07 April 1967
Supreme Court
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COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA Vs RAI BAHADUR HARDUTROY MOTILAL CHAMARIA

Case number: Appeal (civil) 535 of 1966


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PETITIONER: COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAI BAHADUR HARDUTROY MOTILAL CHAMARIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/04/1967

BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  153            1967 SCR  (3) 508  CITATOR INFO :  R          1978 SC  40  (5,6)

ACT: Indian  Income-tax  Act,  1922, s.  31-Powers  of  Appellate Assistant Commissioner in appeal-Whether can enhance  income of  assessee in respect of sources of income not  considered by Income-tax Officer for purpose of taxation.

HEADNOTE: The account books of the respondent for the assessment  year 1952-53 showed three sums of Rs. 2,50,000, Rs. 1,50,000  and Rs.  30,000 as borrowed from parties in Nepal.  The  income- tax  Officer added these amounts to the total income of  the assessee  as  secret  income falsely shown  as  loans.   The Income-tax Officer noted that the assessee had withdrawn  at Calcutta  on  March 31, 1952 a sum of Rs.  5,30,000  from  a Calcutta  Bank  and had sent a sum of Rs.  5,85,000  to  his Forbesganj  branch on the same day to enable that branch  to pay  Rs. 2,50,000 to one of the creditors.  The transfer  of the  money from Calcutta to Forbesganj on the same  day  was considered  by  the  Income-tax Officer  to  be  a  physical impossibility.   When  the matter was in appeal  before  the Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner,  the  latter  not   only confirmed the addition of the -aforesaid loan amounts to the income  of  the assessee but also held that the sum  of  Rs. 5,85,000 transferred from Calcutta to the Forbesganj  branch was also unexplained income of the assessee and after making allowance  for an earlier withdrawal added a further sum  of RS.  4,05,000 on this account to the assessed income of  the respondent.  The Tribunal held that the Appellate  Assistant Commissioner  had power to enhance the income as he did  but reduced  the  enhancement to Rs. 1,55,000.  The  High  Court however  held, in -reference, that the  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner had no power to make the addition as the sum of Rs.  5,85,000  had  not been considered  by  the  Income-tax Officer  for the purpose of assessment.  In appeal  to  this Court, HELD  : The High Court was right.  The power of  enhancement given to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by s. 31(3) of the  Income-tax  Act, 1922 is restricted to the  sources  of income  which have been the subject-matter of  consideration

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by  the  Income-tax  Officer  from  the  point  of  view  of taxability.   In this context ’consideration’ does not  mean ’incidental’  or ’collateral’ examination of any  matter  by the Income-tax Officer .in the process of assessment. [516G] In  the  present case it was manifest  that  the  Income-tax Officer  had not considered the entry of Rs.  5,85,000  from the  point  of  view of its  taxability  and  therefore  the Appellate  Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction in  an appeal  under  s. 31 of the Act to enhance  the  assessment. [516F] Commissioner  of  Income-tax, Bombay v.  Shapoorji  Pallonji Mistry, 44 I.T.R. 891 followed. Narrondas  Manordass Bombay v. Commissioner  of  Income-tax, Central,  Bombay, 31 I.T.R. 909, Commissioner of Income  tax v. M/s.  Mc-Milan & Co., [1958] S.C.R. 689, Commissioner  of Income-tax,  Punjab v. Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan, 6  I.T.R.  370 and   The   King   v.   Income-tax   Special   Investigation Commissioner ,[1936] 1 K.B. 487, considered. 509

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 535 of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated March  26,  1964 of the Calcutta High  Court  in  Income-tax Reference No. 29 of 1961. T.   V.  Vishwanath lyer, A. N. Kirpal, S. P. Navyar for  R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. S. T. Desai and R. C. Prasad, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated March 26, 1964 in Income-tax Reference No. 29 of 1961. The  respondent  (hereinafter  called the  assessee)  is  an individual  carrying on business in Jute, Cloth  and  Films, The assessment year is 1952-53, the corresponding accounting year  being the, calendar year 1951 for all business  except Katihar Cloth Importing Co. and the Jute Mills for which the accounting  year  is financial year ending March  31,  1952. During the year of account the assessee claimed that he  had borrowed three sums of Rs. 2,50,000, 1,50,000 and Rs. 30,000 from  three  parties  from ,Nepal,  Khara-  Bahadur  Nepali, Jiwanmal  Santockchand and Sohanlal Subhkaran  respectively. The  Income-tax  Officer added these amounts  to  the  total income  of the assessee on the ground that the assessee  had inflated  the purchase of raw jute.  The Income-tax  Officer was not satisfied that these three loans were genuine  loans but considered that they represented secret profits made  by the  assessee  by inflating the purchase of raw  jute.   The Income-tax Officer noted that die assessee had withdrawn  at Calcutta  on  March 31, 1952, a sum of Rs. 5,30,000  from  a Calcutta  bank  and had sent a sum of Rs.  5,95,000  to  his Forbesganj  branch on the same day to enable that branch  to make payments including the repayment of Rs. 2,50,000 to Sri Kharag  Bahadur  one of the alleged creditors  noted  above. The  Income-tax Officer discussed the impossibility  of  the amount having reached Forbesganj branch in Bihar on the very same day in order to enable discharge of the creditors there on March 31, 1952.  In regard to this amount of Rs. 5,85,000 the Income-tax Officer observed as follows               "On   31-3-1952   the  Calcutta   Office   has               withdrawn  Rs. 5,30,000 from the Bank and  has               sent  Rs. 5,95,000 to Forbesganj How the  cash               has  reached Forbesganj (in remote  corner  in

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             North  Bihar)  on the same day to  enable  the               branch to make payments (including the sum  of               Rs.  2,50,000 to Kharag Bahadur) is  something               diffi-               510               Cult to understand even in these days of  fast               travel.   Lloyds  Bank in Calcutta  would  not               have  obliged the assessee by paying out  cash               before  10  A.M.  on 31-3-1952  and  the  only               available  train  leaves in  the  night.   The                             journey  including  the ferry  trip  o ver  the               broad  ganges takes over 24 hours.  Hence  the               entries  in  the book cannot be taken  to  ’be               genuine." The  assessee  took the matter in appeal  to  the  Appellate Assistant  Commissioner  and contended that  the  Income-tax Officer  should  not  have  added the  three  items  of  Rs. 2,50,000,  Rs.  1,50,000  and  ’Rs.  30,000  to  the   total assessable income.  The Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not agree with this contention and confirmed the addition of Rs.  4,30,000.   At the same time, the  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner noticed the fact of the alleged transfer of Rs. 5,85,000  from Calcutta to Forbesganj on March 31, 1952  and its credit in the accounts books of the latter branch on the same date.  The Appellate Assistant Commissioner  considered that  the amount of Rs. 5,85,000 should also be included  in the  total income of the assessee, but before doing  so  lie gave  the  assessee a deduction of Rs.  1,80,000  being  the amount  withdrawn  earlier  from the  accounts  of  the  two creditors,   namely,  Jiwanmal  Santokchand   and   Sohanlal Subhkaran  and  added  the balance of  Rs.  4,05,000.   This addition by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner amounted to an  enhancement of the income which the  Income-tax  Officer had  assessed.   The  assessee took the  matter  in  further appeal  to  the  Appellate  Tribunal  which  held  that  the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was justified in coining to the  conclusion that the cash credits in the  accounts  were not  explained satisfactorily and some of the payments  made at  Forbesganj branch on March 31, 1952 were not  made  from the  remittance  from Calcutta but from secret  funds.   The Appellate  Tribunal  pointed out that out  of  the  payments claimed  to have been made at Forbesganj payments to  Kharag Bahadur  Nepali  amounting  to Rs.  2,50,000  must  also  be excluded  because it had been held by the Income-tax  Office and  the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the loan  was not genuine; and since the loan. was not genuine it was  not logical to say that it required repayment from secret funds. The Appellate ’tribunal accordingly reduced the  enhancement to  Rs.  1,55,000.  In doing so the Appellate  Tribunal  re- jected  the contention of the, assessee ,hat  the  Appellate Assistant   commissioner  had no authority  to  enhance  the income  on the ground that it was not the subject-matter  of the   assessment  made  by  the  Income-tax  Officer.    The Appellate Tribunal took the view that the subject-matter  in respect  of  which the enhancement was made  was,  in  fact, considered  by  the Income Tax Officer and  accordingly  the Appellate  Assistant Commissioner had jurisdiction  to  make the enhancement.  At the instance of the assessee the 511 Appellate  Tribunal referred the following question  of  law for  the opinion of the High Court under s. 66 ( 1)  of  the Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the ’Act’) :               "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances               of   the   case   the   Appellate    Assistant

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             Commissioner  was  within  his  authority   in               enhancing  the assessment of the  assessee  by               Rs.  1,55,000 for the assessment year  1952-53                             ?"               By its judgment dated March 26, 1964, the High               Court  answered the question in  the  negative               and in favour of the assessee.               Section  31  of the Act is  to  the  following               effect               "31. (1) The Appellate Assistant  Commissioner               shall  fix a day and place for the hearing  of               the appeal, and may from time to time  adjourn               the hearing.               (2)   The  Appellate  Assistant   Commissioner               may, before disposing of any appeal, make such               further  inquiry as lie thinks fit,  or  cause               further  inquiry to be made by the  Income-tax               Officer......               (3)   In disposing of an appeal the  Appellate               Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of  an               order of assessment,-               (a)   confirm,  reduce, enhance or  annul  the               assessment, or               (b)   set aside the assessment and direct  the               Income-tax Officer to make a fresh  assessment               after  making  such  further  inquiry  as  the               Income-tax Officer thinks fit or the Appellate               Assistant  Commissioner may direct’,  and  the               Income-tax Officer shall thereupon proceed  to               make such fresh assessment and determine where               necessary  the  amount of tax payable  on  the               basis of such fresh assessment........ In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Shapiorji  Pallonji Alistry(1) it was held by this Court that in an appeal filed by the assessee the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has  no power  to enhance the assessment by discovering new  sources of  income  not mentioned in the return of the  assessee  or considered  by the Income-tax Officer in the order  appealed against.  In that case, the assesee had received sum of  Rs. 40,000.  In the proceedings for the assessment year 1946-47, this  came to the notice of the Income-tax  Officer.   Since the receipt fell within the accounting year relative to  the assessment year 1947-48, the Income-tax (1)44 I.T. R. 89 1. 512 Officer  did  not  assess the amount, making  a  note,  "The question  will  however be considered again at the  time  of 1947-48  assessment." In the return for the assessment  year 1947-48,  this  amount was not shown by the  assessee.   The Income-tax  Officer also overlooked the note at the  end  of his order in the previous year’s assessment, with the result that  this item was omitted from the assessment order.   The assessee  appealed to the Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner against  his  assessment for the year 1947 - 48.  While  the appeal was pending, the Income-tax Officer wrote a letter to the  Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner  requesting  him  to assess  the amount of Rs. 40,000.  The  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner, after issuing notice, assessed the amount  and included it in the original assessment.  The question  which was debated before this Court was whether in an appeal filed by  an  assessee, the Appellate Assistant  Commissioner  can find a new source of income not considered by the Income-tax Officer  and assess it under his powers granted by s. 31  of the  Income-tax  Act.  It was held by this  Court  that  the powers  of enhancement conferred on the Appellate  Assistant

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Commissioner under s. 31 only extended to matters considered by  the  Income-tax Officer and if a new source  has  to  be considered then the power of remand may be exercised and the Income-tax Officer should be required to deal with that  new source of income.  At page 895 of the Report,  Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court stated as follows : "The  only question is whether in enhancing  the  assessment for  any year lie can travel outside the record, that is  to say,  the  return made by the assessee  and  the  assessment order  passed  by  the Income-tax Officer  with  a  view  to finding out new sources of income, not disclosed in  either. It  is contended by the Commissioner of Income-tax that  the word ’assessment’ here means the ultimate would it which  an assessee must pay, regard being had to the charging  section and  his  total income.  In this view, it is said  that  the words  ’enhance  the  assessment’ are not  confined  to  the assessment  reached  through a particular  process  but  the amount  which ought to have been computed if the true  total income had been found.  There is no doubt that this view  is also possible.  On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that  there are other provisions like sections 34  and  33B, which  enable escaped income from new sources to be  brought to  tax after following a special procedure.   The  assessee contends   that  the  powers  of  the  Appellate   Assistant Commissioner extend to matters considered by the  Income-tax Officer,  and if a new source is to be considered, then  the power of remand should be exercised.  By the exercise of the power to assess fresh sources of 513 income,  the assessee is deprived of a finding by  two  tri- bunals and one right of appeal. The question is whether we should accept the  interpretation suggested  by  the Commissioner in preference  to  the  one, which  has held the field for nearly 37 years.  In  view  of the  provisions  of  sections 34 and 33B  by  which  escaped income can be brought to tax, there is reason to think  that the view expressed uniformly about the limits of the  powers of  the  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner  to  enhance  the assessment has been accepted by the legislature as the  true exposition of the words of the section." Reference  may be made, in this connection, to the  decision in  Narrondas Manordass, Bombay v. Commissioner  of  Income- tax,  Central, Bombay(1) in which the scope of the power  of the  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner under  s.  31(3)  was considered  by  the Bombay High Court.  In  that  case,  the assessee  carried on business at Rajkot and at  Bombay,  the accounting years at Rajkot and Bombay being different.  With regard  to  the profits of Rajkot,  the  Income-tax  Officer assessed  them  proportionately at R.,. 1,17,643.   He  also found  that  there  were remittances to the  extent  of  Rs. 4,00,000  from  Rajkot  to  Bombay,  but  in  view  of   the concession allowed by the Part B States Taxation  Concession Order  he  did  not include this amount  in  the  assessable income.   The assessee appealed with respect to the  sum  of Rs.  1,17,643  contending that the Rajkot  business  had  no profits  at  all  but only loss.   The  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner thereupon set aside the assessment and remanded the matter to the Income-tax Officer for reassessment  after enquiring into tile matters contained in the second  report. It  was  held  by  the Bombay  High  Court  that  the  power conferred upon the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was  not confined  to the matter of Rs. 1,17,643 in respect of  which the  assessee had appealed, but he had power to  revise  the whole  process  of  assessment  once  an  appeal  had   been preferred, and the order remanding the case was not  invalid

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in  law.   The decision of this case was  approved  by  this Court  in The Commissioner of Income-tax v. M/s Mc-Millan  & Co.  (2  ) The question to be considered in  that  case  was whether it was open to the Appellate Assistant  Commissioner in  exercise  of  his powers under s. 31(3) of  the  Act  to reject the method of accounting followed by the assessee and accepted by the Income-tax Officer, under the proviso to  s. 13  of the Act, and compute the income, profits or gains  of the  assessee  under Rule 33 of the Rules.  It was  held  by this  Court  that  the  question must  be  answered  in  the affirmative and there was nothing in s. 31 read (1) 31 I. T. R. 909. L7Sup .C.I./67-3 (2) [1958] S. C. R. 689. 514 with the provisions of s. 13 of the Act which prevented  the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, in an appeal preferred  by the assessee from exercising the powers which the Income-tax Officer could exercise under the proviso to s. 13 of the Act and to enhance the taxable income of the assessee.  At  page 701  of the Report, S. K. Das, J. quoted with  approval  the following  passage  from  the judgment of  Chagla,  C.J.  in Narronadas’s case(1)               "It  is  clear that  the  Appellate  Assistant               Commissioner  has been constituted a  revising               authority against the decisions of the Income-               tax  Officer; a revising authority not in  the               narrow sense of revising what is the  subject-               matter  of  the appeal, not in  the  sense  of               revising   those  matters  about   which   the               assessee  makes  a grievance, but  a  revising               authority in the sense that once the appeal is                             before him he ran revise not only the  ultimate               computation  arrived  at  by  the   Income-tax               Officer but he can revise every process  which               led to the ultimate computation or assessment.               In  other  words, what he can  revise  is  not               merely the ultimate amount which is liable  to               tax, but he is entitled to revise the  various               decisions  given by the Income-tax Officer  in               the  course  of the assessment  and  also  the               various  incomes or deductions which  came  in               for consideration of the Income-tax Officer." It is necessary to bear in mind, in this connection, that it is  the  assessee who has a right conferred under s.  31  to prefer an appeal against the order of assessment made by the Income-tax  Officer.   If the assessee does  not  choose  to appeal, the order of assessment becomes final subject to any power  of revision that the Commissioner may have  under  s. 33B of the Act.  Therefore, it would be wholly erroneous  to compare  the powers of the Appellate Assistant  Commissioner with  the powers possessed by a court of appeal,  under  the Civil Procedure Code.  The Appellate Assistant  Commissioner is  not  an ordinary court of appeal.  It is  impossible  to talk-  of  a  court of appeal when only  one  party  to  the original  decision is entitled to appeal and not  the  other party, and in view of this peculiar position the statute has conferred  very  wide powers upon  the  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner  once  an  appeal is preferred to  him  by  the assessee.   It  is  necessary also  to  emphasise  that  the statute  provides that once an assessment comes  before  the Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner, his  competence  is  not restricted  to  examining those aspects  of  the  assessment which  are  complained of by the  assessee;  his  competence

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ranges  over the whole assessment and it is open to  him  to correct  the  Income-tax Officer not only with regard  to  a matter  raised  by the assessee but also with  regard  to  a matter which has been considered by the (1)  31 I. T.R.909               515 Income-tax  Officer  and  determined in the  course  of  the assessment.   It is also well-established that  an  assessee having  once filed an appeal cannot withdraw it.   In  other words,  the Assessee having filed an appeal and brought  the machinery  of  the  Act into  working,  cannot  prevent  the Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner  from  ascertaining   and settling the, real sum to be assessed, by intimation of  his withdrawal  of the appeal.  Even if the assessee refuses  to appeal at the hearing, the Appellate Assistant  Commissioner can proceed with the enquiry and if he finds that there, has be-en  an  under-assessment, he can enhance  the  assessment Commissioner  of  Income-tax,  Punjab v.  Nawab  Shah  Nawaz Khan(1).   In  this  context reference may be  made  to  the decision  of the Court of Appeal in The King v.  Income  Tax Special  Commissioners(2)  in which the taxpayer  sought  to withdraw  a  notice, of appeal which had been given  on  his behalf  against an additional assessment under Sch.  D.  The Commissioners of Inland Revenue were not satisfied that  the assessment  was  adequate  The  Special  Commissioners  then proposed  to proceed with the hearing of the appeal  in  the ordinary  way.  At that stage the taxpayer sought a writ  of prohibition  to  prohibit  the  Special  Commissioners  from hearing the appeal.  It was held by the Court of Appeal that notice  of appeal having once been given, the  Commissioners were bound to proceed in accordance with the Income Tax Acts and  determine the true amount of the assessment.   At  page 493 of the Report Lord Wright observed as follows :               "  -in  making the assessment and  in  dealing               with   the  appeals,  the  Commissioners   are               exercising statutory authority and a statutory               duty which they are bound to carry out.   They               are not in the position of judges deciding  an               issue  between two particular parties.   Their               obligation  is  wider  than that.   It  is  to               exercise  their judgment on such  material  as               comes  before them and to obtain any  material               which they think- is necessary and which  they               ought  to have, and on that material  to  make               the  assessment or the estimate which the  law               requires them to make.  They are not  deciding               a  case  interparties; they are  assessing  or               estimating   the  amount  on  which,  in   the               interests  of the country at large,  the  tax-               payer ought to be taxed." The principle that emerges as a result of the authorities of this Court is that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner  has no  jurisdiction,  under s. 31(3) of the Act,  to  assess  a source of income which has not been processed by the Income- tax Officer and which is not disclosed either in the returns filed by the assessee (1) 6 T. T. R. 370.                           (2) [1936]  1. K. D. 487. 516 or  in  the assessment order, and therefore.  the  Appellate Assistant  Commissioner  cannot travel beyond  the  subject- matter  of  the assessment.  In other words,  the  power  of enhancement under s. 31 (3) of the Act is restricted to  the subject-matter of assessment or the sources of income  which have  been considered expressly or by clear  implication  by

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the  Income-tax  Officer  from  the point  of  view  of  the taxability of die assessee.  It was argued by Mr. Vishwanath lyer  on  behalf  of  the appellant  that  by  applying  the principle  to  the  present case,  the  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner  had  jurisdiction to enhance  the  quantum  of income of the assessee.  It was pointed out that the fact of alleged  transfer of Rs. 5,85,000 to Forbesganj  branch  was noted  by the Income-tax Officer and also the fact  that  it did not reach Forbesganj on the same day.  So, it was argued that in the appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner  had jurisdiction to deal with the question of the taxability  of the  amount of Rs. 5,85,000 and to hold that it was  taxable as undisclosed profits in the hands of the assessee.  We are unable  to accept the argument put forward on behalf of  the appellant  as  correct.   It is  true  that  the  Income-tax Officer has referred to the remittance of Rs. 5,85,000  from the  Calcutta branch, but the Income-tax Officer  considered the  despatch  of this amount only with a view to  test  the Genuineness  of the entries relating to Rs. 4,30,000 in  the books  of  the Forbesganj branch.  It is manifest  that  the Income-tax  Officer did not consider the remittance  of  Rs. 5,85,000 in the process of assessment from the point of view of  its taxability.  It is also manifest that the  Appellate Assistant Commissioner has considered the, amount of  remit- tance  of Rs. 5,85,000 from a different aspect, namely,  the point  of view of its taxability.  But since the  Income-tax Officer  has  not applied his mind to the  question  of  the taxability  or nontaxability of the amount of Rs.  5,85,000, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction, in the  circumstances  of  the present  case,  to  enhance  the taxable  income of the assessee on the basis of this  amount of  Rs.  5,85,000  or of any portion thereof.   As  we  have already  stated. it is not open to the  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner to travel outside the record, i.e., the  return made by the assessee or the assessment order of the  Income- tax  Officer with a view to find out new sources  of  income and  the power of enhancement under s. 31(3) of the  Act  is restricted  to  the sources of income which  have  been  the subject-matter  of consideration by the  Income-tax  Officer from  the  point  of view of taxability.   In  this  context "consideration"  does not mean "incidental" or  "collateral" examination  of any matter by the Income-tax Officer in  the process  of  assessment.   There must be  something  in  the assessment order to show that the Income-tax Officer applied Ms  mind to the particular subject-matter or the  particular source  of  income with a view to its taxability or  to  its non-taxability and not to any incidental connection.  In the present case it is manifest that the 517 Income-tax  Officer  has  not considered the  entry  of  Rs. 5,85,000  from  the  point of view  of  its  taxability  and therefore  the  Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner  had   no jurisdiction, in an appeal unders. 31 of the Act, to enhance the assessment. For  these  reasons  we hold that  the  High  Court  rightly answered  the  question in favour of the assessee  and  this appeal must be dismissed with costs. G.C.                            Appeal dismissed. 518