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PETITIONER: D. VENKAMMA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SPECIAL TEHSILDAR (LA) UNIT-IV,JANAGAREDDIGUDEM, W.G. DISTRI

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/11/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (1)  85        JT 1995 (9)   305  1995 SCALE  (6)712

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      Notification  under   Section  4   (1)  of   the   Land Acquisition Act,  1894 (for  short, "the  Act") acquiring an extent of  18  acres  7  cents  of  land  belonging  to  the appellants, was  published on January 3, 1980 along with the lands of  other persons. The Land Acquisition Officer in his award dated  October 31, 1981 determined compensation at the rate of  Rs. 4,500/-per  acre. The  appellant  accepted  the amount without  protest. Other  claimants had  protested and sought reference  under Section  18 of  the Act.  The  Civil Court, by award and decree dated November 21, 1983, enhanced the compensation  to Rs.12,000/- per acre. On further appeal by the  State, in  A.S.No. 1483 of 1984 and cross-objections of the  claimants, the  High Court,  by judgment  and decree dated February  1, 1989,  allowed the  cross-objections  and determined the  compensation at  Rs.20,000/- per acre. Based thereon, an  application under  Section 28-A  of the Act was filed  on  May  16,  1989  seeking  redetermination  of  the compensation and  payment of  the additional  benefits.  The application was  rejected by the Land Acquisition Officer by his order  dated June  1, 1991. When writ petition was filed in  the  High  Court,  the  learned  Single  Judge  directed redetermination of  the compensation  under Section 28-A. On appeal, the  High Court  in Writ  Appeal No.117  of 1993, by judgment and  order dated  August 20,  1993, held  that  the reference under Section 28-A was not maintainable. Thus this appeal by special leave.      Section 28-A  of the  Act speaks  of redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the "award of the Court" and provides that when the court allows any amount in excess of  the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the  person or  persons interested  in  all  other  land covered by  the notification under Section 4 (1) and who are aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding

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that he/they  had not  made an  application,  by  a  written application to  the Collector  within three  months from the date of  award of  the court  require the  Collector to  re- determine the  compensation on  the basis  of the  amount of compensation awarded  by the  court.  In  other  words,  the foundation for  makng an  application under  Section 28-A is the award  of the  court. The  expression "Court"  has  been defined under Section 3 (d) to mean "a principal Civil Court of original  jurisdiction" and  in an  appropriate  case  "a special judicial  officer" appointed  by the  Government  to performt he  functions of  the court.  In other  words,  the court of  original jurisdiction  which receives  an order of reference pursuant  to an  application made under Section 18 is the  Civil Court  of original  jurisdiction. By necessary implication, judgment  of  an  appellate  court  made  under Section 54 of the Act does not give right or cause of action to make an application under Section 28-A of the Act.      In Union  of India  & Anr.  v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) By Lrs. etc.  [(1989) 3 SCR 316 at 339] a Constitution Bench of this Court  held that the words "any such award" cannot bear the broad  meaning of the appellate orders of the High Court or of  the Supreme  Court. Having  regard  to  the  existing hierarchical structure  as contemplated  in the  parent Act, the appellate orders would only be orders arising in appeals against the  award of  the Collector  or of  that Court. The words  "any   such  award"   are  intended  to  have  deeper significance and in the context in which those words appears in Section  30 (2)  it is  clear that  they are  intended to refer to  awards made  by the Collector or the Court between April 20,  1982 and  September 24,  1984.  In  other  words, Section 30  (2) of the Amendment Act extends benefits of the enhanced solatium  to cases where the award of the Collector or of the Court is made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984.  At  page  340,  it  was  further  held  that  the Parliament "never  intended  to  define  the  scope  of  the enhanced solatium  on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in  appeal on  a certain  date. Delays  in the superior Courts extend  now to  limits which  were never  anticipated when the  right to  approach them  for relief was granted by statute". If  it was  intended that  Section 30  (2)  should refer to appeals coming before the High Court or the Supreme Court between  April 30,  1982 and  September 24,  1984 they could well  refer to  proceedings in which an award had been made by  the Collector  from anything between 10 to 20 years before.      In C.A. No.3521/95 (State of Punjab vs.Raghubir Singh & Ors.  decided   on  February  28,  1995  by  this  Court,  a notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act was published on February 4,  1981.  Award  under  Section  11  was  made  on December 22, 1983. No reference under Section 18 was sought. On refrence  under Section  18, the High Court confirmed the award. On  an appeal  filed by  other claimants, by judgment and decree dated September 10, 1990, the High Court enhanced the  compensation.   Thereupon,  the  respondents  filed  an application on  January 2, 1991 under Section 28A(1) seeking reference to  the Court on the basis of judgment of the High Court. The  Collector dismissed the application but the High Court allowed  the same on revision, directing reference for re-determination  of   the  compensation  on  the  basis  of judgment of  the High Court. On appeal, this Court held that reference under  Section 28A could be made only on the basis of the award and decree of the Reference Court under Section 26 on  a reference  under Section  18 but  within limitation prescribed under the proviso to Section 28A (1). It was held that the application was filed neither within limitation nor

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immediately after  the award  of  the  District  Court.  The application under Section 28A, therefore, would not lie.      Therefore, the  judgment and  decree of  the High Court enhancing the  compensation under  Section 23  (1) does  not provide a  right or  cause  of  action  to  make  a  written application under  Section 28-A  seeking re-determination of the compensation on the basis of the compensation awarded by the court  under reference under Section 18 of the Act. Shri Prakash Reddy,  therefore,  is  right  in  his  fairness  to contend that  the application made under Section 28-A is not maintainable.      The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.