REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5239 OF 2002

Dalip Singh …Appellant  

Versus

State of U.P. and others         …Respondents

O R D E R  

1. For many centuries, Indian society cherished two basic values of life  

i.e.,  `Satya’  (truth)  and  `Ahimsa’  (non-violence).   Mahavir,  Gautam  

Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in  

their daily life.  Truth constituted an integral part of justice delivery system  

which was in vogue in pre-independence era and the people used to feel  

proud  to  tell  truth  in  the  courts  irrespective  of  the  consequences.  

However, post-independence period has seen drastic changes in our value  

system.  The materialism has over-shadowed the old ethos and the quest  

for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do  

not  hesitate  to  take  shelter  of  falsehood,  misrepresentation  and  

suppression of facts in the court proceedings.  In last 40 years, a new

creed of litigants has cropped up.  Those who belong to this creed do not  

have any respect  for  truth.   They shamelessly  resort  to  falsehood and  

unethical means for achieving their goals.  In order to meet the challenge  

posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time,  

evolved  new rules  and  it  is  now  well  established  that  a  litigant,  who  

attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain  

of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.

2. In  Hari  Narain  v.  Badri  Das AIR  1963  SC  1558,  this  Court  

adverted  to  the  aforesaid  rule  and  revoked  the  leave  granted  to  the  

appellant by making the following observations:

“It is of  utmost  importance  that  in  making  material  statements  and  setting  forth  grounds  in    applications  for  special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution, care  must  be  taken  not  to  make  any  statements  which  are  inaccurate,  untrue  and  misleading.  In  dealing  with  applications  for  special   leave,  the Court   naturally  takes  statements  of fact and grounds of fact  contained  in  the  petitions  at  their  face value and it  would  be  unfair   to  betray the  confidence of the Court by  making  statements  which are untrue and misleading.  Thus, if at the hearing of  the appeal  the Supreme Court  is satisfied that the material  statements made by the appellant in his application for special  leave are inaccurate and misleading,  and the respondent is  entitled  to  contend  that  the  appellant  may  have  obtained  special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what  he characterizes as misrepresentations of facts contained in  the petition for special leave, the Supreme Court may come to  the conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to the  appellant ought to be revoked.”

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3. In Welcome Hotel and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and  

others etc.  AIR 1983 SC 1015, the Court held that a party which has  

misled the Court  in passing an order in its favour is not entitled to be  

heard on the merits of the case.   

4. In  G.  Narayanaswamy  Reddy  and  others  v.  Governor  of  

Karnataka and another AIR 1991 SC 1726, the Court denied relief to  

the appellant who had concealed the fact that the award was not made by  

the Land Acquisition Officer within the time specified in Section 11-A of the  

Land Acquisition Act because of the stay order passed by the High Court.  

While dismissing the special leave petition, the Court observed:

“Curiously enough, there is no reference in the Special Leave  Petitions  to  any of  the  stay  orders  and we came to know  about these orders only when the respondents appeared in  response to the notice and filed their counter affidavit.  In our  view,  the said  interim orders  have a  direct  bearing on the  question raised and the non-disclosure of the same certainly  amounts  to  suppression  of  material  facts.   On this  ground  alone, the Special Leave Petitions are liable to be rejected.  It  is well settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the  Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches  this  Court  for  such  relief  must  come  with  frank  and  full  disclosure  of  facts.   If  he  fails  to  do  so  and  suppresses  material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed.  We  accordingly dismiss the Special Leave Petitions.”

5. In  S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v.  Jagannath  

(dead) by L.Rs. and others  JT 1993 (6) SC 331, the Court held that  

where  a  preliminary  decree  was  obtained  by  withholding  an  important  

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document from the court, the party concerned deserves to be thrown out  

at any stage of the litigation.   

6. In  Prestige Lights Ltd. V. State Bank of India (2007) 8 SCC  

449,  it  was  held  that  in  exercising  power  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a  

court  of  equity  and a person who invokes the High Court’s  jurisdiction  

under article 226 of the Constitution is duty bound to place all the facts  

before  the  court  without  any  reservation.   If  there  is  suppression  of  

material  facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court  

then it will  be fully justified in refusing to entertain petition filed under  

Article 226 of the Constitution.  This Court referred to the judgment of  

Scrutton, L.J. in R v Kensington Income Tax Commissioners (1917) 1  

K.B. 486, and observed:  

“In  exercising  jurisdiction  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution,  the  High  Court  will  always  keep  in  mind  the  conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction.  If the  applicant does not disclose full  facts or suppresses relevant  materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, then  the  Court  may  dismiss  the  action  without  adjudicating  the  matter on merits.  The rule has been evolved in larger public  interest  to  deter  unscrupulous  litigants  from  abusing  the  process of Court by deceiving it.  The very basis of the writ  jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct  facts.  If  the  material  facts  are  not  candidly  stated  or  are  suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ  courts would become impossible.”   

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7. In A.V. Papayya Sastry and others v. Government of A.P. and  

others, AIR 2007 SC 1546, the Court held that Article 136 does not confer  

a right of appeal on any party.  It confers discretion on this Court to grant  

leave to appeal in appropriate cases.  In other words, the Constitution has  

not made the Supreme Court a regular Court of Appeal or a Court of Error.  

This  Court  only  intervenes  where  justice,  equity  and  good  conscience  

require such intervention.   

8. In Sunil Poddar & Ors. v Union Bank of India (2008) 2 326, the  

Court  held  that  while  exercising  discretionary  and  equitable  jurisdiction  

under Article 136 of the Constitution, the facts and circumstances of the  

case should be seen in their entirety to find out if there is miscarriage of  

justice.  If the appellant has not come forward with clean hands, has not  

candidly disclosed all the facts that he is aware of and he intends to delay  

the  proceedings,  then  the  Court  will  non-suit  him  on  the  ground  of  

contumacious conduct.

9. In  K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others  

(2008) 12 SCC 481, the court held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme  

Court  under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the  

Constitution  is   extraordinary,  equitable  and  discretionary  and  it  is  

imperative that the petitioner approaching the Writ Court must come with  

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clean  hands  and  put  forward  all  the  facts  before  the  Court  without  

concealing  or  suppressing  anything  and  seek  an  appropriate  relief.   If  

there  is  no  candid  disclosure  of  relevant  and  material  facts  or  the  

petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed  

at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.  The same  

rule was reiterated in G. Jayshree and others v. Bhagwandas S. Patel  

and others (2009) 3 SCC 141.  

10. This appeal, which is directed against order dated 21.5.2001 passed  

by the Allahabad High Court is illustrative of how unscrupulous litigants  

can mislead the authorities entrusted with the task of implementing the  

provisions of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (for  

short,  “the Act”) and the courts for retaining possession of the surplus  

land.  The tenure-holder – Praveen Singh did not file statement in terms of  

Section 9(2-A) of the Act in respect of his holding as on 24.1.1971.  After  

about four years, the Prescribed Authority issued notice dated 29.11.1975  

under Section 10(2) of the Act and called upon Shri Praveen Singh to show  

cause as to why the statement prepared under Section 10(1) of the Act  

may not be taken as correct and his land may not be declared surplus  

accordingly.   A copy of  the statement  was sent  to  Shri  Praveen Singh  

along with the notice in C.L.H. Form No.4.  For the sake of convenient  

reference, the notice is reproduced below:

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“C.L.H. FORM NO. 4

(See Rule 8)

(Form  of  Notice  under  Section  10(2)  of  the  imposition  of  Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961)

To, Name of tenure-holder Sri Praveen Singh With parentage s/o. Shri Raghubir Singh and Address r/o  Village  Tisotara,  P.O.  Khas,  Pargana  

Kirat Pur, Tehsil Najibabad, District Bijnor.

Whereas you have failed to submit  a statement/have  furnished incomplete/incorrect statement in respect of all your  holdings in the State of Uttar Pradesh including holdings of  your family members with all  the required particulars within  the time mentioned in the notice in C.L.H. Form 1, published  under Section 9;

And whereas the statement of all holdings held by you  in the State on 8th June, 1973, statement showing proposed  ceiling area applicable to you and the proposed surplus land  have been prepared under sub-section (1) of Section 10, they  are sent to you herewith and you are hereby called upon to  show  cause  within  a  period  of  15  days  from  the  date  of  service of this notice, why the said statement be not taken as  correct.

On  your  failure  to  dispute  the  correctness  of  the  statements  in  any  court,  within  the  time  allowed,  the  aforesaid statement shall be treated as final and ceiling area  applicable to you and the surplus land shall  be determined  accordingly.

Given under my hand and seal of the Court this day of  29-11-1975.

S/d- Signature of the Prescribed Authority of the Sub-

Division Prescribed Authority Tehsil Najibabad.”

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11. The notice was delivered to Shri Praveen Singh on 3.12.1975, but he  

neither filed any objection to the proposed determination of his surplus  

land nor sought extension of time for the said purpose.  After service of  

notice,  the Prescribed Authority adjourned the case on 10.12.1975 and  

again on 19.12.1975 apparently with the hope that the tenure-holder may  

file  objection  to  the  statement  prepared  under  Section  10(1).   This  is  

evident  from  the  proceeding  sheets  of  the  two  dates,  which  are  

reproduced below:   

Proceedings dated 10.12.1975

10.12.1965 File received after service of notice on the  tenure-holder on 3.12.1975.

It  is  ordered  that  the  file  be  put  up  on  19.12.1975 after receipt of objections.

Sd/- Prescribed Authority

Proceedings dated 19.12.1975

19.12.1975 File put up.  The tenure-holder has not filed  any objection despite service.

It is ordered that the file be put up for ex- parte orders on 27.12.1975.

Sd/- Prescribed Authority”

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12. On 27.12.1975,  the  Prescribed Authority  noted that  Shri  Praveen  

Singh has not filed any objection and declared that 18.22 acres of irrigated  

land was surplus in the hands of the tenure-holder.  After six months and  

twelve days,  Shri Praveen Singh submitted an application dated 8.7.1976  

along with what was termed as an affidavit before the Prescribed Authority  

and prayed that ex parte order dated 27.12.1975 may be set aside and he  

may be given opportunity  to file  objections  and tender evidence.   The  

Prescribed Authority rejected the application on the same day i.e. 8.7.1976  

by observing that no valid ground has been made out for reconsidering the  

matter  after  six  months.   The  appeal  preferred  by Shri  Praveen Singh  

against the order of the Prescribed Authority was dismissed by Additional  

Commissioner (Judicial), Allahabad (Appellate Authority) in default because  

no one appeared on the date of hearing.  The restoration application filed  

by Shri Praveen Singh was dismissed on 27.8.1980.  He then challenged  

the  orders  of  the  Prescribed  Authority  and  Appellate  Authority  in  Writ  

Petition No.  8342/1980,  which was allowed by the High Court  and the  

matter was remitted to the Appellate Authority with a direction to decide  

the application of Shri Praveen Singh afresh in accordance with law.

13. In compliance of the direction given by the High Court, the Appellate  

Authority reconsidered the appeal of Shri Praveen Singh but dismissed the  

same on the ground that the tenure-holder had not filed an application  

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under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay and  

even in the application filed for setting aside the ex parte order, no cause  

was shown for the delay.  The Appellate Authority also observed that the  

tenure-holder had not denied receipt of notice dated 29.11.1975 issued  

under  Section  10(2)  of  the  Act,  but  did  not  file  any  objection  till  the  

passing of ex parte order on 27.12.1975 and that his assertion of having  

come to know of the ex parte order from Lekhpal Halqa on 7.7.1976 is not  

believable.  It appears that after remand of the matter by the High Court,  

Shri Praveen Singh died and, therefore, his legal representatives (including  

the appellant herein) were substituted in his place.   

14. The  legal  representatives  of  Shri  Praveen  Singh jointly  filed  Civil  

Miscellaneous Writ  Petition No. 22790/1990 and prayed for quashing of  

orders  dated  27.12.1975,  8.7.1976,  7.8.1990  passed by  the  Prescribed  

Authority and the Appellate Authority respectively.  They also prayed for  

issue of a direction to the Appellate Authority to remand the case to the  

Prescribed Authority for entertaining their objections.  In paragraph 3 of  

the writ petition, the following statement was made:

“That  the  petitioner's  late  father,  against  whom  the  proceedings had been initiated under Section 10(2) of the  Ceiling Act, filed application on 8.7.1976 supported by an  affidavit stating therein clearly that he was seriously ill for  about ten months as such he was not in a position to file  objection, and  as a matter of fact he did not have any  knowledge of the date of the proceedings that were being  

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conducted before the prescribed authority.  True copy of  the application dated 8.7.1976 of petitioners' late father is  annexed  herewith  as  Annexure  2.   True  copy  of  the  affidavit filed in support of the application dated 8.7.1976  of the petitioners' father is annexed herewith as annexure  3.”

(Emphasis added)

15. By  an  order  dated  7.9.1990,  the  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  

Allahabad High Court stayed the operation of the orders passed by the  

Prescribed  Authority  and  the  Appellate  Authority.   The  interim  order  

remained  operative  till  21.5.2001  that  is  the  date  on  which  the  writ  

petition was finally dismissed and during the interregnum the appellant  

continued to enjoy the property.

16. In the special leave petition filed against the order of the High Court,  

notice was issued on 12.10.2001, but the appellants prayer for stay was  

declined.  Thereafter, the surplus land of the tenure-holder was distributed  

among the landless persons who were joined as parties pursuant to order  

dated 27.3.2006 passed in I.A. No. 9/2004.

17. After service of notice, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed counter in the  

form  of  an  affidavit  of  Shri  Pradip  Kumar  Singh,  Additional  Tehsildar,  

District Bijnor, U.P.  In his affidavit, Shri Pradip Kumar gave details of the  

steps  taken by the Prescribed Authority  in  terms of  Section 10(1)  and  

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10(2) of the Act and made a categorical assertion that notice issued on  

29.11.1975 was duly served upon Shri Praveen Singh on 3.12.1975.  This  

is evident from paragraphs 4(iv) and (v) of the counter affidavit read as  

under:

“(iv) That the averments of facts made in the list of dates  against date 7.7.1976 are not admitted being incorrect.  The  notice in CLH Form No. 4 having been served on the tenure- holder on 3.12.1975, it was for him to have filed his objection.  It was for the tenure-holder to have managed his affairs.  It is  not for a Court or an Authority to communicate to the tenure- holder each and every order passed by it once service of the  notice is complete,  the Act does not require that each and  every date of proceedings and the copy or information about  the final order ex parte or otherwise be served on him.  The  tenure-holder avoided to file his objections since he had none.  The  statement  of  surplus  land  is  prepared  by  the  revenue  authorities in accordance with the provisions of the Act which  is prepared on the basis of revenue records of land held by a  tenure-holder  in  his  name  and  there  is  `Presumption  of  correctness of the revenue record.’

(v) That the averments of fact in list of date against date  8.7.1976 are not admitted as stated.  It is submitted that an  application dated 8.7.1976 filed by the tenure-holder did not  dispute service of notice in CLH Form No. 4 dated 29.11.1975.  The application was of a general nature.  If a tenure-holder  having been asked to  file  objections  within  15 days of  the  date of service of him `chooses not to do so’, would proceed  to a presumption that he has nothing to say.  Section 11 o the  Act  provides  that  where  a  tenure-holder  chooses  not  to  dispute  and  not  to  file  any  objection  to  the  statement  prepared by the Prescribed Authority under Section 10 of the  Act  within  the  stipulated  period,  the  Prescribed  Authority  `shall’ accordingly determine the surplus land of the tenure- holder.   Sub-section  (2)  of  Section  11  of  the  Act  further  provides that where an application is made by a tenure-holder  within thirty days of the date of an order under sub-section  (11)  of  the  Act,  that  being  a  statutory  duly  cast  on  the  

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Prescribed  Authority.   In  the  present  case  the  Prescribed  Authority after passing order dated 27.12.1975 fixed the next  date  as  27.1.1976  i.e.  after  30  days  and  it  is  only  on  27.1.1976  that  the  Prescribed  Authority  sent  notification  regarding publication of surplus land in official Gazette which  was so published on 5.6.1976.”

18. Shri  Sunil  Kumar  Singh,  son  of  the  appellant  Dalip  Singh  and  

grandson of  late  Shri  Praveen Singh filed  rejoinder  affidavit  dated 18th  

February, 2002. In paragraph 3 of the rejoinder affidavit Shri Sunil Kumar  

Singh made the following statement :-

“That  it  is  denied  categorically  that  the  father  of  the  petitioner had ever received the notice dated 29.11.1975  along with the statement of surplus land, prepared under  section 10(1) of the Act.  It is humbly stated that father  of the petitioner could not file any show cause without  going  through  the  above  referred  statement  prepared  under Section 10(1) of the Act.”

19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and scrutinized the  

record.  In our opinion, the appeal is liable to be dismissed only on the  

ground that the tenure-holder  Shri  Praveen Singh did not state correct  

facts in the application filed by him on 8.7.1976 before the Prescribed  

Authority for setting aside the ex parte order and the appellant did not  

approach  the  High  Court  with  clean  hands  inasmuch  as,  by  making  a  

misleading statement in paragraph 3 of the writ petition, an impression  

was  created  that  the  tenure-holder  did  not  know  of  the  proceedings  

initiated by the Prescribed Authority.  By making the said statement, the  

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appellant succeeded in persuading the High Court to pass an interim order  

which resulted in frustrating the efforts made by the concerned authority  

to distribute the surplus land among landless persons.  Even before this  

Court, a patently false statement has been made in the rejoinder affidavit  

on the issue of receipt of notice dated 29.11.1975 by Shri Praveen Singh.

20. A perusal of application dated 8.7.1976 submitted by Shri Praveen  

Singh for setting aside ex parte order dated 27.12.1975 passed by the  

Prescribed Authority makes it  clear that he had pleaded his  continuous  

illness for ten months as the cause for his inability to file objection.  In  

paragraph 2  of  the  application,  Shri  Praveen Singh made a  suggestive  

assertion that he had no knowledge of the proceedings initiated by the  

Prescribed Authority and he came to know about the case having been  

decided ex parte only on 7.7.1976 when he went to Lekhpal to procure  

memo.  There was not even a whisper in the application that notice dated  

29.11.1975 issued by the Prescribed Authority under Section 10(2) of the  

Act had not been served upon him and on that account he could not file  

objections within 15 days. The application filed by Shri Praveen Singh was  

not supported by any medical certificate or other evidence which could  

prima facie establish that he was really sick for ten months.  This is the  

reason why the Prescribed  Authority  refused to  reconsider  order  dated  

27.11.1975 and the Appellate Authority declined to entertain his prayer for  

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remand of the case to the Prescribed Authority for the purpose of fresh  

determination  of  surplus  area  case.   Notwithstanding  this,  in  the  writ  

petition filed before the High Court a misleading statement was made that  

due to serious illness, Shri Praveen Singh could not file objection and, as a  

matter of fact, he did not have any knowledge of the dates of proceedings  

which  were  conducted  by  the  Prescribed  Authority.   In  view  of  that  

statement, the learned Single Judge of the High Court felt persuaded to  

stay the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and Appellate Authority  

which,  as  mentioned above,  resulted  in  frustration  of  the action to  be  

taken by the concerned authority for distribution of the surplus land to  

landless persons for a good period of more than eleven years and enabled  

the heirs of Shri Praveen Singh to retain possession of the surplus land  

and  enjoy  the  same.   Before  the  High  Court  also,  no  evidence  was  

produced  in  support  of  the  assertion  regarding  serious  illness  of  Shri  

Praveen Singh.  Insofar as this Court is concerned, Shri Sunil Kumar Singh,  

grandson of Shri Praveen Singh and son of the appellant, boldly made a  

false  statement  that  his  grandfather  did  not  receive  notice  dated  

29.11.1975  along  with  the  statement  of  surplus  land  prepared  under  

Section 10(1) and he could not file any show cause without going through  

the statement.  We are amazed at the degree of audacity with which Shri  

Sunil Kumar Singh could make a patently false statement on oath.   

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21. From what we have mentioned above, it is clear that in this case  

efforts to mislead the authorities and the courts have transmitted through  

three generations and the conduct of the appellant and his son to mislead  

the High Court  and this Court cannot, but be treated as reprehensible.  

They belong to the category of persons who not only attempt, but succeed  

in  polluting  the  course  of  justice.   Therefore,  we  do  not  find  any  

justification to interfere with the order under challenge or entertain the  

appellant’s prayer for setting aside the orders passed by the Prescribed  

Authority and the Appellate Authority.

22. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.  We would have saddled the  

appellants  with  exemplary  costs  but,  keeping  in  view  the  fact  that  

possession of the surplus land was taken in 2002 and the same has been  

distributed among landless poor persons, we refrain from doing so.

……………………………….…J. [G.S. Singhvi]

………………………………..J. [Asok Kumar Ganguly]

New Delhi December 3, 2009

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