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PETITIONER: COLLECTOR OF 24 PARGANAS AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LALIT MOHAN MULLICK & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/02/1986

BENCH: KHALID, V. (J) BENCH: KHALID, V. (J) THAKKAR, M.P. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR  622            1986 SCR  (1) 271  1986 SCC  (2) 138        1986 SCALE  (1)177  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1988 SC2121  (1)

ACT:      West Bengal  Land Development  and Planning Act, 1948 - ss.  2(d)(i)   and  4   -  ’Settlement’   of  immigrants   - Interpretation  of   -  Acquisition   of  land   -  For  the ’resettlement’ of  immigrants - Construction of hospital for crippled children - Whether ’Public purpose’.      Words and phrases - ’Rehabilitation’ - Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      A notification  was issued  for the  acquisition of the land belonging  to the  respondents under  s. 4  of the West Bengal Land  Development and Planning Act, 1948 stating that the land  in question  was needed for the public purpose for the resettlement  of immigrants  who have  migrated into the State  of   West  Bengal.   This  as   followed  by  another notification under s. 6 of the Act.      Later, on  an inspection  of the  record of the Special Land Acquisition  Officer, the respondents came to know from two letters,  that the  acquisition was  not for the purpose mentioned in the notification issued under s. 4, but for the Society of  Experimental Medical Science for construction of a hospital for crippled children.      Finding  that  the  real  purpose  of  acquisition  was different from  the one  mentioned in  the notification, the respondents  approached   the  Land   Acquisition  Authority requesting them  to cancel  the notification  and  the  land acquisition proceedings  on the  ground that  that were made under colourable exercise of powers.      There being  no response the respondents approached the High Court  under Article  226 to  quash the notification. A Single Judge held that the challenge to the Notification was hopelessly time  barred as the Writ Petition was filed after a 272 lapse of more than two years and two months from the date of the Notification  issued under  s. 6, and since there was no satisfactory explaination  for this  delay the discretionary powers under Article 226 should not be exercised.      In appeal the Division Bench reversed the judgment, and held that  the two letters which the respondents came across

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during the  inspection of  the land acquisition records, did not  even   remotely  suggest   that  the   purpose  of  the acquisition was  for "settlement  of immigrants" but was for the establishment  of a  hospital for crippled children, and that the  acquisition proceedings  were consequently  in bad faith to  deprive the  respondents of compensation as on the date of Notification.      In appeal  to this  Court,  on  behalf  of  the  State- appellants, it  was contended  that the notification clearly indicated  that  the  purpose  of  the  acquisition  was  to rehabilitate displaced  persons which  was a  public purpose and it  was neither  proper nor  necessary to  go behind the Notification in a challenge based on bad faith. On behalf of the respondents, the appeal was contested on the ground that ’settlement’ was  not ’resettlement’  and since  the  public purpose shown  in  the  notification  is  ’resettlement’  s. 2(d)(i) was not attracted.      Allowing the  appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench  of the  High Court and restoring that of the Single Judge. ^      HELD: 1.  Section  2(d)(i)  of  the  West  Bengal  Land Development  Planning   Act,  1948   makes   settlement   of immigrants, who  have migrated into the State of West Bengal on account  of circumstances  beyond their  control a public purpose. Under  s. 8(1)(b)  of the  Act determination of the amount of  compensation to  be awarded for the land acquired under the  Act is  the same  as under  s.  23  of  the  Land Acquisition Act,  1894. However,  distinction is made in the section if the land is acquired for public purpose specified in s. 2(d)(i), viz. compensation should be restricted to the market value  of the land on the first day of December, 1946 and not more. [276F-H; 277 A]      2. Section 2(d)(i) speaks of ’settlement’ of immigrants while the  notification under  s. 4 speaks of ’resettlement’ of 273 immigrants. The  intention of the section is to settle those who migrated  to West Bengal from across the border. Whether one uses the word ’settlement’ or ’resettlement’, the intent is clear,  and that  is to  provide for  habitation  and  to extend other  amenities to  those  who  are  displaced  from across the border. [277 B-D]      3. The  real purpose  of rehabilitation can be achieved only if  those  who  are  sought  to  be  rehabilitated  are provided with  shelter, food  and other  amenities of  life. [279 B-C]      4. No  detaled discussion  is necessary  to  hold  that putting up of a hospital, and in particular one for crippled children is  one of  the important facets of the concepts of ’rehabilitation’  of  displaced  persons  and  therefore  to provide a  hospital for  disabled and  crippled children  of such displaced  persons comes within the concept of the idea of ’rehabilitation’  and consequently of ’settlement’ of the refugees. [279 C-E]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 72 (N) of 1972.      From the  Judgment and  Order  dated  6.3.1969  of  the Calcutta High Court in Original Order No. 298 of 1968.      D.N. Mukherjee,  G.S. Chatterjee  and Sukumar  Basu for the Appellants.

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    Sankar Ghose, P.K. Mukherjee for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KHALID, J.  This is  an appeal, by certificate, against the Judgment  of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court reversing the Judgment of a learned Single Judge. The matter relates to land acquisition proceedings. The Collector of 24 Parganas and others are the appellants.      Under Section 4 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 (West Bengal Act XXI of 1948) (for short, the Act),  a notification dated March 28, 1957 was issued in relation to  property, being  C.S.  Plot  Nos.  84  and  86, belonging to  the respondents.  Declaration, under Section 6 of the 274 Act,  dated   January  4,   1962   followed.   The   earlier notification stated  that the  above plots alongwith certain other plots  were likely  to be  needed for a public purpose viz. for  the re-settlement  of immigrants who have migrated into the  State of  West Bengal  on account of circumstances beyond their  control. The  area involved in the proceedings is 3.85 acres, in extent. It appears that the respondents in this case;  the owner  of the land, discovered after receipt of notice  of acquisition,  on inspection  of records at the office of  the Special  Land Acquisition  Officer,  Alipore, that the  land was required not for the purpose mentioned in the notification but for the Society of Experimental Medical Science (India)  for construction of a hospital for crippled children at  the expenses  of the  said Society.  They  then applied for  the copies  of the  two letters which contained this  disclosure.   Finding  that   the  real   purpose   of acquisition  is   different,  from   the  one  made  in  the notification,  they   addressed  a   letter  to   the   Land Acquisition  authorities   requesting  them  to  cancel  the notification and  the land  acquisition proceedings  on  the ground that  they were  made under  colourable  exercise  of powers. There was no response. Hence they moved the Calcutta High Court  by writ  petition CR No.361(W) of 1964, to quash the notification  and the  subsequent  proceedings,  on  the ground that the notification and the acquisition proceedings were mala  fide, beyond  the powers  conferred by the Act in fraud of those powers.      The writ petition first came up before a learned Single Judge of  the High  Court. He held that the challenge to the notification was hopelessly barred by time. The notification under  Section   4,  was  published  on  28.3.1957  and  the succeeding declaration under Section 6 on 4th January, 1962. The writ  petition was filed only on 26.3.1964 - after lapse of more than two years and two months. Since the respondents did not give any satisfactory explanation for this delay the learned Single  Judge felt  that  the  discretionary  powers under Article  226 should  not be exercised in their favour. The learned  Single Judge also repelled the contention based on the  plea that the acquisition proceedings were mala fide and in fraud or in excess of the powers under the Act.      The respondents  took the  matter in appeal. A Division Bench of the High Court reversed the Judgment of the learned 275 Single Judge both on the question of delay and on merits. It was held that the letters, which the respondents came across during the  inspection of the records, did not even remotely suggest  that   the  purpose  of  the  acquisition  was  for "settlement of  immigrants" but was for the establishment of a hospital  for the crippled children by the Society. It was held that  the acquisition  was made in bad faith to deprive the appellants  of  the  compensation  as  on  the  date  of

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notification. Hence the appeal.      The learned  counsel for  the appellants pleaded before us that  the approach  of the  Division  Bench  was  totally unwarranted  and  that  the  Judgment  was  based  on  wrong premises.  He   contended  that   the  notification  clearly indicated  that  the  purpose  of  the  acquisition  was  to rehabilitate displaced  persons which  was a  public purpose and it  was neither  proper nor  necessary to  go behind the notification in a challenge based on bad faith.      We will  now examine  whether the  notification and the land  acquisition  proceedings  are  bad  as  found  by  the Division Bench of the High Court. The Act that governs these proceedings is  not the  Land Acquisition  Act but  the  Act mentioned above.  Section 2(d)  of the  Act defines  ’public purpose’ as under:-           2(d) "public purpose" includes-           (1) the settlement of immigrants who have migrated           into the  State  of  West  Bengal  on  account  of           circumstances beyond their control,           (ii) the  establishment of  towns, model  villages           and agricultural colonies,           (iii) the  creation of better living conditions in           urban and rural areas, and           (iv)   the    improvement   and   development   of           agriculture, forestry, fisheries and industries;           but does not include a purpose of the Union; 276      Section 8(1)(b)  is the  other section  that has  to be taken into account. This reads as follows:           "8(1) After  making a declaration under Section 6,           the State  Government may  acquire  the  land  and           thereupon the  provisions of  the Land Acquisition           Act, 1894 (hereinafter in this section referred to           as the said Act), shall, so far as may be, apply:           Provided that-           (a) ...........           (b) in  determining the  amount of compensation to           be awarded  for land acquired in pursuance of this           Act the  market value  referred to in clause first           of sub-section  (1) of  section 23 of the said Act           shall be deemed to be the market value of the land           on the  date of  publication of  the  notification           under  sub-section   (1)  of  section  4  for  the           notified  area  in  which  the  land  is  included           subject to  the following  condition, that  is  to           say, if  such market  value in  relation  to  land           acquired for  the public purpose specified in sub-           clause (i)  of clause (d) of Section 2, exceeds by           any amount  the market  value of  the land  on the           31st day of December, 1946, on the assumption that           the land  had been  at that  date in  the state in           which it in fact was on the date of publication of           the said  notification, the  amount of such excess           shall not be taken into consideration.           (2) ............................."      Section 2(d)(i)  makes the settlement of immigrants who have migrated  into the  State of  West Bengal on account of circumstances beyond  their control,  a public purpose. From Section 8(1)(b) quoted above, we note that the determination of the  amount of  compensation to  be awarded  for the land acquired under  the Act is the same as that under Section 23 of the  Land Acquisition  Act. However,  the section makes a distinction if  the land  is acquired  for a  public purpose specified in  Section 2(d)(i). When the land is acquired for a

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277 purpose mentioned  in that  section, the compensation should be restricted to the market value of the land on the 1st day of December,  1946 and  not more.  It is this restriction on the amount  of compensation that is really the moving spirit behind  the   writ  petition   and  the   challenge  to  the notification.      We may  even at  the outset reject a contention made by the learned  counsel for  the respondents  on the wording of section 2(d)(i) and the notification. Section 2(d)(i) speaks of ’settlement’  of immigrants  while the notification under section 4  speaks  of  ’re-settlement’  of  immigrants.  The contention raised  is that  ’settlement’ is  not the same as ’re-settlement’, and  since the public purpose shown in this notification is  ’re-settlement’,  Section  2(d)(i)  is  not attracted. We  wish to make it clear that this contention is just an  empty exercise  on  words.  The  intention  of  the section is  to settle those who migrated to West Bengal from across the  border. They  are to  be settled in West Bengal. Whether one  uses the  word settlement or re-settlement, the intent is  clear and  that is  to provide for the habitation and other  amenities to those who were displaced from across the border. Nothing therefore turns, in our view, on the use of the  word ’re-settlement’  in the  notification, though a serious attempt  is seen  made in the affidavit filed by the appellants  to  explain  that  what  was  really  meant  was ’settlement’ and not ’re-settlement’.      Now, what  remains is  the question  whether the public purpose mentioned  in the notification is different from the purpose to  which it  is proposed  to be utilised, accepting the  plea   of  the  respondent  that  the  purpose  is  the construction  of  hospital  for  crippled  children  by  the Society. We  will refer  to  the  letters  on  which  strong reliance is  placed by  the respondents. The first letter is dated   6.9.1962,    from   the    Refugee    Rehabilitation Commissioner, West  Bengal, to the Assistant Secretary, R.R. & R.  Department. The  subject is mentioned as "Allotment of land in  Mouza Palpara,  P.S. Baranagar, Distt. 24 Parganas, to the  Society of Experimental Medical Sciences, India, for construction of  a hospital  for the crippled children." The letter states  that an  area of  1.10 acres of land out of a total declared  area of  3.85 acres  has been  decided to be handed over to the Society of Experimental Medical Sciences, India, for construction of a hospital for 278 crippled children.  The rest  of the  declared area  will be handed over  to the  Society on receipt of the same from the Collector after award. From this letter it is clear that the proposed hospital  for crippled children has something to do intimately with  the rehabilitation  process and that is why the  letter   is  written   by  the  Refugee  Rehabilitation Commissioner  to   the  Assistant   Secretary,  R.R.   &  R. Department.      The second letter is dated 28.11.1962, by the Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal to the Collector, 24 Parganas. This states that the entire land measuring 3.85 acres has  been decided to be handed over to the Society for the purpose  stated above.  The heading  of  the  letter  is "Government   of    West   Bengal,    Refugee   Relief   and Rehabilitation Department".  This letter also shows that the acquisition of  the entire land is intimately connected with the activities of the relief and rehabilitation department.      The learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  invited  our attention to  two other  letters  produced  along  with  the Special Leave  Petition. The  1st letter  is dated  3.1.1963

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from the  Under Secretary  to the Government of India to the Hony. General  Secretary, Society  of  Experimental  Medical Sciences, India, Calcutta, and the subject is: ".... setting up of  a  hospital  for  crippled  children  and  a  general hospital to  develop medical  facilities in  the interest of the displaced  persons from East Pakistan." From this letter it is evident that the matter was known to the Government of India also  and that the acquisition proceedings related not only to  3.85 acres  involved in  this acquisition, but to a much larger  area, for  a hospital  for crippled children as well as  a general hospital. This letter shows that the land will be allotted to the Society on a 99 years lease and that four blocks  of 64  tenements in the colony will be allotted to  the  Society  on  rental  basis  for  accommodating  the hospital staff. All these correspondence taken together show that the State wanted a much bigger area for re-habilitation of displaced persons from East Pakistan. The respondents can succeed only  if they  can establlsh  to the satisfaction of the Court  that  putting  up  of  a  hospital  for  crippled children  is   not  a  public  purpose  connected  with  the rehabilitation of displaced persons. To our pointed question to the  respondent’s counsel  whether the  construction of a hospital for  crippled children  is a public purpose or not, he admitted, after some hesitation, that it 279 was a  public purpose. The next step is to ascertain whether putting up  of such  a hospital  has something  to  do  with rehabilitation of displaced persons.      In Collins  Dictionary of  the  English  Language,  the meaning for  the word  ’rehabilitate’ is given as "to help a person (who  is physically  or mentally disabled or has just been released  from prison)  to readapt  to society or a new job   as    by   vocational    guidance,    retraining    or therepy.......". By  rehabilitation what  is meant is not to provide shelter  alone. The  real purpose  of rehabilitation can  be  achieved  only  if  those  who  are  sought  to  be rehabilitated are  provided with  shelter,  food  and  other necessary amenities  of  life.  It  would  be  too  much  to contend,  much   less  to  accept,  that  providing  medical facilities would  not come  within the  concept of  the word ’rehabilitation’. No  detailed discussion  is  necessary  to hold that putting up of a hospital and in particular one for crippled children  is one  of the  important facets  of  the concept of  ’rehabilitation of displaced persons’. Displaced persons are  an unenviable  section of  society. They  bring with them  not only  misery and  poverty but  ailments also. Their children  will be  afflicted by  manifold ailments. To provide a  hospital for  the disabled  and for  the crippled children  of   such  displaced  persons,  in  our  Judgment, squarely  comes   within  the   concept  of   the  idea   of ’rehabilitation’  and  consequently  of  settlement  of  the refugees.      The  original  object  of  acquisition  proceedings  is generally termed  as ’resettlement  of refugees’ which would mean their  rehabilitation. It  would be for the authorities concerned to  think of  providing various  amenities for the displaced persons  in the process of rehabilitation. In this case, after  the declaration  notification, the  authorities concerned thought of a hospital. They may think of providing educational institutions, shopping centres and the like. All these amenities  can be  conveniently included in the public purpose generally called ’settlement of refugees’.      The respondent’s  contention  can  be  approached  from another angle  also. It  is a  generally accepted  principle that persons interested in lands cannot lightly question the

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validity of  a notification under Section 4 or under Section 6 and  go behind them. When an acquisition is proposed for a public purpose  and the  purpose is  shown to  be  a  public purpose, 200 Courts  usually  frown  upon  lighthearted  attacks  on  the validity of the notification. In this case we see an unusual method of  fishing out information by looking into the files and discovering  two letters in which mention is made of the starting of  a hospital for crippled children. How can these letters help  the respondents? As we have mentioned earlier, the original  notification was  on 28.3.1957  and Section  6 notification was  on 4.1.1962.  The  two  letters  on  which reliance is  placed, came  into being  subsequently. This is because the idea of providing hospital for crippled children must have  occurred to  the officers concerned subsequently. There  may   arise  further   correspondence   between   the department  concerned   suggesting  starting   of   schools, providing transport  facility etc..  It  would  be  idle  to depend upon  such internal  communication, which is normally not available to the party whose property is acquired and to contend that the notification is bad.      Our  considered   view   in   this   matter   is   that establishment of  a hospital  for  crippled  children  falls within  the   idea  of   settlement  and  rehabilitation  is displaced persons  and the notification cannot be faulted on the ground  that the purpose disclosed in the letters is one different  from   the  public   purpose  disclosed   in  the notification. The  Division Bench  of the  High Court was in error in quashing the notification.      In the  result, we  allow the  appeal,  set  aside  the Judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore that of  the Single  Judge but,  in the circumstances of the case, with no order as to costs. A.P.J.                                  Appeal allowed. 281