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PETITIONER: CONCORD OF INDIA INSURANCE CO LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NIRMALA DEVI AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/04/1979

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1979 AIR 1666            1979 SCR  (3) 694  1979 SCC  (4) 365  CITATOR INFO :  R          1988 SC 898  (7)  RF         1992 SC1261  (8)

ACT:      Negligence of  Counsel which  misleads a  litigant into delayed pursuit  of his  remedy-Propriety and reasonableness of companies and other persons relying upon legal opinion in the matter of computation of limitation-Limitation Act, 1963 (Act XXXVI) Section 5.      Need for  no fault  tortious liability  by  State-Legal rights, literacy  in the  case of  automobile, accidents and the  processual   modalities  which   secure  redressal   of grievances, explained.

HEADNOTE:      A doctor  and his brother riding a motor cycle were hit by a  jeep driver and both were killed in November 1971, but the Motor  Accident claims Tribunal delivered judgment on 5- 9-1976 five  years later  awarding sums  of Rs. 80,000/- and Rs. 73,500/- to the two sets of claimants.      The appeal  in this  case had  to be filed on or before 19-1-77 but  was  actually  filed  30  days  later  with  an application for condonation under S. 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground of Counsel’s mistake in the calculation of the period of  limitation. The  High Court  dismissed the appeal and the application.      Dismissing the special leave petitions, the Court ^      HELD: A  company relies  on its  Legal Adviser  and the Manager’s expertise is in company management and not in law. There is  no particular  reason why  when a company or other person retains a lawyer to advise it or him on legal affairs reliance should not be placed on such counsel. Of course, if there is  gross delay too patent even for layman or if there is  in  comprehensible  indifference  the  shield  of  legal opinion may still be vulnerable. If legal Adviser’s opinions are to  be subjected  by company  managers to  further legal scrutiny of  their own,  an impossible  situation may arise. Indeed Government,  a large  litigant in  this country,  may find itself in difficulty. [697E-F, 698 F-G]      This does  not automatically  secure  a  visa  for  the petitioner into  this Court  under Art.  136. There  must be

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manifest injustice or gross misappreciation or perversity in factual findings. [698H]      State of  Kerala v.  Krishna Kurup Madhava Kurup, A.I.R 1971 Kerala 211; approved.      State of  West Bengal  v. Howrah Municipal Corporation, AIR 1972 SC 749; referred to. Observations      1.  The   jurisprudence  of   compensation  for   motor accidents  must   develop  in   the  direction  of  no-fault liability and  the determination  of  the  quantum  must  be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in a free 695 country in  generous scales.  Social justice, the command of the Constitution   is  being violated by the State itself by neglecting road  repairs,  ignoring  deadly  over-loads  and contesting liability  after nationalising  the bulk  of  bus transport and  the  whole  of  general  insurance  business. [696C-D]      2. Medieval  roads with  treacherous dangers  and total disrepair,  explosive   increase  of  heavy  vehicles  often terribly overloaded and without cautionary signals, reckless drivers crazy  with speed and tipsy with spirituous potions, non-enforcement of  traffic regulations  designed for safety but offering  opportunities for  systematised corruption and little else  and, as  a cumulative  effect, mounting highway accidents, demand  a new  dimension  to  the  law  of  torts through no  fault  liability  and  processual  celerity  and simplicity in compensation claims cases. [696B-C]      3. If  only no-fault  liability, automatic reporting by the police  who investigate  the  accident  in  a  statutory proforma signed  by  the  claimants  and  forwarded  to  the tribunal as  in Tamil  Nadu and decentralised empowerment of such tribunals  in  every  district  coupled  with  informal procedures  and   liberation   from   court-fees   and   the sophisticated rules  of evidence  and burden  of proof  were introduced-easy and  inexpensive, if  the State has the will to help  the poor  who mostly  die in  such  accidents-law’s delays in  this compassionate  jurisdiction can be banished. Social justice  in action  is the  measure  of  the  State’s constitutional sensitivity. [696F-G]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition (Civil) Nos. 5228 and 5286 of 1977.      From the  Judgment and  order  dated  8-8-1977  of  the Punjab and  Haryana High  Court in  F.A.O. No.  81 and 82 of 1977.      P. P. Malhotra and R. N. Dikshit for the Petitioner.      S. K. Gambhir for the Respondent.      The order of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER,  J. An explosive escalation of automobile accidents, accounting  for more  deaths than the most deadly diseases, has  become a  lethal phenomenon  on Indian  Roads everywhere. The  jural impact  of this tragic development on our legislatures,  courts  and  law  enforcing  agencies  is insufficient, with the result that the poor, who are, by and large, the casualty in most of these cases, suffer losses of life or  limb and are deprived of expeditious legal remedies in the  shape of reasonably quantified compensation promptly paid-and this,  even after  compulsory motor  insurance  and nationalisation of  insurance business.  The facts  of  this special leave  petitions, which  we dismiss  by this  order,

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raise two  serious issues  which  constrain  us  to  make  a speaking order. The first deals with legal 696 rights, literacy in the case of automobile accidents and the processual modalities  which secure redressal of grievances. The second  relates to  the consequences  of  negligence  of counsel which  misleads a  litigant into  delayed pursuit of his remedy.      Medieval  roads  with  treacherous  dangers  and  total disrepair,  explosive   increase  of  heavy  vehicles  often terribly overloaded and without cautionary signals, reckless drivers crazy  with speed and tipsy with spirituous potions, non-enforcement of  traffic regulations  designed for safety but offering  opportunities for  systematised corruption and little else  and, as  a cumulative  effect, mounting highway accidents demand a new dimension to the law of torts through no fault liability and processual celerity and simplicity in compensation claims  cases. Social  justice, the  command of the Constitution  is being  violated by  the State itself by neglecting  road  repairs,  ignoring  deadly  overloads  and contesting liability  after nationalising  the bulk  of  bus transport and  the whole  of general insurance business. The jurisprudence  of  compensation  for  motor  accidents  must develop in  the direction  of  no-fault  liability  and  the determination of  the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly since the  law values  life and  limb in  a free  country in generous scales.  In the  present case,  a  doctor  and  his brother riding  a motor cycle were hit, by a jeep driver and both were  killed. The fatal event occurred in November 1971 but the  Motor Accident  Claims Tribunal  delivered judgment five years  later awarding  sums of  Rs.  80,000/-  and  Rs. 73,500/- to the two sets of claimants.      The delay  of five  years in  such cases  is a terrible commentary  on   the  judicial  process.  If  only  no-fault liability, automatic reporting by the police who investigate the accident in a statutory proforma signed by the claimants and  forward   to  the   tribunal  as   in  Tamil  Nadu  and decentralised  empowerment   of  such   tribunals  in  every district coupled  with informal  procedures  and  liberation from court-fees  and the sophisticated rules of evidence and burden of  proof were introduced-easy and inexpensive if the State has  the will  to help the poor who mostly die in such accidents-law’s delays  in this  compassionate  jurisdiction can be  banished. Social justice in action is the measure of the State’s constitutional sensitivity. Anyway, we have made these observation  hopefully to  help focus the attention of the Union and the States.      The nationalised insurance company appealed to the High Court against  the award.  We have no doubt that the finding on both the 697 culpability and  the quantum  as rendered by the trial court are correct.  But the High Court dismissed the appeal on the ground  of   delay,  dismissing   the  application   of  the petitioner for condonation under S. 5 of the Limitation Act.      The Accident  Claims Tribunal  pronounced its  award on September, 15, 1976, after making the necessary computations and deductions.  The appeal  had to  be filed  on or  before January 19,  1977 but  was actually  filed  30  days  later. Counsel for  the petitioner  is  stated  to  have  made  the mistake in  the calculation  of the period of limitation. He had intimated  the parties  accordingly with the result that the petitioner  was misled into instituting appeal late. The High Court  took the  view that the lawyer’s ignorance about the law was no ground for condonation of delay. Reliance was

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placed on  some decisions of the Punjab High Court and there was reference  also to  a ruling of the Supreme Court in AIR 1972 SC 749(1). The conclusion was couched in these words:           "The Assistant  Divisional Manager  of the Company      appellant is  not an  illiterate or  so ignorant person      who could  not calculate the period of limitation. Such      like appeals  are filed  by such  companies daily.  The      facts of  this case  clearly show, as observed earlier,      that the  mistake is not bonafide and the appellant has      failed to show sufficient cause to condone the delay."      We are not able to agree with this reasoning. A company relies on  its Legal  Adviser and the Manager’s expertise is in company management and not in law. There is no particular reason why  when a  company or other person retains a lawyer to advise  it or him on legal affairs reliance should not be placed on  such counsel.  Of course, if there is gross delay too patent  even for  layman or if there is incomprehensible indifference the  shield  of  legal  opinion  may  still  be vulnerable. The  correct legal  position has  been explained with reference  to the  Supreme Court decision in a judgment of one of us in AIR 1971 Ker. 211:           "The law is settled that mistake of counsel may in      certain  circumstances   be  taken   into  account   in      condoning  delay   although   there   is   no   general      proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always      a sufficient  ground. It  is always  a question whether      the mistake  was bonafide  or was  merely a  device  to      cover an ulterior purpose such as laches 698      on the  part of  the litigant  or an  attempt  to  save      limitation  in   an  underhand   way.  The  High  Court      unfortunately never  considered the  matter  from  this      angle. If it had, it would have seen quite clearly that      there was  no attempt  to avoid  the Limitation Act but      rather to  follow it  albeit on  a wrong reading of the      situation."           "The High  Court took  the view  that Mr.  Raizada      being an  Advocate of  34  years’  standing  could  not      possibly  make   the  mistake  in  view  of  the  clear      provisions on  the subject  of appeals  existing  under      Section 39(1)  of the  Punjab Courts Act and therefore,      his advice to file the appeal before the District Court      would not  come to  the rescue  of the  appellant under      Section 5  of the  Limitation Act.  The  Supreme  Court      upset this approach."           "I am  of the  view that legal advice given by the      members of  the legal profession may sometimes be wrong      even as pronouncement on questions of law by courts are      some times  wrong. An amount of latitude is expected in      such cases  for, to  err  is  human  and  lay  men,  as      litigants are,  may legitimately lean on expert counsel      in legal  as in  other departments, without probing the      professional competence  of the  advice. The court must      of course, see whether in such cases there is any taint      of mala  fides or  element of  recklessness or ruse. If      neither is  present, legal  advice honestly  sought and      actually given,  must be  treated as  sufficient  cause      when an  application under  Section 5 of the Limitation      Act is  being  considered.  The  State  has  not  acted      improperly in relying on its legal advisers."      We have  clarified the  legal  position  regarding  the propriety and  reasonableness of companies and other persons relying upon  legal opinion  in the matter of computation of limitation since it is a problem which may arise frequently. If Legal  Adviser’s opinions  are to be subjected by company

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managers  to   further  legal  scrutiny  of  their  own,  an impossible situation  may arise.  Indeed Government, a large litigant in  this country,  may find  itself in  difficulty. That is  the reason  why we  have chosen  to explain at this length the application of S. 5 vis-a-vis counsel’s mistake.      This does  not automatically  secure  a  visa  for  the petitioner into  this Court under Article 136. There must be manifest injustice or gross misappreciation or perversity in factual findings. We have 699 examined the merits of the matter to the extent available on the record and have heard counsel for the petitioner. He has hardly convinced us that the merits of the case call for any intervention at  all. In  this view  we are  constrained  to dismiss  the  Special  Leave  Petitions  now  that  we  have expressed ourselves or both the points dealt with above. S.R. Petitions dismissed. 700