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PETITIONER: COLLECTOR LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MST. KATIJI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/02/1987

BENCH: THAKKAR, M.P. (J) BENCH: THAKKAR, M.P. (J) RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1353            1987 SCR  (2) 387  1987 SCC  (2) 107        JT 1987 (1)   537  1987 SCALE  (1)413  CITATOR INFO :  R          1988 SC 897  (7)

ACT:     Indian  Limitation  Act, 1963; s.5--Condoning  delay  in filing  appeal--Existence of ’sufficient  cause’--Determina- tion of--State seeking condonation of delay----To be treated equitably.

HEADNOTE:     An  appeal  by the State. against a  decision  enhancing compensation in respect of acquisition of lands for a public purpose,  raising important questions as regards  principles of  valuation,  was  dismissed by the  High  Court  as  time barred, being four days beyond time, by rejecting an  appli- cation for condonation of dalay. The State appealed to this Court by special leave. Allowing the appeal,     HLED: 1.1 The expression ’sufficient cause’ employed  by the legislature in s.5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately  elastic to enable the Courts to  do  substantial justice  to  parties  by disposing  of  matters  on  merits. [388E-F] 1.2  The State which represents the collective cause of  the community. does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all  litigants, including  the  State as a litigant, are accorded  the  same treatment  and the law is administered in an equitable  man- ner.  The  Courts, therefore, have to be informed  with  the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of  the interpretation of the expression ’sufficient cause’. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application  to matters  at  hand  with the end in view to  do  even  handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which  scut- tles a decision on merits. [390B-C]     2.  In  the instant case, sufficient  cause  exists  for delay in instituting the appeal in the High Court. Delay is, therefore,  condoned.  The matter is remitted  to  the  High Court for disposal on merits. [390C-D]

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 460 of 1987. 388      From  the  Judgment and Order dated 14.4. 1986  of  the Jammu & and Kashmir High Court in Civil 1st Appeal No. 54 of 1985.      Altar Anjad, Adv. General and S.K. Bhattacharya for the Appellants. S.M. Aquil and Shakeel Ahmed for the Respondents. The Order of the Court was delivered by     THAKKAR,  J. To condone, or not to condone, is  not  the only question. Whether or not to apply the same standard  in applying  the "sufficient cause" test to all  the  litigants regardless  of  their  personality in the  said  context  is another.     An  appeal  preferred by the State of  Jammu  &  Kashmir arising out of a decision enhancing compensation in  respect of  acquisition of lands for a public purpose to the  extent of  nearly 14 lakhs rupees by making an upward  revision  of the  order of 800% (from Rs. 1000 per kanal to  Rs.8000  per kanal)  which  also raised important  questions  as  regards principles of valuation was dismissed as time barred being 4 days beyond time by rejecting an application for condonation of delay. Hence this appeal by special leave.     The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of  1963 in  order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice  to parties by disposing of matters on ’merits’. The  expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a  meaning- ful  manner which subserves the ends of justice--that  being the  life-purpose  for the existence of the  institution  of Courts.  It  is common knowledge that this  Court  has  been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters  instituted in  this  Court.  But the message does not  appear  to  have percolated  down to all the other Courts in  the  hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-  "Any  appeal or any application, other than an  application under  any  of the provisions of Order XXI of  the  Code  of Civil Procedure, 1908. may be admitted after the  prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that  he had sufficient cause for not preferring the  appeal or making the application within such period." 389                    1.  Ordinarily a litigant does not  stand               to benefit by lodging an appeal late.                    2.  Refusing to condone delay can  result               in  a meritorious matter being thrown  out  at               the very threshold and cause of justice  being               defeated.  As against this when delay is  con-               doned  the highest that can happen is  that  a               cause would be decided on merits after hearing               the parties.                    3. "Every day’s delay must be  explained"               does not mean that a pedantic approach  should               be  made.  Why not every hour’s  delay,  every               second’s delay? The doctrine               must  be  applied in a rational  common  sense               pragmatic               manner.                    4. When substantial justice and technical               considerations are pitted against each  other,               cause  of substantial justice deserves  to  be

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             preferred  for the other side cannot claim  to               have  vested  right in  injustice  being  done               because of a non-deliberate delay.                      5.  There is no presumption that  delay               is  occasioned deliberately, or on account  of               culpable  negligence,  or on account  of  mala               fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by               resorting to delay. In fact he runs a  serious               risk.                    6.  It must be grasped that judiciary  is               respected  not  on  account of  its  power  to               legalize  injustice on technical  grounds  but               because  it is capable of  removing  injustice               and is expected to do so. Making  a justice-oriented approach from  this  perspective, there  was sufficient cause for condoning the delay  in  the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the  ’State’ which  was seeking condonation and not a private  party  was altogether  irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before  law demands  that all litigants, including the State as a  liti- gant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is  admin- istered  in an even handed manner. There is no  warrant  for according  a stepmotherly treatment when the ’State’ is  the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact  experi- ence  shows that on account of an impersonal  machinary  (no one  in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by  the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the in- 390 herited  bureaucratic methodology imbued with the  note-mak- ing,  file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay  on its part is less difficult to understand though more  diffi- cult  to approve. In any event, the State  which  represents the  collective cause of the community, does not  deserve  a litigant-non-grata  status. The Courts therefore have to  be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision  in the  course of the interpretation of the expression  "suffi- cient cause". So also the same approach has to be  evidenced in  its application to matters at hand with the end in  view to  do  even handed justice on mertis in preference  to  the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts  of the matter giving rise to the present  appeal,  we are  satisfied that sufficient cause exists for  the  delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before  it as time barred, is therefore. set aside. Delay is  condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will  now  dispose of the appeal on merits  after  affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides. Appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs. P.S.S.                                                Appeal allowed. 391