  of  the extension   granted   to  the   Authority  by  the   Central Government,  did not object to the same when the proceedings before  the Authority continued after the extension of  time and  having suffered an adverse order cannot be permitted to raise  this  question  subsequently at an  appellate  stage. Accordingly, this objection of the respondent also fails and the  same is rejected.  For the reasons stated above,  these appeals  succeed  and the orders of the  Tribunal,  impugned herein, are set aside.  The appeals are allowed with costs.

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