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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  4108 of 2007

PETITIONER: THE COMMISSIONER, KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD

RESPONDENT: C. MUDDAIAH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/09/2007

BENCH: C.K. THAKKER & D.K. JAIN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4108 OF 2007 ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 12608 OF 2005

C.K. THAKKER, J.

1.              Leave granted.

2.              The present appeal is filed by the  Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board against the  judgment and order dated March 22, 2005 passed by the  Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka,  Bangalore in Writ Appeal No.6722 of 2003. By the  impugned order, the Division Bench set aside the order  dated August 4, 2003, passed by a Single Judge of that  Court in Writ Petition No. 10722 of 2000. The Division  Bench held that the dismissal of the claim of the  respondent-employee writ-petitioner by the learned  Single Judge on the ground that contempt petitions filed  by him were dismissed was not legal and in consonance  with law. The Division Bench, hence, directed the  appellant-Board to implement the direction issued by the  learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1848 of 1992  decided on October 27, 1997 in ’letter and spirit’ and  disburse ’all consequential benefits’ to which the writ- petitioner was held entitled. 3.              The facts of the case are that the respondent  herein (writ-petitioner) joined service in Karnataka  Housing Board (’Board’ for short) in the year 1972. He  was appointed as a Second Division Assistant and was  promoted as First Division Assistant on February 15,  1972. On December 30, 1974, a seniority list of the First  Division Assistants was published. The writ-petitioner  challenged the said seniority list by approaching the High  Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Writ  Petition No. 1848 of 1992 was allowed on October 27,  1997 by a Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka.  The Court directed the Board to reassign seniority of the  writ-petitioner by placing him above respondent Nos. 2 to  34 and to grant ’other consequential benefits’. 4.              It appears from the record that Writ Appeal  filed by the State against the order passed by the learned  Single Judge was dismissed on March 30, 1998 by the  Division Bench. Even Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.  5487 of 1998 was dismissed by this Court. The order  passed by the learned Single Judge thus became final.

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5.              It is the case of the Board that the order  passed by the Court was implemented and the writ- petitioner was reassigned seniority above respondent  Nos. 2 to 34 as per the direction of the Court and was  also granted  consequential benefits. The grievance of the  writ-petitioner, however, was that he was not granted  consequential benefits as awarded to him by the learned  Single Judge and confirmed even by this Court. The writ- petitioner retired from service on February 28, 1998. 6.              Since consequential benefits were not extended  to him, the writ-petitioner filed Contempt Petition No. 12  of 1998 which was dismissed. Similarly, another  Contempt Petition No. 1134 of 1999 was also dismissed.  He, thereafter, filed a substantive petition, being Writ  Petition No. 10722 of 2000 contending that though an  order was passed in the writ petition filed by him wherein  directions were issued to reassign him seniority and  consequential benefits, arrears of salary to which he was  entitled, was not paid to him. The said action was clearly  illegal, unlawful and not sustainable at law. A prayer  was, therefore, made that the Board may be directed to  extend monetary benefits as per the judgment rendered  in the earlier litigation. The learned Single Judge, as  observed above, dismissed the petition observing that the  Division Bench disposed of Contempt Petitions observing  that the Board had complied with the directions issued  by the learned Single Judge in W.P. 1848 of 1992.  According to the learned Single Judge, if it were so, the  writ-petitioner could not contend that he was entitled to  monetary benefits from the date he was denied seniority  in the final gradation list of First Division Assistant  prepared and published by the Board. The petition was,  therefore, dismissed. Intra court appeal, however, was  allowed by the Division Bench. The Board has challenged  the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court  of Karnataka in this Court by filing this appeal. 7.              On July 14, 2005, notice was issued by this  Court. Counter affidavit was thereafter filed by the writ- petitioner and matter was ordered to be heard finally.  Accordingly, the matter has been placed before us. 8.              We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 9.              The learned counsel for the appellant-Board  contended that the writ-petitioner had succeeded in  earlier litigation. A Single Judge of the High Court  directed the appellant-Board to reconsider the seniority  list and reassign seniority to the writ-petitioner over  respondent Nos. 2 to 34. It is also true that the Court  directed consequential benefits to be extended to the  writ-petitioner. According to the learned counsel,  however, the said order had been complied with and the  appellant-Board has paid all consequential benefits to  the writ-petitioner to which he was entitled in law. He  also submitted that it was the case of the writ-petitioner  that the order passed by the Court had not been  complied with and the appellant-Board had committed  contempt, but the contempt petitions were dismissed. In  view of the said order, it is not open to the writ-petitioner  to contend that there was non-compliance with the order  passed by the Court. A fresh petition for such relief was  not maintainable. According to the counsel, the learned  Single Judge was wholly justified in dismissing the  petition taking into consideration dismissal of contempt  petitions and in observing that the complaint of the writ- petitioner against non-compliance with the order of the  Court was ill-founded. The Division Bench was in error in

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setting aside the said order and in allowing the appeal.  He, therefore, submitted that the present appeal deserves  to be allowed by quashing the directions issued by the  Division Bench and by restoring the order of the learned  Single Judge. 10.             The learned counsel for the respondent-writ- petitioner, on the other hand, submitted that the Division  Bench was wholly right and fully justified in passing the  order in the light of the earlier litigation between the  parties. He submitted that the case was finally decided,  the learned Single Judge allowed the petition filed by the  petitioner and directed the Board to reassign him the  seniority above respondent Nos. 2 to 34 and also to grant  consequential benefits. The said order was challenged by  the Board but intra court appeal as also Special Leave  Petition came to be dismissed by the Division Bench of  the High Court and by this Court respectively. The said  order thus became final and binding on the parties. It  was, thereafter, not open to the Board not to pay  consequential benefits on the so-called ground that such  payment was not envisaged by law. Once an order is  passed by a competent court, it has to be implemented.  Dismissal of contempt petitions was totally irrelevant.  The learned Single Judge was, therefore, not justified in  dismissing the petition and the Division Bench was right  in setting aside the said order. The present appeal,  therefore, has no substance and deserves to be  dismissed. 11.             Having heard learned counsel for the parties  and having given anxious consideration to the rival  submissions of the counsel, in our opinion, the appeal  filed by the Board must be dismissed. Certain facts are  not in dispute. The writ-petitioner was promoted as First  Division Assistant in the year 1972. Seniority list of First  Division Assistants was prepared and published. The  writ-petitioner had grievance against the said list. He,  therefore, challenged the said seniority list and his  placement therein. A Single Judge was satisfied as to the  grievance raised by the writ-petitioner and allowed the  petition directing the Board to place the writ-petitioner  above respondent Nos. 2 to 34 and also to grant  consequential benefits. 12.             In the operative part of the order, the learned  Single Judge stated; "Hence, there will be a direction to the 1st  respondent to the effect that the date of  seniority to be assigned to respondents Nos.2  to 34 shall be with effect from 30-12-1974 and  below the petitioner. The seniority list of the  petitioner and respondents Nos.2 to 34 shall  be revised accordingly. Necessarily it follows  that the petitioner is entitled to such other  consequential benefits that he might earn  consequent upon this revision of ranking.  The learned counsel for the petitioner submits  that the petitioner is due to retire by February,  1998. Taking into account all the  circumstances, it is desirable that the 1st  respondent awards all the consequential  benefits that the petitioner would have earned  consequent upon this judgment by 30-12- 1997. With the above direction, the writ  petition is disposed of".                                                 (emphasis supplied)

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13.             It is not in dispute that the Board challenged  the said decision by filing intra court appeal but the  appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench. Even  Special Leave Petition was dismissed by this Court and  the order passed by the learned Single Judge had become  final and binding between the parties. It was, therefore,  obligatory on the Board to implement the directions  issued by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition, to  reassign seniority of the writ-petitioner by placing him  over respondent Nos. 2 to 34 in the petition and also to  extend ’consequential benefits’. 14.             It is the case of the appellant-Board that all  those directions had been carried out. The writ-petitioner  has been reassigned seniority over respondent Nos. 2 to  34 and he has been awarded consequential benefits.  When it was contended by the learned counsel for the  writ-petitioner that no arrears of salary had been paid,  the learned counsel for the Board did not dispute the  fact. He, however, relied upon statutory provisions. He  also referred to a decision of this Court in S.R. Bhagwat  v. State of Mysore, (1995) 6 SCC 16. The counsel for the  writ-petitioner also placed reliance on that decision. It is,  therefore, necessary to consider the said decision and the  law laid down therein by this Court. 15.             In S.R. Bhagwat, certain Deputy Conservator  of Forests were serving in the former States of Bombay  and Hyderabad. Pursuant to reorganization of States,  they were allotted to the new State of Mysore under  Section 115 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956.  Under the 1956 Act, the Central Government issued  certain directions for equation of posts and promotions  on the basis of provisional inter-State seniority lists  subject to the revision of such promotions in accordance  with the ranking in the final seniority list. The petitioners  claimed certain benefits which were not granted. They,  therefore, approached the High Court of Mysore. The  claim was finally allowed and a direction was issued by  the Court to grant all consequential benefits to the  petitioners. The State of Mysore thereupon enacted an  Act known as the Karnataka State Civil Services  (Regulation of Promotion, Pay and Pension) Act, 1973  (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’). By the said Act, the  actual financial benefits directed to be made available to  the petitioners pursuant to the order passed by the  Division Bench of the High Court, which had become  final, were sought to be taken away. The petitioners, in  the circumstances, approached this Court by filing a  substantive petition under Article 32 of the Constitution  challenging constitutional validity and vires of the Act to  the extent they had affected the petitioners. 16.             After hearing the parties, this Court allowed  the petition, struck down certain provisions of the Act as  ultra vires the legislative power of the State and directed  the Authorities to comply with the directions contained in  the binding decision of the Division Bench in favour of  the petitioners by granting ’all consequential financial  benefits’ within the stipulated period. 17.             In that case also, it was contended by the  State that the petitioners were not entitled to  consequential benefits in view of legislative provision and  overriding effect under Section 11 of the Act. The Court,  however, negatived the contention. It observed that it is  open to a competent Legislature to remove a defect in a  legislation. Such enactment or validating statute could  not be held unconstitutional or ultra vires. But it is

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equally well settled that a binding judicial  pronouncement between the parties cannot be made  ineffective or inoperative with the aid of legislative power  by making a provision which, in substance and in reality,  overrides and overrules a decision rendered by competent  Court. Such process virtually renders a judicial decision  ineffective by indirectly exercising appellate power over a  judicial forum which is impermissible. 18.             The Court stated: "It is now well settled by a catena of decisions  of this Court that a binding judicial  pronouncement between the parties cannot be  made ineffective with the aid of any legislative  power by enacting a provision which in  substance over-rules such judgment and is not  in the realm of a legislative enactment which  displaces the basis of foundation of the  judgment and uniformly applies to a class of  persons concerned with the entire subject  sought to be covered by such an enactment  having retrospective effect".

19.             Considering the overriding effect of Section 11  of the Act, the Court observed: "A mere look at sub-section (2) of Section 11  shows that the respondent, State of  Karnataka, which was a party to the decision  of the Division Bench of the High Court  against it had tried to get out of the binding  effect of the decision by resorting to its  legislative power. The judgments, decrees and  orders of any court or the competent authority  which had become final against the State were  sought to be done away with by enacting the  impugned provisions of sub-section (2) of  Section 11. Such an attempt cannot be said to  be a permissible legislative exercise. Section  11(2), therefore, must be held to be an attempt  on the part of the State Legislature to  legislatively over-rule binding decisions of  competent courts against the State. It is no  doubt true that if any decision was rendered  against the State of Karnataka which was  pending in appeal and had not become final it  could rely upon the relevant provisions of the  Act which were given retrospective effect by  sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Act for  whatever such reliance was worth. But when  such a decision had become final as in the  present case when the High Court clearly  directed respondent-State to give to the  concerned petitioners deemed dates of  promotions if they were otherwise found fit and  in that eventuality to give all benefit  consequential thereon including financial  benefits, the State could not invoke its  legislative power to displace such a judgment.  Once this decision had become final and the  State of Karnataka had not thought it fit to  challenge it before this Court presumably  because in identical other matters this Court  had upheld other decisions of the Karnataka  High Court taking the same view, it passes  one’s comprehension how the legislative power  can be pressed in service to undo the binding

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effects of such mandamus. It is also pertinent  to note that not only sub-section (2) of Section  11 seeks to bypass and over-ride the binding  effect of the judgments but also seeks to  empower the State to review such judgments  and orders and pass fresh orders in  accordance with provisions of the impugned  Act. The respondent-State in the present  case by enacting sub-section (2) of Section  11 of the impugned Act has clearly sought  to nullify or abrogate the binding decision  of the High Court and has encroached  upon the judicial power entrusted to the  various authorities functioning under the  relevant statutes and the Constitution.  Such an exercise of legislative power  cannot be countenanced".                                          (emphasis  supplied) 20.             The Court, therefore, held that the provisions  of sub-section (2) of Section 11 which interfered with the  judgment of a competent Court was unconstitutional,  ultra vires and void. 21.             As to Section 4 of the Act, which provided  certain benefits to employees only on ’notional basis’, the  Court held that it would not apply to the petitioners. 22.             The Court stated: "We, therefore, strike down Section 11 sub- section (2) as unconstitutional, illegal and  void. So far as the underlined impugned  portions of Section 4, sub-sections (2), (3) and  (8) are concerned, they clearly conflict with the  binding direction issued by the Division Bench  of the High Court against the respondent-State  and in favour of the petitioners. Once  respondent-State had suffered the mandamus  to give consequential financial benefits to the  allottees like the petitioners on the basis of the  deemed promotions such binding direction  about payment of consequential monetary  benefits cannot be nullified by the impugned  provisions of Section 4. Therefore, the  underlined portions of sub-sections (2), (3) and  (8) of Section 4 will have to be read down in  the light of orders of the court which have  become final against the respondent-State and  in so far as these provisions are inconsistent  with these final orders containing such  directions of judicial authorities and  competent courts, these impugned provisions  of Section 4 have to give way and to the extent  of such inconsistency must be treated to be  inoperative and ineffective. Accordingly the  aforesaid provisions are read down by  observing that the statutory provisions  contained in sub-sections (2), (3) and (8) of  Section 4 providing that such person who  have been given deemed promotions shall  not be entitled to any arrears for the  period prior to the date of their actual  promotion, shall not apply in cases where  directions to the contrary of competent  courts against the respondent-State have  become final".                                                 (emphasis supplied)

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23.             The learned counsel for the appellant-Board  strenuously urged that in S.R. Bhagwat, this Court  struck down sub-section (2) of Section 11, but did not  hold Section 4 unconstitutional or ultra vires. The Court  held that on the facts and in the circumstances of the  case, the said provision did not apply to the petitioners in  view of the direction issued by the Court and the  petitioners were held entitled to consequential benefits.  But the ratio laid down in the said decision would help  the appellant-Board. The Division Bench, in the light of  S.R. Bhagwat, could not have issued direction as to  payment to be made to the writ-petitioner. 24.             We are unable to uphold the argument. In our  judgment, the submission of the learned counsel for the  writ-petitioner is well-founded that in the instant case  also, express and unequivocal direction was issued by  the Court to grant to the writ-petitioner "such other  consequential benefits that he might get consequent  upon the revision of ranking". It was also observed that  such benefits should be paid to him by December 30,  1997 as the writ-petitioner was to retire in February,  1998. The said decision, to reiterate, has become final  and binding. It is, therefore, not open to the appellant- Board to contend that the respondent is not entitled to  such benefits under 1973 Act and hence no such  direction could have been issued by the Court. 25.             As observed in S.R. Bhagwat, when a decision  has been rendered by a competent Court, the law  provides a remedy to an aggrieved party. If the appellant- Board thought that the writ-petitioner was not entitled to  financial benefits as contended before us now and he  could be granted such benefits only on ’notional’ basis, it  could have challenged the said direction and ought to  have obtained an appropriate order from an appropriate  Court. In the case on hand, the directions issued by the  learned Single Judge were challenged by the Board, but  intra court appeal as well as Special Leave Petition came  to be dismissed. The direction, thus remained and in the  teeth of such direction, it is not open to the appellant- Board not to comply with it by contending that it would  not grant consequential benefits as no such direction  could be issued in view of 1973 Act. 26.             In our opinion, the contention that no fresh  petition could be filed by the respondent-writ petitioner  in 2000 has also no substance. So far as contempt  petitions are concerned, the Court held that the order  passed by the Court had been complied with and it could  not be said that the Board or its Officers were liable to be  punished. An Office Memorandum dated February 2,  1998 is on record. It refers to a decision of the High  Court dated October 27, 1997 in Writ Petition No. 1848  of 1992 and states as to how the direction of the Court  has been complied with. The relevant part of the said  order reads thus: "Accordingly, the promotion of Sri C.  Muddaiah, be worked out with reference to the  promotion accorded to Sri K. Srinath and the  consequential benefit be allowed to Sri C.  Muddaiah, as per the Judgment referred to  above".                          (emphasis supplied)

27.             From the above order, it is clear that  promotion of the writ petitioner was ordered to be worked  out with reference to the promotion accorded to Shri K.  Srinath and the ’consequential benefits’ be allowed to the

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writ-petitioner as per the judgment referred to in the writ  petition. 28.             But our attention was also invited by the  learned counsel for the writ-petitioner to a subsequent  order dated June 1, 1998. The Preamble of the order  refers to the decision in the writ petition and direction of  the Court to place the writ-petitioner above respondent  Nos. 2 to 34 and to grant him consequential benefits. 29.             It then proceeds to state: "In view of the facts explained in the preamble  I, P.B. Mahishi, Housing Commissioner,  Karnataka Housing Board, order that Sri C.  Muddaiah is deemed to have been promoted as  Superintendent from the cadre of F.D.A’s with  effect from 22-03-1984 i.e. the date from which  Sri K. Srinath was so promoted. I further order  that Sri C. Muddaiah is deemed to have been  promoted as Assistant Revenue Officer from  the cadre of Superintendent with effect from  12.06.1985 i.e. the date on which his junior  was so promoted. He is deemed to have been  posted as Assistant Revenue Officer with effect  from 27.10.1997, the date on which the  Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka rendered its  judgment in W.P. No. 1848 of 1992. I also  order that Sri C. Muddaiah be paid arrears of  pay and allowance for the period from  27.10.1997 to 28.2.1998 the date on which he  retired from service on attaining the age of  superannuation presuming that he has worked  as Assistant Revenue Officer during the said  period even though he had actually not worked  in that capacity. Sri C. Muddaiah will not be  eligible for arrears of pay and allowance  for any earlier period since he has not  actually worked in the cadre of  Superintendents and Assistant Revenue  Officers, in view of the provisions of  Karnataka State Civil Services (Regulation  of Pay, Promotion and Pension) Act, 1973.  A statement showing the pay fixation allowed  in favour of Sri C. Muddaiah consequent on  the above orders is enclosed herewith. On the  basis of the revised pay fixation order enclosed  Sri C. Muddaiah will also be entitled for  pension, gratuity and family pension etc."                                          (emphasis supplied)

30.             Bare reading of the above order makes it more  than clear that the salary to be paid to the writ petitioner  was from October 27, 1997 to February 28, 1998. It was  expressly stated that the writ-petitioner would not be  entitled to arrears of pay and allowances for any earlier  period "since he has not actually worked in the cadre of  Superintendents and Assistant Revenue Officers".           It is thus obvious that in spite of clear direction issued by  a competent Court, no payment was made and an  express order was passed to the effect that the writ- petitioner would not be entitled to pay as he had not  worked.  The writ-petitioner, therefore, had legitimate  grievance against such direction. A fresh substantive  petition, hence, could be filed by him and since he was  entitled to such relief, the Division Bench was justified in  granting the prayer. 31.             We are of the considered opinion that once a

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direction is issued by a competent Court, it has to be  obeyed and implemented without any reservation. If an  order passed by a Court of Law is not complied with or is  ignored, there will be an end of Rule of Law. If a party  against whom such order is made has grievance, the only  remedy available to him is to challenge the order by  taking appropriate proceedings known to law. But it  cannot be made ineffective by not complying with the  directions on a specious plea that no such directions  could have been issued by the Court. In our judgment,  upholding of such argument would result in chaos and  confusion and would seriously affect and impair  administration of justice. The argument of the Board,  therefore, has no force and must be rejected. 32.             The matter can be looked at from another  angle also. It is true that while granting a relief in favour  of a party, the Court must consider the relevant  provisions of law and issue appropriate directions  keeping in view such provisions. There may, however, be  cases where on the facts and in the circumstances, the  Court may issue necessary directions in the larger  interest of justice keeping in view the principles of  justice, equity and good conscience. Take a case, where  ex facie injustice has been meted out to an employee. In  spite of the fact that he is entitled to certain benefits,  they had not been given to him. His representations have  been illegally and unjustifiably turned down. He finally  approaches a Court of Law. The Court is convinced that  gross injustice has been done to him and he was  wrongfully, unfairly and with oblique motive deprived of  those benefits. The Court, in the circumstances, directs  the Authority to extend all benefits which he would have  obtained had he not been illegally deprived of them. Is it  open to the Authorities in such case to urge that as he  has not worked (but held to be illegally deprived), he  would not be granted the benefits? Upholding of such  plea would amount to allowing a party to take undue  advantage of his own wrong. It would perpetrate injustice  rather than doing justice to the person wronged. We are  conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory  provision, normal rule is ’no work no pay’. In appropriate  cases, however, a Court of Law may, nay must, take into  account all the facts in their entirety and pass an  appropriate order in consonance with law. The Court,  in  a given case, may hold that the person was willing to  work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do  so. The Court may in the circumstances, direct the  Authority to grant him all benefits considering ’as if he  had worked’. It, therefore, cannot be contended as an  absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment  of consequential benefits can be granted by a Court of  Law and if such directions are issued by a Court, the  Authority can ignore them even if they had been finally  confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as has been  done in the present case). The bald contention of the  appellant-Board, therefore, has no substance and must  be rejected. 33.             For the foregoing reasons, we see no ground to  interfere with the order passed by the Division Bench of  the High Court. The appeal deserves to be dismissed and  is accordingly dismissed with costs which is quantified as  Rs.10,000/-. The appellant-Board shall comply with the  directions within twelve weeks from today.