http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3  

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  845 of 2002

PETITIONER: Chittar Lal                                                      

RESPONDENT: Vs. State of Rajasthan                                               

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/07/2003

BENCH: DORAISWAMY RAJU & ARIJIT PASAYAT

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

       Conviction for offence punishable under Section 302,  Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ’IPC’) made by learned  Sessions Judge, Kota, having been confirmed by a Division  Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, this appeal  has been preferred by the accused.   

Factual scenario as unfolded during trial is as  follows:

On 26.4.1994, septuagenarian Lattor Lal (hereinafter  referred to as ’the deceased’) lost his life at about 7.30  a.m.  He was going with his cows in front of one Madan Lal’s  house.  Accused-appellant Chittar Lal gave him a knife blow   resulting in instantaneous death. This incident was  witnessed by Dhan Raj (PW3), Shiv Prakash (PW5), Nathu Lal  (PW6) and others. Son of the deceased, Heera Lal (PW1)  lodged the report at the police station at about 8.15 a.m.   On being told that accused was coming towards the house of   Heera Lal (PW1), his mother closed the door.  When he went  to the roof, he saw accused who had a knife in his hand was  running towards the hospital.  He reached the spot and found  his father dead.  The background motive for the assault was  said to be execution of a Will of one house by Moti Lal,  father of the accused in favour of his daughter Smt. Ganga  Bai (PW16), who later on sold the house to Bharat Kumar  (PW8) (brother of the informant).  Accused did not like the  transaction and had developed animus towards the deceased.   On registration of the First Information Report,  investigation was undertaken and charge sheet was filed.   Post-mortem was conducted by Doctor (PW18), who found two  stab injuries; one in pleural cavity along with fracture of  mid sternum V arranged and other ¾" x ¼" deep into abdominal  cavity 4", 2" left to umbilicus. The case was committed to  the court of Sessions Judge, Kota and trial was held by it.   Prosecution examined 18 witnesses to further its version.   Accused pleaded innocence.   

During trial two witnesses who claimed to be eye- witnesses (PWs 5 and 6) made departure from the statements  made during investigation.  However, Dhanraj (PW3)

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3  

implicated the accused.   

The Trial Court relying on his evidence held the  accused guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC  and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.

In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the  appellant submitted that evidence of PW3 could not have been  relied upon as his name did not find place in the FIR.   Additionally on the sole testimony of a young boy of 15, the  conviction could not have been made.  The evidence of PW3 is  not cogent and credible and lacks reliability.  His presence  at the spot of occurrence is doubtful.  The incident was  claimed to have taken place at about 7.30 a.m. when he was  supposed to be in the examination hall.  He was student of  class VI and it is hard to believe that he secured 20 marks  in the oral examination, as claimed by him.  On the contrary  it appears that the marks were secured by him at the  examination held on that date. If he appeared at the  examination; question of his having seen the incident does  not arise.   

None appeared for the State of Rajasthan when the  matter is called.

Evidence of the person whose name did not figure in the  FIR as witness does perforce become suspect.  There can be  no hard and fast rule that the names of all witnesses more  particularly eye-witnesses should be indicated in the FIR.   As was observed by this Court in Shri Bhagwan vs. State of  Rajasthan (2001 (6) SCC 296) mere non-mention of the name of  an eye-witness does not render prosecution version fragile.   The information was not lodged by an eye-witness. Mental  condition of a person whose father has lost life inevitably  gets disturbed.  Explanation offered by witnesses for non- mention of PW3’s name is plausible.  Additionally it is to  be noted that in the present case the statement of PW3 was  recorded on the same date of incident, immediately after the  investigation process was set into motion.  Therefore, the  plea that PW3’s testimony is doubtful lacks substance.  The  other plea was that conviction should not have been made on  the basis of a single witness (PW3)’s testimony.  This plea  is equally without essence.  The legislative recognition of  the fact that no particular number of witnesses can be  insisted upon is amply reflected in Section 134 of the  Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short ’Evidence Act’).   Administration of justice can be affected and hampered if  number of witnesses were to be insisted upon.  It is not  seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of  one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of  unknown occurrence where determination of guilt depends  entirely on circumstantial evidence. If plurality of  witnesses would have been the legislative intent cases where  the testimony of a single witness only could be available,  in number of crimes offender would have gone unpunished.  It  is the quality of evidence of the single witness whose  testimony has to be tested on the touchstone of credibility  and reliability.  If the testimony is found to be reliable,  there is no legal impediment to convict the accused on such  proof.  It is the quality and not the quantity of evidence  which is necessary for proving or disproving a fact. This  position has been settled by a series of decisions.  The  first decision which has become locus classicus is Mohamad  Gugal Esa Mamasan Ger Alalah v. The King (AIR 1946 PC 3).  The Privy Council focused on the difference between English

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3  

Law where a number of statutes make conviction impermissible  for certain categories of offences on the testimony of a  single witness and Section 134 of Evidence Act.  The view  has been echoed in Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras  (AIR 1957 SC 614), Guli Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan  (AIR 1974 SC 276), Vahula Bhushan alias Vehuna Krishnan v.  State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1989 SC 236), Jagdish Prasad and  Ors. v. State of M.P. (AIR 1994 SC 1251), and Kartik Malhar  v. State of Bihar (1996 (1) SCC 614).        

Evidence of PW3 comes unscathed on the acid test of  credibility and reliability and, therefore, there can be no  justification in doubting his testimony. Factual aspect  regarding his alleged appearance at examination has been  elaborately analysed by both the Trial Court and the High  Court and it has been found that PW3 did not appear at the  examination and his presence at the spot of occurrence has  been established. That being the position, the said plea of  the accused-appellant also fails. Though there was no  appearance on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, Ms. Minakshi  Vij who has appeared as amicus curiae very fairly placed the  entire material on record for consideration, and we record  our appreciation for the fair approach.   

The appeal fails and is dismissed.