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PETITIONER: CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES’ UNION &ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/10/1987

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) SINGH, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR   37            1988 SCR  (1) 546  1987 SCC  (4) 691        JT 1987 (4)   129  1987 SCALE  (2)798  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1988 SC 305  (22)  RF         1991 SC 101  (263)

ACT:      Constitution of  India-Art. 30(I)  read with  Arts. 41, 42, &  43-Right  to  establish  and  administer  educational institutions of  their choice  conferred  on  religious  and linguistic minorities-The  right has to be exercised subject to the  general laws enacted by the State to give protection to the recognised rights of workers.      Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947-ss. 9A, 10, ll-A, 12 and 33-In  their   application   to   educational   institutions established and  administered by  religious  and  linguistic minorities,  the   provisions  do   not  abridge  the  right conferred on them by Art. 30(l) of the Constitution.

HEADNOTE: %      Sometime  during   the  period   1975-78,   the   first respondent-Association managing the affairs of the Christian Medical College  and Hospital  at Vellore dismissed three of its employees  from service  and terminated  the services of another employee  who  was  on  probation.  When  industrial disputes were  raised in  this behalf,  the State Government made  two  separate  references  to  the  Labour  Court  for adjudication: one  in respect of the three employees who had been dismissed  and the  other in  respect of  the  employee whose services had been terminated. Questioning the validity of  the  reference  the  first  respondent  filed  two  Writ Petitions for  quashing  them  and  a  third  Writ  Petition praying  for  a  declaration  that  the  provisions  of  the Industrial Disputes  Act,  1947  were  unconstitutional  and ultra  vires  and  were  inapplicable  in  entirety  to  the minority educational institutions protected by Art. 30(l) of the Constitution.  The first  Respondent  pleaded  that  the hospital attached to the Christian Medical College formed an integral part  of  the  college  which  was  an  educational institution established  and administered  by a minority and thus was also entitled to the protection of Art. 30(l); that the college  and the  hospital being  minority  institutions entitled to  the protection  of Art.  30(l), any  industrial

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dispute arising  between the management and employees of the college and the hospital could not be adjudicated upon under the provisions  of the  Act as such adjudication amounted to interference with the right of the minority to 547 administer the  college and  the hospital;  and that the Act was not  applicable to  educational  institutions  generally irrespective of their being minority institutions or not.      The High  Court held that the Christian Medical College Hospital which was attached to the Christian Medical College was an  educational institution;  that even  so, it  was  an industry within  the meaning  of the  expression  ’industry’ given in  the Act,  and that even though the College and the hospital constituted an industry, they together constituting an educational institution established and administered by a minority, ss.  9-A, 10, 11-A, 12 and 33 of the Act would not be applicable  to them  by  virtue  of  Art.  30(l)  of  the Constitution, and,  accordingly, quashed  the reference made under s. 10(l)(c) of the Act to the Labour Court.      It was  argued on  behalf of  the first respondent that the application of the provisions of the Act would result in the abridgment  of the  right of  the management of minority educational institutions  guaranteed under Art. 30(l) of the Constitution to administer such institutions inasmuch as the Labour Court  or  Tribunal  might  set  aside  an  order  of dismissal or  removal of  a workman passed by the management and reinstate  him in  service or make an order altering his conditions of service contrary to the agreement entered into with him  and the  minority educational institution would be exposed to  constant and  endless litigation.  Reliance  was placed in  support of the above propositions on the decision of this  Court in  Ahmedabad St.  Xavier’s College Society & Anr. etc.  v. State  of Gujarat  & Anr., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 173 wherein this  Court held  that  certain  provisions  of  the Gujarat University Act, 1949 were violative of Art. 30(l) of the Constitution.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD:  The  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  has  been conceived and  enacted with  the  object  of  bringing  into existence a  machinery for  investigation and  settlement of industrial  disputes   between  employers   and  workmen  in accordance with the principles accepted by the International Labour organisation  and the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural organisation. The Act is meant to be a counter- vailing force  to counteract  the inequalities of bargaining power which  is inherent in the employment relationship. The International Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural Rights, 1966  which is  a basic  document declaring  certain specific human  rights in  addition to proclaiming the right to work  as a  human right  treats equitable  conditions  of work, prohibition  of forced  labour, provision for adequate remuneration, the 548 right to  a limitation  of work  hours, to rest and leisure, the right to form and join trade unions of ones’ choice, the right to  strike etc.  also as human rights. The Preamble of our Constitution  says  that  our  country  is  a  socialist republic. Articles  41 and  42 provide  that the State shall make effective  provision for  securing right  to work, just and humane  conditions of  work and  for  maternity  relief. Article 43  states that  the State shall endeavour to secure by suitable  legislation or  economic organisation or in any other  way   to  all  workers  agricultural,  industrial  or otherwise work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a

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decent standard  of life  and full  enjoyment of leisure and social and  cultural opportunities.  These rights  which are enforced through the several pieces of labour legislation in India have  got to  be applied to every workman irrespective of the character of the management. Even the management of a minority educational  institution has  got to  respect these right and  implement them. Due obedience to these laws would assist in the smooth working of the educational institutions and would  facilitate their  proper administration.  If such laws  are   made  inapplicable   to   minority   educational institutions, there is every likelihood of such institutions being subjected  to  maladministration.  Merely  because  an impartial tribunal  is entrusted  with the duty of resolving disputes relating  to employment,  unemployment, security of work and  other conditions of workmen it cannot be said that the right guaranteed under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution is violated. If  a dispute is raised by an employee against the management  of   a  minority  educational  institution  such dispute will  have necessarily  to be  resolved by providing appropriate machinery  for that purpose. Laws are now passed by  all   the  civilized  countries  providing  for  such  a machinery. The  Act with which we are concerned in this case is an  Act which  has been  brought into force for resolving such industrial  disputes. Sections  9A, 10, 11-A, 12 and 33 of the  Act cannot,  therefore, be  construed as interfering with  the   right  guaranteed   under  Art.   30(1)  of  the Constitution. [570D H; 571A-C. E-F]      2. The  Act is  a social  security measure  intended to ensure welfare  of labour  and it  falls within  one or  the other of  the following  entries in  List III of the Seventh Schedule  to   the  Constitution:   Entry  22-Trade  Unions, industrial and labour disputes; Entry 23-Social security and social insurance,  employment and unemployment; and Entry 24 Welfare of  labour including  conditions of  work, provident funds,   employer’s   liability,   workmen’s   compensation, invalidity and  old age pensions and maternity benefits. The Act generally  applies to all industries irrespective of the religion or caste to which the parties belong. It applies to industries owned  by the  Central and  the State Governments too. Any  decision given  by the  Industrial Tribunal  or  a Labour Court under 549 the Act  is subject  to judicial  review by  the High  Court under Art. 226 and an appeal to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The Labour Court, the Industrial Tribunal, the High  Court and  this Court  while dealing  with matters arising out  of the  Act have to deal with them objectively. The smooth  running of  an educational  institution  depends upon the  employment of  workmen who  are not  subjected  to victimisation  or   any  other  kind  of  maltreatment.  The conditions  of   service  of  workmen  in  all  institutions including  minority  educational  institutions  have  to  be protected in  the interest  of the  entire society  and  any unfair  labour   practice,  such  as  ’hiring  and  firing’, termination or  retrenchment of  the service of a workmen on irrational grounds  will have  to be  checked. The Act makes provisions in  respect of  these matters.  The Act  being  a general law  for prevention  and  settlement  of  industrial disputes  cannot  be  construed  as  a  law  which  directly interferes with  the right  of administration  of a minority educational institution  guaranteed under  Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. The  law is  not enacted  with the  object  of interfering with any such right. It clearly falls within the observation of  Mathew, J. in Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society &  Ant. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. that "regular tax

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measures, economic  regulations, social welfare legislation, wage and  hour legislation  and  similar  measures  may,  of course have some effect upon the right under Art. 30(l). But where the burden is the same as that borne by others engaged in different  forms of  activity, the  similar impact on the right  seems   clearly   insufficient   to   constitute   an abridgement". [582A-G]      Observations of  Mathew, J.  in Ahmedabad  St. Xavier’s College Society  & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 173, relied nn      3. The  decision  in  Ahmedabad  St.  Xavier’s  College Society & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. is distinguishable from the  present one. Clause (b) of the two sub-sections of s. 51-A  of the  Gujarat University  Act, 1949  conferred  a blanket  power  on  the  Vice-Chancellor  or  other  officer authorised by  him to approve or not any recommendation made by  the   management  regarding   the  dismissal,   removal, reduction in  rank or  termination of  service of a workman. The said  Act did  not furnish  any guidelines regarding the exercise of  that power  which was in the nature of a ’veto’ power. Secondly,  s. 52-A of the said Act which required the disputes between  the governing  body and  any member of the teaching staff,  other academic and non-teaching staff of an affiliated college  or recognized  or  approved  institution connected with  the conditions  of service of such member to be referred  to a Tribunal of Arbitration, consisting of one nominated by the governing body of the college 550 or, as  the case  may be,  of  the  recognised  or  approved institution, one member nominated by the member of the staff involved in  the dispute and an Umpire approved by the Vice- Chancellor was  held to  be an unconstitutional interference with  the   right  guaranteed   under  Art.   30(1)  of  the Constitution as  it  was  likely  to  involve  the  minority educational  institutions   in  a   series  of   arbitration proceedings and  the power  vested in the Vice-Chancellor to nominate an  Umpire  to  decide  all  disputes  between  the governing body  and the  members of the staff connected with the letter’s  conditions of service would make virtually the Vice-Chancellor the person who would have the ultimate voice in the  decision of  the Tribunal  of Arbitration. There was also no  check on  the question  whether the dispute was one which  deserved   to  be   considered  by  the  Tribunal  of Arbitration. In  the instant  case there is no room for such contingency to  arise. A  reference under  the Act has to be made by  the Government either when both parties request the Government to  refer an  industrial dispute for adjudication or only when it is satisfied that there exists an industrial dispute.  When   an  industrial   dispute   exists   or   is apprehended, the  conciliation officer should first consider whether it can be settled after hearing both the parties and it is only when his efforts to bring about a settlement fail and  he  makes  a  report  accordingly  to  the  appropriate Government, the Government is called upon to take a decision on the  question whether the case is a fit one for reference to the  Industrial Tribunal  or the Labour Court. It is only when a  reference is  made by  the Government the Industrial Tribunal or  the Labour  Court gets jurisdiction to decide a case. It  cannot, therefore,  be said  that each  and  every dispute raised  by a workman would automatically end up in a reference to  the Industrial  Tribunal or  the Labour Court. Secondly, the circumstances in which the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court may set aside the decision arrived at by the management  in the  course of a domestic enquiry held by the management  into an  act of  misconduct of a workman are

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evolved by  a series of judicial decisions. The powers of an industrial tribunal  to interfere in cases of dismissal of a workman by the management are not unlimited and the Tribunal does not  act as  a court  of appeal  and substitute its own judgment for  that of  the management. It will interfere (a) where there  is want  of  good  faith;  (b)  when  there  is victimisation  or  unfair  labour  practice:  (c)  when  the management has  been guilty  of the basic error or violation of the  principles of  natural justice;  and (d) when on the materials  before   the  Court  the  finding  is  completely baseless or perverse. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Industrial  Tribunal  or  the  Labour  Court  will  function arbitrarily  and   interfere  with  every  decision  of  the management as  regards dismissal  or discharge  of a workman arrived at  in a disciplinary enquiry. The power exercisable by 551 the  Industrial   Tribunal  or   the  Labour  Court  cannot, therefore, be  equated with the power of ’veto’ conferred on the Vice-Chancellor  under cl.(b)  of either of the two sub- sections of  s. 51-A of the Gujarat University Act, 1949. As already stated  the decision  of the  Industrial Tribunal or the Labour  Court is  open to  judicial review  by the  High Court and  by this  Court  on  appeal.  Section  ll-A  which confers the  power on  the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to substitute a lesser punishment in lieu of the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the management cannot be considered  as   conferring  an   arbitrary  power   on  the Industrial Tribunal  or the Labour Court. The power under s. ll-A has  to be  exercised  judicially  and  the  Industrial Tribunal or  the Labour  Court is expected to interfere with the decision  of a  management under s. ll-A only when it is satisfied that  the punishment  imposed by the management is highly disproportionate  to  the  degree  of  guilt  of  the workman concerned.  The Industrial  Tribunal or  the  Labour Court has  to give  reasons for  its decision  which  again, would be  subject to  judicial review  by the High Court and this Court. [565C-H; 566A-H; 567A]      Ahmedabad St.  Xavier’s College Society & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 173, distinguished.      Indian Iron  & Steel  Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. Their Workmen, [1958] S.C.R. 667; Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina & ORS [1979] 1 S.C.R. 820; Mrs. Y. Theclamma v. Union of India &ORS. [1987] 2  S.C.C.   516;  Frank   Anthony  Public  School  Employees Association v. Union of India & ORS. [1986] 4 S.C.C. 707 and All Saints  High School,  Hyderabad, etc.  v. Government  of Andhra Pradesh  & ORS.  etc., [1980]  2 S.C.R. 924; referred to.      4. In  this context  it is interesting to note that the right to  enter into  a contract  flowing from  the right to liberty  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the Constitution of  the United  States  of  America  which  was considered to be an absolute right at one stage is no longer construed as  a bar on the legislature making a law imposing restrictions on  the managements  in order  to  advance  the welfare of  the labour.  It is  now settled  in  the  United States of America that neither the ’contract’ clause not the ’due process’  clause had the effect of overriding the power of  the   state  to   establish  all  regulations  that  are reasonably necessary  to secure  the  health,  safety,  good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community and that this power  can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable  even by express grant; and that all contract and property  or other vested rights are held subject to its fair exercise.  In view of the change in the attitude of the

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Court laws 552 regulating hours  of labour,  labour in mines, employment of children in  hazardous occupation, payment of wages, minimum wages  laws,  workmen’s  compensation  laws  and  collective bargaining have  been upheld in recent years. Similarly, the right to  religious freedom  and the  right to  free  speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States  of America, though they appear to be absolute have been construed to be subject to regulation by the State in exercise  of its legitimate police Powers. [572C; 573C-E; 577C]      Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S.l; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45; Adair v. United States, 208  U.S. 161; Lincoln Federal Labour Union v. North Western Inn  & Metal  Co., 335  U.S. 525; Reynolds v. United States, 98  U.S. 145;  and Whitney  v. California.  274 U.S. 357: referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8818 of 1983.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  23.12.1982 of  the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 220, 221 and 222 of 1980.      C.S. Vaidyanathan,  M.N. Krishnamani, Parbir Chowdhary, S.R. Bhat and K.V. Mohan for the Appellants.      F.S. Nariman,  Harbans Lal,  Shanti Bhushan,  Harish N. Salve, H.K.  Puri, S. Ramasubramaniam, Rajen Mahapatra, Miss Mridula Ray,  Mrs. Kitty  Kumarmangalam, C.V.  Subba Rao, R. Mohan, and A.V. Rangam for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH, J.  The important  question which arises for determination in this appeal by special leave is whether sections 9-A, 10, 11-A, 12 and 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ’the  Act’)  are applicable  to   educational  institutions  established  and administered by  minorities which  are protected by clause ( 1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India. 553 the highest  grade in  the art  and science  of Medicine and Nursing or  in one  or other  of the  related professions to equip them,  in the  spirit of  Christ, for  service in  the relief of  suffering and  the promotion of health. ’ Dr. Ida Scudder, a  daughter of  an American  Medical missionary  in India, realising the need for more women doctors in India to give relief of the suffering women, in particular, started a one-bed clinic  in 1900  at Vellore  in the  State of  Tamil Nadu. Within two years she set up a 40-bed hospital with the assistance of  a group  of medical  women.  Since  her  main desire was  to train  women as nurses and doctors who should go out to serve suffering women and children she started the training courses for nurses in 1906 and a medical school for women in  1918. The  hospital and the medical school grew in their stature  in course  of time.  The medical  school  was converted into  a medical  college with  degree  courses  in 1942. In the year 1947 even men were admitted to the medical college as  students.  The  hospital  has  since  become  an important medical institution in South India The hospital is being used  for training the students of the medical college by providing  clinical facilities.  The medical  college and the college  of nursing  in Vellore  are affiliated  to  the University of  Madras and  they both  go by  the  name,  the Christian Medical  College. In the medical college the post-

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graduate degree  courses have also been started. In addition thereto   post-graduate   diploma   courses   in   different specialities have  also been started. In the year 1982, when the common judgment of the High Court of Madras in the three writ  petitions,  out  of  which  this  appeal  arises,  was delivered, there  were about  500 students  including  post- graduate students  in the medical college, 400 in college of nursing and  about 164  in para medical courses. The medical college also  conducts research  into the fundamental causes of diseases,  their prevention  and treatment.  It  is  also claimed that  the  medical  college  is  a  pioneer  in  the development of  higher specialities  like Cardiology,  Neuro Surgery,  Psychiatry,  Thoracic  Surgery,  Urology,  Gastro- Enterology  etc.   The  hospital   in  which   the  clinical facilities are  provided to  the  students  of  the  medical college is  also a  very big  hospital which  attracts large number of patients, many of whom are treated as in-patients. The college  and the  hospital  are  now  being  managed  by respondent  No.   1  Association.   In  view  of  the  heavy responsibilities undertaken  by the college and the hospital it has  become necessary to employ a large number of persons as teachers, doctors, nurses and other staff for running the college and  the hospital, and also administrative staff for the purpose  of managing their affairs. The employees of the college and  the hospital  are paid  salaries and allowances and are  entitled to  the usual conditions of service as are applicable to  such employees  in other medical colleges and hospitals in India. It is natural 554 that in a big establishment like the one under consideration between A  the management  and its  employees there would be disputes with regard to the security of employment and other conditions of service.      Sometime during  the period 1975-1978, three employees, namely, Mr.  Gilbert Samuel,  a clerk  in  the  Microbiology Department of  the Christian  Medical College  and Hospital, Mr. M.  Devadoss, a  packer in  the Central  Sterile  Supply Department of  the Hospital and Mrs. Yesudial, a cook in the Staff &  Student Nurses’  Hostel of  the Rural Health Center attached to the hospital, were dismissed from service by the management. On  an industrial  dispute being  raised by  the Christian  Medical  College  Hospital  Employee’s  Union  in respect of  the dismissal  of the  above three  persons, the Government of  Madras by  its order dated 19.2.1979 referred the   following   question   to   the   Labour   Court   for adjudication:-           "Whether  the   non-employment  of   Thiruvalargal           Gilbert Samuel,  M. Devadoss  and Tmt. Yesudial is           justified, and if not, to what relief each of them           would be  entitled; to  compute the relief, if any           awarded, it  terms of  money, if  it could  be  so           computed."  This  reference was  numbered as I.D. No. 52 of 1979 on the file of the Labour Court      one R.  Subramaniam, a  probationer Stenographer of the above institutions,  whose services  had been  terminated in 1975 at  the end  of the  probationary period also raised an industrial dispute  in 1978  and that case was also referred to the  Labour Court  by the  State Government on 11.4.1979. The question referred to the Labour Court read as follows:           "Whether   the    non-employment   of   Thiru   R.           Subramaniam is justified, if not to what relief he           is  entitled;   to  compute  the  relief,  if  any           awarded, in  terms of  money, if  it could  be  so           computed."

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This  reference was  numbered as I.D. No. 84 of 1979 on the file of the Labour Court.      Questioning the  validity of  the above  two references the first  respondent-Association filed  Writ Petition  Nos. 221 and  222 of 1980 on the file of the High Court of Madras for quashing the said refe- 555 rences. The  first respondent-Association  also  filed  Writ Petition No.  220 of  1980 on  the file of the High Court of Madras praying  for a declaration that the provisions of the Act  were   unconstitutional  and   ultra  vires   and  were inapplicable  in   entirety  to   the  minority  educational institutions protected  by Article 30(1) of the Constitution of  India,  like  the  Christian  Medical  College  and  the hospital attached thereto at Vellore.      The  first   respondent-Association  pleaded  that  the hospital attached to the Christian Medical College formed an integral part  of  the  college  which  was  an  educational institution established  and administered  by a minority and thus was also entitled to the protection of Article 30(1) of the Constitution  of India.  Secondly, it was urged that the college  and   the  hospital   being  minority  institutions entitled  to   the  protection   of  Article  30(1)  of  the Constitution of India any industrial dispute arising between the management and employees of the college and the hospital could not  be adjudicated  upon under  the provisions of the Act as  such adjudication  amounted to interference with the right of  the minority  to administer  the college  and  the hospital   which   together   constituted   an   educational institution. It  was also  contended that  the Act  was  not applicable    to    educational    institutions    generally irrespective of their being minority institutions or not The petitions were contested by the Union of India, the State of Tamil Nadu,  the  Christian  Medical  College  and  Hospital Employees’ Union  and the  workmen concerned. The High Court after hearing the parties recorded the following findings:-      1. The  Christian Medical  College Hospital  which  was attached to the Christian Medical College was an educational institution;             2. The  Christian Medical  College Hospital even though it  was an  educational institution  was an  industry within the meaning of the expression ’industry’ given in the Act; and      3. Even  though the  Christian Medical  College and the hospital attached  thereto  constituted  an  industry,  they together constituting an educational institution established and administered  by a  minority, sections 9-A, 10, 11-A, 12 and 33  of the Act would not be applicable to them by virtue of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the  High Court  quashed  the  references  made under section  10(1)(c) of  the Act  to  the  Labour  Court. Aggrieved by  the judgment  of the  High Court the Christian Medical College Hospital 556 Employees’ Union  and one  of its  workman have  filed  this appeal by special leave.      The principal  question which  arises for determination in this  case is  whether the  Act which  is passed with the twin  object  of  preventing  industrial  disputes  and  the settlement of  such disputes between employers and employees is  applicable   to  educational   institutions  which   are protected by  Article 30(1)  of the  Constitution of  India. Article 30(1)  of the  Constitution  of  India  provides  as follows:-           "All minorities,  whether  based  on  religion  or

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         language, shall  have the  right to  establish and           administer  educational   institutions  of   their           choice. "      In Re. The Kerala Educational Bill, 1957, [1959] S.C.R. 995. this  Court construed Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India and held thus:-           The first  point to note is that the Article gives           certain rights  not only  to religious  minorities           but also  to linguistic  minorities. In  the  next           place, the  right conferred  on such minorities is           to establish  educational  institutions  of  their           choice. It  does not  say that minorities based on           religion should establish educational institutions           for teaching  religion only,  or  that  linguistic           minorities should  have  the  right  to  establish           educational  institutions   for   teaching   their           language only.  What the Article says and means is           that the  religious and  the linguistic minorities           should have  the right  to  establish  educational           institutions of  their choice.  (Pages  l052-l053)           ................. The  next thing  to note is that           the  Article,  in  terms,  gives  all  minorities,           whether based on religion or language, two rights,           namely, the  right to  establish and  the right to           administer  educational   institutions  of   their           choice. (Page  1053) ..  The right  to  administer           cannot   obviously    include   the    right    to           maladminister. (Page 1062) .... ...."      The meaning  of Article  30(I) of  the Constitution  of India was  again considered  by a Constitution Bench of this Court in  the Ahmedabad  St. Xavier’s College Society & Anr. etc. v.  5tate of  Gujarct & Anr., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 173. Ray, C.J. Observed in the above decision thus:- 557                "The minority  institutions have the right to           administer institutions.  This right  implies  the           obligation and  duty of  the minority institutions           to render  the very  best to  the students. In the           right of  administration, checks  and balances  in           the shape  of regulatory  measures are required to           ensure the  appointment of good teachers and their           conditions of  service. The right to administer is           to  be   tempered  with   regulatory  measures  to           facilitate   smooth   administration.   The   best           administration will  reveal no  trace or colour of           minority. A  minority institution  should shine in           exemplary eclectism  in the  administration of the           institution. The  best compliment that can be paid           to a minority institution is that it does not rest           on or proclaim its minority character.                Regulations which  will serve the interest of           the students,  regulations which  will  serve  the           interest  of   the  teachers   are  of   paramount           importance in  good administration. Regulations in           the interest of efficiency of teachers, discipline           and fairness  in administration  are necessary for           preserving harmony  among affiliated institutions.           (Pages 196-197)           ..................................................                In the  field of  administration  it  is  not           reasonable to  claim  that  minority  institutions           will  have   complete  autonomy.   Checks  on  the           administration may be necessary in order to ensure           that the administration is efficient and sound and           will serve  the academic needs of the institution.

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         The  right   of  a   minority  to  administer  its           educational institution involves, as part of it, a           correlative duty  of  good  administration.  (Page           200)"      Mathew, J.  discussing what type of action by the State would amount  to the  abridgement of  the  right  guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India observed at page 265-266 thus:-                "The application  of the  term ’abridge’  may           not be  difficult in  many cases  but the  problem           arises acutely in certain types of situations. The           important ones  are where  a law  is not  a direct           restriction  of  the  right  but  is  designed  to           accomplish another  objective and  the impact upon           the right 558           is  secondary  or  indirect.  Measures  which  are           directed at  other forms  of activities  but which           have a  secondary or  direct or  incidental effect           upon the  right do  not generally  abridge a right           unless the  content of  the right is regulated. As           we have  already said, such measures would include           various types of taxes, economic regulations, laws           regulating the  wages, measures  to promote health           and to  preserve hygiene and other laws of general           application.  By  hpothesis,  the  law,  taken  by           itself, is a legitimate one, aimed directly at the           control of  some other  activity. The  question is           about its  secondary impact upon the admitted area           of  administration  of  educational  institutions.           This is  especially a  problem of determining when           the  regulation  in  issue  has  an  effect  which           constitutes an  abridgement of  the constitutional           right within  the meaning  of  Article  13(2).  In           other  words,   in  every  case,  the  court  must           undertake to  define and  give content to the word           ’abridge’ in  Article 13(2)(1). The question to be           asked  and  answered  is  whether  the  particular           measure is  regulatory or  whether it  crosses the           zone of  permissible  regulation  and  enters  the           forbidden    territory    of    restrictions    or           abridgement.   So,    even   if   an   educational           institution  established   by   a   religious   or           linguistic minority  does  not  seek  recognition,           affiliation or  aid, its activity can be regulated           in various  ways provided  the regulations  do not           take away or abridge the guaranteed right. Regular           tax measures, economic regulations, social welfare           legislation, wage and hour legislation and similar           measures may,  of course have some effect upon the           right under Article 30(I). But where the burden is           the same  as  that  borne  by  others  engaged  in           different forms of activity, the similar impact on           the right seems clearly insufficient to constitute           an  abridgement.  If  an  educational  institution           established  by  a  religious  minority  seeks  no           recognition, affiliation  or aid,  the  state  may           have no  right to prescribe the curriculum, sllabi           or the qualification of the teachers. "                                         (Underlining by us). 559 machinery for  investigation and  settlement  of  industrial disputes between  employers and  workmen in  accordance with the decisions  of the International Labour organisation. The Act provides  for a machinery for collective bargaining. The

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object of  industrial adjudications  has, therefore, been to be a  countervailing force to counteract the inequalities of bargaining  power   which  is  inherent  in  the  employment relationship. In one of the commentaries on the Act the need for  and   the  character   of  industrial  adjudication  is described as follows:                "The law  governing industrial  relations  is           one of  the vitally important branches of the law-           the legal  system on  which depends the social and           economic security  of a  very large majority. "The           parties to  the  industrial  disputes  present  an           infinite permutations of attitudes" on, economics,           politics and human relations. General consensus on           the methods of resolving them is beyond reach. The           core of modern industrial law, therefore, consists           of the  problems dealing with the conflict arising           between  the   industrial  employers   and   their           employees  relating   to  employment   and  social           security. The  study of industrial law, therefore,           necessarily concerns  itself with  the struggle of           industrial  workmen   for  security.   It  is  the           security of  job, the  minimum standard of living,           of  his  future  and  that  of  his  children  and           conversely the  fear of  insecurity which  bedevil           the  worker.  In  other  words,  security  is  the           keystone in  dealing with the industrial relations           between  the   industrial  employers   and   their           workers. The  industrial worker, therefore, is the           ’focal  point’   of  any   legal  enquiry  in  the           industrial  relations.   In  the  words  of  Prof.           Forkosch, "the sociologist may see the worker as a           human being  caught in  congeries of frustrations,           complexes and  urges-a mind  that cannot cope with           the baffling contradictions of the modern society.           "There is",  therefore, as  Prof. Otto Kahn-Freund           points out "everywhere a constant need for finding           a judicium  finium regundorum  between  collective           bargaining  and   legislation  of   all  kinds  as           instruments for  the regulation  of conditions  of           employment-wages and hours, holidays and pensions,           health,   safety    and   welfare,    and    even,           increasingly,   social    security."   (See   O.P.           Malhotra: The  Law of  Industrial disputes, Fourts           Edn., Vol. I, (1985)-Introduction-page XX)      Section 2(k) of the Act defines an ’industrial dispute 560 dispute or  difference between  employers and  employers  or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is  connected with the employment or non-employment on the terms  of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person.  The Act  provides for the constitution of works committees  in   industrial  establishments   employing  100 workmen or  more and  they are  charged  with  the  duty  of removing causes of friction between the employer and workmen in the day-to-day working of the establishment and promoting measures for securing amity and good relations between them. Industrial peace  is most  enduring where  it is  founded on voluntary settlement, and the works committees are entrusted with the duty of providing a machinery for the settlement of disputes. Section 12 of the Act provides for the appointment of Conciliation  officers in  order to negotiate between the managements and  their workmen and to bring about settlement if possible.  If  the  conciliation  proceedings  fail,  the Conciliation officer has to make a report to the appropriate Government  accordingly.   A  reference   to  an  Industrial

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Tribunal of  a dispute  under section  10 of the Act is made where both  parties to  an industrial dispute apply for such reference or  where the  appropriate Government considers it expedient so  to do.  An award  of  a  Tribunal  may  be  in operation for a period of one year subject to the provisions of section  19 of  the Act.  The power  to refer disputes to Industrial  Tribunals   and  enforce   their  awards  is  an essential corollary  to the  obligation  that  lies  on  the Government  to   secure  conclusive   determination  of  the disputes with a view to redressing the legitimate grievances of the  parties thereto,  such obligation  arising from  the imposition of  restraints on  the rights of strike and lock- out,   which    must   remain    inviolate,   except   where considerations of  public interest override such rights. The Industrial Tribunals  or Labour Courts constituted under the Act are  presided over by persons having judicial experience such as  a person  who is  or has  been a  Judge of the High Court or who has been for a period not less than three years a District Judge or an Additional District Judge or a person who has  not less  than five  years’  service  as  presiding officer of  a Labour Court constituted under any law for the time being  in force  or who  holds a  degree in  law  of  a University established  by law  in any  part of India and is holding or  has held  an of fice not lower in rank than that of  Assistant   Commissioner  of   Labour  under  the  State Government for  not  less  than  ten  years.  The  Presiding officer of  a Labour Court should also possess substantially the same qualifications and they are set out in section 7 of the Act.  Section 9-A  of the  Act,  which  is  one  of  the sections  the   applicability  of   which  to   a   minority educational institution  is  questioned,  provides  that  no employer,  who   proposes  to   effect  any  change  in  the conditions of service 561 applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the  Fourth Schedule  to the Act shall effect such change without giving  to the workmen likely to be affected by such change a  notice in  the prescribed  manner of the nature of the change  proposed to  be effected;  or within  twenty-one days of  giving such  notice, except  in certain cases which are mentioned  in the  proviso  thereto.  This  section  was introduced since  there was  a persistent demand that notice should be  given whenever it was proposed to make any change in the conditions of service of the workmen. Section 11-A of the Act  confers powers  on the Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals  to give  appropriate relief  in case  of discharge or dismissal of workmen. It provides that where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workmen  has been  referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudicational proceedings,  the Labour  Court, Tribunal  or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of  discharge or  dismissal was not justified, it may, by its  award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct  reinstatement of  the workman  on such terms and conditions, if  any, as  it thinks  fit, or  give such other relief to  the workman  including the  award of  any  lesser punishment  in   lieu  of  discharge  or  dismissal  as  the circumstances of  the case  may require. On the basis of the materials on  record, the  Tribunal is  empowered to pass an appropriate order  under section 11-A of the Act. Section 33 of the  Act provides  that the conditions of service etc. Of the  employees   should  remain   unchanged  under   certain circumstances  during  pendency  of  proceedings  before  an arbitrator or  a conciliation  officer or  a Board or of any

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proceeding before  a Labour  Court or  Tribunal or  National Tribunal in  respect of  an industrial  dispute. It  further provides that  no employer  shall in  regard to  any  matter connected with  the dispute,  alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to  them immediately  before the  commencement of such proceeding;  or for  any misconduct  connected with the dispute,  discharge  or  punish,  whether  by  dismissal  or otherwise, any  workman concerned in such dispute, save with the express  permission in  writing of  the authority before which the  proceedings is  pending.  If  the  conditions  of service relate  to any matter not connected with the dispute or if  the misconduct  of the  workman is not connected with the dispute  the management  should seek the approval of the authority concerned  and comply  with the  other  conditions mentioned in  the proviso  to  section  33(2)  of  the  Act. Section 33(3)  of the  Act provides  that  in  the  case  of protected workmen  the express  permission of  the authority concerned should  be obtained  before  any  such  action  is taken. Section 33-A of the Act pro- H 562 vides for the making of an application before a conciliation officer, A Board, an arbitrator, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal  for appropriate  relief if  section 33 of the Act  is contravened. Thus it is seen that the Act is one which is  enacted as  a social  security measure in order to ensure welfare  of labour  and it  falls within  one or  the other  of  entry  22-Trade  Unions;  industrial  and  labour disputes, entry  E3 23-social security and social insurance; employment and  unemployment and  entry 24-welfare of labour including conditions  of work,  provident funds,  employer’s liability, workmen’s  compensation, invalidity  and old  age pensions and  maternity benefits  in the  List  III  of  the Seventh Schedule  to the  Constitution  of  India.  The  Act generally applies  to all  industries  irrespective  of  the religion or caste to which the parties belong. It applies to industries owned  by the  Central and  the State Governments too. Any  decision given  by the  Industrial Tribunal  or  a Labour Court  under the Act is subject to judicial review by the High  Court under  Article 226  of the  Constitution  of India and  an appeal  to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of  India  The  Labour  Court,  the  Industrial Tribunal, the  High Court  and this Court while dealing with matters arising  out of  the Act  have  to  deal  with  them objectively.  The   smooth   running   of   an   educational institution depends  upon the  employment of workmen who are not  subjected   to  victimisation  or  any  other  kind  of maltreatment. The  conditions of  service of  workmen in all institutions  including  minority  educational  institutions have to  be protected  in the interest of the entire society and any unfair labour practice, such as ’hiring and firing’, termination or  retrenchment of  the service of a workman on irrational grounds  will have  to be  checked. The Act makes provisions in  respect of  these matters.  The Act  being  a general law  for prevention  and  settlement  of  industrial disputes cannot  be  construed  as  a-  law  which  directly interferes with  the right  of administration  of a minority educational institution  guaranteed under  Article 30( 1) of the Constitution  of India  The law  is not enacted with the object of  interfering with any such right. It clearly falls within  the  observation  of  Mathew,  J.  in  St.  Xavier’s College, case  (supra) that  "regular tax measures, economic regulations,  social  welfare  legislation,  wage  and  hour legislation and  similar measures  may, of  course have some effect upon  the right  under Article  30(1). But  where the

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burden is  the same  as that  borne  by  others  engaged  in different forms of activity, the similar impact on the right seems clearly insufficient to constitute an abridgement."      It  is,   however,  argued   on  behalf  of  the  first respondent-Association   that   the   application   of   the provisions of  the Act  will result in the abridgment of the right of the management of minority educa 563 tional institutions  to administer  such institutions  since there is  always a  chance in  the course  of an  industrial adjudication that  the Tribunal  or the  Labour Court as the case may  be may  pass an  order setting  aside an  order of dismissal or  removal of  a workman passed by the management and reinstating  him in  service or making an order altering the  conditions  of  service  of  workmen  contrary  to  the agreement entered  into with  them. It  is urged  that  such adjudication results  in the attenuation of the power of the management to  dismiss or  remove a  workman as  and when it likes. It  is also  stated  that  the  minority  educational institution is  likely to be exposed to constant and endless litigation which  would again  adversely affect the right of the minority  to establish  and  administer  an  educational institution  guaranteed   under   Article   30(1)   of   the Constitution of  India. Reliance is placed in support of the above propositions  on the decision of this Court in the St. Xavier’s College  case (supra).  In that case the Court held that clause  (b) of  sub-section (1)  and clause (b) of sub- section (2)  of section  51-A of the Gujarat University Act, 1949 were  violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India so  far as  the minority educational institutions were concerned. The Court also held that section 52-A of that Act was also  violative of  Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. The contentions of the parties urged in that case and the conclusion  reached by  the Court  are briefly stated in the judgment of Khanna, J. at pages 243-244 which read thus:                     "Clause (a)  of sub-sections (1) and (2)           of section  5 lA  of the  impugned Act  which make           provision for  giving a  reasonable opportunity of           showing cause  against a penalty to be proposed on           a  member   of  the   staff  of   an   educational           institution  would  consequently  be  held  to  be           valid. Clause  (b)  of  those  sub-sections  which           gives a  power to  the Vice-Chancellor and officer           of the  University authorised  by him  to veto the           action of  the managing  body  of  an  educational           institution in  awarding punishment to a member of           the staff,  in my  opinion,  interferes  with  the           disciplinary control of the managing body over its           teachers. It  is significant  that  the  power  of           approval conferred  by clause  (b) in  each of the           two sub-sections  of section  5  lA  on  the  Vice           Chancellor or other officer authorised by him is a           blanket power. No guidelines are laid down for the           exercise of that power and it is not provided that           the approval  is to  be withheld  only in case the           dismissal,   removal,   reduction   in   rank   or           termination of  service is  malafide or  by way of           victimisation  or   other   similar   cause.   The           conferment of such blanket power 564           on the Vice-Chancellor or other officer authorised           by him  for vetoing the disciplinary action of the           managing body  of an educational institution makes           a serious inroad on the right of the managing body           to administer  an educational  institution. Clause

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         (b) of each of the two sub-sections of section 51A           should, therefore,  be held  to  be  violative  of           article  30(1)  so  far  as  minority  educational           institutions are concerned.                Section  52A   of  the  Act  relates  to  the           reference of disputes between a governing body and           any member  of the  teaching, other  academic  and           non-teaching staff  of an  affiliated  college  or           recognized or  approved institution connected with           the conditions  of service  of such  member  to  a           Tribunal  of   Arbitration,  consisting   of   one           nominated by the governing body of the college or,           as the  case may be, of the recognised or approved           institution, one member nominated by the member of           the staff  involved in  the dispute  and an Umpire           appointed by  the Vice-Chancellor.  Section 52A is           widely worded  and as  it stands  it  would  cover           within its  ambit every dispute connected with the           conditions of  service of a member of the staff of           an educational  institution, however,  trivial  or           insignificant it  may be,  which may arise between           the governing  body of  a college  and a member of           the staff.  The effect  of this  section would  be           that the  managing  committee  of  an  educational           institution would be embroiled by its employees in           a   series   of   arbitration   proceedings.   The           provisions of  section 52A  would thus  act  as  a           spoke in  the wheel of effective administration of           an educational  institution. It may also be stated           that there  is nothing  objectionable to selecting           the  method  of  arbitration  for  settling  major           disputes connected  with conditions  of service of           staff of  educational institutions.  It may indeed           be a  desideratum. What  is  objectionable,  apart           from what  has been mentioned above, is the giving           of the  power to  the Vice-Chancellor  to nominate           the Umpire.  Normally in such disputes there would           be hardly  any agreement  between  the  arbitrator           nominated by the governing body of the institution           and the  one nominated  by the concerned member of           the staff.  The result  would be  that  the  power           would vest  for all  intents and  purposes in  the           nominee  of  the  Vice-Chancellor  to  decide  all           disputes between the governing body and the member           of the staff connected with 565           the latter’s  conditions of service. The governing           body would  thus be  hardly in  a position to take           any effective disciplinary action against a member           of the  staff. This  must cause  an inroad  in the           right of  the governing  body  to  administer  the           institution. Section  52A  should,  therefore,  be           held to  be violative  of article. 30(1) so far as           minority educational institutions are concerned. "           (emphasis added).      We are  of the  view  that  the  decision  in  the  St. Xavier’s College  case (supra)  is distinguishable  from the present one.-  Clause (b) of the two sub-sections of section 51-A of the Gujarat University Act, 1949 conferred a blanket power on  the Vice-Chancellor or other officer authorised by him to  approve  or  not  any  recommendation  made  by  the management regarding  the dismissal,  removal, reduction  in rank or  termination of  service of  a workman. The said Act did not  furnish any  guidelines regarding  the exercise  of that power  which was  in the  nature  of  a  ’veto’  power.

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Secondly, section  52-A of  the Gujarat University Act, 1949 which required  the disputes  between the governing body and any member  of the  teaching staff,  other academic and non- teaching staff  of an  affiliated college  or recognised  or approved  institution   connected  with  the  conditions  of service of  such member  to be  referred to  a  Tribunal  of Arbitration, consisting  of one  nominated by  the governing body of  the  college  or,  as  the  case  may  be,  of  the recognised or  approved institution, one member nominated by the member  of the  staff involved  in the  dispute  and  an Umpire approved  by the  ViceChancellor was  held to  be  an unconstitutional interference  with a right guaranteed under Article 30(1). Of the Constitution of India as it was likely to involve the minority educational institutions in a series of arbitration  proceedings and that the power vested in the Vice-Chancellor to nominate an Umpire to decide all disputes between the  governing body  and the  members of  the  staff connected with the latter’s conditions of service would make virtually the  Vice-Chancellor the person who would have the ultimate  voice   in  the   decision  of   the  Tribunal  of Arbitration. There was also no check on the question whether the dispute  was one  which deserved to be considered by the Tribunal of  Arbitration. In  the instant  case there  is no room for  such contingency  to arise.  A reference under the Act has  to be  made by  the  Government  either  when  both parties requested  the Government  to  refer  an  industrial dispute for  adjudication or  only when it is satisfied that there exists  an  industrial  dispute.  When  an  industrial dispute exists  or is  apprehended, the conciliation officer should first  consider  whether  it  can  be  settled  after hearing both the parties and it is only 566 when his  efforts to  bring about  a settlement  fail and he makes a  report accordingly  to the  appropriate Government, the Government  is called  upon to  take a  decision on  the question whether  the case is a fit one for reference to the Industrial Tribunal  or the  Labour Court. It is only when a reference is  made by the Government the Industrial Tribunal vi the  Labour Court  gets jurisdiction to decide a case. It cannot, therefore,  be said  that  each  and  every  dispute raised  by  a  workman  would  automatically  end  up  in  a reference to  the Industrial  Tribunal or  the labour Court. Secondly, the circumstances in which the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court may set aside the decision arrived at by the management  in the  course of a domestic enquiry held by the management  into an  act of  misconduct of a workman are evolved by  a series of judicial decisions. In Indian Iron & Steel Co.  Ltd. and  Another v. Their workmen, [1958] S.C.R. 667 this Court has observed that the powers of an industrial tribunal to  interfere in cases of dismissal of a workman by the management  are not  unlimited and the Tribunal does not act as a court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere (a) where there is want of  good faith;  (b) when  there  is  victimisation  or unfair labour  practice; (c)  when the  management has  been guilty of  the basic error or violation of the principles of natural justice;  and (d)  when on  the materials before the Court the  finding is  completely baseless  or perverse.  It cannot, therefore,  be said  that the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour  Court will  function arbitrarily  and  interfere with every  decision of  the management as regards dismissal or discharge  of a  workman arrived  at  in  a  disciplinary enquiry. The power exercisable by the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour  Court cannot,  therefore, be  equated  with  the power of  ’veto’  conferred  on  the  Vice-Chancellor  under

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clause (b) of either of the two sub-sections of section 51-A of the Gujarat University Act, 1949. As we have already said earlier the  decision of  the  Industrial  Tribunal  or  the Labour Court  is open  to judicial  review by the High Court and by  this Court  on appeal.  Section 11-A  which has been introduced since  then into  the Act which confers the power on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to substitute a lesser  punishment in  lieu of  the order  of discharge or dismissal  passed   by  the   management  again   cannot  be considered  as   conferring  an   arbitrary  power   on  the Industrial Tribunal  or the  Labour Court.  The power  under section 11-A  of the  Act has to be exercised judicially and the Industrial  Tribunal or  the Labour Court is expected to interfere with  the decision  of a  management under section 11-A  of  the  Act  only  when  it  is  satisfied  that  the punishment   imposed    by   the    management   is   highly disproportionate to  the degree  of  guilt  of  the  workman concerned. The  Industrial Tribunal  or the Labour Court has to give  reasons for  its EMPLOYEES  UNION v.  C.M.  COLLEGE [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 567 567 decision. The  decision of the Industrial Tribunal or of the Labour Court  is again, as already said, subject to judicial review by the High A Court and this Court.      In Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and Ors J [1979] 1 S.C.R. 820 this  Court was  required to  consider a provision which was more  or less  similar to the provisions in St. Xavier’s College, case (supra). The Court held that the conferment of a right  of appeal  to an  outside authority  like the Vice- Chancellor which  took away  the  disciplinary  power  of  a minority educational  institution was  violative of  Article 30( 1) of the Constitution of India since the said power was uncanalised and  unguided in  the sense  that no restriction had been placed on the exercise of the power.      Explaining his  own decision  in  Lilly  Kurian’s  case (supra) A.P.  Sen, J.  has  observed  recently  in  Mrs.  Y. Theclamma v.  Union of  India and  Ors., [1987] 2 S.C.C. 516 that  while  the  right  of  the  minorities,  religious  or linguistic,  to   establish   and   administer   educational institutions of  their choice  could not be interfered with, restrictions by  way  of  regulations  for  the  purpose  of ensuring educational  standards and  maintaining  excellence thereof can  validity be  prescribed. He  further held  that regulations can  be made  for ensuring  proper conditions of service for  the teachers  and  also  for  ensuring  a  fair procedure in  the matter of disciplinary action and that the endeavour of the court in all the cases had been to strike a balance between  the constitutional  obligation  to  protect what was  secured to  the minorities  under Article 30(1) of the Constitution  of  India  and  the  social  necessity  to protect the  members of  the staff against arbitrariness and victimisation. Accordingly,  A.P. Sen,  J. held that section 8(4) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 was designed to afford some  measure of  protection to  teachers of minority institutions without interfering with the management’s right to take  disciplinary action. According to the learned Judge section  8(4)   which  provided   that  where  a  management committee of  a recognised school intended to suspend any of its employees  such intention  should be communicated to the Director and  no such  suspension should be made except with the prior  permission of  the Director  was not invalid. The learned Judge emphasised his earlier view expressed in Lilly Kurian’s  case  (supra)  that  the  right  guaranteed  under Article 30(1)  of the  Constitution of  India was subject to the regulatory  power of the State and that Article 30(1) of

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the  Constitution   of  India   was  not   a   charter   for maladministration. In  doing so  the learned  Judge followed the observation made by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Frank Anthony Public School Employees’ Association v. Union of H 568  India  and others,  [ 1986]  4 S.C.C.  707  which  read  as follows:-                "Section  8(4)   would  be   inapplicable  to           minority institutions  if it had conferred blanket           power on  the Director  to grant or withhold prior           approval in every case where a management proposed           to suspend  an employee  but we see that it is not           so.  The   management  has   the  right  to  order           immediate suspension  of an  employee in  case  of           gross misconduct  but in order to prevent an abuse           of power by the management a safeguard is provided           to the  employee that  approval should be obtained           within 15  days. The  Director is  also  bound  to           accord his  approval if  there  are  adequate  and           reasonable  grounds   for  such   suspension.  The           provision appears  to be  eminently reasonable and           sound and  the answer to the question in regard to           this provision is directly covered by the decision           in All Saints High School, where Chandrachud, C.J.           and Kailasam, J. upheld section 3(3)(a) of the Act           impugned therein."      In All  Saints High  School,  Hyderabad  etc.  etc.  v. Government of  Andhra Pradesh  and Ors., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 924 etc. a  provision imposing certain restrictions on the power of  suspension  of  a  teacher  by  a  minority  educational institution which  was contained  in clauses  (a) and (b) of sub-section  (3)   of  section   3  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institution Control Act, 1975 was upheld by Chandrachud, C.J. at pages 937-939 thus:                "Section 3(3)(a)  provides  that  no  teacher           employed in  any private  educational  institution           shall be  placed under  suspension except  when an           inquiry into  the gross misconduct of such teacher           is contemplated.  Section 3(3)(b) provides that no           such suspension  shall remain  in force  for  more           than a  period of two months and if the inquiry is           not  completed  within  that  period  the  teacher           shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed           to have been restored as a teacher. The proviso to           the  sub-section   confers  upon   the   competent           authority the power, for reasons to be recorded in           writing to  extend the  period of two months for a           further period not exceeding two months if, in its           opinion, the inquiry could not be completed within           the initial  period  of  two  months  for  reasons           directly attributable to the teacher.                With respect,  I find  it difficult  to agree           with Brother 569           Fazal Ali  that these  provisions are violative of           article 30(1).  The question  which one has to ask           oneself  is   whether  in  the  normal  course  of           affairs, these  provisions are likely to interfere           with the  freedom of  minorities to administer and           manage educational  institutions of  their choice.           It  is   undoubtedly  true   that  no  educational           institution   can    function   efficiently    and           effectively unless  the teachers  observe at least           the commonly  accepted norms  of  good  behaviour.           Indisciplined teachers  can hardly  be expected to

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         impress upon the students the value of discipline,           which is a sine qua non of educational excellence.           They can  cause incalculable  harm not only to the           cause of  education but to the society at large by           generating a wrong sense of values in the minds of           young and  impressionable students. But discipline           is not  to be  equated with dictatorial methods in           the treatment  of teachers. The institutional code           of discipline must therefore conform to acceptable           norms of  fairness  and  cannot  be  arbitrary  or           fanciful. I  do not  think that  in  the  name  of           discipline and  in the  purported exercise  of the           fundamental   right    of    administration    and           management, any  educational  institution  can  be           given the  right to  ’hire and fire’ its teachers.           After all,  though the management may be left free           to   evolve    administrative   policies   of   an           institution, educational  instruction  has  to  be           imparted  through   the  instrumentality   of  the           teachers;  and   unless.  they   have  a  constant           assurance of  justice, security  and fair  play it           will be  impossible for them to give of their best           which alone  can enable  the institution to attain           the  ideal   of  educational  excellence.  Section           3(3)(a) contains  but an  elementary guarantee  of           freedom from  arbitrariness to  the teachers.  The           provision is  regulatory  in  character  since  it           neither denies  to the  management  the  right  to           proceed against  an erring teacher nor indeed does           it place an unreasonable restraint on its power to           do so.  It assumes  the right of the management to           suspend a  teacher but  regulates  that  right  by           directing that  a teacher  shall not  be suspended           unless an inquiry into his conduct is contemplated           and unless  the inquiry  is in respect of a charge           of gross  misconduct. Fortunately,  suspension  of           teachers is  not the  order of  the day, for which           reason I  do not think that these restraints which           bear a  reasonable nexus  with the  attainment  of           educational excellence  can be  considered  to  be           violative of  the right  given by  Art. 30(1). The           limitation of  the period  of suspension initially           to two 570           months, which can in appropriate cases be extended           by  another  two  months,  partakes  of  the  same           character as  the provision  contained in  section           3(3)(a). In  the generality  of cases,  a domestic           inquiry against  a teacher  ought to  be completed           within a  period of  two  months  or  say,  within           another  two   months.  A   provision  founded  so           patently on  plain reason is difficult to construe           as an  invasion of  the  right  to  administer  an           institution, unless that right carried with it the           right to  maladminister. I  therefore  agree  with           Brother Kailasam that sections 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(b)           of the Act do not offend against the provisions of           Art. 30(1) and are valid."      In view of the observations of this Court in All Saints High School’s  case (supra),  Frank Anthony  Public School’s case (supra)  and Y.  Theclamm’s case  (supra) it  has to be held that  the provisions  of the  Act which provide for the reference of an industrial dispute to an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court for a decision in accordance with judicial principles have  to be  declared as  not being  violative of

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Article 30(1)  of the  Constitution of  India. It  has to be borne in  mind that these provisions have been conceived and enacted in  accordance with  the principles  accepted by the International Labour  organisation and  the  United  Nations Economic,   Social    and   Cultural    organisation.    The International Convenent  on Economic,  Social  and  Cultural Rights, 1966  which is  a basic  document declaring  certain specific human  rights in  addition to proclaiming the right to work  as a  human right  treats equitable  conditions  of work, prohibition  of forced  labour, provision for adequate remuneration, the  right to  a limitation  of work hours, to rest and leisure, the right to form and join trade unions of ones’ choice, the right to strike etc. also as human rights. The Preamble  of our Constitution says that our country is a socialist republic.  Article 41 of the Constitution provides that the  State shall  make effective provision for securing right to  work. Article 42 of the Constitution provides that the State  shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of  work and  for maternity relief. Article 43 of the Constitution  states that  the State  shall endeavour to secure by  suitable legislation  or economic organisation or in any  other way to all workers agricultural, industrial or otherwise work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard  of life  and full  enjoyment of leisure and social and  cultural opportunities.  These rights  which are enforced through the several pieces of labour legislation in India have  got to  be applied to every workman irrespective of the character of the management. Even the management of a minority educational institution has 571 got  to   respect   these   rights   and   implement   them. Implementation of  these rights  involves the  obedience  to several  labour  laws  including  the  Act  which  is  under consideration in  this case  which are brought into force in the country. Due obedience to those laws would assist in the smooth working  of the  educational institutions  and  would facilitate  proper   administration  of   such   educational institutions. If such laws are made inapplicable to minority educational institutions,  there is every likelihood of such institutions being  subjected to  maladministration.  Merely because an  impartial tribunal is entrusted with the duty of resolving disputes  relating  to  employment,  unemployment, security of  work and  other conditions of workmen it cannot be said that the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of  India is  violated.  If  a  creditor  of  a minority educational  institution or  a contractor  who  has built the  building of such institution is permitted to file a suit  for recovery of the money or damages as the case may be due  to him  against such  institution and  to bring  the properties of  such  institution  to  sale  to  realise  the decretal amount  due under the decree passed in such suit is Article 30(1)  violated? Certainly  not. Similarly the right guaranteed under  Article 30(1)  of the  Constitution is not violated, if  a minority school is ordered to be closed when an epidemic  breaks out  in the neighbourhood, if a minority school building  is ordered  to be  pulled down  when it  is constructed contrary to town planning law or if a decree for possession is passed in favour of the true owner of the land when a  school is  built on a land which is not owned by the management of  a minority  school. In  the  same  way  if  a dispute is raised by an employee against the management of a minority educational  institution  such  dispute  will  have necessarily  to   be  resolved   by  providing   appropriate machinery for  that purpose.  Laws are how passed by all the civilised countries  providing for such a machinery. The Act

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with which we are concerned in this case is an Act which has been  brought  into  force  for  resolving  such  industrial disputes. Sections  10, 11-A,  12 and  33 of the Act cannot, therefore,  be  construed  as  interfering  with  the  right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. Similarly, section  9-A  of  the  Act,  which  requires  the management to  issue a  notice in  accordance with  the said provision in  order to  make changes  in the  conditions  of service which  may include  changes in  the hours  of  work, leave rules,  introduction of  new rules of discipline etc., cannot be  considered as  violative of  the right guaranteed under Article  30(1) of  the Constitution of India. The High Court was  in error  in  thinking  that  the  power  of  the Industrial Tribunal  or the  Labour Court  under the Act was uncanalised, unguided and unlimited and in thinking that the said  power   was  equivalent  to  the  power  of  the  Vice Chancellor or any other officer nominated by him functioning under 572 the Gujarat  University Act,  1949  which  was  the  subject matter of decision in the St. Xavier s College case (supra). Accordingly we  are of  the  view  that  the  provisions  of sections 9A, 10, llA, 12 and 33 of the Act are applicable to the minority  educational institutions  like  the  Christian Medical College and hospital at Vellore also.      Before concluding  we feel  that it  is appropriate  to refer to  some decisions  of the Supreme Court of the United States of  America in  which it  has construed  some of  the provisions of  the Constitution  of  the  United  States  of America which  appear  to  confer  absolute  rights.  It  is interesting to  note that the right to enter into a contract which was considered to be an absolute right at one stage is no longer construed as a bar on the legislature making a law imposing restrictions on the managements in order to advance the welfare  of the  labour. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of  the United  States of America provides that "no State  shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges  or immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United States; nor  shall any  State deprive  any person  of  life, liberty, or  property, without  due process of law; nor deny to any  person within  its jurisdiction the equal protection of the  laws". The  ’liberty’ guaranteed  by this clause was variously defined by the Supreme Court of America as will be seen  hereinafter.  In  the  early  years  it  meant  almost exclusively ’liberty  of contract’.  The concept of ’liberty of contract’  was elevated  to the  status  of  an  accepted doctrine in  Allgeyer v.  Louisiana. 165  U.S. 578.  Applied repeatedly in  subsequent cases  as  a  restraint  on  state power, freedom of contract was also alluded to as a property right, as is evident in the language of the Court in Coppage v. Kansas  236 U.S. 1 which said that "included in the right of personal  liberty and  the  right  of  private  property- partaking of  the  nature  of  each-is  the  right  to  make contracts for  the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment by which labour and other services  are exchanged  for money  or other  forms of property. If  this  right  be  struck  down  or  arbitrarily interfered with  there is  substantial impairment of liberty in  the  long-established  constitutional  sense.  (emphasis added). In  Lochner v.  New York  198 U.S.  45 (1905)  a law restricting employment  in bakeries to ten hours per day and 60 hours  per  week  was  held  to  be  an  unconstitutional interference with  the right  of adult labourers to contract with respect  to their  means of  livelihood.  In  Adair  v. United States  208 U.S.  161 (1908)  a statute attempting to

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outlaw ’yellow  dog’ contracts  whereby, as  a condition  of obtaining employment,  a worker  had to agree not to join or to remain  a member  of a  union, were  voided on grounds of unconstitutional impairment  of freedom of contract, or more particu 573 larly, of the unrestricted right of the employer to hire and fire. In this case the Supreme Court of the United States of America went  to the extent of holding that it was a part of every man’s  civil rights  that he should be left at liberty to refuse  business  relations  with  any  person  whomsover whether the refusal rested upon reason, or was the result of whim, caprice,  prejudice or  malice and  with  his  reasons neither the  public nor  third person had any legal concern. This was  done during  the first decade of this century. But during 1930s  ’liberty’ in the sense of freedom of contract, judicially translated  into what  Justice Black has labelled the Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage  constitutional doctrine, lost its  potency as  an  obstacle  to  the  enforcement  of legislation calculated to enhance the bargaining capacity of workers as against that already possessed by their employers (Vide Lincoln  Federal Labour  Union v.  Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.  335 U.S.  525 (1949).  It is  now settled  in the United States  of America that neither the ’contract’ clause nor the  ’due process’  clause had  the effect of overriding the power of the state to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary  to secure  the  health,  safety,  good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community and that this power  can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable  even by express grant; and that all contract and property  or other vested rights are held subject to its fair exercise.  In view of the change in the attitude of the Court laws  regulating hours  of labour,  labour  in  mines, employment of  children in hazardous occupations, payment of wages, minimum  wages laws,  workmen’s compensation laws and collective bargaining  have been upheld in recent years even though the  right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment had been once  construed as  an absolute  right not alienable by any consideration of public weal.      Two other  provisions of the Constitution of the United States of  America which  appear to  confer absolute  rights have also been construed as rights which may be regulated by the statute in the public interest in exercise of its police powers and they are the religious freedom and the freedom of expression. The  relevant part of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America reads that "the Congress shall  make no  law respecting  an establishment of religion, or  prohibiting  the  free  exercise  thereof;  or abridging the  freedom of  speech,  or  of  the  press."  In Reynolds v.  United States  98 U.S.  145 (1879) the question for consideration  was whether the conviction of a member of the Mormons  faith under  a law prohibiting polygamy despite the fact  that an accepted doctrine of his church which then imposed on  its male  members the  duty to practice polygamy was valid  or not. The Supreme Court of the United States of America rejecting the contention of the 574 accused  based  on  the  right  which  guaranteed  the  free exercise of religion observed thus:                " ....  There never  has been  a time  in any           State of  the Union  when polygamy has not been an           offense against  society, cognizable  by the civil           courts and  punishable with more or less severity.           In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible           to believe  that the  constitutional  guaranty  of

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         religion  freedom   was   intended   to   prohibit           legislation in  respect  to  this  more  important           feature of  social life.  Marriage, while from its           very nature a sacred obligation, is, nevertheless,           in most  civilized nations,  a civil contract, aud           usually regulated  by law.  Upon it society may be           said to  be built,  and out  of its  fruits spring           social  relations   and  social   obligations  and           duties,  with   which  government  is  necessarily           required to  deal  ..  An  exceptional  colony  of           polygamists under  an exceptional  leadership  may           some times  exist for  a time without appearing to           disturb the  social condition  of the  people  who           surround it;  but there  cannot be  a doubt  that,           unless restricted by some form of constitution, it           is without  the legitimate  scope of  the power of           every  civil   government  to   determine  whether           polygamy or  monogamy shall  be the  law of social           life under its dominion.                In our  opinion the statute immediately under           consideration is  within the  legislative power of           Congress.  It   is  constitutional  and  valid  as           prescribing  a   rule  of  action  for  all  those           residing in  the territories,  and in  places over           which the  United States  have exclusive  control.           This being so, the only question which remains is,           whether those  who make  polygamy a  part of their           religion are  excepted from  the operation  of the           statute. If  they are,  then those who do not make           polygamy a  part of  their religious belief may be           found guilty and punished, while those who do must           be  acquitted   and  go   free.  This   would   be           introducing a  new element into criminal law. Laws           are made  for the government of actions, and while           they cannot  interfere with  mere religious belief           and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one           be lieved  that human  sacrifices were a necessary           part of  religious worship,  would it be seriously           contended that the civil government under which he           lived could  not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?           or if a wife religiously believed it was 575           her duty  to burn herself upon the funeral pile of           her dead  husband, would it be beyond the power of           the civil  government to  prevent her carrying her           belief into practice?                So here,  as a  law of  the  organization  of           society under the exclusive dominion of the United           States, it is provided that plural marriages shall           not be  allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to           the contrary  because of  his religious belief? To           permit  this   would  be  to  make  the  professed           doctrines of  religious belief superior to the law           of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen           to become  a law  unto himself.  Government  could           exist only in name under such circumstances.      More recent  decisions of  the Supreme Court of America on the  above question  show that  the said Court has always balanced the interest asserted by the Government against the claim of  religious liberty  accepted by the person affected and if  the governmental  interest is  compelling and  if no alternative forms of regulation would subserve that interest the claimant  of the  right is required to yield. Thus it is seen that  the religious  freedom guaranteed  by  the  First Amendment is  not absolute  although the  Court has tried to

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protect substantially  the exercise  of religious freedom by the citizens of the United States of America.      Similarly as  regards the  right  of  free  speech  and expression the Supreme Court of the United States of America has observed  in Whitney  v. California  274 U.S. 357 (1927) thus:-                "But although  the rights  of free speech and           assembly are  fundamental, they  are not  in their           nature absolute.  Their expercise  is  subject  to           restriction,   if   the   particular   restriction           proposed is required in order to protect the State           from   destruction   or   from   serious   injury,           political, economic or moral."      It may  be noted  that the  Constitution of  the United States of America does not contain any clauses corresponding to  Article   25(1)  of  the  Constitution  of  India  which guarantees  freedom   of  conscience  and  free  profession, practice and  propagation of  religion, "subject  to  public order, morality and health and to the other provision of" of Part III  of the  Constitution of India and Article 25(2) of the  Constitution  which  provides  that  "nothing  in  this article shall affect the operation of H 576 any existing  law or  prevent the  State from making any law (a)  regulating  or  restricting  any  economic,  financial, political or  other secular activity which may be associated with religious  practice .. " The Constitution of the United States  of   America  also  does  not  contain  a  provision corresponding  to   clause  (2)   of  Article   19  of   the Constitution of  India which  provides that "nothing in sub- clause (a)  of clause  (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law,  or prevent  the State from making any law, in so far  as such  law imposes  reasonable restrictions on the exercise of  the right  conferred by  the said-clause in the interests of  the sovereignty  and integrity  of India,  the security of  the  State,  friendly  relations  with  foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of  court, defamation or incitement to an offence." Yet, the  right to  liberty, the  right to religious freedom and the  right of  free speech  though  they  appear  to  be asbolute, have been construed to be subject to regulation by the State  in exercise  of its  legitimate police powers. We have  set   out  in   some  detail   these  aspects  of  the constitutional law  of the United States of America in order to facilitate  the construction  of and  the meaning  to  be given to  our own constitution, though we need not be guided always by  what the  Supreme Court  of the  United States of America says about its own constitution      Having given  our very  anxious  consideration  to  the right of  the minorities  guaranteed under  Article 30(1) of the Constitution  of India  and the  necessity for  having a general  law   which  regulates   the  relationship  between employers and  workmen and after balancing the two interests we have come to the conclusion that the decision of the High Court is liable to be set aside and the three writ petitions filed  before  the  High  Court  should  be  dismissed.  We, accordingly,  allow   this  appeal,  set  aside  the  common judgment of  the High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 220 to 222 of 1980  on the  file of the High Court and dismiss the said writ petitions.  The Labour  Court to  which the  references have been  made by  the Government  of Tamil  Nadu shall now proceed to dispose of the said references in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs. H.L.C.                                       Appeal allowed. 577

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