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PETITIONER: COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, MADRAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS, ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/02/1989

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) NATRAJAN, S. (J) KANIA, M.H.

CITATION:  1989 AIR 1298            1989 SCR  (1) 824  1989 SCC  (2) 303        JT 1989 (1)   409  1989 SCALE  (1)490

ACT:     Supreme Court Rules, 1966--Order VI, Rule  2(14)--Appli- cations  for condonation of delay--Whether Single  Judge  in Chambers has jurisdiction to dismiss--Whether such  practice just,   fair   and   reasonable-Whether   requires   to   be disturbed--Exception  in favour of applications  under  Art. 136 of the Constitution--Whether violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution--Whether  they  form a  separate  and  distinct class-Different procedure for different applications--Wheth- er  violative of fundamental rights--Arranging the  business of the Court--Whether within the domain of the Court.     Constitution of India, 1950: Arts. 136 and 137--Applica- tions  for  condonation  of delay--Whether  a  separate  and distinct  class--Longstanding  and settled practice  of  the Court--Whether can be disturbed.

HEADNOTE:     An application for condonation of delay was filed by the petitioner-Revenue  alongwith statutory appeals against  the judgment/order  of  the  Customs, Excise  and  Gold  Control Appellate Tribunal. The application was rejected by a Single Judge  of this Court under Order VI, Rule 2(14) of  the  Su- preme Court Rules, 1966.     The  Revenue filed review petitions on the  ground  that the  application for condonation of delay made in  statutory appeals under several Acts should be heard by a bench of  at least  two Judges. It was contended that the effect  of  the refusal of condonation of delay was dismissal of the  appeal itself, that the exception in favour of Special Leave  Peti- tions  amounted to hostile discrimination without any  basis in  that the Special Leave Petitions will be amenable to  be dealt with by two Judges, while a Single Judge will  dispose of  applications  for condonation of delay  under  statutory appeals,  which was irrational and violative of Art.  14  of the  Constitution  and, therefore, the Court  should  either hold  that  as dismissal of application for  condonation  of delay amounted to dismissal of the appeal itself, it  should be  heard by not less than two Judges in terms of Order  VII Rule 1 subject to other provisions or refer the matter to  a larger bench for re-consideration, in view of the decision

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825 of  this  Court in Commissioner of Income  Tax  Bombay  City versus  R.H.  Pandi,  Managing Trustees  of  Trust.  Bombay, holding  that  the applications for  condonation  of  filing petitions  of appeal were within the Chamber business  under Order VI Rule 2(14).     On the question whether a Single Judge has  jurisdiction to dismiss applications for condonation of delay in statuto- ry appeals. Dismissing the review petitions,     HELD:  1.1 A Single Judge in Chambers is and was  always competent  to  dismiss all applications for  condonation  of delay  in statutory appeals. There is nothing  repugnant  in the same that it is not violative of Art. 14 of the  Consti- tution. [836G]     1.2 Order VI, Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that  the powers of the court in relation to a certain  mat- ters may be exercised by a Single Judge sitting in Chambers. Rule  2(14)  deals  with  applications  for  enlargement  or abridgement  of time with some exceptions. Reading the  rule simply,  it  means  all  applications  for  enlargement   or abridgement of time would be cognizable by the Single  Judge in  Chambers  except those applications, time for  which  is fixed  by the court in terms of Order VII and also  applica- tions  for  condonation  of delay in  filing  Special  Leave Petitions. [831E-F]     1.3  On  a proper reading, the exception  made  only  in favour of the time fixed by the court means court  function- ing judicially in terms of Order VII Rule 1 as well as  time fixed by the rules of the court. All other applications  for enlargement  or abridgement for time could be heard  by  the Single Judge. [831F-G]     1.4  If  a separate and distinct provision is  made  for application  for condonation of delay under Art. 136 of  the Constitution, it is not violative of Art. 14 of the  Consti- tution. Applications under Art. 136 are a special class  and are sui juris. These are and should legitimately be  treated separately  other  than  all  other  applications  including applications under statutory appeals. Art. 136 is the resid- uary  power of this Court to do justice, where the court  is satisfied  that  there is injustice. These are  class  part. There is, therefore, no discrimination under Art. 14 of  the Constitution or in Order VI Rule 2(14). [836C-D]     2.1  Order VI demarcates the power of the Registrar  and the  Single Judge and Order VII demarcates the  constitution of the divi-  826 sion courts, powers of a Single Judge and a Vacation  Judge. This is arranging the business of the court, this is  within the power of the court. [831G]     2.2 Different treatment in respect of different applica- tions has always been within the domain of Court’s  arrange- ment of business. These do not involve any violation of  the fundamental rules. [836F)     P.N.  Eswara Iyer etc., etc. v. The  Registrar,  Supreme Court of India, [1980] 2 SCJ 119 relied on.     3.1  The  practice of one Single Judge disposing  of  in Chambers  applications  for delay in  statutory  appeals  is just,  fair  and reasonable. There is no  reason  either  to upset  that practice or to cast doubt on the proprietory  of such  practice, which has been valid since 1966,  and  which has  been  sanctified  by the judicial  decision.  There  is reason in the decision and the practice. [836E; 831D-E]     Commissioner  of Income-Tax, Bombay City v.  R.H.  Pandi Managing Trustees of Trust, Bombay, [1975] 2 SCR 7 affirmed.

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   3.2  In the facts and circumstances of the case  and  in the light of the provisions of the Rules, it cannot be  said that  the earlier decision of this Court in Commissioner  of Income Tax, Bombay City versus R.H. Pandi was clearly  erro- neous  and,  therefore, it is not necessary  to  refer  this question  to a larger bench or to disturb the settled  prac- tice of this Court. [836B]     Keshav  Mills Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T. Bombay North, [1965]  2 SCR  908 and Pillani Investment Corporation Ltd.  v.  Income Tax  Officer,  "A" Ward, Calcutta, and  Another,  [1972]  83 I.T.R. 217, relied on.     Promotho Nath Roy v. W.A. Lee, AIR 1921 Calcutta 415 and M/s.  Mela  Ram & Sons v. The  Commissioner  of  Income-Tax, Punjab, [1956] SCR 166, distinguished. Cooker v. Tempest, 17 M & W 502, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Review Petition Nos.  557- 564 & 571,594/1987. IN 827     CIVIL  MISC. PETITION NOS. 25279, 13195,  19336,  18600, 1563, 15031-33, 19552, 20695/1986. IN     CIVIL  APPEAL NOS. 3005, 1599, 2194, 2067, 158  2148-50, 2902/86, 2533/86,223/88.     G. Ramaswamy Additional Solicitor General, A.K. Ganguli, P.P.  Singh,  R.P.  Srivastava and P.  Parmeswaran  for  the Petitioner.     J.  Ramamurthy, B. Parthasarthi, V.J. Francis, C.S  Vai- dyanathan,  S.R.  Setia, Harish N. Salve,  Ravinder  Narain, D  .N.  Misra, S. Padmanabha Mahale,  Mrs.  Leelawati,  K.K. Gupta V. Balachandran and Uma Dutta for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI MUKIIARJI, J. In these matters, the  question that  arises for consideration is, whether a learned  Single Judge  sitting in Chambers is competent to dismiss  applica- tion  for  condonation of delay in statutory  appeals  under Order  XX-A  of  the Supreme Court  Rules,  1966,  regarding appeal  under section 55 of the Monopolies  and  Restrictive Trade  Practices Act, 1969 as well as under Order  XX-B  re- garding appeals under Section 130-E of the Customs Act, 1962 and Section 35-L of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944. It appears  that an application for condonation of  delay  came before  a  learned  Single Judge and  in  the  circumstances mentioned in the Review Petition No. 557 of 1987, the appli- cation  was  dismissed  by the learned  Single  Judge.  That application  was dismissed by one of us on 11.1 I. 86.  That order was passed by learned Single Judge under Order VI rule 2(14) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. The application  had been  filed  for  the condonation of delay  along  with  the Statutory Appeal against the Judgment/Order of the  Customs, Excises  and  Gold Control Appellate Tribunal.  The  revenue being  the Collector of Central Excise, Madras in this  case filed  a review petition on the ground that the  application for  condonation of delay made in Statutory Appeals  arising out  of  final  orders of the Tribunal  under  several  Acts should  be  heard  by a bench of at least  two  Judges.  The matter was posted before this bench for consideration wheth- er the learned Single Judge had jurisdiction to dismiss such application for condonation of delay or not. In order to decide this question, it is necessary to have  a cons-

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828 pectus  of the relevant rules. In the Supreme  Court  Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Rules’), as amended in 1983,  under  Order XX-B, of the said rules,  provision  has been  made for appeals under clause (b) of Section 130-E  of the Customs Act, 1962 and under Section 35-L of the  Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. According to Rule 1 thereof, the petition  of  appeal shall, .subject to  the  provisions  of Sections 4, 5 & 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 be  presented within  60  days  from the date of the order  sought  to  be appealed  against or within 60 days from the date  on  which the  order sought to be appealed against is communicated  to the  Appellate,  whichever is later. The time  required  for obtaining a copy of the order should be excluded. There  is, however,  no provision providing for limitation in the  con- cerned Statutes. According  to Rule 2 of Order XX--B, Rules 1 to 7  of  Order XX-A  of the Rules relating to appeals under Section  51  of the  Monopolies  and Restrictive Trade Practices  Act,  1969 shall with necessary modifications and adaptations, apply to appeals under that Order. Rule 3 of Order XX-A provides as under:               "After  the appeal is registered, it shall  be               put  up for hearing ex-parte before the  Court               which  may  either  dismiss  it  summarily  or               direct  issue of notice to all necessary  par-               ties,  or may make such orders as the  circum-               stances of the case may require".     According  to this provision, it appears that  all  such statutory  appeals have to be placed before a Court for  ex- parte admission. According to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963:               "Any  appeal or any application  ....  may  be               admitted  after  a prescribed  period  if  the               appellant or the applicant satisfies the court               that  he had sufficient cause for not  prefer-               ring  the  appeal  or  making  an  application               within such a period." Some grounds, according to the appellant, had been made  for condonation of delay. Apparently, in the facts of the  case, the  learned  Single Judge did not find any merit  in  those grounds  and refused to condone the delay. Consequently,  it was contended that the effect of the refusal of  condonation of  delay was dismissal of the appeal following as a  result thereof.  The question is, can the learned Single  Judge  do it9 The  829 learned Single Judge has done it by virtue of Rule 2(14)  of Order  VI of the said Rules. Order VI deals with the  ’Busi- ness in Chambers’. Order VI, Rule 1 provides that the powers of the Court in relation to the matters enumerated  thereun- der  would be exercised by the Registrar. Order VI,  Rule  2 provides that the powers of the Court in relation to certain matters may be exercised by a single Judge sitting in  Cham- bers. Thereafter 28 such matters are enumerated. Rule  2(14) of Order VI provides as follows:               "Applications  for enlargement or  abridgement               of time except where the time is fixed by  the               Court and except applications for  condonation               of delay in filing special leave petitions". Reading the rule simply, it appears to us that it means  all applications  for  the enlargement or  abridgement  of  time would be cognizable by the learned Single Judge in  Chambers except, those applications time for which has been fixed  by the  Court in terms of Order VII and also  applications  for

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condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions. This appears to us to be logical and literal meaning of the  said rule.  The  question, however, has been  posed  is  this--an application  for condonation of delay or an application  for enlargement  or abridgement of time. This question,  it  ap- pears  to us, is concluded by the decision of this Court  in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City v. R.H. Pandi Manag- ing Trustees of Trust, Bombay, [1975] 2 SCR 7. There a bench of  three learned Judges of this Court had occasion to  con- sider  this question. A question arose there as  to  whether the application for condonation of delay in filing  petition of appeal could be heard by the Judge in his Chambers.  Ray, C.J. observed in the said judgment an argument was  advanced before the Hon’ble Judge in Chambers that if an  application for  condonation of delay was refused by the Judge in  Cham- bers it would amount to dismissal of the appeal by the Judge in Chambers. Therefore, it was said that these  applications should be heard by ’the Court’ which alone was competent  to dismiss the appeal. By Court, it was urged, meant a bench of two  learned  Judges. After giving notices  to  the  learned Attorney  General  and the Bar Association, the  matter  was discussed  by  this Court and it was held that  in  view  of Order VI, Rule 2(14) of the Rules set out hereinbefore,  all applications  for enlargement or abridgement of time  except the three cases mentioned in Order VI, Rule 2(14) were to be heard  by the Judge in Chambers. At the relevant  time,  the three  matters  included, inter alia, deposit  of  security. This  Court observed in the said decision that an  important exception was the application for condonation of delay in  830 filing  special leave petitions. It was observed that  Order XLVII  Rule 3 of the Rules stated that the Court  might  en- large or abridge any time appointed by these rules or  fixed by  any  order enlarging time, for doing any act  or  taking proceedings, upon such terms, if any, as the justice of  the case  might require, and any enlargement might  be  ordered, although the application therefore was not made until  after the expiration of the time appointed or allowed. A  petition of  appeal  was required under Order XV of the Rules  to  be presented  within 60 days from the grant of  certificate  of fitness.  The  time to present the petition  of  appeal  was fixed  by the Rules of this Court. It was  observed,  there- fore,  that Order XLVII Rule 3 should apply with  regard  to enlargement  or  abridgement of any time  appointed  by  the Rules  for  doing any act. This Court was of the  view  that Order  VI Rule 2(14) spoke of the applications for  enlarge- ment or abridgement of time. Here the words "enlargement  or abridgement of time" took in applications for enlargement of time  appointed by the Rules, that is to say,  according  to this  Court, fixed by the Rules. The significant feature  of the Rules was that applications for condonation of delay  in filing special leave petitions were excepted from the  busi- ness  of a Chamber Judge. The natural presumption  was  that but  for  the exception the Rule would have to  be  included also applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions. Any application for condonation of delay in filing petition of appeal was therefore included in applica- tions  for  enlargement or abridgement of time.  This  Court noted that the practice of the Chamber Judge hearing  appli- cations  for  condonation of delay in  filing  petitions  of appeal within the time appointed by the Rules of this  Court had  been  followed ever since 1966. Cursus curiae  est  lex curiae. The practice of this Court is the law of the  Court. See  Broom’s  Legal Maxims at p. 82. Where  a  practice  had existed it was convenient to adhere to it because it was the

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practice. It was noted that the power of each Court over its own  process  is unlimited; it is a power  incident  to  all Courts. Reliance was placed on the observations in Cooker v. Tempest,  17  M  & W 502. Therefore, this  Court  held  that applications for condonation of delay in filing petitions of appeal were within the Chamber business under Order VI  Rule 2(14).  Learned Additional Solicitor General contended  that the aforesaid decision requires reconsideration. He  submit- ted  that a prior decision of this Court and a  decision  of Calcutta High Court were not adverted to. He further submit- ted that this Court spoke of "enlargement or abridgement  of time"  fixed by the Rules. Therefore, it could not  be  con- tended  that the application for condonation of delay  would come within this purview. Furthermore, it was argued that if the  exceptions  in favour of special  leave  petitions  are maintained, there would be hostile discrimi- 831 nation  without any basis, namely, special  leave  petitions being amenable to be dealt with by the two Judges, while the learned  Single  Judge will dispose of the  application  for condonation  of delay under Statutory Appeals. This, it  was submitted, is irrational and violative of Article 14 of  the Constitution  and the Rules should not be so construed.  The Learned  Additional Solicitor General, therefore,  submitted before us that we should hold that as dismissal of  applica- tion  for condonation of delay amounts to dismissal  of  the appeal,  it  should be heard in terms of Order  VII  Rule  1 subject  to other provisions, namely, it should be heard  by not  less than two Judges. He submitted that if we were  not inclined to accept this submissions in view of the  decision of this Court in C. 1. T., Bombay City v. R.H. Pandi  Manag- ing Trustees of Trust, Bombay, (supra), we should refer  the matter to a larger bench for reconsideration of the matter.     We  have considered the matter. We are unable to  accept the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor  General. We  accept  the reasoning to the decision of this  Court  in Commissioner  of Income-tax v. R.H. Pandi, (supra). We  find that was the practice of the Court. That has been sanctified by the judicial decision. We also see reason in the decision and the practice. We do not find any reason for holding that the  practice of this Court followed since 1966 requires  to be  altered. Arranging the business of the Court  is  within the  domain  of the Court. These Rules have been  framed  by this  Court  with the approval of the  President  of  India. Under  Order I Rule 2(1)(g) of the Rules, ’Court’ means  the Supreme Court of India. Sub-rule (14) of Rule 2 of Order  VI empowers  a  Single Judge to decide  certain  matters  which speaks  of  applications for enlargement or  abridgement  of time except where the time is fixed by the Court and except, inter alia, applications for condonation of delay in  filing special leave petitions. On a proper reading, it appears  to us that the exception made only in favour of the time  fixed by the Court means Court functioning judicially in terms  of Order  VII Rule 1 as well as time fixed by the Rules of  the Court. All other applications for enlargement or abridgement of  time could be heard by the learned Single Judge.  As  is clear,  Order VI demarcates the power of the Registrar,  and the  learned Single Judge and Order VII demarcates the  con- stitution  of the Division Courts, powers of a Single  Judge and  the Vacation Judge. This is arranging the  business  of the Court. This is within the power of the Court. Two  deci- sions were referred to us by the learned Additional  Solici- tor General. Our attention was drawn to the observations  in the  Division Bench Judgment of the Calcutta High  Court  in Promotho Nath Roy v. W.A. Lee, AIR 1921 Calcutta 415.  There

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the Court was concerned  832 with  the provisions of Civil Procedure Code,  Section  109. The  Court  observed that an order dismissing an  appeal  as barred  by  limitation prescribed  therefore  after  further refusing  an application under section 5 of  the  Limitation Act  to  admit  the appeal after the  prescribed  time,  was ’passed on appeal’ under Section 109. Sanderson, C.J. doubt- ed  the  said conclusion but observed that this  involved  a substantial question of law. That was an application by  the defendant  for a certificate that the decree of this  Court, from  which the appeal was sought to the Privy  Council  in- volved  a claim of Rs. 10,000 and that the  appeal  involved some  substantial question of law. The question was  whether such  application  should be allowed. A point was  taken  on behalf  of the plaintiff that the decree of the  High  Court was not one ’passed on appeal’ within the meaning of  clause (a)  of  Section 109 of the Civil Procedure Code.  There  it appears that the order of Mr. Justice Greaves against  which the appeal was directed, was made on 26th July, 1918. On the 30th  August,  1918, being the last date of sitting  of  the Court,  at  about 5.00 P.M. after the Court  of  Appeal  had risen  an  application  was made to  Mr.  Justice  Chaudhuri sitting on the Original Side for leave to file the  memoran- dum of appeal without a copy of the order against which  the defendant desired to appeal. The learned Judge granted leave to the defendant to file the memorandum of appeal subject to any  objection which might be taken on behalf of the  plain- tiff.  When  the matter came before the  appeal  Court,  the plaintiff  took the point that the appeal was out  of  time. The  appeal Court decided that the appeal was out  of  time, being  barred by the Limitation Act, and the  Court  further refused an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to admit the appeal after the prescribed time and the appeal was  dismissed. Having regard to the above mentioned  facts, Sanderson,  C.J.  observed that it cannot be held  that  the order  was not one ’passed on appeal’. Sanderson,  C.J.  had some  doubts on that proposition but agreed with  Woodroffe, J. that the appeal involved substantial question of law.  In that  appeals,  a certificate was granted. In  our  opinion, this  decision  is  not relevant for the  issue  before  us. Whether  an order dismissing an application for  condonation of  delay in case of Statutory Appeal is an order or  appeal is  not quite in issue here and is not decisive of the  mat- ter. It does not solve the question whether a learned Single Judge can dismiss an application for condonation of delay in a  statutory appeal. After all, the Court functions  by  its arrangement  under the Rules. Order VI mentions the  Chamber Business and the Business to be transacted by the  Registrar and  Single  Judge sitting in Chambers. The  powers  of  the Court,  that  is to say, the whole Court and the  powers  of Division Bench normally, except those mentioned in Order VI, will be as enjoined by Rule. 1 of Order VII, 833 that  is  to say, a bench consisting of not  less  than  two Judges. In that view of the clear provisions of the Rule, we are  of the opinion that the said decision of  the  Calcutta High  Court upon which reliance has been placed does not  in any  manner detract the decision of this Court in C. 1.  T., Bombay City v. R.H. Pandi. Our attention was also drawn to a decision  of this Court in M/s. Mela Ram & Sons v. The  Com- missioner  of Income-Tax, Punjab, [1956] SCR 166. There  the appellant firm had filed appeals against orders assessing it to income-tax and super-tax for two years 1945-46 and  1946- 47 beyond the time prescribed by Section 30(2) of the Income

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Tax  Act. The appeals were numbered and notices were  issued for  their hearing under Section 31 of the Income  Tax  Act, 1922.  At  the hearing of the appeals before  the  Appellate Assistant  Commissioner, the Department took  the  objection that  the appeals were barred by time. The appellant  prayed for  condonation  of delay, but that was  refused,  and  the appeals  were dismissed as time-barred. The  appellant  then preferred  appeals  against the orders of dismissal  to  the Tribunal  under  Section  33 of the Act,  and  the  Tribunal dismissed them on the ground that the orders of the  Assist- ant  Commissioner  were in substance  passed  under  Section 30(2) and not under Section 31 of the Act and that no appeal lay  against  them under Section 33 of the Act.  This  Court observed  that an appeal presented out of time is an  appeal and an order dismissing it as time-barred is one ’passed  in appeal’. Section 31 of the Act was the only provision relat- ing  to the hearing and disposal of appeals and if an  order dismissing  an  appeal  as barred by limitation  as  in  the present  case  is one passed in appeal it must  fall  within Section  31  and  as Section 33 confers a  right  of  appeal against all orders passed under Section 31, it must also  be appealable.  These observations, in our opinion,  were  made entirely  in different statutory context and cannot be  used in the context in which the question has arisen before us in the  present  case.  Learned  Additional  Solicitor  General submitted before us that in view of the fact that these  two decisions  were  not considered by this Court in C.  1.  T., Bombay  City v. R.H. Pandi, (supra) and in view of the  fact that  this  argument in favour of statutory  appeals  to  be heard by the learned Single Judge while the applications for condonation  of delay in respect of the special leave  peti- tions to be heard by the bench of two learned Judges will be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and as such this contention should be heard by a larger bench. We are  unable to accept this submission.      This  Court had occasion to consider the  situation  in which question settled by this Court can be reviewed. Refer- ence  may be made to the observations of Gajendragadkar,  CJ in the Keshav Mills Co. Ltd.  834 v.  C.I.T., Bombay North, [1965] 2 SCR 908 at page  921  the learned Chief Justice observed: "In  dealing  with the question as to  whether  the  earlier decisions of this Court in the New Jehangir Mills,  [(1960)] 1  SCR 249] case, and the Petlad Ltd. case [(1963)] Supp.  1 SCR 871] should be reconsidered and revised by us, we  ought to  be clear as to the approach which should be  adopted  in such cases. Mr. Palkhivala has not disputed the fact that in a  proper  case,  this Court has  inherent  jurisdiction  to reconsider  and  revise its earlier decisions, and  so,  the abstract  question as to whether such a power vests in  this Court or not need not detain us. In exercising this inherent power,  however, this Court would naturally like  to  impose certain  reasonable  limitations and would be  reluctant  to entertain pleas for the reconsideration and revision of  its earlier  decisions,  unless it is satisfied that  there  are compelling  and substantial reasons to do so. It is  general judicial  experience that in matters of law involving  ques- tions of construing statutory or constitutional  provisions, two  views are often reasonably possible and  when  judicial approach  has  to make a choice between the  two  reasonably possible views, the process of decision-making is often very difficult  and  delicate.  When  this  Court  hears  appeals against  decisions  of the High Courts and  is  required  to consider  the propriety or correctness of the view taken  by

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the  High  Courts on any point of law, it would be  open  to this  Court to hold that though the view taken by  the  High Court is reasonably possible, the alternative view which  is also reasonably possible is better and should be  preferred. In such a case, the choice is between the view taken by  the High Court whose judgment is under appeal, and the  alterna- tive view which appears to this Court to be more reasonable; and  in accepting its own view in preference to that of  the High  Court, this Court would be discharging. its duty as  a Court of Appeal. But different considerations must  inevita- bly arise where a previous decision of this Court has  taken a  particular  view as to the construction  of  a  statutory provision  as, for instance, Section 66(4) of the Act.  When it is urged that the view already taken by this Court should be  reviewed and revised, it may not necessarily be an  ade- quate  reason  for  such review and revision  to  hold  that though the earlier view is a reasonably 835 possible view, the alternative view which is pressed on  the subsequent  occasion  is more reasonable. In  reviewing  and revising its earlier decision, this Court should ask  itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other valid  and  compulsive  reasons, it is  necessary  that  the earlier decision should be revised. When this Court  decides questions  of  law, its decisions are,  under  Article  141, binding on all courts within the territory of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this  Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and conti- nuity in the interpretation of law in the country.  Frequent exercise  by this Court of its power to review  its  earlier decisions  on  the ground that the view  pressed  before  it later appears to the Court to be more reasonable, may  inci- dentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce  confusion which must be consistently avoided. That is not to say  that if on a subsequent occasion, the Court is satisfied that its earlier  decision was clearly erroneous, it should  hesitate to  correct  the error; but before a  previous  decision  is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be satis- fied  with  a fair amount of unanimity amongst  its  members that  a revision of the said view is fully justified. It  is not  possible  or  desirable, and in any case  it  would  be inexpedient  to lay down any principles which should  govern the  approach of the Court in dealing with the  question  of reviewing  and  revising  its earlier  decisions.  It  would always depend upon several relevant considerations:--What is the  nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea for  a review  and  revision of the earlier view is based?  On  the earlier  occasion, did some patent aspects of  the  question remain  unnoticed,  or was the attention of  the  Court  not drawn to any previous decision of this Court bearing on  the point  not noticed?. Is the Court hearing such  plea  fairly unanimous  that there is such an error in the earlier  view? What would be impact of the error on the general administra- tion  of  law or on public good?. Has the  earlier  decision been  followed on subsequent occasions either by this  Court or  by  the  High Courts?. And, would the  reversal  of  the earlier  decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship  or mischief?.  These and other relevant considerations must  be carefully  borne in mind whenever this Court is called  upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its earli- er decisions."  836 This view was again reiterated by this Court in the  Pillani Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, "A" Ward, Calcutta, and Another[1972] 83 I.T.R. 217.

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   In the facts and circumstances of the case, in the light of  the provisions of the said Rules as noticed  before,  we cannot  say that we are satisfied that the earlier  decision of  this Court in C.I.T. Bombay City v. R.H. Pandi,  (supra) was clearly erroneous. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary  to  refer this question to a larger bench  or  to disturb the settled practice of this Court.     There is no substance in the contention of any discrimi- nation under Article 14 of the Constitution or in Order  VII rule  2(14).  Applications under Article 136  is  a  special class  and are sui juris. These are and should  legitimately be  treated  separately other than  all  other  applications including  applications under Statutory Appeals. If a  sepa- rate  and  distinct  provision is made  for  application  of condonation of delay under Article 136 of the  Constitution, we do not see any conceivable ground which can be taken  for contending that it is violative of Article 14 of the Consti- tution. After all Article 136 is the residuary power of this Court to do justice where the Court is satisfied that  there is injustice. These are class apart.     The practice of the learned Single Judge disposing of in Chambers applications for condonation of delay in  statutory appeals  is just, fair and reasonable. Every court  has  the right  to arrange its own affairs. We find no reason  either to upset that practice or to cast doubt on the propriety  of such practice. In this connection, reference may be made  to the decision of this Court in P.N. Eswara lyer etc., etc. v. The  Registrar,  Supreme Court of India, [1980]  2  SCJ  119 where  this  Court  upheld the circulation  system  for  the disposal of the Review Petitions and held that early hearing was the essential requirement if a review petition is  found devoid of substance. Such different treatment in respect  of different applications has always been within the domain  of Court’s  arrangement of business. These do not  involve  any violation  of the fundamental right. In the premises, we  do not  find any reason to interfere with the order passed.  We hold  that  a Single Learned Judge in Chambers  is  and  was always competent to dismiss all applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals. We find nothing repugnant  in the  same and no substance in the contention that  otherwise the  same would be violative of Article 14 of the  Constitu- tion.  The  Review Petitions therefore, fail  and  are  dis- missed. N.P.V.                            Petitions dismissed.                                 1 ?837