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PETITIONER: COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, WEST BENGAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHAMPA KUMARI SINGHI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/01/1972

BENCH: GROVER, A.N. BENCH: GROVER, A.N. HEGDE, K.S. RAY, A.N.

CITATION:  1972 AIR 2119            1972 SCR  (3) 118  1972 SCC  (1) 508  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1976 SC2450  (8)

ACT: Wealth  Tax  Act,  1957, Section  3-Jain  undivided  family, whether Hindu Undivided Family.

HEADNOTE: The  High  Court held that the assessee,  a  Jain  undivided family  was not a Hindu undivided family within the  meaning of section 3 of Wealth Tax Act, 1957.  According to the High Court, in order to form a Hindu undivided family its members must  be  Hindus; the assessee family being Jains  were  not Hindus  and so its members could not form a Hindu  undivided family  although it was "capable of forming a unit  of  very much of the same type and governed by the law applying to  a Hindu  undivided family".  On the question whether the  word ’Hindu’ preceding the words undivided family signifies  that the  undivided  family should be of those  (i)  who  profess Hindu religion; or (ii) to whom Hindu Law applies; or, (iii) who  though  not professing Hindu religion have come  to  be regarded   as   Hindu  undivided  family’by   judicial   and legislative practice. HELD : The expression Hindu undivided family includes  ’Jain undivided family’. For  a  long time Courts seem to have taken  the  view  that Jains are Hindu dissenters. [123 E] Bhagwandas Tejmal v.  Rajmal, (1873) 10 Bom.  HCR. 241, Lala Mohabeer Pershad v. Musammut Kunelar Koover, 8 Cal.   W.Rep. 116 Civ.  Rule and Sheokuarbai v. Jeoracaj, [1921] P.C.  77, referred to. The  above view has been challenged by Jain  historians  and writers  and  it has been maintained that  Jains  are  quite distinct  from Hindus and have a separate code of law  which unfortunately  was not brought to the notice of the  courts. if [124 E] Bobaladi  Gateppa v. Bobbaladi Eramma & Others, A.I.R.  1927 Mad. 228 and C.R. Jain.  Jain Law, (1926) pp. 3-23, 219-258, referred to. But,  the  suggestion that Jain law which is  found  in  the available books should still be applied and the error  which has crept in the matter of jains being governed by Hindu Law

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should be rectified cannot possibly be followed particularly in view of statutory enactments which in express terms  have been made applicable to Jains’ [125 B] Panna  Lal  &  Others v. Sitabai,  I.L.R.  1954  Nagpur  30, Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj, [1921] P.C. 77, referred to. Before  the amendment and codification of major branches  of Hindu  law,  by the four statutes, i.e. the  Hindu  Marriage Act,  1955,  the  Hindu  Succession  Act,  1956,  the  Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. the Hindu Adoption  and Maintenance Act, 1956, the undisputed position was that  the Jains  were governed by Hindu law modified by custom  and  a Jain  joint  family was a Hindu joint family  with  all  the incidents                             119 attached  to  such  a  family  under  the  Hindu  Law.   The legislative  practice also was to generally treat  Jains  as included   in   the  term  ’Hindu’  in   various   statutory enactments.   Wherever Jains were mentioned in  addition  it was  ex abundanti cautela.  The new statutes did not  change the situation.  The fallacy underlying the reasoning of  the High  Court is that the artificial field of  application  of the law in those statutes shows that Jainism is not  treated even  as a form or a development of Hinduism.  Even  if  the religions  are different, what is common is that  all  those who are to be governed by the provisions of these enactments are included in ’the term ’Hindu’.  They are to be  governed by   the  same  rules  relating  to  marriage,   succession, minority, guardianship, adoption and maintenance as  Hindus. The statutes thus accord legislative recognition to the fact that  even though Jains may not be Hindus by  religion  they are  to,  be governed by the same laws as the  Hindus.   The expression ’Jain undivided family’ is not known to law.  The Jains  are  governed by all the incidents  relating  to  the Hindu joint family. Hindu undivided     family  is  a  legal expression which has been employed in taxation laws.   It has a definite connotation and embodies the meaning ascribed to the    expression ’Hindu Joint Family’. [127 E-128A] Kamawari v.    Digbijai,  A.I.R.  1922 P.C. 14,  Bachebi  v. Makhan Lal & Another, I.L.R. 3 All. 55 Bhagwan Koer v. J. C. Bose, Ambalal v. Keshav, Bandhochand Gujar, I.L.R. 1941 Bom. 250 and Kalyvani Vitlial Das v. Commissioner of Income  Tax, L.R. 64 I.A. 28, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.  1090  of 1971 and 1686 of 1968. Appeals  by special leave/certificate from the judgment  and order  dated August 25, 1967 of the Calcutta High  Court  in Wealth Tax Reference No. 435 of 1963. S.   Mittra,  B.  D.  Sharma and R.  N.  Sachthey,  for  the appellant (in both the appeals). S.   T. Desai, D. N. Mishra, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C.  Mathur and  Ravinder  Narain,  for the  respondents  (in  both  the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover,  J.  This  is an appeal by special  leave  from  the judgment  of  the  Calcutta  High Court  arising  out  of  a reference  under  the  Wealth  Tax Act  1957  in  which  the question  involved is one of importance, namely,  whether  a Jain  undivided family is included in the expression  "Hindu undivided family" within s.   3 of the Act. The facts are few and may be stated. For the assessment year 1957-58,  the valuation date being 31-12-56 the  Wealth  Tax

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Officer  assessed the family assets of the assessee  in  the status  of  a  Hindu undivided family.   On  appeal  to  the Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner the  contentions  raised, inter  alia,  were  that (i) upon  the  description  of  the assessee  in the notice of demand the assessment  should  be deemed to have been made in the status of an association  of persons which was not a unit on which tax 120 could be levied under the Act; (ii) even if the assessee was to be treated as a Hindu undivided family, the imposition of wealth tax on such family was ultra vires the Constitution. These contentions failed before the Appellate Assistant Com- missioner.   The Appellate Tribunal, to whom the matter  was taken  in appeal, held that the assessee followed  the  Jain religion  and since the unit chargeable to wealth tax  under S.  3  of the Act was either individual or  Hindu  undivided family or company none of the units covered the case of  the assessee which was a Jain family.  According to the Tribunal Jains were not Hindus and, therefore, the expression  "Hindu undivided family" in S. 3 did not cover the case of a  Jain, family.   The  Tribunal  set aside the  assessment  on  this ground  alone.   The  Commissioner of Wealth  tax  filed  an application  under  S.  27(1) of the Act  praying  that  the question of law which arose out of the order of the Tribunal be  referred to the High Court.  At the time of the  hearing of  that  application  it was suggested  on  behalf  of  the assessee that further questions arising out of the order  of the   Tribunal  should  also  be  referred.   Finding   that questions   other  than  the  question  suggested   by   the Commissioner  of  Wealth  tax arose out of  the  order,  the Tribunal  referred  the following question of  law  for  the opinion of the High Court :-               "1.  Whether, the assessee, a  Jain  undivided               family,  was  not  a  Hindu  undivided  family               within  the meaning of s. 3 of the Wealth  tax               Act, 1957, and as such the Tribunal was  right               in  setting aside the assessment made  on  the               assessee ?               2.    Whether  levy  of Wealth  tax  on  Hindu               undivided  family  or  joint  family  governed               under Mitakshra school of Hindu law was beyond               the  legislative competence of Parliament  and               ultra vires the Constitution of India ?               3.    Whether the Wealth Tax Act in so far  as               it  purports  to  levy  Wealth  tax  on  Hindu               undivided families is void and inoperative  as               it  offends Article 14 of the Constitution  of               India ?" The  High Court held that the Jains not being Hindus in  the generally accepted sense of the term a Jain undivided family could not be a Hindu undivided family although the incidence of  a  Jain family and a Hindu family "may be  the  same  or largely the same".  According to the High Court, in order to form  a Hindu undivided family its members must  be  Hindus, the assessee family being Jains, were not Hindus and so  its member,,; 121 could  not  form a Hindu undivided family  although  it  was "capable of forming a unit of very much of the same type and governed  by the law applying to a Hindu undivided  family". The answer to the first question, therefore, was returned in the  affirmative and in favour of the assessee.   The  other two  questions  were  not pressed  before  the  High  Court, presumably in view of the decision in Banarsi Dass v. Wealth Tax Officer, Special Circle, Meerut(1).

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According to s. 2 (c) of the Act assessee means a person  by whom Wealth tax or any other sum of money is payable  under the Act and includes               (i)   every  person  in respect  of  whom  any               proceedings under this Act has been taken  for               the determination of wealth tax payable by him               or by any other person or the amount of refund               due to him or such other person;               (ii)  every  person  who is deemed  to  be  an               assessee under this Act;               (III)******"               Section 3 is in the following terms               "Charge   of wealth tax--Subject to the  other               provisions contained in this Act, there  shall               be   charged  for  every   (assessment   year)               commencing on and from the first day of  April               1957, a tax (hereinafter referred to as wealth               tax) in respect of the net wealth on the  cor-               responding valuation date of every individual,               Hindu undivided family and company at the rate               or rates specified in the schedule". The only other provision in the Act in which the  expression "Hindu"’  undivided family" occurs is s. 20.  It deals  with assessment  after  partition of a  Hindu  undivided  family. Under s. 3     of  the Act it is the Hindu undivided  family which  is  one  of the assessable entities.   It  should  be distinguished  from  a Hindu co-parcenary which  is  a  much narrower  body than the Joint family.  A Hindu joint  family consists  of  all persons lineally descended from  a  common ancestor, and includes their wives and unmarried  daughters. A Hindu coparcenary includes only those who acquire by birth an  interest  in the joint coparcenary property,  being  the sons,  grandsons  and great grandsons of the holder  of  the joint property.  Thus there can be a joint Hindu family (1) 56 I.T.R. 224. 9-L864SupCI/72 122 consisting  of a single male member and widows  of  deceased coparceners.   It must be remembered that the  words  "Hindu undivided  family" are used in the Income tax statutes  with reference  not  to one school of Hindu law only but  to  all schools.   The sole previous decision in which an  identical question came up for consideration under the Income tax  law is that of the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner’s Court in Nathu Sao v. Commissioner of Income tax C.P. & Berar(1).  In  that case  the assessee was a member of the Lad  Vaish  community and was a Jain.  He claimed to be governed by the Hindu  law and  contended that his widowed mother and widowed aunt  who lived  with  him ’constituted a Hindu joint family.  it  was held  that  ordinarily Hindu Law applied to  Jains  in  the absence of proof of custom or usage to the contrary and that the expression "Hindu undivided family did not mean a  Hindu coparcenary  but was a wider expression which would take  in the  widowed mother and the widowed aunt of the assessee  in that case.  No contrary view seems to have been expressed in any  other case subsequently and it appears that it  is  for the first time that the Calcutta High Court in the  judgment under appeal has upheld the contention that a Jain undivided family  cannot fall within the expression  "Hindu  undivided family".   It  will  not be out of  place  to  mention  that indisputably  ever since income tax laws have been in  force no  distinction has ever been made between a Jain  undivided family  and a Hindu undivided family and a Jain  family  has always  been assessed as a Hindu undivided family.  Even  in the  forms  prescribed for making returns of Income  tax  no

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such differentiation or distinction has ever been made. The  main reasoning which prevailed with the High  Court  is that although Hindu law applies to Jains except in so far as such law is varied by custom, Jains do not become Hindus  in the same way as Khojas and Cutchi Memons of Bombay and Sunni Borahs of Gujarat etc. cannot be regarded as Hindus although Hindu  law  applies to them in matters  of  inheritance  and succession.   Moreover,  Hinduism  does  not  include  Hindu converts to Christianity and Islam and also dissenters  from Hinduism who formed themselves into distinct communities  or sects  with peculiar religious usages so divergent from  the principles  of the Shastras that they could not be  regarded as  Hindus.   Reliance  was placed on the  decision  of  the Mysore  High Court in P. F. Pinto v. Commissioner of  wealth Tax, Mysore (2).  In that case the ancestors of the assessee were  originally Hindus.  They later on became  converts  to Christianity.   It was found that although for the  purposes of succession to property the Hindu law was still applicable to the family of the assessee, he could be assessed only  as an (1) 2  I.T.R. 463. (1) 65, I.T.R. 123. 123 individual for wealth tax purposes and could not be assessed in the status of a Hindu undivided family.  The Mysore  High Court  was inclined to the view that the  expression  ’Hindu undivided  family’  in  s.  3 of  the  Act  was  limited  to Mitakshra  families or families of persons professing  Hindu religion  governed  by Mitakshra law and thus it  could  not include  a Christian undivided family although  governed  by Hindu  law.  The Calcutta High Court in the  judgment  under appeal, however, did not consider that the Mysore High Court was  right in holding that s. 3 of the Act was limited  only to Mitakshra families.  It may be pointed out that so far as Income tax law is concerned the expression ’Hindu  undivided family’  has been held to have reference to all  schools  of Hindu  law and not one school only. [See Kalyani Vithal  Das v. Commissioner of Income tax(1)]. The  real  question for determination is  whether  the  word ’Hindu’  preceding  the words ’undivided  family’  signifies that the undivided family should be of those (i) who profess Hindu religion; or (ii) to whom Hindu law applies; or  (iii) who  though  not professing Hindu religion have come  to  be regarded as Hindu undivided family by judicial decisions and legislative  practice.  It may be mentioned that for a  long time  the courts and particularly the Privy Council seem  to have taken the view that Jains are of Hindu origin; they are Hindu  dissenters  and although generally  adhering  to  the ordinary  Hindu  Law  they  do  not  recognise  any   divine authority  of  the Vedas nor do they practice  a  number  of ceremonies observed by the Hindus.  But the modern trend  of authority   is  against  the  view  that  Jains  are   Hindu dissenters.    As  a  result  of  comparative  research   in Hinduism,  Jainism  and Buddhism, it is  being  emphatically claimed  that the theory that Jains are Hindu dissenters  is based on a misreading of the ancient authorities relating to these religions (See C. R. Jain-Jain Law’-pp. 3-23 and 21,9- 258).  One of the early decisions in which Jains were stated to  be  of Hindu origin being Hindu dissenters  is  that  of Westropp  C.J.  in Bhagwandas Tejmal v. Rajmal  ( 2  ).  The learned  Chief  Justice  based his view  on  high  authority including the researches of Mr. Mountstuart Elphintone, Late Col.   Mackenzie  (9th  Vol.  of  the  Asiatic   Researches, including,  the  essay  of Mr. Cole Brooke on  the  Sect  of Jainas), the work of Abbe Dubois on the Manners etc. of  the

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People of India and tile elaborate account of the Jain  sect in the First Volume of Prof.  H. H. Wilson’s work.  He  also referred to certain decisions of the Sudder Divan Adault  in Calcutta  and the High Court of Calcutta, in  particular  to the  opinion  of Peacock C.J. in Lola  Mohabeer  Pershad  v. Musammut Kundar Koover(3). (2)  (1873) 10 Bom.  HCR 241. (1)  L.R. 64 I.A. 28. (3) 8 Cal.  W. Rep. 116 Civ.  Rul. 124 The following passage from the judgment of Westropp C.J.  is noteworthy :               "The term Hindu or Gentu, when used in Regula-               tions  Act,  Statutes, and Charters  in  which               Hindus  or Gentus have been declared  entitled               to the benefit of their own law or  succession               and   of  contract,  has  been   largely   and               liberally construed.  See the remarks at pages               184, 185, 186, 5 Bom.  High C. Reports  (Lopes               v.  Lopes),  where  Sir  Edward  Hyde   East’s               evidence  in 1830 before the House  of  Lords’               Committee  is  mentioned, in which  he  stated               that Sikhs were treated as a sect of Hindus or               Gentus of which they were a dissenting branch.               The  authorities.  already quoted,  show  that               Jainas are regarded as a sect of Hindus." Out  of the decisions of the Privy Council, we  may  mention Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj(1) in which their lordships relied  on the statement in Mayne’s Hindu law and Usage that Jains  are of  Hindu  origin; they are Hindu  dissenters  and  although "generally adhering to ordinary Hindu law, that is, the  law of  the  three  superior castes, they  recognise  no  divine authority  in the Vedas and do not practice the  Shradha  or ceremonies for the dead". The  above view has been challenged by Jain  historians  and writers and it has been maintained that the Jains are  quite distinct  from Hindus and have a separate code of law  which unfortunately  was not brought to the notice of the  courts. Kumaraswami  Sastri, Officiating Chief  Justice,  delivering the judgment of the Bench in Bobbaradi Gateppa v.  Bobbaladi Eramma  & Others(2) elaborately discussed the contrary  view and observed that if the matter were res Integra he would be inclined  to hold that modem research had shown  that  Jains were not Hindu dissenters but that Jainism had an origin and history long anterior to Smritis and commentaries which were recognised authorities of Hindu law and usage. Mr.  C. R. Jain in his work "Jain Law" written in  1926  has discussed the findings of various Orientalists subsequent to those mentioned in the judgment of Westropp C.J. and has put forward  the thesis that Hinduism and Jainism were  parallel creeds though they shared the same form of social order  and mode  of  living.  Jain Law was quite independent  of  Hindu law.  According to him the Courts had tried on each occasion to  ascertain  the Jain Law but  unfortunately  for  various reasons Jains concealed their Shastras and objected to their production in Courts.  He has emphasised that Jain Law which is found in the available books should still be applied  and the error which has crept in the matter (1) A.I.R 1927 Mad. 228. (2)  A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 228. 125 of  Jains being governed by Hindu Law should  be  rectified. Since 1926 there have been several enactments apart from the codification of certain major Branches of Hindu law which in express  terms  have  been made applicable  to  Jains.   The

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course suggested by C. R. Jain cannot possibly be,  followed particularly in the presence of statutory enactments. In Panna Lal & Others v. Sitabai(1), Hidayatullah J. (as  he then  was)  delivering the judgment of  the  Division  Bench observed  that it was too, late in the day to  contend  that "Jains’  are  not  included in the  term  "Hindus"  for  the purposes  of law.  He referred to Mayne’s Hindu law as  also the leading cases on the point apart from West and  Buhler’s Hindu Law (4th Edn.), Gopal Chandra Sarkar’s Hindu Law  (7th Edn.) and Hari Singh Gour’s Hindu Code (4th Edn.). All these are  acknowledged authorities and the conclusion  which  was derived  not  only from the statements  contained  in  their works on Hindu law but also from decided cases was that  the Jains were to be regarded as Hindus for the purposes of  law though  they seem to dissent from some of the principles  of orthodox  Hinduism.  In the Nagpur case the  question  which was being considered was whether The Hindu Women’s Right  to Property Act 1937 was meant to apply to Jains as well or  to Hindus  proper.  It was in that connection that the-  extent to  which  Jains were governed by Hindu law or  were  to  be treated  as  Hindus  for purposes of that law  came  up  for discussion.   The following passage may be  reproduced  with advantage :-               "The legislature must be taken to be aware  of               the  pronouncements  of the Privy  Council  as               well  as the leading decisions of  the  Indian               High Courts where a liberal interpretation was               given  to the term ’Hindu’.  We do  not  think               that  the  Legislature used the  term  without               advertence   to  these  dicta  and,   in   our               judgment,  the Legislature must be  deemed  to               have  used  the term "Hindu’  in  that  larger               sense  which  has been explained by  Mayne  at               page  5 of his treatise in the passage  quoted               by  us  elsewhere  and  which  has  been   the               foundation of decisions on the subject in  the               courts of India". It  may be mentioned that the statement from  Mayne’s  Hindu Law  referred to above is the same which was relied upon  by the Privy Council in Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj (2) We  may  next  notice certain decisions in  which  the  word ’Hindu’  as used in various statutes came to be  interpreted by  the Courts.  In Kamawati v. Digbijai Singh(3) s. 331  of the Indian (1)  I.L.R. 1954 Nagpur 30. (3) [1921] P.C. 77. (2) A.I.R. 1922 P.C.14. 126 Succession  Act  1865 had to be interpreted.   According  to that section the provisions of that Act were not to apply to intestate or testamentary succession to the property of  any Hindu.   It was held that the person who had ceased to be  a Hindu in religion and had become a Christian could not elect to  be  bound by the Hindu Law in the matter  of  succession after  the passing of the Indian Succession Act and  that  a Hindu  convert to Christianity was solely governed  by  that Act.   In  other  words, according to the  Privy  Council  a person  who had ceased to be a Hindu by religion was  not  a Hindu within the meaning of s. 331 of the aforesaid Act.  It was held in Bachebi v. Makhan Lal & Another(1) that the term ’Hindu’ in s. 331 of the Indian Succession Act 1865 included a Jain and consequently in matters of succession Jains  were not  governed  by  that Act.  It was pointed  out  that  the ordinary Hindu law of Inheritance was to be applied to jains in the absence of proof of custom or usage varying that law.

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The Privy Council in Bhagwan Koer v. J. C. Bose & Others  (2 )  expressed the view that a Sikh was a ’Hindu’  within  the meaning  of  that term as used in S. 2 of  the  Probate  and Administration Act 1881.  It was pointed out that the Courts had always acted upon the premise that Sikhs were Hindus and that Hindu Law applied to them in the same way as it applied to Jains in the absence of custom varying that Law.  It  was observed :               "It  appears  to their Lordships to  be  clear               that in s. 331 the term "Hindu’ is used in the               same wide sense as   in  earlier   enactments,               and  includes  Sikhs. if it be  not  so,  then               Sikhs   were,   and   are,   in   matters   of               inheritance,  governed by the Succession  Act,               and Act based upon, and in the main embodying,               the English law; and it could not be seriously               suggested  that such was the intention of  the               legislature". In  Ambalal v. Keshav Bandhochand Gujar ( 3 )  the  question was whether Jains were governed by Hindu law of  Inheritance (Amendment)  Act 1929 which applied to all persons  governed by Mitakshara as modified by the Mayukha.  It was argued  in that case that the Indian Succession (Amendment) Act of 1929 speaks  of Jains as well as Hindus and ss. 4 and 57  of  the Indian  Succession  Act 1925 also did the same.   The  Court pointed  out that s. 331 of the Indian Succession  Act  1865 did not make any separate mention of Jains and even then  it had  been  held that the term ’Hindu’ included  Jains.   The Hindu  Wills  Act of 1870 which applied to  the  territories under  the Lt.  Governor of Bengal and the cities of  Bombay and Madras no doubt mentioned Jains as well as Hindus  being governed by certain sections of the (1) I.L.R. 3 All. 55.                (2) I.L.R. 31 Cal.  11. (3)  I.L.R. 1941 Bom. 250. 127 Succession  Act of 1865 and the Indian Succession  Act  1925 was  a  commodating Act which repealed the previous  Act  of 1865 as well as Hindu Wills Act of 1870.  It was, therefore, probably  thought necessary ex-majore cautela to  separately mention the Jains in the consolidating measure.  However, in all  the other enactments affecting the Hindu Law there  was no  separate  mention of Jains along with the  Hindus.   The Jains  were,  therefore,  governed  by  the  Hindu  Law   of Inheritance  (Amendment)  Act 1929.  The  mention  of  Jains separately in Article 25 of the Constitution was noticed  in Pannalal v. Sita Bai(1) and it was observed that the framers of  the Constitution felt, having regard to the  differences in  the two faiths that an express mention might be made  of all faiths ex-abundanti cautela and to put the matter beyond all  controversy,  and that faith is one thing  and  law  is another  and  the Constitution could not be  taken  to  have undone the long series of decisions on the subject.   Before the  amendment and codification of major branches  of  Hindu law by the four statutes, i.e. The Hindu Marriage Act  1955, the  Hindu  Succession  Act 1956,  the  Hindu  Minority  and Guardianship  Act 1956, the Hindu Adoption  and  Maintenance Act,  1956, the undisputed position was that the Jains  were governed  by  the Hindu law modified by custom  and  a  Jain joint family was a Hindu joint family with all the incidents attached  to  such  a  family  under  the  Hindu  law.   The legislative  practice also was to generally treat  Jains  as included   in   the  term  ’Hindu’  in   various   statutory enactments.   Wherever Jains were mentioned in  addition  it was  only by way of abundant caution.  The new statutes  did not change the situation and it is not possible how the High

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Court in the judgment under appeal pressed them into service in  support  of  its  view.   The  fallacy  underlying   the reasoning of the High Court is that the artificial field  of application of the law in those statutes shows that  Jainism is not treated even as a form or a development of  Hinduism. That  is an erroneous approach.  We are not  concerned  with the  question  whether Jains are a sect of Hindus  or  Hindu dissenters.   Even if the religions are different,  what  is common  is  that  all those who are to be  governed  by  the provisions  of  these enactments are included  in  the  term ’Hindu’.  They are to be governed by the same rules relating to  marriage, succession, minority,  guardianship,  adoption and  maintenance  as  Hindus.   The  statutes  thus   accord legislative  recognition to the fact that even though  Jains may not be Hindus by religion they are to be governed by the same  laws  as the Hindus.  In this view of the  matter  the expression  ’Hindu undivided family’ Will certainly  include the ’Jain undivided family’.  The latter class of  family is not  known  to  law.   The Jains are  governed  by  all  the incidents  relating  to  the  Hindu  joint  family.    Hindu undivided (1)  I.L.R.1954 Nagpur 30. 128 family  is  a legal expression which has  been  employed  in taxation  laws.  It has a definite connotation and  embodies the meaning ascribed to the expression ’Hindu joint family’. For the above reasons the appeal is allowed and the question referred  is answered in favour of the Revenue  and  against the  assessee.  There will be no order as to costs  in  this Court.   The  appeal  by  Certificate  (CA  1686/68)   being defective for want of reasons is her-by dismissed. K.B.N.                                   Appeal allowed. 129