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PETITIONER: DAMYANTI NARANGA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/02/1971

BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) MITTER, G.K. HEGDE, K.S. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN

CITATION:  1971 AIR  966            1971 SCR  (3) 840  1971 SCC  (1) 678  CITATOR INFO :  D          1971 SC1737  (31)  D          1985 SC 973  (9)  RF         1985 SC1622  (5)  D          1987 SC 379  (9)  RF         1988 SC1136  (30,31)

ACT: Fundamental  Rights-Freedom  of  Association-Hindi   Sahitya Sammelan,    a   registered   society-Parliament    enacting legislation    declaring    Sammelan    as    of    national impor tance-Power  to  frame  rules  to  admit  new  members without  consent  of  original  members  of  Society    If infringes  right to form Association of original members  of society-  Transferring  properties of  Society  to  Sammelan while Society kept in existence- If infringes right to  hold property-Constitution  of  India Article 19 (1)(c)  and  (f) cls. (4) and (5)-Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1962.

HEADNOTE: The  Hindi Sahitya Sammelan (hereinafter referred to as  the Society)   was   a  registered  society  founded   for   the development  and  propagation of Hindi.  After a  number  of years  of its successful working differences  arose  between its  members  and this resulted in litigation. in  1956  the Uttar  Pradesh legislature passed the U.P. Sahitya  Sammelan Act, under which a statutory body was created under the name of  Hindi Sahitya Sammelan.  This act was declared  void  by the  Allahabad  High  Court  as  violating  the  freedom  of association   guaranteed  under  article  19(1)(c)  of   the Constitution. Thereafter,  Parliament  enacted  the   Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1962legislating  under  entry  63, list I of the Seventh Schedule declaringthat       "the institution  known  as  the Hindi  Sahitya  Sammelan  is  an institution of national importance".  By the Act a statutory sammelan was constituted as a body corporate by the name  of the  Hindi Sahitya Sammelan.  Under s. 4(1) of the  Act  the Sammelan was to consist of the first members of the  Society and  all  persons  who might become  members  thereafter  in accordance  with the rules made in that behalf-by the  first

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Governing  Body to be constituted by the Central  Government by  notification.   The  Act provided, for  vesting  in  the Sammelan  of  all  property  movable  or  immovable,  of  or belonging to the society. Petitions  under  Article 226 in the High  Court  and  under Article  32  in  this  Court  were  filed  challenging   the constitutionality  of the Act mainly on the ground that  the Act  interfered  with the right of the petitioners  to  form association  under  Article 19(1) (c) of  the  Constitution. The  High  Court  held that since all  the  members  of  the society  had also become members of the Sammelan  under  the Act,  there  was  no  infringement  of  the  right  to  form association.   In  the  appeal and  in  the  petition  under Article  32, the respondent contended that  having  declared the  old  Hindi  Sabitya  Sammelan,  which  was  a   society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as  an institution of national importance, Parliament has proceeded to  legislate in respect of it under entry 63 of List  I  of the  Seventh Schedule in order that its  administration  may not suffer as a result of the quarrels that were going inter be  between  the  members of the society; it  was  for  this purpose that a first Governing Body was constituted to  take over  the  management temporarily; the Act was  designed  to reconstitute  the  Sammelan in such a manner that  it  could worm  successfully and without difficulties; and  in  making provisions  for this purpose all members of the old  society were included as members of the Sammelan                            8 4 1 so  that  their right to form association may not  be  taken away  from  them Alternatively the respondent  took  up  the position  that the Act no where specifically laid down  that the society shall stand dissolved while it constituted a new Sammelan and therefore, it should be inferred that while the society  still continued to exist in its original  form  the law  has brought into existence a new Sammelan to which  all the  functions and the properties etc.-of the  society  have been passed.  Allowing the petition and the appeal. HELD : Under s. 12(1) (a) very wide powers are given to  the first  governing  body to make rules in respect  of  matters relating   to   membership  including   qualifications   and disqualifications  for  membership of the  Sammelan.   Under this  power  the  rules framed  could  make  provisions  for admission of persons as members whom the original members of society may never have liked to admit in their Society.  The number  of  such new members could even be so  large  as  to leave  the  original members in a small  minority  with  the result that those members. could become totally  ineffective in  the  society.   Thus the Sammelan which  has  come  into existence,  is not identical-with the Sammelan which  was  a registered  society under the Societies  Registration  Act., This is clear interference with the right to form a  society which  has been exercised by the members of the  Society  by forming  the Society with its constitution under which  they were  members.  The Act does not merely regulate  the  admi- nistration of the affairs of the Society; what it does is to alter the composition of the society itself.  The result  of this  change  in  composition  is  that  the  members,   who voluntarily  formed the society are now compelled to act  in that Association with other members who have been imposed as members by the Act and in whose admission to membership they had  no  say.   The right to  form  association  necessarily implies  that the persons forming the society have also  the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily  admit  in the association.  Any  law  by  which members are introduced in the voluntary association  without

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any  option being given to the members to keep them  out  or any  law which takes away the membership of those  who  have voluntarily joined. it will be a law violating the right  to form association. [847 H; 849 C-E] The right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) cannot be  confined to  the initial stage of forming an association. if it  were to be so confined, the right would be meaningless because as soon  as  an  association is formed, a  law  may  be  passed interfering  with  its composition so that  the  association formed may not be able to function at all.  The right can be effective only if it is held to include within, it the right to   continue  the  association  with  its  composition   as voluntarily   agreed  upon  by  the  persons   forming   the association.  And, Article 19(4), on the face of it,  cannot be called in aid to claim lidity for the Act.  Therefore the provisioncontained in the Act for reconstituting the society into   the  Sammelan  is  void.   The  whole   Act   becomes ineffective in as much as the formation of the new  Sammelan is  the very basis for all the other provisions in the  Act. [849 F-H; 851 E] O.K.  Ghosh and Another v. E. X. Joseph, [1963] SUppl.  3 S.C.R. 789; State of Madras v. V. G. Row, [1952] S.C. R. 597 and V. G. Row v. The State of Madras, A.I.R. 1951 Mad.  147, referred to. The  alternative submission cannot be accepted  as  ensuring the validity of the Act. First, the specific case taken by the respondent has been, that the Actreconstitutes the  Society and does not create a separate and  independent body in the form of a new Sammelan.  Secondly, even if it be acceptedthat  a  new Sammelan has  been  constituted,  the question of- 842 legislative competence of Parliament to pass such a law will arise.   The  Sammelan is itself a body corporate  and  that Sammelan  has  never  been declared as  an  institution  of national  importance.   The  only institution  that  was  so declared  was the society which, of course, earlier  carried the  same  name  as  the  new  Sammelan.   Parliament   was, therefore,  not  competent to legislate in respect  of  this newly  constituted  Sammelan  which at  no  stage  has  been declared as an institution of national importance.  Thirdly, if it were to be held that Parliament passed this Act so  as to transfer all the properties and assets of the Society  to the  Sammelan, the Act would contravene Article 19(1)(f)  of the  Constitution.   The  Sammelan is a  new,  separate  and distinct legal entity from the Society.  The Society is thus deprived  of  all its properties by the Act and such  a  law depriving the Society of its properties altogether cannot be held  to be a reasonable restriction in the public  interest on  the  right of the society to hold  the  property.   The applicability  of Article 19(1(f) is on the assumption  that the  old  Society  still  exists  as  it  was  and  yet  its properties  have been transferred to the Sammelan.   If  the Society  still exists, so does its Governing Body  in whom the  property of the Society vested.  The Act thus  deprives the  members  of the Governing Body of  the  property  which still  continued to vest in them in spite of the passing  of the  Act.   This total deprivation of  property  instead  of regulating  the management of the affairs of the Society  of its  property  cannot clearly be justified as  a  reasonable restriction  in public interest.  If the law is  passed  not merely for ensuring proper management and administration  of the property, but for totally depriving the persons, in whom the  property vested, of their right to hold  the  property, the law cannot be justified as reasonable restriction  under

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Article 19(5). [852 B-H; 853 E-854 A] The  Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani  Tibia  College, Delhi v. The State of Delhi & Anr. [1962] Suppl.  I  S.C.R. 156; referred to.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL    JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 91 of 1964. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for  the enforcement  of fundamental rights and Civil Appeal No.  358 of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September 9, 1963 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil  Writ Petition No. 1885 of 1962. J.P.  Goyal and Raghunath Singh, for the  petitioner  (in W.P. No. 91 of 1964). A.K. Sen, J. P. Goyal and Raghunath Singh, for the appel- lants (in C.A. No. 358/66). B.Sen and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 1 (in W.P.  No. 91 of 1964) and respondents Nos. 3 and 4 (in C.A. No. 358 of 1966). N.N. Sharma, for respondent No. 2 (in W.P. No. 91/64) and respondents Nos. 16 and 17- (in C.A. No. 358/66).                             843 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bbargava, J.-This writ petition and the appeal challenge the validity  of the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act No. 13  of  1962 (hereinafter  referred to as "the Act").  The facts  leading up  to the passing of this enactment are that, in  the  year 1910,  some eminent educationists assembled at  Banaras  and founded an Association for the development of Hindi and  its propagation  throughout the country.  This  Association  was named  as the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan.  On the  8th  January, 1914,  it  was registered as a Society under  the  Societies Registration  Act  No.  21  of 1860,  with  Head  Office  at Allahabad,  under the name of Hindi Sahitya  Sammelan.   The rules  and bye-laws of the Society laid down the objects  of this  Association  and the manner of its  working.   It  had three  classes of members, viz., special  members  (Vishisht Sadasya),  permanent members (Sthayi Sadasya), and  ordinary members (Sadharan Sadasya).  Under the bye-laws, apart  from the original members constituting the Society, further  mem- bers could be admitted under these three classifications  on being  elected  by  the working committee  of  the  Society. Under  the Rules and bye-laws of the Society,  other  bodies could  be  constituted  for carrying on  activities  of  the Society.   These  included  a  Governing  Body,  a   Working Committee,  a  Hindi University  Council,  Literary  Council (Sahitya  Samiti),  Library Committee,  Parchar  Samiti  and Rashtriaya  Bhasha Prachar Samiti.  Through the agencies  of these various Committees, the Society carried on the work of development  and propagation of Hindi, of spreading the  use of  Devnagri scrip, of holding examinations, and of  confer- ring  Degrees for proficiency in Hindi.  The  Society  owned landed  properties and buildings at Allahabad as well as  at some   other  places  such  as  Warding,  and  was   holding considerable  funds  for carrying on  its  activities.   The Society worked very successfully for a number of years.   It appears  that  in  the year  1950,  some  differences  arose between the members of the Society, and attempt was made  to alter  the constitution, of the Society. while  one  section wanted  the alterations, another section was opposed to  it. This  resulted  in litigation.  Three different  suits  were instituted  in  the  civil  Courts  at  Allahabad  in   this

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connection and injunctions were sought by one party  against the other.  Ultimately, the Court appointed a Receiver. In view of- these circumstances, the U.P. Legislature passed an  Act known as the U.P. Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act No.  36 of 1956, under which a statutory body was created under  the name of Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, and the word "Sammelan"  was defined as referring to the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan constitu- ted  under  the Act.  Under that Act.  Under that  Act,  the mana- 844 gement   and  properties  of  the  original  Hindi   Sahitya Sammelan,  which was a registered Society, were to be  taken over by the new statutory Sammelan.  That Act was,  however, declared  void  by the Allahabad High Court on  the  ground that  Act had made the original Sammelan cease to exist  and provided  for the constitution of a new Sammelan  under  its terms  in which the members of the original Sammelan had  no say,  so that Act infringed the right of the members of  the original  Sammelan of forming an association  guaranteed  by Art.  19 (1) (c) of the Constitution.  It was  further  held that Act was not saved under Art. 19(4) of the Constitution. Thereafter,  the  present Act, now challenged in  this  writ petition  and  the appeal, was passed  by  Parliament  under Entry  63  of  List  I  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to   the Constitution.   The Act itself, in section 2, contained  the necessary  declaration  to give  legislative  competence  to Parliament under that Entry. The  Act first contained in section 2 a declaration  in  the following words :-               "Whereas the objects of the institution  known               as  the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan which  has  its               head  office at Allahabad are such as to  make               the  instituation one of national  importance,               it  is  hereby declared that  the  institution               known  as  the Hindi Sahitya  Sammelan  is  an               institution of national importance." Having  declared  this  institution  as  an  institution  of national   importance,   th.-,  Act  proceeded   to   define "Sammelan"  as  meaning the institution known as  the  Hindi Sahitya Sammelan incorporated under this Act, while the word "Society"  was defined to mean "the Hindi  Sahitya  Sammelan which  has  its head office at Allahabad and  is  registered under  the Societies Registration Act, 1860." Under  section 4(1) of the Act, the Sannnelan was constituted which was  to consist of the first members of the Sammelan and all persons who may hereafter become members thereof in accordance  with the rules made in that behalf.  This statutory Sammelan  was constituted  as  a body corporate by the name of  the  Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, and under sub-section (2) of section 4, it was  to  have perpetual succession and a  common  seal  with power,  subject to the provision of the.  Act,  to  acquire, hold and dispose of property and to contract and to sue  and be  sued by that name.  The Head Office of the Sammelan  was to  be  at Allahabad.  Under subs.(4) of section  the  first members  of  the Sammelan were to consist of  persons  who, immediately before the appointed day.-               (a)   were special members (Vishisht  Sadasya)               of the Society;                                    8 45               (b)   (were. life members (Sthayi Sadasya)  of               the Society.               (c)   had been Presidents of the Society; or               (d)   were    awarded   the   Mangla    Prasad               Paritoshik by the Society. This  sub-s.  (4) of section 4 was  amended  retrospectively

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with  effect from the date that the Act came into  force  by the  Hindi Sahitya Sammelan (Amendment) Act No. 1  of  1963, and  the  first  members of the Sammelan  were,  under  this amendment, declared to be-               (a)   all persons who, immediately before  the               appointed day, were members of the Society;               (b)   all  persons who, before that  day,  had               been Presidents of the Society; and               (c)   all  persons who, before that day,  were               awarded  the Mangla Prasad Paritoshik  by  the               Society. It  is not necessary to give in detail the other  provisions of  the  Act, except that it may be mentioned that  the  Act provided for vesting of all property, movable or  immovable, or,  belonging to the Society in the Sammelan,  transferring all  rights and Liabilities of the Society to the  Sammelan, converting  reference  to  the Society in  any  law  to  the Sammelan,  and other similar necessary provisions.  The  Act itself did not make any provision for the future  membership of  the  Sammelan; but, under section 12(1) (a),  the  first Governing Body of the Sammelan was directed to make rules in respect   of  matters  relating  to  membership,   including qualifications  and disqualifications For membership of  the Sammelan.   The first Governing Body was to  be  constituted under  section  8  and  was to  consist  of  a  Chairman,  a Secretary and 13 other members.  This Governing Body was  to be constituted by a notification in the Official Gazette  by the  Central  Government.  The thirteen members were  to  be chosen as follows :-               (i)   one member to represent the Ministry  of               the  Central  Government  dealing         with               education;               (ii)one member to represent the Ministry  of               the Central Government dealing with finance;               (iii)not  more than three members from  among               the former Presidents of the Society; and               (iv)the  remaining number from  among  persons               who are, in the opinion of the Central Govern-               846               ment,  eminent in the field of Hindi  language               or Hindi literature. It was this first Governing Body which was to make rules  on all  matters  relating to membership of the  Sammelan  under section  12 (1 )(a) of the Act.  These rules were  not  have effect until they were approved by the Central.   Government and  were  published  by the first Governing  Body  in  such manner  as the Central Government may, by order, direct.   A copy  of the rules was also to be laid before each House  of Parliament.  Counsel for respondent No. 1 placed before us a copy of the rules which, according to him, have been made by the first Governing Body with the approval of the Government and  have been published as required.  The Rules  come  into force on 1st of February, 1971.  The petition under Art. 32, and  the  petition under Art. 226, out of  which  the  civil appeal arises, were both moved much earlier and long  before these  Rules  were framed.  These petitions  challenged  the validity of the Act, without taking into account the  actual Rules  framed,  mainly  on  the  ground  that  he  Act   had interfered  with  the  right  of  the  petitioners  to  form association Linder Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution and was not  protected  by Art. 19(4).  In the petition  before  the Allahabad  High  Court, the Court held that, since  all  the members  of  the  Society had also  become  members  of  the Sammelan  under  the Act, there was no infringement  of  the right  to  form association, so that the Act  could  not  be

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declared invalid on that ground.  The writ petition in  this Court  has  been filed by only one member  of  the  Society, while the petition in the High Court and the appeal against the  judgment  of the High Court, which is before  us,  were filed  by the original Hindi Sahitya Sammelan as  one  party and 72 members of that Sammelan joining as other petitioning parties.  ’In the civil appeal, thus, the grievance that the Act ha$ infringed the fundamental right has been put forward both by the Society itself as well as by 72 of its  members, including members of the Working Committee and the Governing Body  of the society.  They have all come up to  this  Court against  the  decision of the High Court in this  appeal  by special leave. In the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents in the writ petition before the High Court as well as in the writ petition in this Court, the position taken up was  that the  Act,  in  fact, does not deprive the  Society  and  its members of any rights which they had under the  constitution of  the  Society and did not interfere with their  right  of association inasmuch as all the members of the Society  have been included as members of the Sammelan under the Act.  The High  Court,  in  fact,  dismissed  the  writ  petition   on accepting  this  submission  put forward on  behalf  of  the respondents.   In the arguments before us,  learned  counsel for                             847 respondent No. 1, however, took UP a different position  and urged  that  the Act keeps the Society in-tact  as  it  was, where  a new Sammelan is constituted under the Act  for  the purpose of managing the institution which has been  declared as  an  institution  of national importance.   He  put  this aspect   of  the  case  in  the  forefront,  but,   in   the alternative,  he  also argued the case on the basis  of  the position  taken  up in the counter-affidavits  in  the  High Court and in this Court as mentioned above.  We consider  it convenient to first deal with the case as was  specifically put  forward in the counter-affidavits.  In  these  counter- affidavits,  the position taken up is that, having  declared the  old  Hindi  Sahitya  Sammelan,  which  was  a   Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, as an insti tution   of   national  importance,   Parliament   has proceeded  to legislate in respect of it under Entry  63  of List   I  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  in  order   that   its administration  may not suffer as a result of  the  quarrels that  were  going  on inter-se between the  members  of  the Society.   It  was for this purpose that a  first  Governing Body   was constituted  to  take  over   the   management temporarily.   The  Act  was designed  to  reconstitute  the Sammelan in such manner that it could work successfully  and without  difficulties  and,  in making  provision  for  this purpose,  all  members of the old Society were  included  as members  of  the Sammelan, so that their  right  of  forming association  may not be taken away from them.   The  Society was never dissolved; instead of the Society remaining a body registered  under  the Societies Registration  Act,  it  was converted into a statutory Sammelan under the Act. It, however, appears on examination of the provisions of the Act that the Sammelan under the Act is composed not only  of persons, who were members of the Society, but of others  who have  been  given the right to be members  of  the  Sammelan without  the  consent  of the  preexisting  members.   Under section  4(4)  itself, as retrospectively amended  in  1963, apart from persons, who were members of the Society, others, who have been made members of the Sammelan, are all  persons who, before that day, had been Presidents of the Society and

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all  persons who, before that day, were awarded  the  Mangla Prasad  Paritoshik by the Society.  These members have  been added  without  any option being available to  the  existing members  of the Society to elect or refuse to elect them  as members  which  was  the  right  they  possessed  under  the constitution of the Society itself.  Further, under  section 12  (1)  (a),  very  wide powers were  given  to  the  first Governor  Body to make rules in respect of matters  relating to     membership,     including     qualifications      and disqualifications  for  membership of the  Sammelan.   Under this power, the rules framed could make 10-L1100 SupCI71 848 provision  for  admission  of persons as  members  whom  the original  members  of the Society may never  have  liked  to admit  in  their Society.  The number of  such  new  members could even be so large as to leave the original members in a small  minority  with the result that  those  members  could become  totally  ineffective in the Society.   Even  in  the Rules  actually framed, there is provision for admission  of members  under various classes.  In addition to the  persons mentioned  in section 4(4) of the Act, Rule 6  proVides  for membership  of  persons  who may become  Sabhapatis  of  the Sammelan for any annual session subsequent to the Act coming into  force, and persons who may be awarded  Mangala  Prasad Paritoshik  subsequent to the Act coming into force.   Under Rules  7, 8, and 9, new Vishisht Sadasyas, Sthayi  Sadasyas, and  Sadharan Sadasyas can be admitted to the membership  of the Sammelan on payment of Rs. 1,000/- or Rs. 300/-, as  the case  may be.  This admission to membership,  according to the  Rules,  will  be made by the new  Karya  Samiti  to  be elected under the Rules and not by the Working Committee  of the  original  members of the Association.   Further,  under section  7(2)  of  the Act, the Governing Body  of  the  new Sammelan  is  to  consist of such  number  of  persons,  not exceeding  55,  as the Central Government may from  time  to time  determine; and out of these, a number not exceeding  7 are  to be nominated by the, Central Government  from  among educations  of repute and eminent Hindi scholars.   These  7 nominees  are to be chosen by the Central Government and  on becoming, members of the Governing Body, under Rule. 11 they become members of the Sammelan.  Under Rule 10,  educational institutions can also be admitted as Sanstha Sadasyas of the Sammelan   by  the  new  Karya  Samiti  and,  thereupon,   a representative  of  each of such institution  has  right  to participate in’ proceedings of the Sammelan, exercising  all the  rights  of a member.  It will, thus, be seen  that  the Sammelan,  which has come into existence under the  Act,  is not  identical with the Sammelan which was registered  as  a Society   under%  the  Societies  Registration  Act.   1860. Certain persons have been added as members by the Act and by the Rules.  Admission of future members is no longer at  the choice  of  the original members who’ had formed  the  Asso- ciation,Persons,  in whose admission as members the  members of the, Society, had no hand, can become members and get the right of associating with them in the Sammelan, without  the original members having any right to obecti. this is  clear interference  with the right to form an  association  which had been exercised by the members of the Society by  forming the  Society  with its constitution, under which  they  were members and future members could only come in as a result of their  choice by being elected by their  Working  Committee. We  are  unable to agree with the High Court  that  the  new Sammelan, as constituted under the Act, 849

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is  identical  with the Society and that all the  rights  of forming  an  association,  which  were  being  exercised  by members  of  the Society, have been kept in-tact  under  the Act. It was argued that the right guaranteed by Article 19 (1 (c) is  only  to  form an  association  and,  consequently,  any regulation  of the affairs of the Association, after it  has been formed, will not amount to a breach of that right.   It is  true that it has been held by this Court that, after  an Association has been formed and the right under Art. 19  (1) (c) has been exercised by the members forming it, they  have no right to claim that its activities must also be permitted to  be carried on in- the manner they desire.   Those  cases are,  however,  inapplicable to the present case.   The  Act does  not merely regulate the administration of the  affairs of the Society, what it does is to alter the composition  of the  Society itself as we have indicated above.  The  result of  this  change  in composition is that  the  members,  who voluntarily formed the Association, are now compelled to act in that Association with other members who have been imposed as members by the Act and in whose admission to  membership, they had no say.  Such alteration in the composition of  the Association  itself  clearly interferes with  the  right  to continue to function as members of the Association which was voluntarily  formed by the original founders.  The right  to form  an association, in our opinion,  necessarily,  implies that the persons forming the Association have also the right to  continue  to  be associated with only  those  whom  they voluntarily,  admit in the Associate on.  Any law, by  which members are introduced in the voluntary Association  without any  option being given to the members to keep them out,  or any  law which. takes away the membership of those who  have voluntarily Joined it, will be a law violating the right  to form  an association.  If we were to accept  the  submission that  the right guaranteed by Art. 19 ( 1 ) (c) is  confined to the initial stage of forming an Association and does  not protect  the  right  to continue the  Association  with  the membership,  either chosen by the founders or  regulated  by rules  made  by the Association itself, the right  would  be meaningless because, as soon as an Association is formed,  a law may be passed interfering with its composition., so that the  Association formed may not be able to function at  all. The  right  can be effective only if it is held  to  include within  it the right to continue the, Association  with  its composition  as  voluntarily  agreed  upon  by  the  persons forming the Association.  This aspect was recognised by this Court though not in plain words, in the case of O. K.  Ghosh and  Another v. E. X. Joseph(").  The Court, in that  case.. was  considering the validity of Rule 4 (B) of  the  Central Civil  Service,,,  (Conduct) Rules, 1955,  which  laid  down that: (1)[1963] Supp 3 S.C.R. 789. 850               "No Government servant shall join or  continue               to  be a member of any Service Association  of               Government servants               (a)which  has not, within a period  of  six               months   from  its  formation,  obtained   the               recognition of the Government under the  Rules               prescribed in that behalf; or               (b)recognition in respect of which has been               refused  or withdrawn by the Government  under               the said Rules."               This Court held:-               "It  is  not  disputed  that  the  fundamental

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             rights guaranteed by Art. 19 can be claimed by               Government  servants.  Art. 33  which  confers               power  on the Parliament to modify the  rights               in  their  application to  the  Armed  Forces,               clearly brings out the fact that all  citizens               including Government servants, are entitled to               Claim the rights guaranteed by Art. 19.  Thus,               the  validity of the impugned rule has  to  be               judged  on the basis that the  respondent  and               his   co-employees   are  entitled   to   form               Associations or Unions.  It is clear that Rule               4-B  imposes a restriction on this right.   It               virtually  compels  a  Government  servant  to               withdraw   his  membership  of   the   Service                             Association of Government Servants as soon  as               recognition  accorded to the said citation  is               withdrawn  or  if, after  the  Association  is               formed,  no  recognition is  Aaccorded  to  it               within six months.  In other words, the  right               to  form an Association is conditioned by  the               existence  of  the  recognition  of  the  said               Association   by  the  Government.    If   the               Association   obtains  the   recognition   and               continues to enjoy it, Government servants can               become members of the said Association; if the               Association  does not secure recognition  from               the Government or recognition granted to it is               withdrawn,  Government servants must cease  to               be the members of the said Association. That               is the plain effect of the impugned rule." The Court in the above passage, thus, accepted the principle that  the  Government  servants,  who  may  have  formed  an Association.  could not, be compelled to resign from  it  by imposition of a condition of recognition of this Association by  the Government and that if the Government  servants  are required to cease to be members that would be a violation of the  right under Art. 19 (1) (c).  The Court, of course,  in that  case,  further proceeded ’to examine  whether  such  a restriction on the right could be justified under 851 Art. 19(4) or not.  That case, thus, supports our view  that the  right to form an Association includes the right to  its continuance  and  any law altering the  composition  of  the Association  compulsorily will be a breach of the  right  to form the Association. This Court had also proceeded on the same basis in the  case of State of Madras v. V. G. Row(1).  Though this aspect  was not  clearly brought out in the judgment, the  point,  which came  up  for consideration, was decided on the  basis  that persons  forming, an Association had a right under Art.  19 (1)  (c)  to  see that the composition  of  the  Association continues  as voluntarily agreed to by them.  That  decision was given in an appeal from a judgment of the High Court  of Madras reported in V. G. Row,v.  The State of Madras(2).  In the  High  Court, this principle was clearly  formulated  by Rajamannar, C.J., in the following words :-               "The  word  "form" therefore, must  refer  not               only  to  the  initial  commencement  of   the               association,  but also to the  continuance  of               the association as such." The  Act, insofar as it interferes with the  composition  of them  Society  in  constituting  the  Sammelan,   therefore, violates the right of the original members of the Society to form an association guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (c).

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Article 19(4), on-the face of it, cannot be called in aid to claim  validity for the Act.  Under Art.  19(4),  reasonable restrictions  can  be imposed only in the interests  of  the sovereignty  and integrity of India, or in the interests  of public  order  or morality.  It has not  been  contended  on behalf  of  the respondent, nor could it be  contended  that this  alteration of the constitution of the Society  in  the manner  laid  down by the Act was. in the interests  of  the sovereignty and integrity of India, or in, the interests  of public  order or morality.  Not being protected  under  Art. 19(4), if must be held that the provision contained, in  the Act  for  reconstituting the Society into the  Sammelan  is, void.   Once  that section is declared void, the  whole  Act becomes.  ineffective inasmuch as the formation of  the  new Sammelan  is  the very basis for all  the  other  provisions contained in the Act. In  view  of this position emerging in the course  of  argu- ments,  Mr.  B. Sen put forward an  entirely  different  and alter-native case before us which we have mentioned earlier. The.   position  he  took  up  was  that  the  Act   nowhere specifically  lays.  down  that  the  Society  small   stand dissolved,   while  it  does  constitute  a  new   Sammelan. According to him, therefore, it should (1) [1952] S.C.R. 597. (2) A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 147. 852 be inferred that, while the Society still continues to exist in its original form, the law has brought into existence  a new Sammelan to which all the functions, properties, etc. of the  Society  have passed under the Act.   There  are  three reasons  why this alternative submission cannot be  accepted as ensuring the validity ,of the Act.  The first is that the specific case taken by the respondents has been that the Act reconstitutes the Society and does not create a separate and indepedent  body in the form of a new  Sammelan.   Secondly, even  if  it  be  accepted that  a  new  Sammelan  has  been constituted  by  the Act, the question will  ,arise  of  the Legislative  competence of Parliament to pass such  :a  law. Constitution  of Societies is under List 11 of  the  Seventh Schedule.   Parliament  purported  to  exercise  legislative power under Entry 63 of List I on the basis of a declaration that   the   Hindi  Sahitya  Sammelan,  Allahabad   was   an institution  of national importance.  The  institution  that was  declared  was the Society itself.  It was  not  a  case where  the  Society could be distinguished from  some  other institution which might have been declared as an institution of national importance There can, of course, be cases  where a  Society may be running a college, a school or some  other like institution, in which case Parliament may declare  that particular  institution as of national  importance,  without declaring  the  Society as such In the  present  case,  what section  2 of the Act did was to declare the Society  itself as an institution of national importance, and, consequently, Parliament  became competent to legislate in respect of  the Society.   On  the  interpretation now  sought  to,  be  put forward, the Act keeps that Society in-tact, but deprives it of all its functions and properties and transfers them to ’a newly constituted body, viz., the Sammelan, as defined under the Aet.  This Sammelan is itself a body corporate, and that Sammelan  has  never  been declared  as  an  institution  of national   importance.   The  only  institutaion  that   was declared as of national importance was the Society which, of course, earlier, carried the same name as the new  Sammelan. Parliament  was,  therefore, not competent to  legislate  in respect  of  this newly constituted Sammelan  which,  at  no

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stage,  had  been  declared as an  institution  of  national importance.   The third reason why this submission  must  be rejected, is that, if we were to hold that Parliament  pased this Act so as to transfer all the properties and assets  of the  Society to the Sammelan, the Act would contravene  Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.  On this interpretation,  what the Act purports to do is to take away all the properties of the  Society, leaving the Society as an existing  body,  and give  them  to the new Sammelan.  This Sammelan  is  a  new, separate  and distinct legal entity from the  Society.   The Society  is,  thus’ deprived of all its properties  by the Act.  Such a law depriving the Society of its properties al- 8 5 3 together  cannot be held to be a reasonable  restriction  in the public interest on the right of the Society to hold  the property.   The property, under section 5 of  the  Societies Registration Act, 1860, vested in the Governing Body of  the Society.   The members of the Governing Body, therefore  had the right to hold the property under Art. 19(1)(f) and  they having   been  deprived  of  that  property   have   rightly approached the Courts for redress of their grievance. In  this  connection counsel for the respondents  relied  on decision  of this Court in The Board of Trustees,  Ayurvedic and  Unnanii Tibia College, Delhi v. The State of Delhi  and Another(1), where the Board of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani  Tibbit  College, Delhi was dissolved  by  the  Tibbia College Act, 1952, and the property, which had vested in the Board  of Trustees, passed to the newly  constituted  Board under  the impugned Act.  The Court held that there  was  no violation  of  the  fundamental rights  guaranteed  by  Art. 19(1)(f) or Art. 31 That decision, however, proceeded on the basis  that the property of the original Society  registered under the Societies Registration Act had vested in the Board of  Trustees  which  had been dissolved  and  the  property, thereafter,  did not vest in the members of the  Society  in view  of  the  provisions  of the Act  of  1860.   In  these circumstances,  it was held that no one could complain  that his right to property under Art. 31 or his right to hold the property  under  Art. 19 (1) (f) had been  violated  by  the impugned  Act.   In the present case, the  applicability  of Art.  19(1)(f) is being considered by us on  the  assumption that the old Society still exists as it was and, yet all its properties  have been transferred to the Sammelan.   If  the Society  still exists, so does its Governing Body  in  whom- the property of the Society  vested.    The   Act,    thus, deprives  the members of the Governing Body of the  property which  still  continued  to vest in them  in  spite  of  the passing  of  the Act.  This total deprivation  of  property, instead of regulating the management of the affairs of the Society or its properties, cannot clearly be justified as  a reasonable restriction in public interest.  It is true that, at the time    when the Act was passed, litigation was going on  between the members of the Society, and the  affairs  of the  Society were probably in a mess.  The remedy,  however, could  not  lie  in depriving the Society  of  its  property altogether.  Reasonable restrictions could have been imposed so  as to ensure the proper preservation of the property  of the Society and its proper management.  If the law is passed not merely for ensuring proper     management            and administration  of the property, but for  totally  depriving the persons, in whom the property vested, of their (1)  [1962] Suppl.  I S.C.R. 156. 854 right to hold the property, the law cannot be justified as a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(5).  Consequently, even

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on  this  alternative position taken up by counsel  for  the respondents, the Act cannot be held to be valid. As  a result, the petition and the appeal are  both  allowed with  costs.   The Act is declared to be  invalid,  so  that there  will be restraint on the concerned bodies,  including the  Union Government, from taking or continuing any  action under the Act.There will be one hearing fee. R.K.P.S.       Petition and Appeal allowed. 8 5 5