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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  959-960 of 2000

PETITIONER: D.C. Aggarwal (Dead) by LRs.

RESPONDENT: State Bank of India and another

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/04/2006

BENCH: B.N. Srikrishna & Lokeshwar Singh Panta

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

Srikrishna, J.

       These two appeals arise between the same parties and are  interconnected. Hence, they can be disposed of by a common  judgment.

       The appellants are the legal representatives of one D.C.  Aggarwal, an erstwhile employee of the respondent\026State Bank of  India, who have brought these appeals claiming: (a) the benefits of an  extension in service of the said D.C. Aggarwal up to the age of sixty  years; and (b) the benefits arising out of notional promotion which  ought to have been granted to the said employee, etc.  For the purpose  of convenience, the said D.C. Aggarwal shall be referred to as  "the  appellant" in the course of our judgment.

Background to the Promotion Issue         The appellant joined the respondent-bank as Probationary  Officer on 15.1.1960. He got repeated promotions during the period  1960-1980, reaching all the way to Top Executive Grade Scale VI  (hereinafter "TEGS VI") as a Deputy General Manager on 27.7.1980.  On 4.1.1981, the appellant was posted as Deputy General Manager of  the respondent-bank at Chandigarh and was put in charge of the  respondent-bank’s branches in the State of Haryana and in the Union  Territory of Chandigarh. On 8.7.1981, the appellant’s explanation was  called for in respect of some irregularities pertaining to his work. He  gave an explanation, which was not acceptable to the respondent-bank  and on 11.7.1981, he was placed under suspension. The respondent- bank conducted an inquiry and the investigating officials held an ex- parte inquiry. The appellant challenged the investigation and the  matter ultimately landed up in this Court. This Court disposed of the  matter by a direction that the Central Vigilance Commission appoint  an inquiry officer who would re-open the inquiry from the stage it was  closed.  Further directions were given so as to enable the parties to  lead evidence and to ensure that the inquiry was conducted  expeditiously.  

The inquiry was conducted by one A.K. Rastogi, a senior IAS  officer, who submitted his report on 30.5.1985 by which he  exonerated the appellant of most of the major charges; and put on  record that most of the charges were fabricated and were intended to  denigrate the conduct of the appellant as a senior and responsible  official of the bank. The report of A.K. Rastogi was considered by the  Central Vigilance Commission, which, however, disagreed with his  findings and found the charges proved against the appellant. It  recommended that, at the very least, the appellant be removed from

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service. The Disciplinary Authority of the respondent-bank, through  an elaborate order, agreed with the findings of the Central Vigilance  Commission, except with regard to the recommendation on the  quantum of punishment. It found that the recommended punishment  of removal from service, was too harsh and instead imposed the  punishment of demotion by two grades on the appellant. Consequently, the appellant was relegated to Middle  Management Scale IV, virtually resulting in the forfeiture of almost  more than a decade’s service of the appellant. This order was  confirmed by the executive committee of the respondent-bank on  4.11.1987. The appellant joined the demoted post of Secretary,  Banking Services Recruitment Board, Chandigarh, though under  protest. Within twenty-six days, he was transferred to Bhopal. He,  however, did not join the post at Bhopal on the ground that it was  against the rule for officers of Middle Management Grade Scale to be  transferred out of the circle. After about six months, the transfer of the  appellant was cancelled and he was permitted to join in the demoted  post as Officer on Special Duty, Zonal Office, Chandigarh. A  departmental appeal carried by the appellant against the order of the  penalty imposed on him, was dismissed.  

During the aforesaid period, the appellant was not considered  for promotion to the post of General Manager (TEGS VII) on  1.8.1984, 20.2.1986, 8.6.1987, 1.8.1988, 24.4.1989 and 3.2.1992.  Also, the appellant’s case was not considered under the "sealed cover  procedure" pending finalisation of the departmental proceedings. On  17.4.1989, the appellant moved a Civil Writ Petition No.15874/1989  challenging his order of demotion before the Punjab and Haryana  High Court. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and  granted him the relief sought for. A Letters Patent Appeal No.  553/1991 carried by the respondent-bank was dismissed by the  Division Bench of the High Court. The respondent-bank moved this  Court by filing Special Leave Petition No. 10198/1991. This Court  dismissed the appeal by holding that the appellant had been prejudiced  in the matter of his defence; it was held: "\005The order is vitiated not because of mechanical exercise of  powers or non-supply of the inquiry report but for relying and  acting on material which was not only irrelevant but could not  have been looked into. Purpose of supplying document is to  contest its veracity or give explanation. Effect of non-supply of  the report of Inquiry Officer before imposition of punishment  need not be gone into nor it is necessary to consider validity of  sub-rule 5. But non-supply of CVC recommendation which was  prepared behind the back of respondent (appellant herein)  without his participation, and one does not know on what  material which was not only sent to the Disciplinary Authority  but was examined and relied, was certainly violative of  procedural safeguard and contrary to fair and just inquiry."  

In the result, this Court was of the view that the inquiry against the  appellant had been rightly quashed by the High Court.         Consequent to the aforesaid Order, on 7.11.1992, the appellant was  transferred to Hyderabad as Deputy General Manager, but he refused to join  there as a matter of protest and remained absent without leave.  Subsequently, the appellant’s posting in Hyderabad was cancelled and he  was posted at Chandigarh once again and he retired with effect from  10.9.1993 after working as Deputy General Manager.

   However, when the appellant was still in service, on 28.12.1992, the  appellant was given a fresh showcause notice for an inquiry against him. The  appellant challenged the fresh show cause notice by filing Contempt Petition  No.1098/92 before the High Court in which two Managing Directors of the  respondent-bank V. Mahadevan and P.V. Subba Rao were made  respondents. The said respondents challenged the initiation of the contempt  proceedings against them, before this Court, by Special Leave Petition Nos.

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1707-08/1993. Leave was granted therein and Civil Appeal Nos. 1017- 18/1993 was disposed of by this Court with the following three directions : 1.      "\005no fresh enquiry shall be held against the respondent for  the act or commission for which action was taken against  him which resulted in reduction from rank in 1987. Notice  dated 28th December, 1992 shall stand withdrawn." 2.      "The State Bank of India shall reconsider the claim of  promotion of the respondent to higher scale in accordance  with rules. We do not express any opinion on the question if  interview for higher scale is necessary and if there was any  valid justification for not promoting the respondent whose  record prior to these proceedings is unblemished but if under  the policy framed by the bank and followed in other cases,  constitution of a committee and interview is necessary then  the committee be constituted but the Managing Director,  State Bank of India, Central Office, Bombay and Managing  Director (Personnel), State Bank of India, Central Office,  Bombay who are appellants in this Court may not be its  members."  3.      "The committee shall be constituted within three weeks  from today which shall decide if respondent (the appellant  herein) was entitled to be promoted to higher scale\005" and if  the committee decides that the appellant is not suitable for  promotion it shall give reasons therefor. 4.      In view of the abovesaid conditions, the contempt  proceedings against the two Managing Directors of the  respondent-bank were dropped.

Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the General Manager  (Operations) Chandigarh issued a letter dated 26.8.1993 calling upon the  appellant to attend an interview so as to adjudge his suitability for promotion  to TEG Scale VII (General Manager’s Post). The appellant appeared before  the Interview Committee on 1.9.1993. The Committee  awarded him only  25.7% marks as a result of which he was informed by a letter dated 8.9.1993  that his claim for promotion was rejected as he was found unsuitable by the  Interview Committee. The appellant made a representation thereagainst to  the Chairman of the respondent-bank. He also approached this Court by a  Contempt Petition No. 324/1993 in Civil Appeal No. 4017-18/1993 for  initiation of contempt proceedings against the respondent-bank and its  officers. This Contempt Petition was withdrawn on 17.9.1993 with liberty to  move the High Court for appropriate relief. The appellant thereupon filed  Civil Writ Petition No.15245/1993 before the High Court by which he  impugned the action of the respondent-bank in not granting him the  promotion he sought. He also claimed therein salary from November 1992 to  16.6.1993, which was denied to him on the ground that he had failed to  report to Hyderabad where he had been posted and had remained absent  without leave.

       The appellant’s Writ Petition No. 15245/1993 was allowed on the  ground that, under the policy applicable to the appellant’s case, an interview  by the Departmental Promotion Committee was not envisaged and that his  claim for promotion had to be decided by an informal interview by the  Managing Director and some other officers. The Single Judge also held that  it could not be said that the appellant had been absenting himself from  8.11.1992 to 16.6.1993 as his posting at Hyderabad was unfair and had been  cancelled. Thus, his claim for salary was allowed. The respondent-bank  challenged the learned Single Judge’s judgment by filing Letters Patent  Appeal No. 364/1998 in which the appellant also filed cross-objections.  

Background to the Extension Issue         During the pendency of the litigation between the appellant and the  respondent-bank, the appellant was granted extension in service from  10.3.1991 to 9.9.1993 i.e. upto the age of fifty-eight years by a letter dated  9.9.1993. He was also informed that the Review Committee had not  recommended further extension of his service in terms of Rule 15 of the

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State Bank of India Service Rules; as a result of which, the appellant would  retire on attaining the age of superannuation with effect from 10.9.1993. The  appellant preferred an appeal before the Chairman of the respondent-bank,  which was turned down. Thereafter, he filed Civil Writ Petition No.12062 of  1993, which was also dismissed by the Division Bench on 5.10.1993. He  then carried Special Leave Petition 17752/1993 to this Court. Leave was  granted therein and the resultant Civil Appeal No. 1609/1994 was allowed  on 11.3.1994. This Court disposed of the appeal by the following operative  order: "In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The orders  passed by the High Court, the Appellate Authority and the  Review Committee are quashed. The respondents are directed  to constitute a fresh committee of the personnel mentioned in  the rule itself. In case the appellant had made any allegation  against any of those Deputy Managing Directors, then the  committee shall comprise of Deputy Managing Directors, other  than those who are mentioned in the rules. The earlier Deputy  Managing Directors who were the members of the committee  shall not be members of the new committee. The  recommendations of the committee shall be placed before the  competent authority who shall be different and higher in rank  then (sic-than) the members who shall constitute the committee.  Such committee shall be constituted within two weeks from  today and the decision by the competent authority shall be  taken within two weeks thereafter."  

       The respondent-bank filed I.A. No. 3/1994 for clarification of the  aforesaid order on the ground that the Chairman and Managing Director is  the Appellate Authority and as a consequence, he could not deal with the  Committee to consider the case for extension of the appellant. It was pointed  out that the appellant had made serious allegations against several senior  officers, as a result of which, they could not be nominated as members of the  Review Committee. Accordingly, in pursuance of the time bound directions  of this Court, the Executive Body of the respondent-bank decided on  27.5.1994 to formally constitute a three-member committee comprising S.  Doreswamy, Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Bank of India as its  Chairman/Competent Authority, and the two other members were R.  Vishwanathan, Deputy Managing Director (Commercial Banking) and G.  Kathuria, Deputy Manager Director (Treasury and Investments  Management). The three-member Review Committee would consider and  decide the claim of the appellant for extension of his term in accordance  with the rules. It was also made clear in the order of this Court that it was  not open to the parties to challenge the constitution of the Committee in any  further proceedings. It was also directed that, the Committee be constituted  within two weeks and thereafter the Competent Authority take a decision  within two weeks.  

        R. Vishwanathan and G. Kathuria held two meetings on 6.6.1994 and  9.6.1994 and on 16.6.1994 recommended to the Chairman/Competent  Authority that it was not in the interest of the respondent-bank to extend the  services of the appellant beyond the age of fifty-eight years. The Chairman  accepted the recommendation on the very same day. All the three members  of the Committee met on 16.6.1994, and recorded the minutes of the  proceedings making a recommendation against granting an extension of  service to the appellant. The appellant once again challenged this by way of  Contempt Petition No. 4/1995 which was dismissed as withdrawn with  liberty to impugn it by appropriate proceedings.  

The appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No. 5567/1995 challenging the  decision of the respondent-bank not to grant an extension to him. The  learned Single Judge was of the view that the Committee was biased against  the appellant on account of his history of previous litigation; that other  officers who were not as competent as the appellant had been granted  extensions up to the age of sixty years and thus, there was discrimination  against the appellant. Consequently, the learned Single Judge interfered and

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set aside the recommendation and held that the action of the Review  Committee and the Competent Authority was arbitrary. Thus, the writ  petition was allowed and the relevant orders were quashed. The respondent- bank challenged the said judgment of the learned Single Judge in Letters  Patent Appeal No.81/1999 in which the cross-objections were also filed by  the appellant.

       The Division Bench of the High Court by its impugned judgment  dated 9.3.1999 referred commonly to the Letter Patent Appeals in the  Promotion and Extension matters. It allowed both the appeals and set aside  the judgments of the learned Single Judge by holding that the action of the  respondent-bank was not liable to be interfered with on any ground. Hence  this appeal.

Promotion Matter The learned counsel for the appellant elaborately pointed out the  history of the litigation between the parties commencing from the first  showcause notice given to the appellant and the final order made against  him. Counsel also highlighted the fact that all the disciplinary orders had  been set aside by this Court from time to time. His contention was that, this  had resulted in an institutional bias against the appellant. Counsel suggested  that all the top officers of the respondent-bank were biased against the  appellant and were unanimously against him.  

The second contention of the learned counsel is that the appellant was  a brilliant officer who, between the period 1960 to 1981, had succeeded to  the top echelons of the respondent-bank by dint of his merit. It was only  thereafter that, the top officers deliberately spoiled his good record by giving  him showcause notices on frivolous grounds, which were ultimately quashed  by this Court. He submitted that the appellant had already reached TEGS VI  and the case of the appellant for TEGS VII had to be considered on four  different dates: 1.8.1984, 20.2.1986, 8.6.1987, 1.8.1988 and thereafter on  24.4.1989 and 3.2.1992. It is contended that, during the period the appellant  was under suspension, the respondent-bank was bound to consider his case  under the "sealed cover procedure", which the respondent-bank had failed to  do. Thus, the legitimate claim of the appellant was defeated on account of  the bias against him, as well as, for not following the procedure prescribed.  

       Taking the second point first, it appears to us that the contention is  misconceived. The learned counsel contends (and the learned Single Judge  agreed with this) that the respondent-bank had erred by retrospectively  applying the procedure prescribed in the policy document dated 11.3.1989,  for promotions to be considered between 1.8.1984 to 1.8.1988. We are  satisfied that this was a mistake on the part of the learned Single Judge for  he failed to take notice of a document which was placed on record. This  document was dated 23.2.1984, and modified an earlier promotion policy  enunciated in the year 1982. There is no dispute that such a document  existed and that it was placed on record before the learned Single Judge.  There is also no dispute that such a policy governed the case of the  appellant. With this in mind, the Division Bench has correctly analysed the  facts and pointed out that for the first four dates on which the appellant’s  promotion had to be considered i.e. on 1.8.1984, 20.2.1984, 8.6.1987 and  1.8.1988, the assessment had to be made under the terms of the policy dated  23.2.1984. While learned Single Judge was under the impression that the  case of the appellant for promotion was governed by the policy of 1982, the  Division Bench rightly points out that by this time the modified policy of  1984 had already come into force. By the Government of India Circular  dated 28.9.1983, guidelines were issued to add to Regulation 17 of the  Officers Service Recruitments the following: "All promotions to Senior Management Grade, Scale V and  Top Executive Grade, Scale VI and VII will be made by a  Committee of Directors consisting of the Managing Director,  the Government Director and the Reserve Bank of India  Director on the basis of the evaluation of the past performance  and the assessment of the potential of the eligible officers by

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the said Committee."

The memorandum titled "Executive Selection System", prepared for  the Central Board of the respondent-bank dated 21.2.1984 in respect of the  promotion system inter alia for TEGS VI, TEGS VII, TEG Special Scale,  noted (vide paragraph 2):  "The system is essentially merit based, seniority being given  due weightage for the purpose of reckoning eligibility (among  officers of equal merit or suitability, seniority would count).  While performance on a given job is assessed in terms of the  identified key responsibility areas, potential to shoulder the  responsibilities in the higher management cadres assumes  importance\005"

For assessing these factors, the memorandum prescribed (vide paragraph  2(iv)) "\005a supplementary process of structured interview for promotion to  Senior Management Grade Scale V and Top Executive Grade Scale VI."  The interviews were to be held by a Committee consisting of the Managing  Director and any one or more of the other members of the Central  Management Committee "\005with a view to assessing the officer’s potential".

More importantly, the memorandum noted (vide paragraph 2(v)): "The eligible officials are assessed separately on the basis of  their (a) past performance and (b) potential for handling higher  assignments. An officer who is unable to get a minimum score  of 60% (or equivalent rating) either in the appraisal of his  performance or in the interview, is not considered for  promotion. Giving equal weightage to the two processes, the  merit list is prepared by adding the ratings/scores in respect of  both the aspects and officers equivalent to the number of  vacancies are recommended to the Executive Committee of the  Central Board for promotions strictly according to their  positions in the merit list."

       The above memorandum was placed before the Central Board of the  respondent-bank and was considered by it during its meeting on 23.2.1984.  In pursuance of the memorandum, the Central Board resolved that a  Departmental Promotion Committee act as the Recommending Authority for  promotions to Senior Management Grade Scale V and above. Thus, it is  clear that the appellant’s case for promotion between 1.8.1984 to 1.8.1988  had to be considered in the light of the promotion policy of 1982, as  modified by the policy of 1984. Hence, the Division Bench was right in its  view that there was no question of the policy of 1989 being applied  retrospectively in the case of the appellant. We agree with the view of the  Division Bench in this regard.

       The Interview Committee noted that the appellant had been under  suspension from 21.7.1981 to 12.11.1987 and his service upto 21.7.1981  only had to be taken into consideration for appraisal of the past performance  of the appellant in the same manner as had been done for other eligible  officers. Considering the case of the appellant on each of the relevant dates,  the Committee found that although the appellant had obtained 60%  marks  for "performance appraisal", his performance at the interview was very poor  as he had obtained only 25.7%  marks. Thus, on each of the relevant dates,  the Committee was of the view that his case could not be considered for  promotion to TEGS VII. The High Court rightly points out that, whatever  might have been the assessment of the appellant on the basis of an informal  interview conducted under the promotion policy prior to 1982, he was now  required to undergo a structured and formal interview before a Committee  which would adjudge him on the basis of indicia as prescribed in the 1984  policy. We can hardly find fault with the Committee for its decision in  rejecting the claim of the appellant for promotion to TEGS VII, which  undoubtedly, is a grade at the highest level requiring extreme responsibility  on the part of the officer concerned.

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       Taking the first argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, that  the appellant’s case was rejected because of institutional bias, we are of the  view that this is nothing but resurrection of an issue which had been finally  laid to rest by this Court. Having examined the matter between the parties,  this Court had said by its order that the appellant’s acts should be considered  by a Committee which did not include any of the officers who had been  made respondents in the previous litigations. The general argument of  institutional bias or that of senior officers being biased against him, does not  cut ice with us. Having noted the questions that were asked of him, and the  manner in which the appellant replied to them, it appears to us that there was  no doubt that the appellant (who had been adjudged to be excitable by the  Interview Committee, the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench and  even this Court)  had either displayed ignorance of the requisite knowledge  to answer the questions or was taking up an obstructive attitude in order to  scuttle the interview, which according to him could not have been held. The  Division Bench was being charitable in assuming that the appellant had  sufficient knowledge but deliberately obstructed the interview. We cannot  say that the assessment made by the Division Bench is in anyway erroneous  or does not arise from the facts placed before it. The Division Bench of the  High Court came to the conclusion that the appellant had never intended to  submit to the interview but wanted to filibuster and ultimately to scuttle it,  although he was aware of the consequences of his actions.  

We agree with the impugned judgment of the High Court that no fault  could be found with the Interview Committee when they assessed the  performance of the appellant to be poor. We have seen the record and the  three questions that the Committee put to the appellant. Answers to those  three questions would have demonstrated the depth of knowledge the  appellant had in his professional field. The answers given by him to the  questions asked, suggest that either he was incapable of answering them or  that he was deliberately filibustering the interview. In either event, he did  not deserve to be selected by the Interview Committee. No fault can be  found with the decision of the Interview Committee or with the decision of  the respondent-bank that the appellant was not fit for promotion to TEGS  VII.

Extension Matter         As a result of the order made by this Court in Civil Appeal  No.1609/1994 dated 11.3.1994, together with the order made on 13.5.1994  in I.A. No. 3/1994, the respondent-bank requisitioned the services of S.  Doreswamy, Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Bank of India to  act as the Chairman/Competent Authority of a three-member committee to  make recommendations as to whether the appellant’s services were to be  extended till the age of sixty years. As we have already pointed out, the  other two members of the committee were R. Vishwanathan, Deputy  Managing Director (Commercial Banking) and G. Kathuria, Deputy  Manager Director (Treasury and Investments Management). In the course of  the hearing, the parties accepted the names of the above-mentioned officers  without demur or protest. The two members of the Committee i.e. R.  Vishwanathan and G. Kathuria, considered the entire service record of the  appellant and recommended that it was not in the respondent-bank’s interest  to give an extension in service to the appellant. The Chairman of the  Committee/Competent Authority also concurred with this recommendation.  The recommendations thus made by the Committee were accepted by the  management of the respondent-bank.

       The appellant could not have challenged the constitution of the  Committee as this Court had specifically precluded any such attempt. The  learned counsel before us contended that there was an institutional bias that  affected the decision of the three-member Committee, which was not  objective in its assessment. We find this difficult to accept. That there was  bad blood between the appellant and some top officers of the bank is an  admitted fact. It was precisely because of this that this Court took the trouble  of formulating a Committee headed by an outsider as its Chairman, so that a  decision could be taken objectively as to the suitability of the appellant to be

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granted the extension he sought. The Committee went into the entire service  record and after scanning through the Annual Confidential Reports of the  appellant, took a decision, which we think was fair and objective, that no  extension as sought for, could be granted.  

The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the  decision of the Committee was influenced by a report made by the General  Manager, Chandigarh Circle and that the Committee did not independently  look into the facts of this case. This is an argument that cannot be  countenanced. It is difficult to believe that the two top-most officers of the  respondent-bank, who were accepted without demur or protest as members  of the Committee, and a person of the rank of Chairman-cum-Managing  Director of an unconcerned bank and who had no interest in the matter  whatsoever, would all conspire together so that the appellant was denied an  extension.  

       The argument for the learned counsel for the appellant proceeded on a  misapprehension of the manner in which extension of service is to be  granted. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and others v. Jag Mohan  Lal  (hereinafter "Jag Mohan Lal") this Court had occasion to point out that  a rule under which extension of service can be granted beyond the normal  age of retirement, does not invest a legal right in the employee to be granted  such an extension.  The very same regulation as in this case was interpreted  in Jag Mohan Lal (supra) and it was pointed out therein that the sole  purpose of giving extension of service is to promote the interest of the bank  and not to confer any benefit or favour on retiring officers.  It was pointed  out that it was not a conferment of a benefit or privilege on officers. Merely  because the officer has put in the requisite number of years of service, that  does not earn him/her that benefit or privilege. This Court observed:

"The Bank, however, is required to consider the case of  individual officers with due regard to (i) continued utility; (ii)  good health; and (iii) integrity beyond reproach of the officer. If  the officer lacks one or the other, the Bank is not bound to give  him extension of service. In this case, the Bank has shown to  the High Court that the case of the respondent was considered  and he did not fit in the said guidelines. The High Court does  not sit in an appeal against that decision. The High Court under  Article 226 cannot review that decision."  

If the bank considers that the continuance of services of an officer  is  desirable in the interest of the bank, it may allow him to continue beyond the  age of superannuation. If the bank considers that the service of the officer is  not required beyond the age of superannuation, that is the end of the matter.  Further, non-extension of service is no reflection on the calibre of the officer  and it carries no stigma.  

       It appears to us that these principles were not kept in mind by the  learned Single Judge when he interfered with the discretion of the  respondent-bank not to grant an extension to the appellant. The Division  Bench has, however, rightly applied the legal principle stated in Jag Mohan  Lal (supra) and found that there was no such right vested in the appellant to  demand an extension beyond the age of fifty-eight years. Further, in the facts  and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench found that the extension  had been refused for good reasons and was not liable to be interfered within  its writ jurisdiction. We agree with this reasoning of the High Court.

Relief Prayed For

       There is another issue that precludes any relief being granted to the  appellant. As a matter of fact, the appellant retired from service on 9.9.1993  and died in 2005. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that even  though the appellant had died, his legal heirs could be granted the monetary  benefits on the footing that the appellant was entitled to get extension of

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service by two years and was also entitled to promotion to TEGS VII. In our  view, both these contentions are unsustainable. Even if the appellant were to  succeed in his appeal, the most favourable order for him could have been a  direction to the respondent-bank to reconsider his case for promotion to  TEGS VII as also to reconsider extension of his service beyond the age of  fifty-eight years. Thus, even with such a direction, it would not have been  possible for us to say that the respondent-bank was bound to grant either of  the appellant’s claims. Thus, there is no question of monetary relief being  granted to the legal heirs of the appellant. Further discussion on this aspect  becomes unnecessary since we are not satisfied that the appellant was  entitled to any relief.  

In the result, we find no substance in both the appeals. The impugned  judgment of the High Court is unexceptionable. Consequently, the appeals  before us are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall  be no order as to costs.