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PETITIONER: COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH-TAX

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. HASHMATUNNISA BEGUM

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/01/1989

BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) PATHAK, R.S. (CJ)

CITATION:  1989 AIR 1024            1989 SCR  (1) 155  1989 SCC  Supl.  (2)  43 JT 1989 (1)    92  1989 SCALE  (1)85

ACT:     Wealth  Tax  Act, 1957: Section  4(1)(a)  Proviso-Wealth tax-Assets  transferred by way  of  gift--Exemption--Whether gifts made before assessment year commencing after March 31, 1964  entitled to benefit of exemption--For  any  assessment year commencing after March 31, 1964  Interpretation of.     Statutory   Interpretation:  Literal  rule--Meaning   of statute   is   plain--Court   must   apply   regardless   of result--Court  not entitled to read statute in  another  way anxious to avoid its unconstitutionality. Words and Phrases: ’Interpretation’--’Construction"--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     In Civil Appeal No. 1118 of 1975 the  respondent--asses- see’s husband gifted certain lands and buildings to his  two spouses  by three gift deeds dated 26.4.1962, 26.5.1962  and 17.8.1962.  The gifts were chargeable to gift-tax  and  were accordingly  assessed  to gift-tax In  the  assessment  year 1963-64.     In  the  proceedings-for assessment to  wealth  for  the assessment  year  1967-68, it was claimed on behalf  of  the estate  of  the assessee’s husband, who had  later  died  on 16.12.1968  that as the gifts were chargeable  to  gift-tax, the  proviso to s. 4(1)(a) was attracted and the  assets  so transferred  were  not includible in the net wealth  of  the deceased  for any assessment year commencing after the  31st day  of  March, 1964. The Wealth Tax Officer  rejected  this claim.  On  appeal,  the  Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner confirmed  the assessment. Allowing the  assessee’s  further appeal, the Appellate Tribunal, on a particular construction of the proviso, held that the assets transferred, which  had attracted gift-tax, were not includible in the net wealth of the deceased for the assessment year 1964-65 onwards.     On  a reference made at the Instant of the Revenue,  the High Court agreed with the construction placed on the provi- so by the Tribunal. The Revenue filed an appeal, by  Special leave In this Court. 156     The  appellant-assessee  in Civil Appeal Nos.  1226  and 1227  of  1975, made a gift of certain amount to  her  minor

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daughter  on 7.10.1959. The assets so transferred  were  in- cluded in the assessee’s wealth for the two assessment years 1964-65  and 1965-66 under s. 4(1)(a)(ii) of the  Wealth-tax Act.  The  claim  of the assessee that  the  proviso  to  s. 4(I)(a) operated to exclude the asset from the net wealth of the assessee as the transfer was chargeable to gift-tax  was not  accepted by the Wealth-tax Officer. The  Appellate  As- sistant Commissioner rejected the assessee’s appeal.     However,  the Appellate Tribunal, accepting the  conten- tion of the assessee, allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that, on a true construction of the proviso, so long as  the gift  was chargeable to or exempt under s. 5 from  gift-tax, to  that extent s. 4(1)(a) ceased to have operation and  the statutory fiction embodied in it was not attracted and  that since, the gift was chargeable to gift-tax, at the  relevant time, the exemption was to operate from the assessment  year commencing after 31-3-1964.     The  High Court, on a reference made at the instance  of the Revenue reversed the Tribunal’s view. Hence, the  asses- see filed the appeal, by certificate, in this Court.     In  the appeals before this Court, it was  submitted  on behalf  of  the Revenue that the words "for  any  assessment year commencing after the 31st day of March, 1964" could, in the context only refer to the gift and gift-tax assessments, that only that class of gifts which were chargeable to  gift tax  for  any  assessment year 1964-65  or  thereafter  (hut subject to the time limit fixed by the 1971 amendment) which would otherwise fail under s. 4(1)(a) were eligible for  the benefit of exemption, and that where the enactment was clear and  admitted of only one meaning, and did not admit of  two or more meanings, it would be the plain meaning that  should be  given effect to and no resort could be had to any  rules of  construction  which would denude the  provision  of  its plain and ordinary meaning.     On  behalf of the assessees, it was contended  that  the date of the’ gift was immaterial and as long as the transfer was chargeable to gift tax or was exempted under s. 5  what- ever may be the year in which the gift was made, the  exemp- tion  from a gift-tax must commence for any assessment  year commencing  after  the 31st day of March 1964",  that  these words  should not be read as part of the first part  of  the proviso relating to gift-tax assessments but as part of  the second part denoting the commencement of the operation  from Wealth-tax,  and  that  a construction  which  promoted  its constitutionality has to be preferred to the 157 one which, if accepted, would expose the proviso to the vice of discrimination and unconstitutionality.     Allowing  the appeal of the Revenue and  dismissing  the appeal of the assessee.     HELD: 1. On a reading of the plain words of the  proviso to  s. 4(1)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, the clause  "for any  assessment  year commencing after 31st  day  of  March, 1964" can only be read as relating to gift-tax  assesssments and not to the wealth-tax assessments. [165E]     The amendment introducing the proviso was brought  about by an amending Act of 1964, but the date of the commencement of its operation was left to be fixed by a Notification.  If the  construction that the clause should be read as part  of the second part, denoting the commencement of the  operation of  exemption  from Wealth tax is accepted,  effect  of  the Notification  issued bringing the proviso into  effect  from 1.4.1965  would be wholly ignored, and the  introduction  of the  words  "but before the 1st day of April,  1972",  by  a later  amendment would operate to take away the  benefit  of

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the exemption after 1.4.1972 and the exemption confined only to the assessment years between 1964-65 and 1972-73.  [165C- D]     Therefore,  the gifts in question though  chargeable  to gift-tax  would  not attract the benefit  of  exemption  and would  be  liable to be included in the net  wealth  of  the assessees. [163A]     T. Saraswathi Achi v. C.I.T., 104 ITR 195 (Mad);  C.W.T. v.  Seth Nand Lal Ganeriwala, 107 ITR 758 (Pun.); M.G.  Kol- lankulam  v.  C.I.T., ITR 160 (Kerala),  Malti  Harseey   v. C.W.T.,  12 ITR 676 (MP) and C.W.T. v. Rasesh  N.  Mafatlal, 126 ITR 173 (Bom) approved.     2.1 One of the pillars of statutory interpretation viz., the literalrule, demands that if the meaning of the Statuto- ry Interpretation is plain, the Courts must apply regardless of the result. [165G]     2.2  The  very concept of  interpretation  connotes  the introduction of elements which are necessarily extrinsic  to the words in the statute. Though the words  "Interpretation" and  "construction"  are used interchangeably, the  idea  is somewhat different. [165H]      2.3  The  rule of construction that  if  the  statutory provision is susceptible or admits of two reasonably  possi- ble views, then the one 158 which  would  promote its constitutionality should  be  pre- ferred on the ground that the legislature is presumed not to have intended an excess of its own jurisdiction, is  subject to the further rule that it applies only where two views are reasonably possible on the statutory language. If the  words of  the statute, on a proper construction, can be read  only in  a particular way, then it cannot be read in another  way by a court of construction anxious to avoid its  unconstitu- tionality. [166G-H]     2.4  In a case, as here, where a reference arises  under ’Act’,  the  question of the constitutionality  of  the  Act cannot  be examined and pronounced upon by this Court.  That is  the task of the Court in judicial-review.  However,  the rule of preference of a particular construction amongst  the alternatives,  in  order to  avoid  unconstitutionality,  is unavailable in the instant case. [166H; 167A, F]     3.  In a taxing measure, the legislature enjoys a  wider latitude  and its dispensations are based on an  interaction of  diverse  economic,  social  and  policy  considerations. Further, if the proviso is bad for discrimination, it  would follow  that  the converse situation brought  about  by  the later  amendment, a discrimination as between gifts made  as between the 31st of March, 1972 and on 1st April, 1972 might also become bad. This Court is required to notice the provi- sion as it stood at the relevant time. [167D-E]     State  of Punjab v. Prem Sukhdas, [1977] 3 SCR  408  and Attorney  General  v. Carlton Bank, [1899] 2 Q.B.  158,  re- ferred to.     Dr.  Patrick Devlin: Samples of Law Making--Oxford  Uni- versity Press, p. 70-71 and Max Radin "Statutory Interpreta- tion" 43 Hat. L.R. 863 (868), referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL   APPELLATE   JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal  No.  11 IS(NT) of 1975. WITH Civil Appeal Nos, 1226 & 1227(NT) of 1975.     From the Judgment and Order dated 18.9.1974 and 11.10.74

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of  the  Andhra  Pradesh and Calcutta High  Court.  In  case referred No. 15 of 1973 and matter No. 7 10 of 1970  respec- tively     B.B.  Ahuja, Ms. A. Subhashini, K.C. Dua for the  Appel- lant in C.A. No. 1118 of 1975. 159     Harish N. Salve, Vivek Gambhir and Preveen Kumar for the Appellant in C.A. No. 1226-27 of 1975. A. Subba Rao for the Respondent in C.A. No. 1118 of 1975. B.B.  Ahuja,  K.C. Dua and Miss. A. Subhashini for  the  Re- spondent in C.A. Nos. 1226-27 of 1975. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     VENKATACHALIAH,  J-  Civil Appeal No.  1118/NT/1975,  by special  leave,  by the Commissioner of  Wealth-tax,  Andhra Pradesh, and CA Nos. 1226 & 1227/NT/1975, on a  certificate, under  Sec. 29(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, (Act) by  the assessee  raise a question as to the proper construction  of the  proviso to Sec. 4(1)(a) of the Act, which provides  for exemption  respecting transferred assets which would  other- wise be includible in the wealth of the assessee under  sec. 4(1)(a) of the Act.     The  condition for the grant of the exemption under  the proviso is that the transfer of the asset is either  charge- able  to gift-tax or is not chargeable under sec. 5  of  the Gift-tax  Act, 1958. The particular point for  consideration is whether, on the language of the proviso, the exemption is attracted  only to such gifts as were chargeable to tax  for any assessment year commencing "after the 31st day of March, 1964,"  as  understood by the Revenue or whether  the  gifts even made earlier would attract the benefit of the exemption as claimed by the assessees.     2. There appears a divergence of judicial opinion on the point  in  the High Courts. In C.W.T. v.  Smt.  Sarala  Debi Birla, 101 ITR 488 (Cal.); T. Saraswathi Achi v. C.I.T., 104 ITR 185 (Mad.); C.W.T. v. Seth Nand Lal Ganeriwala, 107  ITR 758 (Pun.); M.G. Kollankulam v. C.I.T., 115 ITR 160 (Kerala) Malti  Harseey  v.  C.W.T., 12 ITR 676 (MP)  and  C.W.T.  v. Rasesh  N. Mafatlal, 126 ITR 173 (Bom)  several  High-Courts have construed the provision in the manner suggested by  the Revenue. C.W.T. v. Hashmatunnisa Begum, 108 ITR 98 (AP)  has taken  the  opposite view extending a wider benefit  of  the exemption.     The  opinion of the Calcutta High Court in  1011TR  488, which is representative of the view in favour of Revenue, is under appeal in CA 1226 and 1227 of 1985 and the opinion  of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in 108 ITR 98 which is favour- able to the assessee is under appeal 160 No. CA 1118 of 1975 preferred by the Revenue.     3.  In CA 1118 of 1975 the assessee  Smt.  Hashmatunnisa Begam, the legal representative of the late Nawab Zabeer Yar Jung  Bahadur,  claimed in respect of  the  assessment  year 1967-68,  that the value of the immovable properties  gifted by  the late Nawab to his wives before 1.4. 1964 should  not be included in the net wealth of the Nawab as on the  valua- tion  dated 31.9.1966. The Nawab under three deeds  of  gift one dated 25.5.1962, in favour of Smt. Hashmatunnisa  Begum, his  first  wife, and two other deeds  dated  17.8.1962  and 26.4.1962, in favour of Smt. Fareed Jehan Begum his  second- wife, gifted in their favour certain lands and buildings  of a total value of Rs. 1,96,950. The gifts were chargeable  to gift-tax  and were accordingly assessed to gift-tax  in  the assessment  year  1963-64. On behalf of the  estate  of  the Nawab--who  later dies on 16.12.1968--it was claimed in  the proceedings for assessment to wealth for the Assessment Year

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1967-68. That though the gifts were otherwise includible  as belonging to the Nawab under sec. 4(I)(a)(i), as the  trans- fers made to the spouses otherwise than for adequate consid- eration,  however, as the gifts were chargeable to  gifttax, the  proviso  to  sec. 4(I)(a) was attracted  and  that  the assets so transferred were not includible in the net  wealth of the Nawab "for any assessment year commencing after the 3 1st day of March 1964". The Wealth-tax Officer rejected this claim.  The Appellate Asst. Commissioner, in the  assessee’s appeal, confirmed the assessment. In the assessee’s  further appeal  before  the Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal,  on  a particular  construction of the proviso, allowed the  appeal and  held that the assets transferred, which  had  attracted gift-tax, were not includible in the net wealth of the Nawab for the assessment year 1964-65 onwards. At the instance  of the  Revenue, the following question of law was referred  to the High Court for its opinion:               "Whether,  on  the facts and  in  the  circum-               stances of the case, the assessee was entitled               to  exclude,  under  the  proviso  to  section               4(1)(a) of Wealth-Tax Act, 1957, the value  of               the assets gifted to his wives in the  Wealth-               tax  assessment for the assessment year  1967-               68?" The  High Court agreed with the construction placed  on  the proviso  by  the Tribunal and answered the question  in  the affirmative and against the revenue. The revenue has come up in appeal by special leave.     4.  In  CA 1226 and 1227 of 1975  the  assessment  years concerned  are   1964-65 and 1965-66  corresponding  to  the valuation dates 161 31.3. 1964 and 31.3.1965. On 7.10.1959 Smt. Sarladevi Birla, the  assessee,  made  a gift of Rs.l,O0,011,  to  her  minor daughter  Smt. Manju Rani Birla. The assets  so  transferred were  included in the assessee’s wealth for the two  assess- ment years 1964-65 and 1965-66 under sec. 4(I)(a)(ii) of the Wealth-tax  Act. The claim of the assessee that the  proviso to  sec. 4(I)(a) operated to exclude the asset from the  net wealth  of  the assessee as the transfer was  chargeable  to gift-tax  was  not accepted by the Wealth-tax  Officer,  who completed the assessment including the transferred-asset  in the assessee’s net-wealth. The assessee’s appeal before  the Appellate Asst. Commissioner was unsuccessful.     However, the Appellate Tribunal accepted the  contention of  the assessee and by its appellate order dated  11.5.1970 allowed  the assessee’s appeal holding that on a  true  con- struction of the proviso, so long as the gift was chargeable to or exempt under sec. 5 from gift-tax to that extent  sec. 4(I)(a)  ceased to have operation and the statutory  fiction embodied in it was not attracted and that as at the relevant time the gift was chargeable to gift-tax. The exemption  was to  operate  from  the  assessment  year  commencing   after 31.3.1964.  At  the instance of the revenue,  the  Appellate Tribunal  referred  the following question of  law  for  the opinion of the High court:               "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances               of the case and on a proper interpretation  of               section  4(1)(a)  of  the  Wealth-tax  Act  as               amended  by  the Wealth-tax  (Amendment)  Act,               (Act  46)  of 1964, the sum  of  Rs.  1,00,011               gifted  by the assessee to her minor  daughter               could   be  included  in  computing  her   net               wealth"?   The  High Court of Calcutta in reversal of the view  taken

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by the Tribunal answered the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee has come up in appeal  by certificate.     5.  We have heard Shri B.B. Ahuja, learned  counsel  for the  revenue and Shri Harish Salve and Shri Subba  Rao,  for the assessees.     The  controversy generated on the point leading  to  the divergence  of  the  judicial opinion on the  point  is  at- tributable  to  the  somewhat  inelegant  and  inappropriate phraseology  of  the provision. To appreciate  the  relevant contentions  it  is  necessary to notice the  words  of  the proviso: 162               "Provided  that  where the  transfer  of  such               assets  or any part thereof is either  charge-               able  to gift-tax under the Gift-tax Act  1958               (18  of  1958),  or is  not  chargeable  under               Section 5 of that Act, for any assessment year               commencing after the 3 1st day of March, 1964,               (but  before the 1st day of April, 1972),  the               value  of such assets or part thereof, as  the               case may be, shall not be included in  comput-               ing the net wealth of the individual;" The  words  "but before the 1st day April  1972"  was  later introduced by the Financee (No. 2) Act 1971 with effect from 1.4. 1972.     This  was  introduced by the amending Act of  1964,  but given effect to from 1.4.1965 by the notification. Under the various clauses of Sec. 4(1)(a) certain transfers of  assets made  by an individual in favour or for the benefit  of  the spouse  or a minor child, not being a married  daughter,  of such  individual, are required to be ignored and the  trans- ferred-assets  included  in the wealth of the  assessee,  as belonging  to him. Section 4(1)(a) aims at foiling an  indi- vidual’s  attempt  to  avoid or reducing  the  incidence  to wealth tax by transferring the assets to or for the  benefit of  the spouse or the minor child of the individual  by  re- quiring the inclusion of such transferred assets in  comput- ing the net wealth of the individual.     However,  the  proviso makes the  provision  inoperative where  and  in  so far as the transferred  asset  is  either chargeable  to gift-tax under or is exempt under sec.  5  of the  Gift-tax  Act. The controversy surrounds  the  question whether  the expression "for any assessment year  commencing after  31st  day of March 1964", occurring  in  the  proviso should  be read with the first part and as referring to  the eligibility of the gifts for exemption with reference to the point  of time at which the gifts were made or whether  that expression  does not condition the identity of the  eligible gifts  but only signifies the starting point for the  exemp- tion from wealth tax. Assessees contend that the date of the gift is immaterial and as long as the transfer is chargeable to  gifttax or is exempt under sec. 5,--whatever may be  the year  in which the gift was made,--the exemption from  gift- tax must commences "for any assessment year commencing after the 31st day of March 1964".     If  the expression "for any assessment  year  commencing after  the 31st day of March, 1964" is intended  to  qualify and  determine the gifts, the subject-matters of  which  are eligible for exemption, then the literal construction, would be that the gifts made earlier to that period, 163 though chargeable to gift-tax would not attract the  benefit of exemption. But the assessees say that the clause must  be read as part of the second part of the proviso which contem-

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plates the exemption. So read, the clause would qualify  the commencement  of  the benefit of the exemption and  not  the point  of  time when the Gift is required to be made  to  be eligible  for  the exemption from  wealth-tax.  The  learned Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the course  of the Judgment under appeal in CA 1118 of 1975 observed:                         " .....  The words ’for any  assess-               ment  year  commencing after the 31st  day  of               March, 1964’ are referrable to the  assessment               to  be  made under the  Wealth-tax  Act.  They               render  the  provisions  of  section   4(1)(a)               inoperative  irrespective of the fact  whether               the transferred asset was chargeable to  gift-               tax or not chargeable to gift-tax. The proviso               specifies  the period of exemption  upto  31st               March,  1964. Irrespective of the year of  the               gifts  when the assets were gifted, they  will               not be included in the computation of the  net               wealth  of the individual till the  assessment               year  1964-65. We are, therefore, of the  view               that the intention of Parliament was to exempt               transfers  made under clauses (i) to  (iv)  of               section 4(1)(a) from being computed in the net               wealth  of the individual upto the  wealth-tax               assessment year commencing after 3 1st day  of               March, 1964  .....  "     7.  Sri Ahuja submitted that the words "for any  assess- ment  year commencing after the 31st day of 1964" could,  in the  context,  only refer to the gift and  gift-tax  assess- ments. The proviso, he said, which was introduced by way  of an  amendment,  was  brought into  force  with  effect  from 1.4.1965 by a notification which specified the  commencement of  the operation of the proviso and that, quite  obviously, it would be redundant to read the clause under consideration as  again referring to the commencement of the operation  of the proviso. While the clause under consideration related to and qualified the Gift tax assessments, the commencement  of the exemption of the subjectmatter of the Gifts for purposes of wealth-tax was controlled and determined by the commence- ment of the operation of the proviso, which, by notification was specified as 1.4.1965.     Sri  Ahuja  submitted that the proviso was  intended  to effectuate the legislative policy that in respect of certain gifts made in favour of a spouse or a minor child, during  a specified  period,  the assets transferred under  the  Gifts would have the benefit of exemption from the 164 operation of Section 4(1)(a). This was because the  legisla- ture  took  into consideration that  from  1.4.1964  onwards there  was a sharp ascent in the rates of gift-tax-and  that the  assets  which constituted the subject  matter  of  such gifts attracting such high rates of gift-tax should not also be  included in the net-wealth of the donor  for  wealth-tax purposes  which  would otherwise be  the  consequence  under Section 4(1)(a) of the Act. As the proviso originally stood, gifts  chargeable to gift-tax for any assessment  year  com- mencing  after 3 1st March, 1964, attracted the  benefit  of exemption.  The outer limit for the period of such  eligible gifts was later fixed by the amendment made by Finance  (No. 2)  Act,  1971, w.e.f. 1.4.1972 which introduced  the  words ’but  before the 1st day of April, 1972’.  Accordingly,  Sri Ahuja  contends  that  only that class of  gifts  that  were chargeable  to gift-tax for any assessment year  1964-65  or thereafter  (but  subject  to the limit fixed  by  the  1971 amendment) which would otherwise fall under Section  4(1)(a)

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were eligible for the benefit of the exemption. According to Sri  Ahuja the plain words of the proviso leave no room  for doubt  and where the enactment is clear and admits  of  only one  meaning and does not admit of two or more meanings,  it would  be the plain meaning that should be given effect  to. When the meaning is plain, says counsel, no resort could  be had  to  any rules of construction which  would  denude  the provision of its plain and ordinary meaning.     8. Sri Harish Salve presenting the case of the assessees sought  to  point  out the intrinsic anomaly  of  the  cases between  a  gift made, say, on 3 1st of March 1963  and  one made the very next-day i.e. 1st of April, 1963 on the other, to show that while in the first case even for the assessment year  1965-66  the transferred asset is  includible  in  the wealth of the assessee, in the latter case it is exempt  for all  time  to come thereafter. Learned counsel  pointed  out that the criterion of higher rates of Gift-tax as a justifi- cation  supporting the classification also fails in view  of the  fact  that under the proviso it is not only  the  gifts chargeable  to tax but also those exempt under sec.  5  that attract the exemption with the result that between two gifts which are both exempt under sec. 5 of the Gift-tax Act,  one is for ever exempt from wealth-tax in the hands of the donor while the other is includible in his wealth for purposes  of wealth-tax depending solely on the criterion of the date  of gift--whether the gift was made prior to 31st March 1963  or thereafter. Here the criterion of classification of gifts on the  basis of the exigibility for higher rates of tax,  says Sri  Salve, collapses and the cut-off date  determining  the difference  in  consequences in the two different  class  of cases  become wholly arbitrary. Shri Salve submitted that  a construction which promotes its constitutionality has to  be pre- 165 ferred  to  the  one which, if accepted,  would  expose  the provision to the vice of discrimination and  unconstitution- ality.     The  essential basis of Sri Salve’s suggested  construc- tion  rests on the requirement that the words "for  any  as- sessment  year commencing after the 31st day of March  1964" should not be read as part of the first part of the  proviso relating  to gift-tax assessments but as part of the  second part denoting the commencement of the operation of exemption from wealth-tax.     9.  This,  we are afraid, will imboggle  itself  in  the quagmire  of irreconcilable  constructional  contradictions. The  amendment introducing the proviso was brought about  by an amending Act of 1964; but the date of the commencement of its  operation was left to be fixed by a  Notification.  The effect of the Notification issued bringing the proviso  into effect  from  1.4.1965 would be wholly ignored by  the  con- struction suggested by Sri Salve. Secondly, the introduction of the words "but before the 1st day of April, 1972"  would, if  the  construction suggested by Sri  Salve  is  accepted, operate  to  take away the benefit of  the  exemption  after 1.4.1972  and the exemption confined only to the  assessment years between 1964-65 and 1972-73. On a reading of the plain words  of the proviso, the clause "for any  assessment  year commencing  after 31st day of March, 1964" can only be  read as  relating to gift-tax assessments and not to the  wealth- tax assessments.     10. But, Sri Salve contends that this literal  construc- tion would expose the provision to an attack on its  consti- tutionality on the ground that it brings about a discrimina- tion  between two classes of assessees on nothing more  than

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an arbitrary cut off date. The cases of gifts exempted under sec.  5, he says, illustrate the point as according  to  Sri Salve  there could be no rational basis  for  discriminating between  a gift exempted under sec. 5 made on  31.3.1963  on the one hand and 1.4.1963 on the other.     11. One of the pillars of statutory interpretation viz., the literalrule, demands that if the meaning of the Statuto- ry Interpretation is plain and the Courts must apply regard- less of the result.     12.  The  very concept of  interpretation  connotes  the introduction of elements which are necessarily extrinsic  to the  words in the statue. Though the words  "interpretation" and  "construction"  are used interchangeably, the  idea  is somewhat different. Dr. Patrick Devlin says: 166               "   .....   A better word, I think,  would  be               construction,  because construction,  although               one often used it alternatively with interpre-               tation, suggests that something more is  being               got  out  in the elucidation  of  the  subject               matter  than can be got by strict  interpreta-               tion of the words used. In the very full sense               of the word ’construction’ the judges have set               themselves in this branch of the law to try to               frame  the  law  as they would  like  to  have               it  .....  ".               [See: Samples of Law Making--Oxford University               Press--p.70-71]     "A  statute" says Max Radin "is neither a literary  text nor  a divine revelation. Its effect is, therefore,  neither an  expression laid on immutable emotional over-tones nor  a permanent  creation of infallible wisdom. It is a  statement of  situation or rather a group of possible events within  a situation  and  as such it is essentially  ambiguous."  [See "Statutory Interpretation"--43 Har. L.R. 863 (868)].     The observations of Lord Russel of Killowen in  Attorney General  v. Carlton Bank, [1899] 2 Q.B. 158 though an  early pronouncement, is refreshing from its broad common-sense:                         "I see no reason why special  canons               of  construction should be applied to any  Act               of Parliament, and I know of no authority  for               saying  that a Taxing Act is to  be  construed               differently  from any other Act. The  duty  of               the Court is, in my opinion, in all cases  the               same, whether the Act to be construed  relates               to taxation or to any other subject, namely to               give  effect to the intention of the  Legisla-               ture, as that intention is to be gathered from               the  language employed, having regard  to  the               context  in  connection with which it  is  em-               ployed   .....  Courts have to give effect  to               what the Legislature has said."     The rule of construction that if the statutory provision is  susceptible or admits of two reasonably  possible  views then  the  one  which would  promote  its  constitutionality should  be preferred on the ground that the  legislature  is presumed not to have intended an excess of its own jurisdic- tion,  is subject to the further rule that it  applies  only where  two  views are reasonably possible on  the  statutory language. If the words of the statute, on a proper construc- tion,  can be read only in a particular way, then it  cannot be read in another way by a court of construction anxious to avoid its unconstitutionality. In a case, as here, 167 a reference arises under ’Act’, the question of the  consti-

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tutionality  of the ’Act’ cannot be examined and  pronounced upon.  In State of Punjab v. Prem Sukhdas, [1977] 3 SCR  408 this Court made the point clear:                         "   .....  This amounts  to  nothing               short  of legislation. We think that the  view               is  an  impossible one.  The  principle  that,               where  a  provision is capable of one  of  two               interpretations,   the  interpretation   which               validates rather than one which may invalidate               a  provision applies only where two views  are               possible.  It  cannot be pushed so far  as  to               alter the meanings of the clear words used  in               an enactment and to, in effect, repeal  statu-               tory provisions by making them useless without               holding them to be void." [p. 410]                                                   (Emphasis               Supplied)     Even  in regard to constitutionality of the  classifica- tion,  it  is not possible to rule out arguments as  to  the validity  of  classification  as wholly  unstateable.  In  a taxing  measure the legislature enjoys a wider latitude  and its  dispensations  are based on an interaction  of  diverse economic, social, and policy considerations. Further, if the proviso is bad for discrimination, it would follow that  the converse  situation brought about by the later amendment,  a discrimination as between gifts made as between the 31st  of March 1972 and on 1st April, 1972 might also become bad.  It is  true that we are required to notice the provision as  it stood at the relevant time.     We, however, should not be understood to have pronounced on  the question of constitutionality. That is the  task  of the Court in judicial-review but the rule of preference of a particular  construction amongst the alternatives, in  order to avoid unconstitutionality is unavailable here.     Accordingly,  while  Civil Appeal No. 1226 and  1227  of 1975 preferred by the assessee are dismissed, CA No. 1118 of 1975 of the revenue is allowed and in reversal of the  order dated  18.9.1974 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court the  ques- tion  referred is answered in the negative and in favour  of the revenue.     In  the circumstances, the parties are left to bear  and pay their own costs in these appeals. N.P.V.                C.A. Nos. 1226 & 1227/75 are dismissed                                C.A. No. 1118/75 is allowed. 168