REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   3637       OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.20941 of 2006)

Dabur India Ltd. … Appellant

Versus

K.R. Industries … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Appellant is a manufacturer of a product known as ‘Dabur Red Tooth

Powder’ or ‘Dabur Lal Dant Manjan’.  In the year 1993, it had allegedly

adopted a unique colour  combination  and arrangement  of  features  which

was subsequently changed in December 1999.

3. Respondent herein is also said to be manufacturer of a tooth powder

known  as  ‘Sujata’.   It  is  said  to  have  infringed  the  copy  right  of  the

appellant.  A suit was filed by the appellant against the respondent in the

Delhi High Court.  Paragraph 7 of the plaint reads thus :

“7. In December 1999,  the  plaintiff  adopted  a new carton while retaining the conical shape and white  cap  for  their  product  which  is  described hereinbelow :

• On  one  column  has  the  words  RED  TOOTH  POWDER within a yellow blurb.

• Immediately below the blurb is an oval shaped picture of a family with a yellow background.

• Above these two features there is  a legend within a blurb mentioning the fact that this is a new pack.

• The column immediately next to it contain the same features in the Devnagri script.

• A third column sets out the details including Composition, Weight, MRP and Manufacturers Name etc.

• The top half  of the third column contains an oval shaped device  containing  a  diagrammatic  representation  of  the herbs that constitute the ingredients of Plaintiffs product.”

4. It was alleged that the said carton constituted an ‘artistic work’ within

the meaning of Section 25-C of the Copyright Act, 1957 (the 1957 Act).

Respondent is said to have been using an identical colour scheme lay out,

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arrangement of features and get  up as  that  of the  plaintiffs,  the essential

features whereof are :

• “One column has the words RED TOOTH POWDER within a yellow blurb.

• A column which contains the representation of a family in an oval shape picture.

• There is  a similar representation in the Devnagri script  in another column.

• The details of the product are set out in another column.

• Above the details of the product there is advice of a lotus, similar  to  the  positioning  of  the  plaintiff’s  herbs  in  the plaintiff’s carton.”

5. The reliefs claimed for by the plaintiff in the said suit, inter alia, are :

“(A) An  order  of  permanent  injunction restraining  the  defendant,  their  partners, proprietors and/or promoters, as the case may be, their servants and agents,  representatives, dealers and all others acting for and on their behalf from reproducing  any  of  the  artistic  features  of  the plaintiff’s  DABUR RED  TOOTH  POWDER container/  packaging/pouch,  including  its  colour combination,  get  up,  layout  or  arrangement  of features,  printing,  publishing,  using  or  otherwise reproducing any of the artistic features thereof in any material from amounting to an infringement of copyright.

(B) An  order  of  permanent  injunction restraining  the  defendants,  their  partners, proprietors and/or promoters, as the case may be,

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their servants and agents,  representatives, dealers and all others acting for and on their behalf from manufacturing,  selling,  offering  for  sale  or otherwise  directly  or  indirectly  dealing  in  tooth powder packed in the impugned packaging or any other  packaging  as  may  be  a  slavish  imitation and/or a substantial  reproduction of the DABUR RED  TOOTH  POWDER container/packaging/pouch  or  from  committing any other act as is  likely to cause confusion and deception amounting to passing off.”

6. Respondent  filed  an  application  in  the  suit  purported  to  be  under

Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred

to as ‘the Code’) contending that  as  the  defendant  is  resident  of Andhra

Pradesh, the Delhi High Court had no jurisdiction.   

7. By reason of the impugned judgment and order dated 22.5.2006, a

learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the said contention of the

respondent.   

8. An intra court appeal preferred thereagainst has been dismissed by a

Division Bench of the said Court holding that the matter is covered by the

decision of this Court in Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, [(2006) 9 SCC 41].

It was stated :

“The learned Single Judge has also held that so far as  the  aforesaid  relief  relating  to  passing  off  is

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concerned,  Delhi  court  does  not  have  any territorial jurisdiction as the respondent/defendant is  from  Andhra  Pradesh  and  there  is  no documentary evidence to show that the respondent was  selling  goods  in  Delhi.   We agree  with  the aforesaid findings and conclusions recorded by the learned  Single  Judge.   Accordingly,  we  find  no merit in the submissions of the counsel appearing for  the  appellant  that  the  composite  suit  of infringement of copyright  and passing off  would lie  in the same forum.  We also do not find any error in the judgment of the learned Single Judge as in our considered opinion so far the relief for passing off is concerned, the same is covered by the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Dhodha House case.”

9. Mr. Fali S. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellant, submits that the Division Bench of the High Court committed

a serious error in passing the impugned judgment in so far as it failed to take

into consideration the effect of a consolidated suit  under the 1957 Act as

also the  Trade Marks  Act,  1958 (for  short  ‘the  1958 Act’),  as  would be

evident from the following excerpts of Dhodha House (supra) :

“22. We are not  concerned in this case with  the maintainability of a composite suit both under the 1957 Act and the 1958 Act. Indisputably, if such a situation  arises,  the  same would  be  permissible; but the same may not be relevant for the purpose of determining the question of a forum where such suit  can be instituted.  Sub-section (2) of  Section 62  of  the  1957 Act  provides  for  a non  obstante clause  conferring  jurisdiction  upon  the  District

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Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit  or other proceeding, the persons instituting the suit or other proceedings have been residing. In terms of sub- section (1) of Section 62, suit can be instituted and the  proceedings  can  be  initiated  in  respect  of matters  arising  under  the  said  chapter  for infringement of the copyright in any work or the infringement  of  any  other  right  conferred thereunder. It does not confer jurisdiction upon a District  Court  where  the  plaintiff  resides,  if  a cause of action arises under the 1958 Act.

XXX XXX XXX

43.  The  short  question  which  arises  for consideration is as to whether causes of action in terms  of  both  the  1957  Act  and  the  1958  Act although  may  be  different,  would  a  suit  be maintainable  in  a  court  only  because  it  has  the jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  same  in  terms  of Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act?

44. A cause of action in a given case both under the 1957 Act as also under the 1958 Act may be overlapping  to  some  extent.  The  territorial jurisdiction conferred upon the court  in terms of the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure indisputably  shall  apply  to  a  suit  or  proceeding under  the  1957  Act  as  also  the  1958  Act.  Sub- section (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act provides for  an  additional  forum.  Such  additional  forum was provided so as to enable the author to file a suit who may not otherwise be in a position to file a suit at different places where his copyright was violated. Parliament while enacting the Trade and Merchandise  Marks  Act  in  the  year  1958  was aware of the provisions of the 1957 Act. It still did not  choose  to  make  a  similar  provision  therein. Such an omission may be held to be a conscious action on the part of Parliament. The intention of

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Parliament  in  not  providing  for  an  additional forum in relation to the violation of the 1958 Act is,  therefore,  clear  and explicit.  Parliament while enacting the Trade Marks Act, 1999 provided for such an additional forum by enacting sub-section (2) of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act.  The court shall not, it is well settled, readily presume the existence of jurisdiction of a court which was not  conferred  by the  statute.  For  the  purpose  of attracting  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  in  terms  of sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act, the conditions  precedent  specified  therein  must  be fulfilled,  the  requisites  wherefor  are  that  the plaintiff  must  actually  and  voluntarily  reside  to carry on business or personally work for gain.”

10. Learned counsel would contend that the jurisdiction of the court to

entertain a composite suit under the 1957 Act and the 1958 Act should be

determined having regard to the provisions of  Section 55 of the former.

Then term ‘Law’ within the meaning of the said provision, it was submitted,

would not only include a statute law but also the common law and, thus,

viewed  from  that  perspective  a  composite  suit  for  infringement  of  a

copyright as also passing of shall be maintainable.   Strong reliance in this

behalf has also been placed on Exphar Sa & Anr. v. Eupharma Laboratories

Ltd. & Anr. [(2004) 3 SCC 688].

11. Mr.  Shailen  Bhatia,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the

respondent,  on the  other  hand,  would submit  that  this  Court  in  Dhondha

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House (supra) categorically held that the cause of action for infringement of

the 1957 Act and that of the 1958 Act are distinct and separate.

12. Order II Rule 3 of the Code, it was submitted, deals with pecuniary

jurisdiction and not the territorial jurisdiction of the Court.   

Drawing our attention to the provisions contained in Section 134 of

the  Trade  Marks  Act,  1999,  the  learned  counsel  would  contend  that  in

relation  to  a  passing  off  the action,  even the  Parliament  did  not  think  it

expedient that any provision giving an option to the plaintiff to file a suit

where it resides and not the defendant.   

13. Before adverting  to  the rival  contentions  of  the parties,  as  noticed

hereinbefore, we may notice the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 55

and sub-section (2) of Section 62 of 1957 Act, which read :-

“Section 55.   Civil  remedies  for  infringement of copyright—(1) Where copyright in any work has been infringed,  the owner of the copyright  shall, except  as  otherwise  provided  by  this  Act,  be entitled to all such remedies by way of injunction, damages, accounts and otherwise as are or may be conferred by law for the infringement of a right;

Section  62—Jurisdiction  of  court  over  matters arising under this Chapter  

(1) … ….

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(2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), a "district court  having  jurisdiction"  shall,  notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of  1908),  or  any other  law for  the  time being in force, include a district court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution  of  the  suit  or  other  proceeding,  the person instituting the suit or other proceeding or, where there are more than one such persons, any of them actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.”

Sub-section (2) of Section 27 of the 1958 Act reads :-

“27. No action for infringement of unregistered trade mark. –

(1) …. ….

“(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect rights  of  action  against  any person  for  passing off goods as the goods of another person or the remedies in respect thereof.”

Sub-section 2 of Section 106 of 1958 Act reads :-

“Section 106 - Reliefs in suits for infringement or for passing off.-  

(1) ….. ……

(2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub- section (1), the court shall not grant relief by way of  damages  (other  than  nominal  damages)  or  an account of profits in any case--

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(a)  where  in  a  suit  for  infringement  of  a trade mark, the infringement complained of is in relation to a certification trade mark; or

(b)  where  in  a  suit  for  infringement  the defendant satisfies the court--

(i) that at the time he commenced to use the trade mark complained of in the suit he was unaware and had no reasonable ground for believing that the trade mark of the plaintiff was on the register or that the plaintiff was registered  user  using  by  way of  permitted use; and

(ii)  that  when  he  became  aware  of  the existence and nature of the plaintiffs right in the trade mark,  he forthwith ceased to use the  trade  mark  in  relation  to  goods  in respect of which it was registered; or

(c)  where  in  a  suit  for  passing  off  the defendant satisfies the court--

(i) that at the time he commenced to use the trade mark complained of in the suit he was unaware and had no reasonable ground for believing that the trade mark of the plaintiff was in use; and

(ii)  that  when  he  became  aware  of  the existence and nature  of the  plaintiffs  trade mark, he forthwith ceased to use the trade mark complained of.”

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14. We may also at this stage notice the provisions of the Trade Marks

Act, 1999, (for short, ‘1999 Act’), Section 134 whereof reads :-

“Section  134  -  Suit  for  infringement,  etc.,  to  be instituted before District Court  

(1) No suit--  

(a) for  the  infringement  of  a  registered  trade mark; or  

(b) relating  to  any  right  in  a  registered  trade mark; or  

(c) for passing off arising out of the use by the defendant  of  any  trade  mark  which  is identical  with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trade mark, whether registered or unregistered,  

shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit.  

(2) For the purpose of clauses (a) and (b) of sub- section (1), a "District Court having jurisdiction" shall,  notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or any other  law for  the  time  being  in  force,  include  a District  Court  within  the  local  limits  of  whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the suit or proceeding, or, where there are more than one such persons any of them, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.  

Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section (2), "person" includes the registered proprietor and the registered user.”  

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Sub-section (1) of Section 135 of the 1999 Act reads :-

“Section 135.Relief in suits for infringement or for passing  off.—(1)  The  relief  which  a  court  may grant  in any suit  for infringement or for passing off referred to in section 134 includes injunction (subject to such terms, if any, as the court thinks fit)  and  at  the  option  of  the  plaintiff,  either damages or an account of profits, together with or without  any  order  for  the  delivery-up  of  the infringing  labels  and  marks  for  destruction  or erasure.”

15. The  question  which  was  posed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  is  as

under:-  

“The  next  question,  however,  which  is  more important is whether the plaintiff can combine the two causes of action one under the Copyright Act and the second under the Act of 1958 in a situation where this court  has the  jurisdiction in so far as cause  of  action  under  the  Copyright  Act  is concerned  but  has  no  territorial  jurisdiction  to entertain  the  cause  of  action  relating  to  Act  of 1958.”

16. Noticing the provisions of Order II Rule 2 and 3 of the Code of Civil

Procedure enabling the plaintiff to combine more than one cause of actions,

it was opined that the said provisions relate to pecuniary jurisdiction.  The

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said jurisdiction, however, can be exercised only in the event the court has

otherwise jurisdiction in respect of the cause of action wherefor the action

has been brought.   

17. The learned Single Judge noticed some precedents and opined :-

“13. Normally, I  would  have  felt  myself  bound by the aforesaid two judgments which are not only of  this  court  but  relate  to  same  subject  matter, namely,  joining  of  two  causes  of  action  under trademark  and  copyright  law.   Even  if  I  hold different  opinion,  the  normal  course  of  action would have been to refer the matter to the Division Bench.   However,  this  is  not  necessary  in  the instant case in view of the fact that the controversy now  stands  settled  by  the  Supreme  Court  in Dhodha House (supra).”  

18. The  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  on  the  other  hand  while

holding that the High Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate and decide upon

the relief of infringement of copyright observed that it would be open to the

appellant to file a fresh suit in the court of competent jurisdiction in respect

of its action for passing off and thus the plaint is required to be returned for

filing in the court of competent jurisdiction only in relation thereto.   

19. In  Dhodha  House (supra)  this  Court  was  concerned  with  the

correctness of judgments of the Allahabad High Court in  Surendra Kumar

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Maingi   v.  M/s. Dodha House, [AIR 1998 Allahabad 43] and the decision

of the Delhi High Court in  : P.M. Diesels Ltd.  v.  M/s. Patel Field Marshal,

[ AIR 1998 Delhi 225 ]

20. It  was  clearly  held  that  a  judgment  passed  by  a  court  having  no

territorial jurisdiction is a nullity.   As regards the cause of action under the

1957 Act and a cause of action under the 1958 Act and or a passing off

action,  it  was  held  that  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  62  would  confer

jurisdiction on a court where the plaintiff resides.  The cause of action in

respect of others was stated to be where the defendant resides.   

It was also noticed that in a given case the petition under the 1957

Act or 1958 Act may be overlapping, holding :-

“44. The  territorial  jurisdiction  conferred  upon the court in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indisputably shall apply to a suit or proceeding under the 1957 Act as also the 1958 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act provides for an additional forum. Such additional forum was provided so as to enable the author to file a suit who may not otherwise be in a position to file a suit at different places where his copyright was violated. Parliament while enacting the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act in the year 1958 was aware of the provisions of the 1957 Act. It still did not  choose  to  make  a  similar  provision  therein. Such an omission may be held to be a conscious action on the part of Parliament. The intention of Parliament  in  not  providing  for  an  additional forum in relation to the violation of the 1958 Act is, therefore, clear and explicit.”

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21. Noticing  that  whereas  in  Dhoda  House (supra)  the  infringement

complained of primarily was that of 1958 Act and not under the 1957 Act,

in Patel Field Marshal (supra) the thrust was on the sale of products and/or

advertisement by the appellant for registration of trade marks in the Trade

Marks Journal and other local papers.   

The law was stated in the following terms :-

“54. For the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a court only because two causes of action joined in  terms of  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure, the same would not mean that thereby the  jurisdiction  can  be  conferred  upon  a  court which  had  jurisdiction  to  try  only  the  suit  in respect of one cause of action and not the other. Recourse  to  the  additional  forum, however,  in  a given  case,  may  be  taken  if  both  the  causes  of action  arise  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court which otherwise had the necessary jurisdiction to decide all the issues.”

22. What would, however, be the nature of composite suit, was also be

taken note of.  The Court observed :-  

“55. In  this  case  we  have  not  examined  the question as to whether if a cause of action arises under  the  1957  Act  and  the  violation  of  the provisions  of  the  Trade  Marks  Act  is  only incidental, a composite suit will lie or not, as such a question does not arise in this case.”

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It is in the aforementioned context, submission of Mr. Nariman that a

composite suit would be maintainable having regard to sub-section (1) of

Section 55 of the 1957 Act must be considered.   

23. Sub-section (1) of Section 55 of 1957 Act provides for the remedies

in  terms  whereof  the  plaintiff  shall  be  entitled  to  all  reliefs  by  way  of

injunction, damages, accounts and otherwise as are or may be conferred by

law for the infringement of a right.  It must be read as ‘ejusdem generis’.  It

must take its colour from the words, ‘any proceeding’  namely the right to

obtain a decree by way of injunction, decree for damages, accounts or other

incidental reliefs which can be granted by a civil court.  Such a provision

can be found in the Code of Civil Procedure also, namely Order VII Rule 7

thereof.  It is,  therefore, in our opinion, would not be correct to read the

word “as are or may be conferred by law” to mean, any other law, violation

whereof although would give rise to separate and distinct cause of action.

Under  the  Code claims arising under  a  statutes  governing substantive  or

procedural law, a number of remedies may be combined. The Court  may

grant  an order  of injunction even in a passing off action.   It  is  trite  that

where the court has the jurisdiction/power to adjudicate, it will necessarily

have the incidental  power  therefor.   It  may, however,  be  different  if  the

Court  may  have  exercised  a  power  which  is  not  provided  for  as  a

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supplemental proceeding e.g. Section 94 of the Code.  {[See State of Punjab

and Anr. v.  Devans Modern Brewaries Ltd. and Anr  [(2004) 11 SCC 26]}.

24. Thus,  whereas  an  incidental  power  is  inherent  in  the  court,  a

supplemental  power may also be exercised,  keeping in view the ultimate

relief which may be granted by it.  We may notice that this Court in Sakiri

Vasu v.   State  of  U.P.  and  others,  [  (2008)  2  SCC 409  ] held  that  the

Magistrate will have power to grant interim maintenance, although no such

provision existed in Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.   

Similarly in Hindustan Lever Ltd. v.  Ashok Vishnu Kate, [ (1995) 6

SCC 326 ]  this Court has held that the Labour Court will have the power to

grant injunction as an incidental power.      

25. If a person is found to be guilty of violation of copyright he will be

bound  to  pay  damages.   For  the  purpose  of  quantification  of  damages,

taking  of  the  accounts  may  be  necessary  and  it  is  in  this  behalf  the

Parliament  thought  it  fit  to  use  the  word  “otherwise”.   Thus  the  power

conferred by law within the meaning of sub-section (1) of  Section 55 of

1957 Act qualifies the power of the court to grant remedies as envisaged

thereunder  if  any other  cause of  action  arose under  a different  Act.   An

action for passing off is common law right but the same does not determine

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the jurisdiction of the court.  For exercising such jurisdiction, the provisions

of the Code would be applicable.  1957 Act being a special law would, thus,

prevail over the general law, viz., the Code.  

26. Exphar  Sa (supra)  cannot  be  said  to  have  any  application  in  the

instant case.  The question which arose for consideration therein was as to

whether the jurisdiction of a court under sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the

1957 Act is wider than that of the court specified under the Code of Civil

Procedure  and  thus  a  person  instituting  a  suit  having  any  claim  on  the

ownership  of  the  copy  right  which  has  been  infringed,  would  not  be  a

ground  for  holding  that  he  would  not  come within  the  purview of  sub-

section (2) Section 62 of the 1957 Act, as he had been served with a ‘cease

and desist’ notice, opining :-

“13. It  is,  therefore,  clear  that  the  object  and reason  for  the  introduction  of  sub-section  (2)  of Section 62 was  not  to  restrict  the  owners of  the copyright  to  exercise  their  rights  but  to  remove any impediment from their doing so. Section 62(2) cannot  be read as limiting the jurisdiction of the District  Court  only  to  cases  where  the  person instituting the suit  or other  proceeding, or where there are more than one such persons, any of them actually  and  voluntarily  resides  or  carries  on business or presently works for gain. It prescribes an additional ground for attracting the jurisdiction of a court over and above the “normal” grounds as laid down in Section 20 of the Code.”

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27. There  cannot  be  any doubt  whatsoever  that  the  Parliament  having

inserted sub-section (2) in Section 62 of the 1957 Act, the jurisdiction of the

Court thereunder would be wider than the one under Section 20 of the Code.

The object and reasons for enactment of sub-section (2) of Section 62 would

also appear from the report of the Committee, as has been noticed by this

Court  being  a  provision  which has  been specially  designed  to  confer  an

extra  benefit  upon  the  authors  who  were  not  in  a  position  to  instate

copyright  infringement  proceeding  before  the  Courts.   It  is  in  the

aforementioned context the law laid down by this  Court in paragraph 13 of

Dhonda House (Supra) must be understood.

28. If the impediment is sought to be removed by inserting an incidental

provision, there cannot be any doubt the court could be entitled to pass an

interim order, but the same by no stretch of imagination can be extended to

a cause of action which is founded on separate set of facts as also rights and

liabilities  of  a  party  under,  a  different  Act.   In  Dhoda  House  (supra),

although  Exphar  Sa  (supra)  was  not  noticed,  the  distinction  would  be

apparent from the following :-  

“50. In this case, the Delhi High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction in terms of the 1957 Act.  The  primary  ground  upon  which  the jurisdiction of the original side of the High Court

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was invoked was the violation of the 1958 Act, but in  relation  thereto,  the  provisions  of  sub-section (2)  of  Section  62 of  the  1957  Act  could  not  be invoked.

51. The plaintiff was not a resident of Delhi. It has not  been  able  to  establish  that  it  carries  on  any business at Delhi. For our purpose, the question as to  whether  the  defendant  had  been  selling  its produce in Delhi or not is wholly irrelevant (sic). It is possible that the goods manufactured by the plaintiff  are  available  in  the  market  of  Delhi  or they are sold in Delhi but that by itself would not mean that the plaintiff carries on any business in Delhi.”

29. What then would be meant by a composite suit?  A composite suit

would not  entitle  a court  to entertain  a suit  in  respect  whereof it  has no

jurisdiction,  territorial  or  otherwise.   Order  II  Rule  3  of  the  Code

specifically states so and, thus, there is no reason as to why the same should

be  ignored.   A composite  suit  within  the  provisions  of  the  1957  Act  as

considered in Dhoda House (supra), therefore, would mean the suit which is

founded on infringement of a copy right and wherein the incidental power

of the Court is required to be invoked.  A plaintiff may seek a remedy which

can  otherwise  be granted  by the court.   It  was that  aspect  of  the matter

which had not been considered in Dhoda House (supra) but it never meant

that two suits having different causes of actions can be clubbed together as a

composite suit.

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30. For  the  reasons  aforementioned  we  do  not  find  any  merit  in  this

appeal which fails and is dismissed with costs.  Counsel’s fee assessed at

Rs.50,000/-.   

………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

..…………………………J.     [Lokeshwar Singh Panta]

New Delhi; May 16, 2008

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