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PETITIONER: DEONARAYAN SINGH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE COMMISSIONER OF BHAGALPUR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       23/04/1997

BENCH: S.B. MAJMUDAR, M. JAGANNADHA RAO

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T S.B. Majmudar, J.      This appeal  on special  leave is  directed against the decision rendered  by a  Full Bench  of the Patna High Court dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellants.      In order  to appreciate the grievance of the appellants it will be necessary to note a few relevant facts leading to these proceedings.  A Jamabandi No. 65 of mauza Billi within police Station Madhupur, in the district of Santhal Parganas in the  State of  Bihar was recorded in the names of Sitaram Singh, Jaleshwar  Singh, Yudhisthir Singh and Kastura Kumari Devi as  Mool Raiyat  Ka Jote. They amongst themselves had 8 annas interest in the said jote. As occupants of lands, they were called  Raiyats with their headman as Mool Raiyat. Mool Raiyat Ka Jote was a land tenure in Santhal parganas. It was attached to  a Mool  Raiyat who  as a  village  headman  was responsible for  the collection  of land revenue in times of British rule.  The proprietor landlord was called ’Ghatwal’. Requisite rent of the land was to be banded over by the Moll Raiyat to  the Ghatwal.  Mool Raiyat  had  two types of land tenures. Mool  Raiyat ka  Jote was  alianable and  personal. Mool Raiyat  Jote was  inalienable and  was attached  to his office. It  was called  official jote.  it is not in dispute between the  parties that official jote admeasured 1 acre 81 decimals while  Mool Raiyat  of the  village in place of his farther in  Revenue Miscellaneous  Case No.99  of 1938-39 of the Court  of  sub-Divisional  officer,  Deoghar.  the  said appointment was  duly approved by the Deputy commissioner of Santhal parganas.  It is  the case of the appellants that as the entire  family of  Sarju Singh @ Bhatu Singh was heavily indebted and was in need of money, the said 8 annas interest in Mool  Raiyat comprising  38 acres 9 decimals representing his share  in Nij  Jote came  to be sold by said Bhatu Singh and his  brothers to  one Bimal  Kanti Roy Choudhury on 22nd March 1939.  The further  case of the appellants is that the said vendors  had been  in possession of 38.09 acres of land in lieu  of their  8 annas interest in Mool Raiyat by family arrangement  with   their  co-sharers.  The  said  sale  was effected for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/-. That after the said purchase  Shri Bimal  Kanti Roy  Choudhury got his name

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mutated in  respect of  8 annas  interest in  Mool Raiyat Ka Jote of  the said  mauza Billi in Revenue Miscellaneous Case No.21 of  193-40 by  an order of the sub-Divisional Officer, Deoghar dated  27th November 1939 which was duly approved by Deputy Commissioner, Dumka on 28th November 1939. Shri Bimal Kanti Roy  Choudhury was  subsequently appointed as 16 annas sarbarakar of  the said  mauza. The  said order  was  passed after service  of notice  on all  the co-owners of Jamabandi No.65.      That by  Sale Deed  dated 26th  June 1950   said  Bimal Kanti  Roy  Choudhury  sold  his  entire  right,  title  and interest in  the Mool  Raiyat Ka  Jote to  Shri Radha Prasad Singh, Father  or the  appellants  for  a  consideration  of Rs.17,000/-. The  vendee Radha  prasad Singh  got  hes  name mutated in  the Revenue Miscellaneous Case No. 40 of 1950-51 of the  Court of  Sub-Divisional Officer,  Deoghar. The said order of  mutation was passed after service of notice on all the opposite  parties, respondent  nos.4 to  15. The  vendee Radha  Prasad   Singh  during   his  lifetime   remained  in possession of the aforesaid 38.09 acres of land of Jamabandi No.65 and  was also  acting as sharer of a annas Mool raiyat Ka jote  and 16  annas sarbarakar  or the said mauza. As the contesting respondents  sought to  disturb the possession of Radha Prasad  Singh proceedings  under Section  145 Code  of Criminal Procedure  were initiated.  They were registered as Criminal  Case  No.  567  of  1950.  But  the  learned  Sub- Divisional Officer.  Deoghar by  his order dated 31st August 1951 declared  the possession  of  the  appellants’  father. Revision against  the said  order was  rejected by  Sessions Judge,  Dumka.  After  the  death  of  Radha  Prasad  Singh, appellant no.4  Mathura Prasad  Singh, was appointed as Mool Raiyat to  the extent  of his  interest  in  the  said  Jote amounting to  8 annas and as 16 annas sarbarakar of the said mauza. It  was only  thereafter that  in  the  year  1970-71 respondent nos.4  to 15  claiming to  be  the  original  co- sharers of  the  mauza  filed  an  application  before  Sub- Divisional Officer, Deoghar against the appellants for their eviction from  38.09 acres  of  land  of  Jamabandi  No.  65 alleging that  the same had been illegally alienated. It was registered as  Revenue Eviction  Case No.67 of 1970-71. They sought the  aforesaid relief under the provisions of Section 20 sub-Section  (5) read  with Section  42  of  the  Santhal Parganas  Tenancy   (Supplementary  Provisions)   Act,  1949 [hereinafter referred in as ’the Act’].      In the  first instance  learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Deoghar, rejected  the said application. Respondent Nos.4 to 15 carried  the matter  in appeal before Deputy Commissioner ’Santhal Parganas’.  It  was  transferred  to  the  file  of Additional Deputy  Commissioner, Dumka,  who  by  his  order dated 30th  September 1972  allowed the  appeal and  ordered eviction of  the appellants.  It was  held by the Additional Deputy Commissioner  that the  original sale  transaction by Bhatu Singh  in favour  of Bimal  Kanti Roy  Choudhury dated 22nd March 1939 was violative of provisions of Section 27(1) of  the   Santhal  Parganas   Settlement  Regulation,   1872 (hereinafter referred  to as ’the Regulation’) which applied at the relevant time and consequently the subsequent sale by Shri Bimal  Kanti Roy  Choudhury in  favour  of  appellants’ father was  equally violative  of the  provisions of Section 20(1) of  the Act.  Hence the  appellants were  liable to be evicted  from  the  land.  The  aforesaid  decision  of  the appellate   authority    resulted   in    further    Revenue Miscellaneous   Appeal    before   Commissioner,   Bhagalpur Division, who  by order  dated 2nd  June 1976  dismissed the same and  confirmed the  eviction order passed by Additional

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Deputy  Commissioner,   Dumka.  The   appellants  thereafter carried the  matter to the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of  the Constitution  of  India.  The  appellants’  Writ Petition was  heard by  a Full  Bench consisting of the then Chief Justice  S.S. Sandhawalia,  Justice S.  Ali Ahmad  and Justice B.S.  Sinha. The  Full  Bench  considered  the  main question which  was posed  for its decision, namely, whether the prescriptive period of 12 years for perfecting the title by adverse  possession when  the original  transfer  was  in contravention of  Section 27  of the  Regulation would  stop running from 1st November 1949 being the date of enforcement of  the  Act.  The  Full  Bench  noted  that  this  was  the significant solitary  question arising  from  a  deep-seated conflict  of   precedent  within   that  Court   which   had necessitated that  reference to  the Full  Bench.  The  Full Bench speaking  through S.S.  Sandhawalia, CJ., On this moot question referred  to an  earlier decision of the Full Bench of that  Court in the case of Bhauri Lal Jain and another v. Sub-Divisional Officer  of Jamtara and others AIR 1973 Patna 1 and  posed the  question whether  the earlier  Full  Bench decision covered the controversy posed for their decision in the present  case and  if so what was the precise mandate of the earlier  Full Bench  decision. In  the impugned judgment the Full Bench took the view that the earlier transaction of 22nd  March   1939  was  violative  of  Section  27  of  the Regulation and  that the  possession of  the vendee  through Bimal Kanti  Roy Choudhury from that date was adverse to the vendors but  by the time the Act applied to Santhal Parganas with effect  from 1st  November 1949  the said  vendee Bimal Kanti Roy  Choudhury had  not completed  12 years of adverse possession and  consequently the  transaction in  his favour and  the   subsequent  transaction   by  him  in  favour  of appellants’ father  on 26th  June 1950  were  liable  to  be voided both under Section 27(1) of the Regulation as well as Section 20(1)  of the  Act read  with  Section  42  thereof. Resultantly the  Full Bench  did not  find  fault  with  the decision rendered  by  the  lower  authorities  against  the appellants. Sandhawalia,  CJ., also  noted in  his  judgment that in view of his decision he was disinclined to permit or advert to  the ancillary  contentions sought  to be urged in the alternative  for the first time in the writ jurisdiction by the  appellants. Thus  there was  a unanimous decision of the Full  Bench that  prescriptive period  of 12  years  fro perfecting the  title by  adverse possession  in  connection with the  transactions  entered  into  in  contravention  of Section 27  of the  Regulation would  stop running  from 1st November 1949  being the  date of  enforcement of  the  Act. However on  the question  of relief  to be granted under the circumstances the  majority of  the learned  Judges took the view that  the orders  of the  learned Commissioner  and the Additional Deputy  Commissioner directing settlement of land with respondent  no.10 must  be set  aside  meaning  thereby according to  the majority  the land  should be place at the disposal of  the State  Government for  being dealt  with in accordance with  law. We  may note  at this  stage that  the contesting respondents  who had  moved  a  separate  Special Leave Petition  to the  extent they  were aggrieved  by  the decision of the majority of the High Court setting aside the direction fro  restoration of  the land  in their possession could not  persuade this  Court to admit their Special Leave Petition which  had stood dismissed. Hence strictly speaking they are  out of  the arena  of contest  and now the contest remains between  the officers of the State of Bihar, namely, respondent nos.1  to 3  and State of Bihar, respondent no.16 on the one hand and the appellants on the other.

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    Dr. Dhavan  learned senior  counsel for  the appellants raised various  contentions  before  us  for  assailing  the decision of  the Full  Bench under  appeal. He  also  had  a serious grievance  against the  earlier decision of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Bhauri Lal Jain (supra). However  as will be indicated hereinafter it is not necessary for  us to  pronounce upon  the correctness of the decision of  the Full  Bench in  the case of Bhauri Lal Jain (supra) which  in its  turn was  heavily relied  upon by the latter Full  Bench of  the Patna  High Court in the impugned judgment.  The  appellants  are,  as  will  be  demonstrated hereinafter, entitled  to succeed  on an  entirely different ground which  also was  placed for  our consideration by Dr. Dhavan, learned  senior counsel for the appellants and which was  justifiably   contested  by  learned  counsel  for  the respondent-authorities. We  will, therefore,  deal with this solitary ground.      The aforesaid  narration  of  facts  leading  to  these proceedings shows that on 22nd March 1939 when 8 annas share in Mool  Raiyat was conveyed by one of the co-sharers of the said Jote, namely, Bhatu Singh in favour of Shri Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury,  Section 27(1)  of the Regulation was holding the field. The said Section 27(1) read with Section 27(3) of the Regulation provided as under:      "27.(1) No  transfer by a Raiyat of      his right  in his  holding  or  any      portion  thereof,   by  sale,  gift      mortgage,  lease   or   any   other      contract  or  agreement,  shall  be      valid unless  the right to transfer      has been  recorded in the record of      rights, and then only to the extent      to which such right is so recorded.      (2) ... ... ... ...      (3) If  at any time it comes to the      notice of  the Deputy  Commissioner      that a  transfer  contravention  of      sub-Section (1) has taken place, he      may, in  his discretion,  evict the      transferee and  either restore  the      transferred land  to the  Raiyat or      any heirs  of the  Raiyat  who  has      transferred  it,  or  resettle  the      land with  another Raiyat according      to  the   village  custom  for  the      disposal of an abandoned holding:      Provided-      (a) that  the transferee whom it is      proposed to  evict has  not been in      continuous  cultivating  possession      for twelve years;      (b) that he is given an opportunity      of showing  cause against the order      of eviction; and      (c) that  all  proceedings  of  the      Deputy  Commissioner   under   this      section shall be subject to control      and revision by the Commissioner."      It is  not in  dispute and  was not rightly disputed by learned senior  counsel for  the appellants  that  the  said transaction prima  facie appeared to be violative of Section 27(1) of  the Regulation  as Bhatu  Singh who  was a  Raiyat sought to transfer his 8 annas share in the Mool Raiyat when the right  to transfer  which was  recorded in the Record of Rights enabled  the Mool  Raiyat to transfer, if at all, his

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entire rights  in the mauza consisting of his alienable Mool Raiyat ka Jote as he was the Mool Raiyat. But learned senior counsel for  the  appellants  submitted  that  by  a  family partition prior  to the transaction of sale 8 annas share in the Mool  Raiyat comprising  of 38 acres and 9 decimals feel to the  share of Bhatu Singh and it  was his entire share in the Mool  Raiyat that  was transferred  by the  transaction. Hence Section 27(1) was fully complied with. This contention is not open to the learned senior counsel for the appellants for the  simple reason that the Full Bench of the High Court of Patna in the impugned judgment has noted  in paragraph 22 that there  was a  concurrent finding  of the sub-Divisional officer, the  Deputy Commissioner  and then the Commissioner that the  said transfer  was in  violation of  the record of rights of  the estate  and  consequently  Section  27(1)  of Regulation III  of 1872  and that concurrent finding was not challenged before  the High  Court indeed being based on the relevant record  was  thus  wholly  unassailable.  We  must, therefore, proceed on the basis that the transaction of sale dated 22nd  March 1939  by Vendor  Bhatu Singh  in favour of vendee Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury was violative of Section 27 (1) of the Regulation.      But now  arises the further question as to how the said transaction was  treated by the authorities charged with the administration of the Regulation in the area. so far as this aspect is  concerned unfortunately the attention of the High court does  not seem  to have  been drawn  to it.  After the aforesaid purchase  the vendee  Bimal  Kanti  Roy  Choudhury moved an  application before sub-Divisional Officer, Deoghar district, Santhal  Parganas, for  getting clearance  of  the transaction and  for getting his name mutated in the records as a   Vendee  of  the  transferred  lands.  That  case  was registered as  Revenue Miscellaneous  Case No.21 of 1939-40. Thus he  drew the  attention of  the competent  authority in connection with this transaction. The Sub-Divisional officer by his  order dated  31st May  1939 issued  notices  to  the parties concerned  for objection,  if any. Notices were duly served. The  landlord Ghatwal  did not  file  any  objection through his  agent as  noted in  the proceedings of 1st July 1939. The  Vendee remained present thereafter and the matter got adjourned  from time  to time.  On 19th  August 1939 the landlord’s  agent   objected  to   the  clearance   of   the transaction by saying that the security offered by other co- sharers was  insufficient and  that the  purchaser had taken only Mool  Raiyat’s interest.  Hence notices  were issued to the co-sharers of the late Mool Raiyat why their share would not remain  in security.  Thereafter on  09th  October  1939 Vendee’s agent  and landlord’s agent were present and no one appeared for  the co-sharers of the late Mool Raiyat. Matter was put  up for  orders on  02nd November  1939  vendee  was present. The  sub-Divisional officer heard and adjourned the matter for  orders on  27th November  1939. On 27th November 1939 co-sharers  of the  late Mool  Raiyat did not appear or object. He,  therefore, held that  mutation was required  to be allowed.  He, therefore,  submitted  the  matter  to  the Deputy Commissioner  for orders. Submitted the matter to the Deputy  commissioner   approving  the  transaction  and  the mutation in  favour of the vendee Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury. Accordingly mutation  was carried  out on  24th January 1940 and papers  were corrected.  The aforesaid  facts which have been brought  on record and on which learned counsel for the authorities could  not obviously  offer any objection, leave no room  for doubt  that the first transaction of sale dated 22nd March  1939  was  duly  scrutinised  by  the  competent authorities and  the Deputy  Commissioner who  approved  the

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same. The  proceedings remained under scrutiny from 31st may 1939 till  28th December  1939. Thus  for seven  months  the enquiry went  on and  ultimately the  aforesaid decision was rendered. It  must, therefore,  be held that there was ample opportunity for  the Deputy  Commissioner, if so advised, to order eviction  of the  transferee in exercise of his powers under Section 27(3) of the Regulation but it appears that in his  discretion   he  had   waived  his   objection  to  the transaction and the same was regularised. The said inference is inevitable as but for the said fact mutation in favour of vendee Bimal  Roy Choudhury would never have been sanctioned by the  competent authority  at the  relevant time. It must, therefore, be  held that  on the peculiar facts of this case the first  transaction of  sale dated  22nd March  1939  was duly  approved   and  cleared  by  the  competent  authority exercising powers  under Section  27(3) of  the  Regulation. Once that  happened a  right accrued in favour of the vendee to remain in possession of the transferred lands admeasuring 38.09 acres  in his own right and the curtain dropped on the said transaction.  It is  obvious that  thereafter under the said  Regulation   if  it   had  continued  to  operate  the transaction would  not have been re-opened once it was found that  the   Deputy  Commissioner   having  notice   of   the transaction had  not thought it fit to exercise powers under Section 27(3)  of the  Regulation for  evicting the  illegal transferee.  it   may  be  ,  as  learned  counsel  for  the authorities rightly  submitted  that  if  in  a  given  case relevant facts  were not brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner earlier  and if  subsequently he had found that the transaction  was violative of sub-Section (1) of Section 27 in  a proper  case he  could have  exercised power  under Section 27(3)  but such  are not  the facts  of the  present case. As noted earlier seven months elapsed during which the transaction remained  under the gaze of scrutiny of the sub- Divisional officer  and ultimately  got scrutinised  by  the Deputy Commissioner  himself. Consequently  on the  peculiar facts of this case it must be held that the said transaction was duly  filtered by  the competent  authority who  in  its discretion approved  the same  years back  on 28th  December 1939. Accordingly  it must  be held  that a right accrued to the transferee  of the said transfer in his favour under the Regulation. Let us now see as to what was the effect on this right of  the vendee  by the  coming in  to operation of the Act. As  noted earlier  the Act  became applicable from 01st November 1949.   Section  3  of  the  Act  states  that  the enactment mentioned in Schedule A are repealed to the extent specified in  the fourth  column thereof.  When we  turn  to Schedule A  to the Act we find listed as one of the Acts the Regulation of  1872 and  the extent  of the  repeal  of  the Regulation was  in connection  with Sections 27 and 28. Once Section 27  of the  Regulation stood  repealed by  the  Act, question arises  whether the  right  which  had  accrued  to vendee Bimal  Kanti Roy  Choudhury under  the Regulation  in connection with  the operation of Section 27 sub-Sections(1) and (3)  of the  Regulation was  saved or  not  despite  the repeal of  the said  Section 27. A mere look at the relevant provisions of  the  Act  shows  that  there  is  no  express provision in  the Act  which lays  down that notwithstanding the orders  passed  or  actions  taken  in  connection  with transactions under  the Regulation.  and notwithstanding any rights which might have accrued thereunder fresh scrutiny of the said  transaction  could  be  made  under  the  relevant provisions of  the Act  which corresponded  to  the  earlier repealed Section  27 of the Regulation. When such a contrary intention does  not appear  from the  scheme of the Act, the

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effect of  the  repeal  of  Section  27  of  the  Regulation squarely attracts  the provisions  of Section 8 of the Bihar General Clauses Act, 1917 which reads as under:      "8. Effect  of repeal.  - Where any      Bihar and  Orissa Act  or Bihar Act      repeals  any   enactment   hitherto      made,  or  hereafter  to  be  made,      then, unless  a different intention      appears, the repeal shall not-      (a) revive anything not in force or      existing at  the time  at which the      repeal takes effect; or      (b) affect  the previous  operation      of any  enactment so  repealed,  or      anything  duly   done  or  suffered      thereunder; or      (c) affect  any  right,  privilege,      obligation, or  liability acquired,      accrued  or   incurred  under   any      enactment  so  repealed; or      (d) affect  any penalty, forfeiture      of punishment  incurred in  respect      of any  offence  committed  against      any enactment so repealed; or      (e) affect any investigation, legal      proceeding or  remedy in respect of      any    such    right,    privilege,      obligation,   liability,   penalty,      forfeiture,   or    punishment   as      aforesaid,      and any  such investigation,  legal      proceeding   or   remedy   may   be      instituted, continued  or  enforce,      and any such penalty, forfeiture or      punishment may be imposed as if the      repealing Act had not been passed."      As repealed  Section 27 of the Regulation is re-enacted as Section  20(1) of  the Act and as the latter Act does not project any  different and  contrary  intention  to  set  at naught any  final orders  rendered  by competent authorities under the repealed Section 27  of the Regulation, the repeal of Section  27 of  the Regulation by the Act will not affect any right,  privilege, obligation,  or  liability  acquired, accrued,  accrued   or  incurred  under  the  said  repealed provision.  Consequently   the  immunity   earned   by   the transaction of  22nd March 1939 under the Regulation and the approval granted  to it  by the Competent authority, namely, the Deputy  Commissioner by  his order  dated 28th  December 1939 remained  available and  accrued to  the  Vendee  Bimal Kanti Roy  Choudhury despite the repeal of Section 27 of the Regulation by  the Act.  Thus on  the peculiar facts of this case it must be held that the transaction of 22nd March 1939 cannot be  said to  have any  adverse effect on the right of the vendee  under  the  said  transaction  and  he  remained perfectly competent to deal with the transferred 38.09 acres of land  covered by the said transaction in his favour which was duly  filtered by  the then  competent authorities under the Regulation.  Consequently the  decision rendered  on the merits of  this transaction by all the authorities below and which came  to be accepted by the High Court in the impugned judgment cannot  be sustained  on account  of these  salient tell-tale facts  which have remained undisputed on record of the case.      The  Second  transaction  which  is  on  the  anvil  of scrutiny is the sale dated 26th June 1950 by Bimal Kanti Roy

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Choudhury in  favour of  Radha Prasad  Singh, father  of the appellants. so  far as this Sale Deed is concerned it stands on a  a still  stronger footing.  By the  said Sale Deed the entire  right,   title  and  interest  of  Bimal  Kanti  Roy Choudhury in  38.09 acres  of land  got  conveyed  to  Radha Prasad Singh.  Consequently it  could not  be said  to be  a transfer which  was hit  by  Section  20  of  the  Act.  The relevant provisions thereof read as under :      "20. Transfer  of Raiyat’s rights.-      (1) No  transfer by a Raiyat of his      holding or  any portion thereof, by      sale, gift,  mortgage, will,  lease      or any  other contract or agreement      express or implied, shall be valid,      unless the  right to  transfer  has      been  recorded  in  the  record  of      rights, and then only to the extent      to which such right is so recorded.           Provided  that   a  lease   of      Raiyati land in any subdivision for      the purpose excise shop thereon may      be validly  granted or renewed by a      Raiyat , for a period not exceeding      one year, with the previous written      permission    of     the     Deputy      Commissioner:           provided  further  that  where      gifts by  a recorded Santhal Raiyat      to  a   sister  and   daughter  are      permissible under  the Santhal law,      such Raiyat  may, with the previous      written permission  of  the  Deputy      Commissioner, validly  make such  a      gift.           Provided    also    that    an      aboriginal  Raiyat  may,  with  the      previous written  permission of the      Deputy Commissioner  , make a grant      in  respect   of  his   lands   not      exceeding one  half of  the area of      his holding  to his  widowed mother      or to  his wife for her maintenance      after his death.      (2)................................      (3)................................      (4)................................      (5) If  at any time it comes to the      notice of  the Deputy  Commissioner      that a transfer in contravention of      sub-section (1)  or (2)  has  taken      place  he  may  in  his  discretion      evict  the  transferee  and  either      restore the transferred land to the      Raiyat or  any heirs  of the Raiyat      who  has  transferred  it,  or  re-      settle the land with another Raiyat      according to the village custom for      the  disposal   of   an   abandoned      holding:           Provided that  the  transferee      whom it  is proposed to evict shall      be given  an opportunity of showing      cause   against    the   order   of      eviction."      It would at once become clear that Section 20(1) of the

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Act runs parallel to the scheme of the earlier provisions of Section 27(1)  of the Regulation. Bimal Kanti Roy  Choudhury was a  Raiyat who  was recognised  as the Mool Raiyat by the competent  authorities  under  the  Regulation.  His  entire right, title  and interest  in the  said land  which was  an alienable  jote   was  transferred  under  the  said  second transaction in favour of the appellant’ father. The right to transfer was  duly recorded  in the  Record  of  Rights  and required the  transferor to  transfer if  at all  his entire right, title  and interest  in  the  Mool  Raiyat.  That  is precisely what  was done by Bimal Roy Choudhury in favour of the appellants’  father by  the transaction  dated 26th June 1950.  Therefore,   this  transaction  did  not  offend  the provisions of  Section 20(1)  of the  Act. If that is so, it remained fully  within the forecorners of the said provision and could  not be  treated to be illegal or invalid from any angle. Consequently  there would  remain no occasion for the authorities to  invoke Section  20(5) of  the Act  read with Section  42   thereof  in   connection  with   this   latter transaction of  sale  dated  26th  June  1950.  In  fact  in fairness to  the respondents  it must  be submitted that all authorities below  as well as the High Court by the impugned judgment  have   considered  the  invalidity  of  the  first transaction of  sale dated 22nd March 1939 and in that light they have  voided the  second transactions  a  consequential transaction. once  the nexus  between  the  two  sales  gets snapped and  the earlier  transaction by  itself  cannot  be found fault  with from any angle, then there would remain no occasion  for   the  respondent-authorities  to  invoke  the provisions of  Section 20(1)  read with  sub-section (5) and section 42  of the  Act in  connection with  even the second sale transaction  dated 26th June 1950. once that conclusion is reached  the result  becomes obvious.  On these  peculiar facts there  is no  escape  from  the  conclusion  that  the possession of  the appellants  as heirs  of deceased  vendee Radha Prasad Singh can be said to have been validly obtained and a  valid title  that was  convoyed in  land  admeasuring 38.09 acres,  to their  father Radha  prasad Singh under the second sale  transaction dated  26th June  1950, got legally transmitted  to  the  appellants  by  rules  of  succession. Consequently on  these facts no action could have been taken by the  authorities under the relevant provisions of the Act against  the   appellants,  Only   on  this   short  ground, therefore, the  appeal is required to be allowed. We made it clear that in view of the aforesaid decision of ours we have not thought  it fit  to  consider  the  correctness  of  the decision of  the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of Bhauri Lal  Jain (supra) as well as the impugned judgment of the full  Bench in connection with the adverse possession of the vendee under an  invalid transaction of land in the area being violative  of  Section  27(1)  of  the  Regulation  or Section 20(1)  of the Act. That question is, therefore, kept open. Similarly  we have  also not thought it fit to go into the wider  question canvassed  by learned  counsel  for  the respondent-authorities that  even if  mutations are rendered by the  authorities under  the Regulation  or the  Act if on subsequent facts  being brought  to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner and  once there  was  no  earlier  occasion  or possibility for  the Deputy  Commissioner to exercise powers under Section  21(5) of  the Act or 27(1) of the Regulation, such  power   could  be   exercised  later  on  under  those circumstances. We leave that question also open as it is not necessary for  us to  pronounce upon the same in view of the decision rendered  by us  on the  merits of the impugned two transactions as seen earlier.

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    In the  result the  appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court are quashed and set aside. Similarly the decision rendered by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dumka dated  30th September  1975 as  well as  the  decision rendered by  the Commissioner  dated 02nd June 1976 are also quashed  and   set  aside   and  the  application  moved  by respondent nos.4 to 15 under Section 20 sub-section (5) read with Section  42 of  the Act  is ordered to be dismissed. In the facts  and circumstances  of the  case there  will be no order as to costs.