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PETITIONER: DARSHAN SINGH AND ANR. ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAM PAL SINGH AND ANR. ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/11/1990

BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) THOMMEN, T.K. (J) KASLIWAL, N.M. (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR 1654            1990 SCR  Supl. (3) 212  1992 SCC  Supl.  (1) 191 JT 1990 (4)   561  1990 SCALE  (2)1114

ACT:     Punjab  Custom (Power to Contest) Act,  1920: Section  7 Alienations of immovable property--Contesting of--Effect  of Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Amendment Act, 1973  Wheth- er retrospective and applicable to pending proceedings. Punjab Laws Act 1872, Section 5.     Punjab  Pre-emption  Act, 1913  Effect  of  Punjab  Pre- emption (Repeal) Act, 1973--What is. Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act 1920. Hindu Succession Act 1956, Section 4. Jurisprudence--Custom and law--Relationship--What is. Statutory Interpretation. Retrospectivity of statute----What is. Practice and Procedure.     Appeal--Whether  a  continuation of  a  suit--Change  in law-Effect on pending proceedings. Words and Phrases--’Contest’--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellants in the appeals were  contesting  aliena- tions  under the provisions of the Punjab Custom  (Power  to Contest)  Act,  1920 and their suits were at  the  appellate stage  in  the High Court when the Punjab Custom  (Power  to Contest Amendment Act, 1973 came into force on the 23rd  day of January, 1973.     The  High  Court dismissed the appeals taking  the  view that  no  contest to alienations was permissible  after  the 1973 Amendment Act came into force. ^     In  Ujaggar  Singh v. Dharam Singh &  Ors.,  a  Division Bench   of  this  Court  while  dismissing  the  appeal   on 28.11.1986, held that Section 7 of the Punjab Custom  (Power to Contest) Act as amended in 1973 has retrospective  effect and that it also applies to pending proceedings.     In  another Civil Appeal viz. Udam Singh & Ors. v.  Tar- sera  Singh & Ors. another Division Bench rejected the  con- tention  that  the Amendment Act did not  apply  to  pending proceedings and dismissed the appeal on 15.7.1987. 213     However,  in  Bara  Singh v. Kashmira Singh  &  Ors.,  a

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Division  Bench while considering the same question  as  re- gards  the  applicability  of the Amending  Act  to  pending proceedings,  held on 4.1.1987, that the view  expressed  in Ujaggar Singh v. Dharam Singh & Ors., appears to run counter to the express provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Amendment Act which provides that the amendment shall be deemed  to have come into force only on January 3, 1973  and that  it cannot be disputed that Section 3 of the  Amendment Act  which  makes  Section 7 of the Act  applicable  to  all immovable  property  affects the substantive rights  of  the parties,  and that the matter requires  reconsideration  and that the matter be placed before a bench of three Judges  by the Chief Justice.     The  main contentious of the appellants in  the  appeals were that neither by express words nor by necessary implica- tion the 1973 Amendment Act can be said to be  retrospective and  applicable to pending proceedings, and that more so  in view  of sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the  Amendment  Act deeming  it to have come into force on 23.1.1973,  and  that ï7 3 pal Act; the vested rights to contest alienations could  not be said to have been taken away by retrospective operation.     The  respondents’ contentions however were that in  view of the deletion of Section 6 and the amendment of Section  7 by  the Amendment Act 1973 so as to include  both  ancestral and  non-ancestral immovable properties, there could  be  no question  of any contest after the Amendment Act  came  into force, and this Court in Ujaggar Singh’s case having already held that the Amendment Act is retrospective and  applicable to pending proceedings, the High Court has rightly dismissed the appeals. Dismissing the appeals, this Court,     HELD:  1(a)  The Punjab Laws Act, 1872 was  an  Act  for declaring which of certain rules, laws and regulations would have the force of law in the Punjab. [222H]     (b) A custom prevailed in Punjab that ancestral  immova- ble  property is ordinarily inalienable (especially  amongst ’Jats’  residing  in the Central districts of  the  Punjab), except  for necessity or with the consent of  male  descend- ants,  or, in the case of a sonless proprietor, of his  male collaterals. [223G-H] 214     (c)  The degrees of collaterals eligible to  contest  an alienation on the basis of the above custom being not limit- ed by the custom itself, there arose a need to enact certain restrictions in respect of suits in which the alienation  of immovable property or the appointment of heir was  contested by  descendants  or collaterals on the ground  that  it  was contrary to custom. [224B]     (d) The object of Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872 was  to settle for Punjab the rule of decision  in  question stated in clauses (a) and (b) thereof. The Act settled  this question  laying down the first rule ’any custom  applicable to the parties concerned which was not contrary to  justice, equity  and good conscience, and which had not been, by  the Act itself or by any other enactment, altered or  abolished, and  had not been declared to be void by any  competent  au- thority’. Clause (b) provided that the principle of Mohamme- dan  Law in cases where the parties were Mohammedan and  the Hindu Law, in cases where the parties were Hindus, should be the other rule of decision except in so far as such law  has been  altered or abolished by legislative enactment,  or  is opposed to the provisions of that Act, or has been  modified by  any such custom. Thus the legislature intended that  the Hindu  and  Mohammedan Law should be applied where  no  such

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customary rule prevailed. [226G-227D] ï73     Vaishno Ditti’s case 1929 Lab. (10) 86 (P.C.) at p. 103; Thakur Gokulchand v. Parvin Kumari, AIR 1952 SC 231=  [1952] SCR  825  and Ujaggar Singh v. Mst. Jeo, AIR 1959  SC  1041, referred to.     2(a) Alongwith the repeal of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 it was considered that the right to contest  alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral  on the  ground  that it was contrary to custom should  be  done away  with.  The Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal)  Act,  1973  by Section 2 repealed the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913.  [226B- D]     (b) The intention of the legislature is therefore clear, that  in  case of the Pre-emption Act by repeal of  the  Act itself the legislature put an end to that custom. [228F]     3.  The  right  to contest an alienation  to  a  limited extent  was  conferred  by Section 6 of  the  Punjab  Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920. [224H]     4. Section 7 of the Principal Act puts a complete bar to contest  of  any alienation of  ancestral  or  non-ancestral immovable property or 215 appointment  of an heir to such property on the ground  that such  alienation  or  appointment was  contrary  to  custom. [227F]     The  provisions of Section 7 that ’no person shall  con- test any alienation of immovable property whether  ancestral or  non-ancestral  or  any appointment of an  heir  to  such property  on  the ground such alienation or  appointment  is contrary  to custom’ undoubtedly puts an end to  contest  of any alienation. This should normally leave no doubt that the use  of the above words and expression is inconsistent  with the continued existence of the custom. [228H-229A]     5. Neque leges neque senatus consulta ita serioi possunt utomnis casus qui quandoque in sediriunt comprehendatur; sed sufficit ea quae plaeramque accidunt conteneri. Neither laws nor Acts of a Parliament can be so written as to include all actual  or possible cases; it is sufficient if they  provide for those things which frequently or ordinarily happen. What is material is to see the expressed objects and reasons  and the language used. [230H-231B]     6. If the provisions of an Act of Parliament are  repug- nant  to the continued existence of the custom,  the  custom will be treated as abrogated and destroyed, although the Act does  not actually extinguish the custom by  express  words. ï7 3 and  reasons of the Amendment Act, namely, to do  away  with the  custom, and the negative provision of Section 7 of  the Amendment Act, the view is that continuance of the custom is inconsistent with the statute. [231C-D] Halsbury’s Law of England, Vol. 12 Para 442 relied on.     7. Consuetudo semel reprobata non potest amplius induci. A  custom once disallowed cannot be again  brought  forward. [231E]     8.  Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956  provides overriding effect of the Act. In effect it lays down that in respect of the matters dealt with by the Act it repeals  all existing  laws, whether in the form of enactments or  other- wise,  which are inconsistent with this Act. the  result  is that immediately on coming into operation of the Act the law of  succession hitherto applicate to the parties, by  virtue of  any  text, rule or interpretation of Hindu  Law  or  any custom  or  usage  having the force of law  ceased  to  have effect in respect of the matters expressly dealt with by the Act. [232F-233D]

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216     S.S.  Munna  Lal v. S.S. Rajkumar & Ors.,  AIR  1962  SC 1493:. 1962 Supp. (3) SCR 418; Giasi Ram & Ors. v.  Ramjilal JUDGMENT: Ammal v. Ramalingam (Minor) & Anr., AIR 1970 SC 1730: [1970] 3  SCR  894; Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur  &  Ors.  v. Chunder  Sen  & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 1753: [1986]  3  SCC  567; Yudhishter  v.  Ashok Kumar, AIR 1987 SC 558: [1987]  1  SCC 204; Smt. Manshan & Ors. v. Tej Ram & Ors., [1980] Supp. SCC 367;  Taro v. Darshan Singh, AIR 1960 Punjab 145:  ILR  1959 Punjab 2253; Hansraj v. Dhanwant Singh, AIR 1961 Punjab 510: ILR  (1961)  1 Punjab 369; Banso v. Charan Singh,  AIR  1961 Punjab  45; Kaur Singh v. Jaggar Singh, AIR 1961 Punjab  489 and Kalu v. Nand Singh, AIR 1974 P & H 50, referred to.     9.  Any rule of law of succession previously  applicable to those who were governed by custom would after the  coming into  force of the Hindu Succession Act be permissible  only in  respect  of the matters for which no provision  is  made under  the  Act. However the Hindu Succession Act  does  not appear to have abrogated any rule or customary law in Punjab relating to restrictions on alienation by a male  proprietor over and above what could be done under Hindu law. The right of  reversioners, besides those who could do so under  Hindu Law,  to challenge or contest any such alienation could  not be said to have ceased to exist. This being the position, it was  still  necessary to do away with the right  to  contest such an alienation as the legislature desired. The Amendment Act was the measure adopted. [234A-C] ï73      Bant  Singh v. Gurpreet Singh, [1973] 75 PLR 797;  Gur- dial  Singh v. Piara Singh, [1973] 13 Cur. L.J. 529;  Charan Singh v. Gehl Singh, [1974] 76 PLR 125; Jit Singh v. Karnail Singh, [1975] 77 PLR 488; Surjit Kaur v. Zail Singh,  [1977] 79 PLR 690; Raj Narain Pandey & Ors. v. Sant Prasad Tewari & Ors., [1973] 2 SCC 35 and Brownsea Haven Properties v. Poole Corpn., [1958] Ch. 574 (CA): (1958) 1 All E.R. 205, referred to.      10(a)  An  appeal is a continuation of a suit  and  any change in law, which has taken place between the date of the decree and the decision of the appeal, has to be taken  into consideration.  When a suit fried by a reversioner  is  dis- missed  and  he files an appeal then  before  the  appellate court  also he is contesting the alienation. If he does  not contest or challenge the alienation, then he cannot  achieve success. [235B-C]      Thakur Gokulchand v. Parvin Kumari, (supra); Garikapat- ti  Veeraya L N. Subbian Choudhury, [1957] SCR 488; Jose  Da Costa v. 217 Bascora  Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim, [1976] 2 SCC 917;  Govind Das v. The Income Tax Officer, [1976] 1 SCC 907; Henshail v. Porter,  [1923]  2  L.R. King’s Bench Div.  193  and  United Provinces  v. Mst. Atiga Begum, [1940] 2 FCR  110,  referred to.     10(b) Contest continues right up to the final  decision. The  right  to  contest comes to an end only  when  a  final decision is given one way or the other putting an end to the litigation  between the parties with regard to  the  aliena- tion. [235A-B]     11.  Every  statute which takes away or  impairs  vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new  obli- gation; imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability  in respect  to  transactions or  considerations  already  past. Retroactive  statute  means a statute which  creates  a  new obligation on transaction or considerations already past  or destroys or impairs vested rights. [236B]

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Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 44 para 921.     12. Courts will construe a provision as conferring power to  act  retroactively when clear words are used.  Both  the intention  and  language of the Amendment Act  is  clear  in these respects. Applying the Amending Act of 1973 to aliena- tions  prior  to  23.1.1973 does not  necessarily  mean  its retrospective operation. [237A-B, E]  Ã¯73     Rafiquennessa  v. Lal Bahadur Chetri (Dead) Through  His Representatives & Ors., [1964] 6 SCR 876; Athlumney Ex Parte Wilson,  [1898] 2 Q.B.D. 547 and Mithilesh Kumari & Anr.  v. Prem Behari Khare, [1989] 2 SCC 95, referred to.     13. In the instant case, the Legislature looked back  to January 23, 1973 and not beyond to put an end to the  custom and merely because on that cut off date. Some contests  were brought  to an abrupt end would not make the  Amendment  Act retrospective. [236F]     14.  In  the instant case, the words  "no  person  shall contest any alienation on the ground that such alienation is contrary to custom" are very significant. A plain reading of the provision even when construed prospectively leads to the result  that the right to contest being contrary  to  custom has been totally effaced and taken away. Thus no person  has any  right to contest any alienation of  immovable  property whether 218 ancestral  or non-ancestral on the ground of being  contrary to custom after 23.1.1973. This provision will thus apply to all pending actions whether at the stage of trial or  before the appellate court. It is well settled that an appeal is  a continuation of the suit and if a right to contest an alien- ation  on  the ground of being contrary to custom  has  been taken  away, such right to contest cannot be permitted  even at the stage of first appeal or second appeal. [239F-G]     Harbhajan Singh v. Mohan Singh & Ors., [1974] 2 SCC 364; Sadhu  Singh & Anr. v. Dharam Der & Ors., [1981] 1 SCC  510; Official  Liquidator  v.R.  Desikachar, AIR  1974  SC  2069: [1975]  1 SCR 890; Lakshmi Narayan Guin & Ors.  v.  Niranjan Modak,  [1985] 1 SCC 270; Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil  Mills  & Ginning  Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha,  [1962]  2 SCR 159; Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal, AIR  1941 FC  51:1940 FCR 84; Shyabuddinsab v. GadagBetgeri  Municipal Borrough, [1955] 1 SCR 1268; King v. General Commissioner of Income  Tax, [1916] 2 KB 249; K.C. Mukherjee,  Official  Re- ceiver v. Ramratan Kuer, [1935] LR 631A 47: AIR 1936 PC  49; Dayawati  v. Inderjit, [1966] 3 SCR 275: AIR 1966  SC  1423; Mohanlal Jain v. His Highness Maharaja Shri Sawai Man Singh, [1962]  1  SCR 702: AIR 1962 SC 73; Amarjit Kaur  v.  Pritam Singh,  [1975]  1 SCR 605; Colonial Sugar  Refining  Co.  v. Irving,   [1905]  AC 369 at 372;  Garikapatti  Veeraya  v.N. Subbiah  Choudhury, [1957] SCR 488; Delhi Cloth and  General Mills  Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner, [1927] LR 54  IA 421:  ILR  9 Lab. 284; Colonial Sugar Refining Co.  Ltd.  v. Irving, [1905] AC 369; Govind Das and Ors. v. The Income Tax Officer  & Anr., [1976] 1 SCC 907; The United  Provinces  v. ï7 3 and Anr. v. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim & Ors.,  [1976] 2  SCC  917;  Delhi  Cloth and General  Mills  Co.  Ltd.  v. Income-tax  Commissioner, [1927] LR 54 IA  421;  Garikapatti Veeraya v.N. Subbiah Choudhury, [1957] SCR 488, referred to.     15. The right to appeal has to be distinguished from the right  to  contest. While the right to  appeal  implies  the continuation  of the right sought to be effectuated  in  the appeal,  in  the instant case the power  to  contest  itself constituted  the custom which the legislature wanted  to  do

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away  with. To take away the power to contest means  nothing else  than doing away with the custom itself. The  right  to contest  wherever needed, namely, at any stage of a suit  is expressly barred. [243B]     Henshall  v.  Porter, (supra); Bowling v.  Camp,  [1922] W.N.  297; Beadling v. Golf, [1922] 39 Times L.R. 128;  Smi- thies v. National 219 Association  of Operative Plasterers, [1909] 1 K.B. 310  and Gillmore v. Shooter, [1677] 2 Mod. 310, referred to.     16.  Considering the principles, the provisions  of  the Principal Act, the Statement of Objects and Reasons and  the provisions  of  the Amendment Act and the decisions  of  the Punjab High Court and of this Court, Section 7 of the  Prin- cipal Act as amended by the Amendment Act is retroactive and is  applicable to pending proceedings. The decision of  this Court  dated  28.11.1986 in Ujaggar Singh v.  Dharam  Singh, (Civil Appeal No. 1263 of 1973) and in Udham Singh v. Tarsem Singh,  (Civil Appeal No. 1135 of 1974) dated  15.7.1987  do not need reconsideration. [244B-C]     17(a) In the matter of a custom in relation to law three different  relations  have  to be  distinguished.  First,  a custom  may be only judicially noticed. This belongs to  the realm  of evidence and validity of the custom.  Secondly,  a custom may be legally confirmed, and regulated. In this case the custom remains as custom law only confirming or regulat- ing  it. Thirdly, a statute may be passed on the basis of  a custom in which case the custom is transformed into a statu- tory  right  and thereafter it is not treated as  a  custom. [244F-G]     (b) A custom becomes a customary law when it is  clothed with  the  legal  sanction in the judicial  mode.  A  custom becomes  law only when enforced by the  political  sanction. [245E]     Austin  Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Lecture  V (P. 163) and Lecture XXX, referred to. ï73     Daya Ram v. Sohel Singh & Ors., 110 PR (1906) 390; Abdul Hussein  Khan v. Bibi Sona Dero, [1970] L.R. 45 I.A.  10(13) and Salig Ram v. Munshi Ram, [1962] 1 SCR 470, referred to.     In the instant case, the custom was confirmed and  regu- lated  by  the Punjab Laws Act, 1872 and the  Punjab  Custom (Power  to Contest) Act, 1920 and it was done away  with  by the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Amendment Act 1973.  No statute  was passed on the basis of the custom itself so  as to  transform  the  custom itself into  a  higher  statutory right. Therefore either before or after the custom has  been done  away  with  by the Amendment Act, the  rights  of  the parties  under Hindu Law remain unaffected and will  provide the  rule of decision where alienations are contested  under Hindu Law. [246F-G] 220       the  cases of the appellants under Hindu Law were  not gone into by the High Court or lower Courts, the cases  were sent back to the High Court with a direction to examine  the cases of the willing appellants under Hindu Law after  hear- ing  the parties and, if needed, giving them an  opportunity to adduce further necessary evidence. [247C]

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