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PETITIONER: DEDH NATHU RAJA (DEAD) BY L. RS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: L. ANGHA NATHU JAMAL (DEAD) BY L. RS & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/09/1969

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. RAMASWAMI, V. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1971 AIR  300            1970 SCR  (2) 434  1969 SCC  (3) 813

ACT:     Practice and Procedure--States Reorganisation Act (37 of 1956),  ss.  52, 57 land 59--High Court in Part B  State  of Saurashtra--Appeal from Judgment to single judge to Division Bench permissible only with certificate--Part B State merged with  State  of  Bombay  and High  Court  in  Part  B  State abolished--Proceedings transferred to  Bombay  High   Court- Letters  Patent, Cl. 15--Judgment of single Judge  in  first appeal appealable without certificate--First appeal to  High Court in Part B State--Disposed    by Single Judge of Bombay High  Court after merger--Whether appeal to  Division  Bench lies without certificate.

HEADNOTE:     Under  s.  22A(2) of the Saurashtra Ordinance No.  2  of 1948,  an appeal lay to a Division Bench of  the  Saurashtra High  Court  Tom a judgment of a single Judge of  that  High Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, if  the Judge  certified  that the, case was a fit one  for  appeal. The  States  Reorganisation Act, 1956, merged the  Part  ’B’ State of Saurashtra into the State of Bombay, abolished  the High  Court  of  Saurashtra as from November  1,  1956,  and transferred the proceedings pending before the High Court of Saurashtra  to the High Court of Bombay.  Section 52 of  the Act conferred upon the High Court of Bombay, after  November 1,  1956,  the original, appellate  and  other  jurisdiction which  was  exercised  by  the  High  Court  of   Saurashtra immediately prior to that date in respect of the territories in the State of Saurashtra.  The Saurashtra Ordinance No.  2 of  1948 was repealed with effect from November 1. 1956.  by the Saurashtra (Adaptation of Laws on Union Subjects  Order, 1957.  and   the Rules and orders relating to  practice  and procedure  framed  by  the High  Court  of  Saurashtra  were abrogated  as  from November 1, 1956 by rules  of  the  High Court of Bombay made under s. 54 of the State Reorganisation Act. 1956.  The effect of s. 57 of the States Reorganisation Act is that the powers of a Division Bench of the High Court for the new State of Bombay shall be the same as the  powers of  the  Division Bench under the law in  force  immediately before  November 1, 1956, in the State of Bombay. Clause  15

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of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Bombay, which was law  in force immediately before November  1.  1956, in  the State  of Bombay, provides that an appeal from the  judgment of  a  single  Judge of the Bombay High Court,  in  a  first appeal  from a judgment of the Subordinate Court,  could  be filed  without a certificate of the Judge hearing the  first appeal.  Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay  High Court  applied  also  to the Gujarat High  Court  which  was established  as  a result of the Bombay  Reoganisation  Act. 1960.     A  first appeal against a decree of a subordinate  court in  Saurashtra,  pending  in the Saurashtra  High  Court  on November  1,  1956,  was transferred to the  High  Court  of Bombay, and disposed of by a single Judge of the Bombay High Court.  ’An appeal to the Division Bench under CI. 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Bombay, was  transferred to  the Gujarat High Court after its establishment, but  the Gujarat  High  Court held that the  appeal  was  incompetent under  s.  22A of the Saurashtra Ordinance No.  2.  of  1948 without a certificate from the single Judge.      435 In appeal to this Court,     HELD: (1) It was only in the absence of any provision to the  contrary, that a right attached to the action  when  it was commenced in the subordinate court in Saurashtra that an appeal against the decision of the single Judge of the  High Court of Saurashtra in appeal, shall lie only if the single. judge  certified  that  it was a fit case for  appeal  to  a Division Bench.     Garikapatti  Veerayya  v.N.  Subbiah  Choudhury,  [1957] S.C.R. 488, referred to. [443 A-B].     (2)  But,  from November 1, 1956,  the  Saurashtra  High Court  was abolished, the Saurashtra Ordinance No. 2 of 1948 was  repealed,  and the jurisdiction of the  High  Court  of Saurashtra   was   conferred  upon  the Bombay  High  Court. Therefore, the single Judge of the High Court who heard  the first appeal, heard it not as a Judge of the Saurashtra High Court, but as a Judge of the Bombay Court. [443 B-C]     (3)  Section52  of the States Reorganisation  Act,  1956 does  not  mean  that the jurisdiction  conferred  upon  the Bombay  High Court in respect of the territories within  the State  of Saurashtra was to be regulated with  reference  to the  law  which  was  in  force  on  November  1,  1956   in Saurashtra.  Therefore,  it  does  not  incorporate   either expressly or by implication the limitations prescribed by s. 22A(2)  of the Saurashtra Ordinance into the Letters  Patent of the High Court. [443 G-H; 444 C-D]     (4)  Since  the  restriction placed by  s.  22A  of  the Ordinance  applied only to a judgment of a single  Judge  of the  High  Court  of Saurashtra and could  not  apply  to  a judgment  of  a single-Judge of the Bombay High  Court,  and could not operate to restrict a right of appeal  exercisable under  CI.  15’ of the Letters Patent, the judgment  of  the single  Judge of the Bombay High Court was, under s.  57  of the  States  Reorganisation  Act, subject  to  appeal  to  a Division  Bench without a certificate of the  single  Judge. [443 D-F]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1456 of1966.     Appeal from the judgment ,and order dated April 6,  1964 of the Gujarat High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 8  of 1960.

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    D.U. Shah, P.C. Bhartari and J.B. Dadachanji,  for the’ appellants.  S.K. Dholakis  and  Vineet Kumar, for  respondents  Nos.  1 (a) to 1(e)and (g).  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Shah, J.---The facts which give rise to these appeal are few and simple.  The appellant commenced on May 3, 1951   an action  in the Court of the Assistant Judge, Morvi,  in  the former  Part  ’B’ State of Saurashtra for a decree  for  Rs. 9,387/5/- against one L. Angha Nathu Jamal and respondents 2 &  3  in this appeal. The Trial Court decreed  the  suit  on October 17, 1955.  An appeal was filed against the decree in the  High  Court of Saurashtra  at Rajkot.  On  November  1, 1956,  the  High Court of Saurashtra was abolished  and  the proceedings pending in that Court stood’ transferred to  the High Court of Bombay.  On February  21,. 436 1958,  Vyas,  J., of the High Court of  Bombay  allowed  the appeal.  Against  that order an appeal under C1. 15  of  the Letters Patent of the High Court of Bombay was filed by  the plaintiff  but without an order of Vyas, J. certifying  that the case was fit for appeal to a Division Bench of the  High Court.   On May 1, 1960 under the Bombay Reorganisation  Act 1960,  the  appeal stood transferred to the  High  Court  of Gujarat.  The High Court of Gujarat held that the appeal was incompetent  in the absence of an order under S. 22A of  the Saurashtra Ordinance 2 of 1948 certifying that the case  was fit  for  appeal  to a  Division  Bench.   With  certificate granted  by the High Court of Gujarat this appeal  has  been preferred.     The  Rulers  of Indian States in Kathiawar   agreed  "to unite  and integrate" their territories in one State  to  be styled  the  United  State  of  Saurashtra  with  a   common executive,  legislature   and judiciary.  By Ordinance 1  of 1948  the  administration  of  the  covenanting  States  was taken  over by the  Rajpramukh.      The Rajpramukh  issued, in  exercise of power reserved to him by Art. 9 el.  (3)  of the  Covenant,  Ordinance 2 of 1948 setting up  with  effect from  February 29, 1948, a High Court of Judicature for  the State  of   Saurashtra.  The expression "High   Court"   was defined  in s. 3(c) as meaning "the High  Court  established and  constituted  by this Ordinance and functioning  as  the High Court of the Saurashtra State.  By s. 21 the High Court was  to be the highest Court of appeal and revision  in  the State  and to have jurisdiction to maintain and  dispose  of such  appeals, revision and other cases, civil or  criminal, as  it  may be empowered to do under the  Ordinance  or  any enactment  in force in the State.  By s. 22 the  High  Court was  also  to be a Court of reference with  power  to  hear, revise and determine all eases referred to it.  By Ordinance 5 of 1950 s. 22A was added: it vas provided thereby:               "(  1  ) Except as otherwise provided  by  any               enactment  for  the time being  in  force,  an               appeal from any original decree, or from  any.               order against which  an appeal is permitted by               any  law for the time being in force, or  from               any   order   under   Article   226   of   the               Constitution of India, made by a single  Judge               of   the  High  Court, shall lie  to  a  Bench               consisting   of two  other Judges of the  High               Court.                   (2) An appeal shall lie from a judgment of               one  Judge of the High Court in respect  of  a               decree or order made in exercise of Appellate;               Jurisdiction  to  a Bench  consisting  of  two

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             other  Judges of the High Court if  the  Judge               who  made the decree or order  certifies  that               the case is a fit one for appeal:"      437     Under  the  Constitution  of  India,  the  territory  of the  United State of Saurashtra was formed into a  Part  ’B’ State of Saurashtra.  By the States Reorganisation Act  1956 the  territory  of the State of Saurashtra merged  into  the State of Bombay.     By s. 49 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956, it  was enacted  that the High Court exercising  immediately  before the appointed day, jurisdiction in relation to the  existing State of Bombay shall, as from the appointed day, be  deemed to  be  the High Court for the new State of Bombay.   By  s. 50(1) as from the appointed day, the High Courts of all  the existing   Part  B  States  (with  certain  exceptions   not material)   were to cease to  function and  were  abolished. By section 52 was provided:                     "The  High Court for a new  State  shall               have,   in   respect  of  any  part   of   the               territories  included in that new  State,  all               such    original,    appellate    and    other               jurisdiction  as,  under   the  law  in  force                             immediately   before   the  appointed  day,  is               exercisable  in  respect of that part  of  the               said territories by any High Court or Judicial               Commissioner’s  Court for an existing  State".               By s. 54 it was provided:                   "Subject to the provisions of this   Part,               the  law  in  force  immediately  before   the               appointed  day  with respect to  practice  and               procedure   in   the  High   Court   for   the               corresponding State shall, with the  necessary               modifications,  apply in relation to the  High               Court  for a new State, and  accordingly,  the               High  Court for the new State shall  have  all               such  powers  to make rules ’and  orders  with               respect  to  practice and  procedure  as  are,               immediately,   before   the   appointed   day,               exercisable   by  the  High  Court,  for   the               corresponding State:                   Provided  that any rules or  orders  which               are in force immediately before the  appointed               day with respect to practice and procedure  in               the  High  Court for the  corresponding  State               shall,  until  varied or revoked by  rules  or               orders made by the High Court for a new State,               apply  with  the  necessary  modifications  in               relation to practice and procedure in the High               Court  for  the new State as if made  by  that               Court".     Section  59(3) provided that all proceedings pending  in the High Court of Saurashtra or in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Kutch immediately before the appointed  day shall stand transferred to the High Court of Bombay.  By  s. 119 it was provided:                       "The  provisions of Part II shall  not               be deemed to   have effected any change in the               territories to which any               L2Sup .CI/70--6               438               law   in   force    immediately   before   the               appointed   day   extends  or   applies,   and               territorial  references in any such law to  an

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             existing State shall, until otherwise provided               by a competent Legislature or other  competent               authority,   be  construed  as   meaning   the               territories  within  that  State   immediately               before the appointed day."               Section 127 provided:                     "The  provisions of this Act shall  have               effect  notwithstanding anything  inconsistent               therewith contained in any other law." In   exercise  of  the  power  conferred  upon  the  Central Government  by s. 120  of the States   Reorganisation   Act, 1956,  the Saurashtra (Adaptation of Laws on Union Subjects) Order, 1957, was promulgated by the Central Govt.  By cl.  3 of the order it was provided that Saurashtra Ordinance 2  of 1948  shall   stand repealed with effect  from  November  1, 1956.  The High Court of Bombay for the new State added  rr. 252-A and 252-B to the Rules of the High Court of Judicature at  Bombay,  Appellate  Side,  1950.  By  r.  252-A  it  was provided:                     "Rules and orders relating to.  practice               and  procedure  in  the High  Court  in  force               immediately  prior to the appointed day in the               High   Court  of Bombay   shall,  subject  to.               modifications made from time to time  thereto,               apply  to  the practice and procedure  in  the               High Court."               Rule 252-B provided:                   "Rules and orders relating to practice and               procedure  in the High Court  framed  by   the               High    Courts   of  Nagpur,   Hyderabad   and               Saurashtra and Judicial Commissioner’s  Court,               Kutch,  shall stand abrogated as from the  1st               November 1956 in the areas of the new State of               Bombay which before the 1st November 1956 were               parts   of  the  States  of  Madhya   Pradesh,               Hyderabad, Saurashtra and-Kutch."     The High Court of Gujarat held that the appeal filed  by the respondents in the High Court of Saurashtra against  the judgment of the Assistant Judge, was and continued to remain subject to the provisions of s. 22A of Saurashtra  Ordinance 2  of 1948 and an appeal could lie against the  decision  of Vyas  J.,  only if he certified that the case  was  fit  for appeal to a Division Bench.  Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court provided:                    "And we do further ordain that an  appeal               shall   lie    to  the  said  High  Court   of               Judicature  at Fort William in    Bengal  from               the  judgment  (not being  a  judgment  passed               in  the exercise of appellate jurisdiction  in               respect of a                    439               decree  or  order  made  in  the  exercise  of               appellate  jurisdiction by a Court subject  to               the  superintendence of the said  High  Court,               and not being an order made in the exercise of               revisional   jurisdiction  and not   being   a               sentence  or  order  passed  or  made  in  the               exercise of the power of superintendence under               the provisions of s. 107 of the Government  of               India  Act  or in the   exercise  of  criminal               jurisdiction)  of one Judge of the said   High               Court  or  one Judge of  any  Division  Court,               pursuant  to section 108 of the Government  of               India ACt, and that notwithstanding   anything               hereinbefore  provided  an appeal shall lie to

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             the  said  High Court from a judgment  of  one               Judge  of the said High Court or one Judge  of               any Division Court, pursuant to section 108 of               the  Government of India Act made on or  after               the;  first  day  of  February  1929)  in  the               exercise of appellate jurisdiction in  respect               of  a decree or order made in the exercise  of               appellate  jurisdiction by a Court subject  to               the  superintendence of the said  High  Court,               where  the  Judge  who  passed  the   judgment               declares  that  the  same is  a  fit  one  for               appeal; but .. .. .right of appeal from  other               judgments of Judges of the said High Court  or               of  such  Division Court shall be to  Us,  Our               Heirs or Succes-SOTS. " By cl. 15 of the Letters Patent a judgment in an appeal from a  civil  suit  by a single  Judge of  the  High   Court  of Bombay is subject to appeal to a Division Bench except  when the order is made in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of  the  Court  or  in second appeal,  or   in  exercise  of criminal    jurisdiction,  or   in  exercise  of  power   of superintendence under s. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935  (Art. 227 of the Constitution).  Vyas, J, decided  the appeal  sitting  as  a Judge of the High  Court  of  Bombay. Prima facie, his judgment delivered in a first  appeal  from a judgment of the subordinate court was subject to appeal  0 a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay. There  was clearly an inconsistency between s. 22A  of   the Saurashtra  Ordinance 2 of 1948, and cl. 15 of  the  Letters Patent of the High Court of Bombay.  By virtue of s.  22A(2) an  appeal  lay to a Division Bench of the  Saurashtra  High Court  from a judgment of one Judge "in respect of a  decree or order made in exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction when the Judge  who made the decree or order certified that the  case is  a  fit  one.  for  appeal".  The  Legislature  made   no distinction  between  a first appeal, a  second  appeal,  an appeal  from  order  land  an  application  in  exercise  of revisional  jurisdiction.  But an appeal under cl. 15 of the 440 Letters Patent of the High Court of Bombay in be appeal from filed  without the judgment of the Court of  First  Instance could a certificate of the Judge hearing the appeal.     The  right  to  appeal  from a  decree  or  order  is  a substantive  right.   As a corollary thereto, the  right  to maintain  a  decree  of a Court without  interference  by  a superior Court and subject only to the limitation therein is also  a  vested  right  and may be  taken  away  by  express enactment or clear implication of the amending statute.   In Colonial  Sugar Refining Company v.  Irving(x) the  Judicial Committee held that a provision which deprives a suitor in a pending  action  of an appeal to a superior  tribunal  which belonged  to  him as of right does not  regulate  procedure. The  Australian Commonwealth Judiciary Act, 1903, came  into force  on  August  25, 1903.  Against the  judgment  of  the Supreme Court of Queens land in an action commenced on  Act. 25, 1902, an application was made for leave to appeal to the Judicial  Committee  and leave was granted on  September  4, 1903.   At  the  hearing  of  the  appeal  by  the  Judicial Committee  the respondents applied that the appeal from  the judgment of the Supreme Court of Queensland be dismissed  on the  ground that the power of the Court below to give  leave to  ,appeal  stood  abrogated by s.  39  of  the  Australian Commonwealth  Judiciary  Act,  1903.   The  application  was rejected   by  the  Judicial  Committee.   Lord   Macnaghten observed:

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                   As      regards the  general  principles               applicable   to  the     case  there  was   no               controversy.   On the one hand it  was     not               disputed  that if the matter in question be  a               matter of    procedure only, the petition  (to               dismiss)  is  well founded.     On  the  other               hand,   if  it  be  more  than  a  matter   of               procedure, if it touches a right in  existence               at the passing    of the Judiciary Act, it was               conceded  that  in accordance    with  a  long               line  of  authorities from the  time  of  Lord               Coke  to the present day the  appellants  (the               Sugar  Co.)    would be entitled  to  succeed.               The  Judiciary Act is not    retrospective  by               express     enactment   or    by     necessary               intendment.  And therefore, the only  question               is,  was     the  appeal  to  His  Majesty  in               Council a right vested in the    appellants at               the  date  of the passing of the Act,  or  was               it a mere matter of  procedure ? .It  seems to               their    Lordships that the question does  not                             admit  of  doubt.    To deprive. a sui tor in  a               pending  action  of an appeal  to  a  superior               tribunal which belonged to him as of right  is               a   very  different  thing   from   regulating               procedure". (1) [1905] A.C. 369. 441 In Garikapatti Veeraya v.N. Subbiah ChoudhurY(1), this Court accepted   the  principle   in   Colonial   Sugar   Refining Company’s  case(2).  In the absence of any provision to  the contrary,  there- fore, a right attached to the action  when it  was  commenced   in 1951, that  an  appeal  against  the decision  of a single Judge of the High Court of  Saurashtra shall lie only if the Judge deciding the case certified  the case  to  be a fit one for appeal. But the  Saurashtra  High Court   was  abolished  from  November  1,  1956   and   the jurisdiction of the Saurashtra High Court was conferred upon the Bombay High Court.  The case was tried by Vyas, J.,  not as  a Judge of the Saurashtra High Court but as a  Judge  of the  High Court of Bombay.  In terms the restriction  placed by s. 22A applies to a judgment of one of the Judges of  the High Court of Saurashtra: it does not apply to a judgment of a  Judge of the High Court of Bombay.  Once  the  Saurashtra Ordinance 2 of 1948 was repealed and the jurisdiction to try the   appeal was conferred upon the High’ Court  of  Bombay, the  right  of  appeal exercisable by  the  parties  to  the litigation decided by the High Court of Bombay was  governed by the Letters Patent of that court had not by s. 22A of the Saurashtra  Ordinance 2 of 1948. Granting that the  incident prescribed  by s. 22A continued to attach to the action,  in terms  s. 22A of the Saurashtra Ordinance could not  operate to  restrict a right of appeal exercisable by cl. 15 of  the Letters  Patent governing the judgments    of the Judges  of the High Court of Bombay.  The expression "Judge of the High Court"  in  s.  22A of the ordinance for   the’  purpose  of giving  effect  to  the rule in   Colonial   Sugar  Refining Company’s  case(2) cannot be read as meaning a Judge of  the High  Court of Bombay.  By  the  clearest   implication   of the  repeal by the Saurashtra (Adaptation of Laws  on  Union subjects) Order, 1957, promulgated by the Central Government and  by the application of cl. 15 of the Letters  Patent  of the Bombay High Court, the judgment of Vyas, J., was subject to  appeal  to  a Division Bench without  an  order  of  the

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Learned judge certifying the case to be fit for appeal.     In support of his submission counsel for the respondents relied upon the terms of s. 52 of the States  Reorganisation Act, 1956. But that section only confers upon the High Court of Bombay after November 1, 1956 the original, appellate and other jurisdiction, which was exercisable  by the High Court of   Saurashtra  immediately prior to November 1,  1956,  in respect  of the territories within the State of  Saurashtra. The  section  does not incorporate either  expressly  or  by implication  the  limitations  prescribed by  s.  22A(2)  of Saurashtra  Ordinance 2 of 1948 into the Letters  Patent  of the  High  Court  of  Bombay.   The  jurisdiction--original, appellate  and  other--which the High  Court  of  Saurashtra could  exercise prior to November 1, 1956, survived  to  the High Court (1) [1957] S.C.R. 488. (2)[1905] A.C.360. 442 of  Bombay  in respect of the territories of  the  State  of Saurashtra,  and the appeal filed by the  respondent  before the High Court of Saurashtra was triable in the exercise  of the  appellate jurisdiction    of the High Court of  Bombay, after the case stood transferred to that Court by virtue  of sub-s. (3) of s. 59 of the States Reorganization Act,  1956. Vyas, J., functioned as a Judge of the High Court of  Bombay and  his judgments in first appeals were, in the absence  of an  express  provision to the contrary,  subject  to  appeal under  cl.  15  of the Letters Patent to  a  Division  Bench without a certificate. The  High  Court of Gujarat  was right in  holding  that  in respect  of  the areas of the former Saurashtra  State,  the High  Court    Bombay acquired the same  jurisdiction  which the High Court of Saurashtra possessed.  That however,  does not  mean  that the jurisdiction was to be  regulated  "with reference to the law which was in force on the appointed day i.e.   November  1,  1956".   Section  52  of   the   States Reorganisation  Act  preserved the original,  appellate  and other  jurisdiction  as under the law in  force  immediately before  the  appointed day exercisable in  respect  of   the territories  within the State of Saurashtra.  Unless in  the exercise     that jurisdiction any restriction under the law then  in  force  was  by  express  provision  or  by   clear implication  preserved,  the  provisions of cl.  15  of  the Letters Patent must apply.     It is necessary to recall the provisions of s. 57 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, which provide that the  law in  force immediately before the appointed day  relating  to the powers of the Chief Justice, single Judges and  division courts  of  the High Court for the corresponding  State  and with  respect  to matters ancillary to the exercise  of  the powers  shall,  with the necessary  modification,  apply  in relation  to  the High Court for a  new  State.  Immediately before  November 1, 1956, against the judgment of  a  single Judge  of  the High Court of Bombay exercising  power  in  a first  appeal, an appeal lay to a Division Bench  without  a certificate.  The power of a Division Bench to entertain  an appeal continued to remain exercisable by the Judges of  the Bombay High Court when dealing with cases transferred  under s.  59(3) to the Bombay High Court from the Saurashtra  High Court.  In terms  s. 57 provides that powers of the Division Bench of the High Court for the corresponding State i.e. the new  State of Bombay shall be the same as the powers of  the Division Bench under the law in force immediately before the appointed  day in the State of Bombay.  A Division Bench  of the  High  Court  of BOmbay was competent  to  entertain  an

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appeal  against  the judgment of a single Judge  deciding  a first  appeal  from  the decision  of  a  subordinate  court without a certificate of the Judge deciding the appeal. 443     The  High  Court  of Gujarat  have  made  a  distinction between ’power" and "jurisdiction", and they have held  that when  s. 52 of the States Reorganisation Act,  1956,  enacts that the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court of  Bombay for  the  new  State  of Bombay shall  in  relation  to  the Saurashtra  area be the same as the jurisdiction  which  the Saurashtra  High Court possessed, it is meant that the  High Court  of  Bombay has the same jurisdiction which  the  High Court of Saurashtra originally had, and in exercise of  that jurisdiction  is subject to the same limitations  which  the High  Court  of Saurashtra was subject.  We  are  unable  to agree   with   that  view.   Section  52   of   the   States Reorganization Act, 1956, does not say so, and s. 57 of that Act provides to the contrary.     The  High Court of Gujarat was also of the view that  s. 52  of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 "crystalizes  the law"  only with respect to the territorial  jurisdiction  of each of the areas comprised in the High Court of Bombay, and if  the  Legislature extended the jurisdiction of  the  High Court of Bombay and also retained the jurisdiction which the abolished High Court possessed, the result would be "odd and conflicting"--there  being  conflict of  jurisdiction.   But that,  in  our judgment, is a ground for  holding  that  the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court superseded in case  of conflict,  the restrictions on the exercise of  jurisdiction by the original High Court qua the Saurashtra territory, and not  that the jurisdiction of the High Court of  Bombay  was because of some unexpressed limitation restricted.     The High Court of Gujarat recognised that the conclusion to  which  they  had  reached  revealed  a  defect  in   the administration of justice.  They observed:                   "The  Legislature  may  have  had  a  good               reason    for  preserving  in  tact  the   old               jurisdiction  of the Saurashtra High Court  in               regard   to  pending  cases.    However,   our               conclusion affects cases instituted after  the               Reorganisation  Act came into force.   In  our               judgment, there is no reason why the litigants               from the Saurashtra and Kutch areas should now               be  treated  on a different footing  from  the               litigants  in  the old Bombay  area.   In  our               judgment, the rights of appeal of litigants in               all the areas should now be placed on the same               footing.    live   would  recommend   to   the               authorities   concerned   to   examine               this question and, if so advised, to undertake               the necessary legislation so as to confer  the               same  rights of appeal to the  litigants  from               the  Saurashtra & Kutch areas as are given  to               the  litigants from the rest of the  State  of               Gujarat." 444 In our view the conclusion that the restriction on the  "old jurisdiction  of  the Saurashtra High Court" in  regard  to. pending  cases  was preserved by s. 52 is erroneous.  _  The States  Reorganisation  Act,  1956  does  not  purport   to. preserve the restrictions upon the exercise of jurisdiction, and  no  implication arises from the use of  the  expression "original, appellate and other jurisdiction as under the law in  force  immediately before the appointed day",  that  the limitations  upon the exercise  of the  jurisdiction   which

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were existing prior to November 1, 1956, notwithstanding the provisions  of s. 57 of the States Reorganisation  Act  were preserved.     The  order  passed by the High Court of Gujarat  is  set aside, and the case is remanded to the High Court to be  re- entered  under  the  original number and  to  be  heard  and disposed  of according to law.  Costs wilt be costs  in  the High Court. V.P.S.                     Appeal allowed and case remanded. 445