04 May 1988
Supreme Court
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D.N.TANEJA Vs BHAJAN LAL

Bench: DUTT,M.M. (J)
Case number: Appeal Criminal 79 of 1984


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PETITIONER: D.N.TANEJA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BHAJAN LAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/05/1988

BENCH: DUTT, M.M. (J) BENCH: DUTT, M.M. (J) PATHAK, R.S. (CJ) KANIA, M.H.

CITATION:  1988 SCR  (3) 888        1988 SCC  (3)  26  JT 1988 (2)   499        1988 SCALE  (1)924

ACT:      Contempt   of    Courts   Act,    1971-Section   19(1)- Interpretation of-When  can High  Court be  said to exercise its jurisdiction  to  punish  for  its  contempt-High  Court exercises this  jurisdiction only when it imposes punishment for contempt-If  no punishment  is imposed  on contemnor, no jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised.      Contempt   of    Courts   Act,    1971-Section   19(1)- Interpretation  of-The  right  of  appeal  is  only  of  the contemnor and  not  of  the  person  who  alleges  that  the contemnor had  committed contempt of the Court-Remedy of the person alleging  contempt lies  under  Article  136  of  the Constitution.      Rule of Interpretation-Right of appeal is a creature of statute  and  should  be  considered  on  interpretation  of provisions of the statute and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant filed an application for contempt against the respondent in the High Court complaining of interference by  the   respondent  with   the  due   course  of  judicial proceedings.  A   Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  after considering the application, affidavits and submissions made on behalf of the parties took the view that it was not a fit case in  which the  court should  exercise its  jurisdiction under  the   contempt  of   Courts  Act  and  dismissed  the application. The  appellant filed  the instant  appeal under section 19(1)  of the Act. The respondent took a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal under section 19(1). While  upholding the  objection  and  dismissing  the Appeal, this Court, ^      HELD: The High Court derives its jurisdiction to punish for contempt  from Article  215  of  the  Constitution.  The appeal will lie under Section 19(1) of the Act only when the High Court  makes an  order or  decision in  exercise of its jurisdiction  to   punish  for   contempt.  The  High  Court exercises its  jurisdiction or  power as  conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for contempt.  When the  High  Court  does  not  impose  any

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punishment on the alleged 889 contemnor the  High court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power  to punish  for contempt.  The jurisdiction  of the High Court  is to  punish. When  no punishment is imposed by the High  Court, it  is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised  its jurisdiction  or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution. [892C-E]      Whenever a  court, tribunal or authority is vested with a jurisdiction  to decide a matter, such jurisdiction can be exercised in  deciding the  matter in  favour or  against  a person. For  example, a  civil court  is conferred  with the jurisdiction to  decide a  suit; the  civil court  will have undoubtedly the  jurisdiction to  decree the suit or dismiss the same.  But when  a court  is conferred with the power or jurisdiction to  act in a particular manner, the exercise of jurisdiction or  the power  will involve  the acting in that particular manner  and in  no  other.  Article  215  confers jurisdiction or  power on  the  High  court  to  punish  for contempt. The  High Court can exercise its jurisdiction only by punishing for contempt.[893F-G]      The contention  of the appellant that there would be no remedy against  the erroneous  or perverse  decision of  the High Court  in not exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, is  not correct.  When the  High Court erroneously acquits  a   contemnor  guilty  of  criminal  contempt,  the petitioner who  is interested  in maintaining the dignity of the Court  will not  be without  any remedy.  Even though no appeal is  maintainable under  section 19(1) of the Act, the petitioner in  such a case can move this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. [894B-C]      Right of  appeal is  a creature  of the statute and the question whether there is a right of appeal or not will have to be  considered on  an interpretation  of the provision of the statute  and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration. [894D-E]      A contempt  is a  matter  between  the  court  and  the alleged contemnor. Any person who moves the machinery of the court for  contempt only  brings to  the notice of the court certain  facts   constituting  contempt   of  court.   After furnishing such  information he  may still assist the court, but the  aggrieved party under section 19(1) can only be the contemnor who  has been  punished  for  contempt  of  court. [894E-G]      Smt. Ujjam  Bai v.  State of  Uttar Pradesh,  [1963]  1 S.C.R. 778 and Paradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Mishra, [1975]1 S.C.R. 524, referred to. 890

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 79 of 1984.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  5.10.1983  of  the Punjab and  Haryana High Court in Criminal Original Contempt Petition No. 27 of 1983.      R.K. Garg,  Mahabir  Singh  and  S.Srinivasan  for  the Appellant.      Kapil Sibal,  R.N. Karanjawala,  Mrs. M.Karanjawala,and Ejaz Maqbool for theRespondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      DUTT,  J.  This  appeal  under  section  19(1)  of  the Contempt of  Courts Act,  hereinafter referred  to  as  ’the Act’, is  directed against  the judgment  and order  of  the

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Punjab &  Haryana High  Court dismissing the application for contempt filed by the appellant against Shri Bhajan Lal, who was then the Chief Minister of the State.      In the  application for  contempt, it  was, inter alia, alleged by the appellant that one Shri Devinder Sharma was a Forest Minister  in the  Council of Ministers headed by Shri Bhajan Lal.  The said  Devinder Sharma  was defeated  in the legislative assembly election held in 1982. Shri Bhajan Lal, because of  his political  and personal  relations with Shri Devinder Sharma,  was personally  very keen on giving him an office of profit. In order to achieve this objective, Bhajan Lal  got  an  Ordinance  being  Ordinance  No.  44  of  1982 promulgated by  the Governor.  The  Ordinance,  inter  alia, provided the  constitution of  a Forest  Development  Board. According to  the appellant, such Board was constituted with a view  to  appointing  the  said  Devinder  Sharma  as  its Chairman.      It was  further  alleged  by  the  appellant  that  the constitutional validity of the said Ordinance was challenged by twelve  Indian Forest Officers including the appellant by filing a  writ petition  in the  High Court.  It was alleged that the respondent, Bhajan Lal, through Shri R.K. Vashisth, the Superintendent of Police, pressurised and threatened the writ petitioners  to withdraw  the said  writ petition  and, pursuant  to   that,  eleven   officers  withdrew  from  the petition.  It  was  only  the  appellant  who  continued  to prosecute the  writ petition and, as a consequence of which, the appellant was transferred from the Forest Expert Special Project Cell to the Forest Department, Haryana, on 891 March 18,  1983. The further allegation of the appellant was that after  having failed  to threaten  and  demoralise  the appellant through indirect means the respondent, Bhajan Lal, called him  to his  official  residence  on  July  26,  1983 through  the   Acting  Chief   Conservator  of  Forests  and criminally intimidated him to withdraw the writ petition.      Thereafter, the  appellant  filed  an  application  for contempt against  the respondent,  Bhajan Lal,  in the  High Court complaining of interference by the respondent with the due course  of judicial  proceedings.  The  application  was admitted and a rule nisi was issued upon the respondent. The respondent appeared  in the  rule and  opposed the  same  by filing an affidavit denying all the allegations made against him by the appellant.      The learned  Single Judge  of  the  High  Court,  after considering the  application, affidavits and the submissions made on behalf of the parties, took the view that there were circumstances to  indicate that  it was  not a  fit case  in which the  court should  exercise its jurisdiction under the Act. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge dismissed the application and discharged the rule nisi.      It is  apparent from  the facts  stated above  that the allegations made by the appellant, if proved would consitute a criminal  contempt. It is also not disputed by the parties that it  was a  case of  criminal  contempt  as  defined  in section 2(c)  of the  Act.  The  scope  and  ambit  of  this judgment will, therefore, be confined to criminal contempt.      Mr. Sibbal,  learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent,  has   taken  a  preliminary  objection  to  the maintainability of  the appeal  under section  19(1) of  the Act. It  is contended  by him  that  as  no  punishment  was imposed on  the respondent  by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction  to punish  for contempt,  section 19(1) is inapplicable and  the appeal  is incompetent.  Section 19(1) provides as follows:

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              "19(1). An  appeal shall lie as of right from           any order  or decision  of a  High  Court  in  the           exercise  of   its  jurisdiction   to  punish  for           contempt-                (a)  where the order or decision is that of a                     single judge, to a Bench of not less                     than two Judges of the Court; 892                (b)  where the order or decision is that of a                     Bench, to the Supreme Court.                Provided that  where the order or decision is           that of  the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in           any Union  territory, such appeal shall lie to the           Supreme Court."      The right of appeal will be available under sub-section (1) of  section 19  only against  any decision or order of a High Court  passed in  the exercise  of its  jurisdiction to punish for  contempt. In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to  the provision  of Article  215 of the Constitution which provides  that every  High Court  shall be  a court of record and  shall have  all  the  powers  of  such  a  court including the  power  to  punish  for  contempt  of  itself. Article 215  confers on  the High  Court the power to punish for contempt  of itself.  In other  words,  the  High  Court derives its jurisdiction to punish for contempt from Article 215 of  the Constitution.  As has  been noticed  earlier, an appeal will lie under section 19(1) of the Act only when the High Court  makes an  order or  decision in  exercise of its jurisdiction to  punish for  contempt. It  is  submitted  on behalf of  the respondent  and, in our opinion rightly, that the High  Court  exercises  its  jurisdiction  or  power  as conferred on  it by  Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a  punishment for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemnor, the High Court does  not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt.  The jurisdiction  of the  High  Court  is  to punish. When  no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult  to say  that the  High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or  power as  conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution.      It is,  however, strenuously  urged by  Mr. R.K.  Garg, learned Counsel  appearing on  behalf of the appellant, that when the  High Court  acquits a  contemnor after hearing the parties and after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court does so also in the exercise of its jurisdiction  as   conferred   by   Article   215   of   the Constitution. Counsel  submits that  jurisdiction to  punish for contempt  includes also  the jurisdiction  to dispose of the case  either by punishing the contemnor or by acquitting him. In  support of  the contention  much reliance  has been placed on  behalf of  the appellant  on a  decision of  this Court in  Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 1 SCR 778  wherein S.K.  Das, J.  observed "jurisdiction means authority to  decide." Relying  upon the said observation it is submitted  by Mr.  Garg that the jurisdiction of the High Court to  punish for contempt also includes the jurisdiction to decide whether such punishment 893 should be  imposed or  not and  when the High Court comes to the finding  that such  punishment should  not be imposed on the contemnor  or that no contempt has been committed by the alleged contemnor and acquits him, such decision of the High Court acquitting  the contemnor  is made  in the exercise of its jurisdiction  to punish  for contempt.  We are unable to accept  this   contention.  The  said  observation,  in  our

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opinion, should  not be  read dehors the context in which it was made. In that case, the Sales Tax Officer disallowed the claim of  the petitioner  to exemption from payment of Sales Tax under a certain notification. An appeal preferred by the petitioner to  the Court  of the Judge (Appeals), Sales Tax, Allahabad, was  dismissed. The  question that  came  up  for consideration before  this  Court  was  whether  a  writ  of certiorari  could  be  issued  for  quashing  the  order  of Assessment on  the ground  that the  authority concerned had erroneously  exercised  its  jurisdiction  by  not  granting exemption to  the  petitioner.  In  that  context  the  said observations was  made and which was immediately followed by further observation:           "Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is           empowered or  required to  enquire into a question           of law  or  fact  for  the  purpose  of  giving  a           decision on  it, its  findings thereon  cannot  be           impeached collaterally  or on  an application  for           certiorari  but  are  binding  until  reversed  on           appeal.  Where   a  quasi-judicial  authority  has           jurisdiction to  decide a matter, it does not lose           its jurisdiction  by coming  to a wrong conclusion           whether it is wrong in law or in fact."      There can  be no  doubt that whenever a court, tribunal or authority  is vested  with a  jurisdiction  to  decide  a matter, such  jurisdiction can  be exercised in deciding the matter in  favour or  against a person. For example, a civil court is  conferred with  the jurisdiction to decide a suit; the civil  court will  have undoubtedly  the jurisdiction to decree the  suit or  dismiss the  same. But  when a court is conferred with  the  power  or  jurisdiction  to  act  in  a particular manner, the exercise of jurisdiction or the power will involve  the acting in that particular manner and in no other. Article 215 confers jurisdiction or power on the High Court to  punish for  contempt. The  High Court can exercise its jurisdiction  only by punishing for contempt. It is true that in considering a question whether the alleged contemnor is guilty  of contempt  or not,  the court hears the parties and considers  the materials  produced  before  it  and,  if necessary, examines  witnesses and,  thereafter,  passes  an order either  acquitting or punishing him for contempt. When the High  Court acquits  the contemnor,  the High Court does not exercise its jurisdic- 894 tion for contempt, for such exercise will mean that the High Court should  act in a particular manner, that is to say, by imposing punishment  for contempt.  So long as no punishment is imposed  by the High Court, the High Court cannot be said to be  exercising its  jurisdiction or  power to  punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution.      It does  not, however,  mean that  when the  High Court erroneously acquits a contemnor guilty of criminal contempt, the petitioner  who is interested in maintaining the dignity of the  court will not be without any remedy. Even though no appeal is  maintainable under  section 19(1) of the Act, the petitioner in  such a case can move this Court under Article 136 of  the  Constitution.  Therefore,  the  contention,  as advanced on  behalf of the appellant, that there would be no remedy against  the erroneous  or perverse  decision of  the High Court  in not exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, is not correct. But, in such a case there would be no right  of appeal  under section  19(1), as  there  is  no exercise of  jurisdiction or  power by  the  High  Court  to punish for  contempt. The  view which  we take finds support from a  decision of  this Court in Paradakanta Mishra v. Mr.

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Justice Gatikrushna Mishra, [1975] 1 SCR 524.      Right of  appeal is  a creature  of the statute and the question whether there is a right of appeal or not will have to be  considered on  an interpretation  of the provision of the statute  and not on the ground of porpriety or any other consideration. In  this connection,  it may  be noticed that there was  no right  of appeal  under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. It is for the first time that under section 19(1) of the  Act, a  right of  appeal has  been provided  for.  A contempt is  a matter  between the  court  and  the  alleged contemnor. Any  person who  moves the machinery of the court for contempt  only brings to the notice of the court certain facts constituting  contempt of court. After furnishing such information he  may still  assist the  court,  but  it  must always be  borne in mind that in a contempt proceeding there are only  two parties,  namely, the court and the contemnor. It may  be  one  of  the  reasons  which  weighed  with  the Legislature in  not conferring  any right  of appeal  on the petitioner for  contempt. The  aggrieved party under section 19(1) can  only be  the contemnor  who has been punished for contempt of court.      For the  reasons aforesaid,  there is  substance in the preliminary objection  raised as  to the  maintainability of the appeal.  In our  view the  appeal is incompetent and is, accordingly, dismissed.  There will, however, be no order as to costs. H.S.K.                                Appeal dismissed. 895