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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3392 of 2002

PETITIONER: Cholan Roadways Limited

RESPONDENT: G. Thirugnanasambandam

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/12/2004

BENCH: N. Santosh Hegde & S.B. Sinha

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

S.B. Sinha, J :

        This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 6.6.2001  passed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in W.A. No.46/1993  as also the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of the  said Court in a Writ Petition No.11113/88 whereby and whereunder the writ  petition filed by the Appellant herein for setting aside order dated 29.4.88  passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Tamil Nadu, Madras in Approval Petition  No. 125 of 1985 rejecting the grant of approval sought for as regard order of  dismissal passed against the Respondent herein was dismissed.   

The factual matrix of the matter is not much in dispute.   

The Respondent herein was a driver of a bus bearing No.TMN-4148  plying between Tanjore and Nagapattinam.  On 18.5.1985 while the said bus  was driven by the Respondent herein it met with an accident resulting in  death of 7 passengers.  According to the Appellant the said bus was being  driven in a rash and negligent manner.  The road at the place of the accident   was 300 ft wide and straight one.  The Respondent allegedly despite noticing  that another bus was coming from the opposite direction did not slow down  the vehicle in order to avoid collision therewith.  It is said that the Bus was  being driven at a speed of 80 k.m.p.h.  The bus driven by the Respondent  herein is said to have swerved suddenly to the extreme left side of the road  which was lined with tamarind trees on both sides.  The impact of the said  collusion was so severe that the bus dashed against the protruding branches  and stumps of the tamarind trees, then dashed against the bus resulting the  left side of the bus completely damaged as a result whereof 7 passengers  died and several persons were seriously injured.   

The Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunal, Madras awarded a sum of Rs. 9  lakhs to the dependants of the victims as compensation for loss of life.  It is  not in dispute that the Branch Manager of the Appellant, Mr. Venkatesan  visited the scene of the accident at about 4 p.m. on the same day and  conducted an investigation.  During the said inspection some passengers  were examined.  He submitted a detailed report.  In furtherance of the said  report, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the Respondent on the  following charges:

"1. On 18.5.85 while you served as the driver in  the bus bearing No.TMN 4148 you have been very  careless in your duty and around 3.00 p.m. near  Poondi dashed against a tamarind tree which was  at the edge of the road and thereby caused a very  big accident.

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2. While you were on duty as aforesaid, even  though it was a straight road and was visible to a  distance of about 300 ft.  In respect of the buses  which come from the opposite direction, you have  been very negligent and in a careless and  irresponsible manner move the bus very fast and  dashed the front left side of the bus against the  branch of the tamarind tree which was cut and  found at the left side of the road and after that  turned the bus towards the right side and thereby  caused heavy damage to the bus.  On account of  your aforesaid act the entire left side of the bus  dashed against the tamarind tree branch which  resulted in the passengers at the left side of the bus  to sustain grievous injuries and that seven  passengers died in the aforesaid accident and about  10 passengers sustained grievous injuries and that  you were responsible for the same.

3. Further, you were responsible for the loss of  accessories of the bus to the tune of Rs.30,000/-  and also you were responsible for the loss of  revenue for the Corporation.

4. Further, you were responsible for tarnishing the  fair name of the Corporation amongst general  public."

In the domestic inquiry that followed the said charge-sheet, two  witnesses were examined on behalf of the Appellant.   

The Inquiry Officer upon consideration of the materials brought on  records by the parties therein found the Respondent guilty of misconduct in  relation to the charges framed against him.  The Inquiry Officer rejected the  contention of the Respondent herein that the bus was being driven at a slow  speed and the accident took place to save a boy who suddenly crossed the  road holding:   

"Thus it has been proved beyond doubt by the  evidence adduced by the management’s side that  the delinquent was careless, negligent and rash in  driving the bus at the time of the occurrence  resulting in this accident and he is responsible for  this accident and consequences thereof and the  defence evidence by way of two statements  adduced by the delinquent in proof of his defence  cannot be given any credit or credence for reasons  already expatiated.  The delinquent has not alleged  any brake failure in his earlier statement in Ex.P-9  or in his written explanation to charge memo, in  which he has stated that he effectively used brake  and halted the bus after impact."

The Respondent was, thereafter, dismissed from the services by the  Disciplinary Authority.   

       As an industrial dispute was pending before the Industrial Tribunal the  Appellant herein filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial  Disputes Act for grant of approval of the said order of dismissal.  The  learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal by an order dated 29.4.88  despite holding that ’the scope of adjudication in a proceeding under Section  33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is limited and while granting   approval it does not sit as a court of appeal re-appreciating the evidence for  itself but has to examine the findings of the Enquiry Officer on the evidence  adduced in the domestic enquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case had

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been made out on the charges leveled or if the findings are perverse’, came  to the following findings:  

"In the instant case, the domestic enquiry  conducted cannot be considered as fair and proper  and is vitiated on account of the failure of the  Enquiry officer to observe the principles of natural  justice by not examining the passengers who had  given the statements."

       On such finding the approval sought for by the Appellant herein was  rejected.  A writ petition was filed by the Appellant questioning the  correctness or otherwise of the said order dated 1.12.1992 before the High  Court.  A learned Single Judge of the High Court upheld the said order. A  writ appeal No.46/1993 filed by the Appellant against the order passed by  the learned Single Judge was dismissed opining:   

"Though the learned counsel for the Appellant  placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex  Court in State of Haryana & Another Vs Rattan  Singh reported in AIR 1977 SC 1512, we hold that  the said pronouncement of the Apex Court will not  have any application to the present case as it was a  converse case where the finding are based upon  some evidence, namely, eye witness, and therefore,  in that context, the Supreme Court held that non- examination of the passenger will not vitiate the  enquiry.  The said pronouncement will not have  any application to the facts of the present case and  it is clearly distinguishable."

       Mr. K. Ramamurthy, learned senior counsel on behalf of the  Appellant would contend that the learned Tribunal and consequently the  learned Judges of the High Court committed a serious error in passing the  impugned judgments insofar as they failed to take into consideration that in  an enquiry of this nature it was not necessary to examine the passengers of  the bus.  The learned counsel urged that the admitted photographs of the bus  in question after it met with an aforementioned accident clearly  demonstrate  that the same was being driven in a rash and negligent manner as a result of  which 7 passengers died and some others suffered serious injuries.  It was  submitted that the Respondent had not only afforded an opportunity to the  Respondent to cross examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the  Appellant but also was given the opportunity to examine his defence  witnesses and in that view of the matter the principles of natural justice must  be held to have fully been complied with.  In support of the said contention,  learned counsel has strongly relied on a decision of this Court in Divisional  Controller KSRTC (NWKRTC) Vs. A.T.Mane [2004(8) SCALE 308]

       Mr. J. Buther, learned counsel on behalf of the Respondent, on the  other hand, would submit that in the domestic enquiry the alleged  misconduct of the Respondent cannot be said to have been proved inasmuch  as no finding has been recorded as regards the culpability of the Respondent  vis-a-vis commission of the said misconduct.  It was further contended that  only because an accident had taken place, the same by itself in absence of  the strict proof thereof and having regard to the fact that the Respondent had  been acquitted in the criminal trial, cannot be held to be a ground to infer  that the misconduct on the part of the Respondent stood proved.  The learned  counsel in support of his argument has placed reliance upon a decision of  this Court in M/s Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. Vs. The Workmen and  Others [1971(2) SCC 617] and Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs Union of  India & Others [(1999) 7 SCC 409]

       Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act reads as under:

"(2) During the pendency of any such proceeding

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in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer  may, in accordance with the standing orders  applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute  or, where there are no such standing orders, in  accordance with the terms of the contract, whether  express or implied, between him and the workman  \026  

(a)     *** (b)     for any misconduct not connected with the  dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal  or otherwise, that workman.

Provided that no such workman shall be  discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid  wages for one month and an application has been  made by the employer to the authority before  which the proceeding is pending for approval of  the action taken by the employer."

       It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the jurisdiction of the  Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is a  limited one.  The jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section  33(2)(b) cannot be equated with that of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes  Act.  In this case admittedly an enquiry has been held wherein the parties  examined their witnesses.  The Respondent was represented and assisted by  three observers.  Shri M. Venkatatesan was the Branch Manager, CRC  Tanjore Town Branch, who had submitted his report and proved the same  before the Inquiry Officer.  He furnished a detailed account of the position  of the bus vis-‘-vis the other bus after the collision took place.  He found  that there was no brake tyre mark of the bus on the road.  All the two seaters  seats on the entire left side of the bus were found totally damaged.  The left  side roof arch angle of the bus was found totally out.  Not only 4 persons  were found to be dead at the spot, the driver and conductor of the bus and 10  other passengers were also sustained injuries in this accident.  Out of the  said 10 passengers, 3 subsequently died in the hospital owing to the injuries  sustained by them.  He further found that on the left side of the road in the  earthen margin, there was a tamarind tree’s protruding branch and which  was found to have been already cut and the bottom stump of the branch was  found protruding to a length of 3 inches.  The bus was found to have been  brought to a halt only at a distance of 81 ft. from the place of impact against  the tree.  He further noticed that even after the impact of the bus against the  tree, the delinquent is said to have swerved the bus further to the right side  from left side without applying brake and reducing speed and later only be  brought the bus to a halt at some distance as a result of which the entire side  roof angle of the bus got cut.

       The learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, as noticed  hereinbefore, opined that the passengers of the bus should have been  examined.  It does not appear from the order dated 29.4.88 passed by the  Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal that the Respondent herein made any  prayer for cross examining the passengers who travelled in the ill-fated bus  and who were examined by the said Shri M. Venkatesan.  It is evident from  the order of the learned Tribunal that only in the show cause filed by the  Respondent in response to the second show cause notice, such a contention  was raised.  The learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal in his  impugned judgement further failed to take into consideration that even if the  statements of the said passengers are ignored, the misconduct allegedly  committed by the Respondent would stand proved on the basis of the  evidence adduced by Shri M. Venkatesan together with the circumstantial  evidences brought on records.  The learned Single Judge of the High Court  although referred to the sketch drawn by PW-1 on the site (Ex.P-2) and 4  photographs (Ex.P-8) but ignored the same observing that unless witnesses  were examined in support of the two exhibits, it is not possible to draw any

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inference therefrom.  The Division Bench of the High Court did not examine  the materials on records independently but referred to the findings of the  Industrial Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge  to the effect that from  their judgments it was apparent that  the driver had not been driving the bus  rashly and negligently.

       It is now a well-settled principle of law that the principle of Evidence  Act have no application in a domestic enquiry.   

       In Maharastra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary  Education Vs. K.S. Gandhi and Others [(1991) 2 SCC 716], it was held:

"It is thus well settled law that strict rules of the  Evidence Act, and the standard of proof envisaged  therein do not apply to departmental proceedings  or domestic tribunal.  It is open to the authorities to  receive and place on record all the necessary,  relevant, cogent and acceptable material facts  though not proved strictly in conformity with the  Evidence Act.  The material must be germane and  relevant to the facts in issue.  In grave cases like  forgery, fraud, conspiracy, misappropriation, etc.  seldom direct evidence would be available.  Only  the circumstantial evidence would furnish the  proof.  In our considered view inference from the  evidence and circumstances must be carefully  distinguished from conjectures or speculation.  The  mind is prone to take pleasure to adapt  circumstances to one another and even in straining  them a little to force them to form parts of one  connected whole.  There must be evidence direct  or circumstantial to deduce necessary inferences in  proof of the facts in issue.  There can be no  inferences unless there are objective facts, direct or  circumstantial from which to infer the other fact  which it is sought to establish.\005The standard of  proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but the  preponderance of probabilities tending to draw an  inference that the fact must be more probable.   Standard of proof, however, cannot be put in a  strait-jacket formula.  No mathematical formula  could be laid on degree of proof.  The probative  value could be gauged from facts and  circumstances in a given case.  The standard of  proof is the same both in civil cases and domestic  enquires."

There cannot, however, be any doubt whatsoever that the principle of  natural justice are required to be complied with in a domestic enquiry.  It is,  however, well-known that the said principle cannot be stretched too far nor  can be applied in a vacuum.   

The jurisdiction of the Tribunal while considering an application for  grant of approval has succinctly been stated by this Court in Martin Burn  Ltd. vs R.N. Banerjee (AIR 1958 SC 79).  While exercising jurisdiction  under Section 33(2(b) of the Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required to see as  to whether a prima facie case has been made out as regard the validity or  otherwise of the domestic enquiry held against the delinquent; keeping in  view the fact that if the permission or approval is granted, the order of  discharge or dismissal which may be passed against the delinquent employee  would be liable to be challenged in an appropriate proceeding before the  Industrial Tribunal in terms of the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act.   In Martin Burn’s case (supra) this court stated:

"A prima facie case does not mean a case proved

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to the hilt but a case which can be said to be  established if the evidence which is led in support  of the same were believed.  While determining  whether a prima facie case had been made out the  relevant consideration is whether on the evidence  led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in  question and not whether that was the only  conclusion which could be arrived at on that  evidence.  It may be that the Tribunal considering  this question may itself have arrived at a different  conclusion.  It has, however, not to substitute its  own judgment for the judgment in question.  It has  only got to consider whether the view taken is a  possible view on the evidence on the record.  (See  Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. vs The Workers  of the Company (1952) Lab. AC 490(F)."

       It is further trite that the standard of proof required in a domestic  enquiry vis-‘-vis a criminal trial is absolutely different.  Whereas in the  former ’preponderance of probability’ would suffice; in the latter, ’proof  beyond all reasonable doubt’ is imperative.   

       The tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of  the Industrial Disputes Act was required to bear in mind the aforementioned  legal principles.  Furthermore, in a case of this nature the probative value of  the evidence showing the extensive damages caused to the entire left side of  the bus; the fact that the bus first hit the branches of a tamarind tree and then  stopped at a distance of 81 ft therefrom even after colliding with another bus  coming from the front deserved serious consideration at the hands of the  tribunal.  The nature of impact clearly demonstrates that the vehicle was  being driven rashly or negligently.   

       Res ipsa loquitur is a well-known principle which is applicable in the  instant case.  Once the said doctrine is found to be applicable the burden of  proof would shift on the delinquent.  As noticed hereinabove, the enquiry  officer has categorically rejected the defence of the Respondent that the bus  was being driven at a slow speed.

       In Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi and Others Vs. M/s. Ranjit Ginning  & Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd. and another [AIR 1977 SC 1735] this Court  observed:

"6.The normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to  prove negligence but as in some cases considerable  hardship is caused to the plaintiff as the true cause  of the accident is not known to him but is solely  within the knowledge of the defendant who caused  it, the plaintiff can prove the accident but cannot  prove how it happened to establish negligence on  the part of the defendant.  This hardship is sought  to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa  loquitur.  The general purport of the words res ipsa  loquitur is that the accident "speaks for itself" or  tells its own story.  There are cases in which the  accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for  the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing  more.  It will then be for the defendant to establish  that the accident happened due to some other cause  than his own negligence\005"

       The said principle was applied in Sarla Dixit (Smt.) and Another Vs.  Balwant Yadav and Others [(1996) 3 SCC 179].

       In A.T. Mane (supra), this Bench observed:

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"6\005Learned counsel relied on a judgment of this  Court in support of this contention of his in the  case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. Vs.  B.S. Hullikatti [(2001) 2 SCC 574].  That was also  a case where a conductor concerned had  committed similar misconduct 36 times prior to the  time he was found guilty and bearing that fact in  mind this Court held thus:-

"Be that as it may, the principle of res ipsa  loquitur, namely, the facts speak for themselves, is  clearly applicable in the instant case.  Charging 50  paise per ticket more from as many as 35  passengers could only be to get financial benefit,  by the Conductor.  This act was either dishonest or  was so grossly negligent that the respondent was  not fit to be retained as a Conductor because such  action or inaction of his is bound to result in  financial loss to the appellant corporation."

7. On the above basis, the Court came to the  conclusion that the order of dismissal should have  been set aside.  In our opinion, the facts of the  above case and the law laid down therein applies  to the facts of the present case also."

                In Thakur Singh Vs. State of Punjab [(2003) 9 SCC 208], this Court  observed:

"4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself was  driving the vehicle at the relevant time.  It is also  admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge and  then it fell into canal.  In such a situation the  doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and  the burden shifts on to the man who was in control  of the automobile to establish that the accident did  not happen on account of any negligence on his  part.  He did not succeed in showing that the  accident happened due to causes other than  negligence on his part."         

       The burden of proof was, therefore, on the Respondent to prove that  the vehicle was not being driven by him rashly or negligently.

       Furthermore, in a case involving accident it is not essential to examine  the passengers of the bus.  In State of Haryana & Others Vs Rattan Singh  [(1977) 2 SCC 491] this Court observed:

"5. Reliance was placed, as earlier stated, on the  non-compliance with the departmental instruction  that statement of passengers should be recorded by  inspectors.  These are instructions of prudence, not  rules that bind or vitiate in the violation.  In this  case, the Inspector tried to get the statements but  the passengers declined, the psychology of the  latter in such circumstances being understandable,  although may not be approved.  We cannot hold  that merely because statements of passengers were  not recorded the order that followed was invalid.   Likewise, the re-evaluation of the evidence on the  strength of co-conductor’s testimony is a matter  not for the court but for the administrative tribunal.  

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In conclusion, we do not think the courts below  were right in overturning the finding of the  domestic tribunal."

       Yet again, this Court in A.T. Mane (supra) referring to the decision of  this court in Rattan Singh (supra) held:

"6\005In such circumstances, it was not necessary or  possible for the appellant \026 corporation to have  examined the passengers to establish the guilt of  the respondent.  He also submitted that the finding  of the Labour Court and the learned Single Judge  that the punishment is disproportionate to the  misconduct is wholly misconceived."   

       In M/s Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.(supra) this Court  was  seized with a different  question namely the employer’s liability to pay the  bonus to the workmen which had a direct relation with the profit earned by  the company  for the year 1960-61.  In support of financial condition of the  management which had a direct nexus with the employer’s capacity to pay  bonus and in that situation it was held that mere production of a balance- sheet by the management would not serve the purpose as the entries  contained therein, if called in question, must be proved.  The tribunal in that  case came to the conclusion that management had failed to prove the  original cost of the machines, plant and machinery, its age, the probable  requirements for replacement, the multiplier and the divisor.  In those  circumstances the claim was held to have been properly disallowed by the  Tribunal holding:

"14\005\005.No doubt the procedure prescribed in the  Evidence Act by first requiring his chief- examination and then to allow the delinquent to  exercise his right to cross-examine him was not  followed, but that the Enquiry Officer, took upon  himself to cross-examine the witnesses from the  very start.  It was contended that this method  would violate the well recognized rules of  procedure.  In these circumstances it was observed  at page 264:

"Now it is no doubt true that the  evidence of the Respondent and his  witnesses was not taken in the mode  prescribed in the Evidence Act; but  that Act has no application to  enquiries conducted by Tribunal even  though they may be judicial in  character.  The law requires that such  Tribunals should observe rules of  natural justice in the conduct of the  enquiry and if they do so their  decision is not liable to be impeached  on the ground that the procedure  followed was not in accordance with  that which obtains in a Court of law."

But the application of principle of natural justice  does not imply that what is not evidence can be  acted upon.  On the other hand what it means is  that no materials can be relied upon to establish a  contested fact which are not spoken to by persons  who are competent to speak about them and are  subjected to cross-examination by the party against  whom they are sought to be used.  When a

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document is produced in a Court or a Tribunal the  questions that naturally arise is, is it a genuine  document, what are its contents and are the  statements contained therein true.  When the  appellant produced the balance-sheet and profit  and loss account of the company, it does not by its  mere production amount to a proof of it or of the  truth of the entries therein.  If these entries are  challenged the Appellant must prove each of such  entries by producing the books and speaking from  the entries made therein.  If a letter or other  document is produced to establish some fact which  is relevant to the enquiry the writer must be  produced or his affidavit in respect thereof be filed  and opportunity afforded to the opposite party who  challenges this fact.  This is both in accord with  principles of natural justice as also according to the  procedure under Order XIX, Civil Procedure Code  and the Evidence Act both of which incorporate  these general principles.  Even if all technicalities  of the Evidence Act are not strictly applicable  except in so far as Section 11 of the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 and the rules prescribed therein  permit it, it is inconceivable that the Tribunal can  act on what is not evidence such as hearsay, nor  can it justify the Tribunal in basing its award on  copies of documents when the originals which are  in existence are not produced and proved by one of  the methods either by affidavit or by witnesses  who have executed them, if they are alive and can  be produced.  Again if a party wants an inspection,  it is incumbent on the Tribunal to give inspection  in so far as that is relevant to the enquiry.  The  applicability of these principles are well  recognized and admit of no doubt."

       The said decision, for the reasons stated hereinabove, cannot have any  application to the fact of the present case.   

       The learned Counsel for the respondent also placed reliance upon a  decision of this Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar (supra).  In that case,   this court was concerned with the charge of misconduct against the appellant  therein concerning an allegation that he favoured M/s Hari Vishnu Pakaging  Ltd. Nagpur (assessee) by not imposing penalty on it under Rule 173-Q of  the Central Excise Rules, 1944 when he had passed an order-in-Original  No.20 of 1995 dated 2.3.1995 holding that the assesee had clandestinely  manufactured and cleared the excisable goods willfully and evaded the  excise duty and had ordered confiscation of the goods.  The misconduct was  said to have been committed by the appellant while exercising his judicial  function.  Having regard to the factual matrix obtaining therein, this court  observed:

"37. Penalty to be imposed has to be  commensurate with the gravity of the offence and  the extent of the evasion.  In the present case,  penalty could have been justified.  The appellant  was, however, of the view that imposition of  penalty was not mandatory.  He could have formed  such a view\005\005."

       It was further observed: "41. When penalty is not levied, the assessee  certainly benefits.  But it cannot be said that by not  levying the penalty the officer has favoured the  assessee or shown undue favour to him.  There has

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to be some basis for the disciplinary authority to  reach such a conclusion even prima facie.  The  record in the present case does not show if the  disciplinary authority had any information within  its possession from where it could form an opinion  that the appellant showed "favour" to the assessee  by not imposing the penalty.  He may have  wrongly exercised his jurisdiction.  But that wrong  can be corrected in appeal.  That cannot always  form a basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings  against an officer while he is acting as a quasi- judicial authority.  It must be kept in mind that  being a quasi-judicial authority, he is always  subject to judicial supervision in appeal.

42. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against  an officer cannot take place on information which  is vague or indefinite.  Suspicion has no role to  play in such matter.  There must exist reasonable  basis for the disciplinary authority to proceed  against the delinquent officer.  Merely because  penalty was not imposed and the Board in the  exercise of its power directed filing of appeal  against that order in the Appellate Tribunal could  not be enough to proceed against the appellant.   There is no other instance to show that in similar  case the appellant invariably imposed penalty."

       In the aforementioned factual matrix of the case it was held that every  error of law would not constitute a charge of misconduct.   

       This decision also has no application to the facts of the present case.   In the instant case the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal as also the  learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court misdirected  themselves in law insofar as they failed to pose unto themselves correct  questions.  It is now well-settled that a quasi-judicial authority must pose  unto itself a correct question so as to arrive at a correct finding of fact.  A  wrong question posed leads to a wrong answer.  In this case, further more,  the misdirection in law committed by the Industrial Tribunal was apparent  insofar as it did not apply the principle of Res ipsa loquitur which was  relevant for the purpose of this case and, thus, failed to take into  consideration a relevant factor and furthermore took into consideration an  irrelevant fact not garmane for determining the issue, namely, the passengers  of the bus were mandatorily required to be examined.  The Industrial  Tribunal further failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to a  domestic enquiry, which in "preponderance of probability" and applied the  standard of proof required for a criminal trial.  A case for judicial review  was, thus, clearly made out.   

       Errors of fact can also be a subject-matter of judicial review.  (See E.  vs Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004 Vol.2 Weekly Law  Report page 1351).  Reference in this connection may also be made to an  interesting article by Paul P. Craig Q.C. titled ’Judicial Review, Appeal and  Factual Error’ published in 2004 Public Law Page 788.         The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained and, thus,  must be set aside.

Ordinarily, we would have remitted the matter back to Industrial  Tribunal for its consideration afresh but as the matter is pending for a long  time and as we are satisfied having regard to the materials placed before us  that the Industrial Tribunal should have granted approval of the order of  punishment passed by the Appellant herein against the Respondents, we  direct accordingly.  The Respondents may, however, take recourse to such  remedy as is available to in law for questioning the said order of dismissal.

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For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be  sustained which are set aside accordingly.  The appeal is allowed.  No costs.