08 October 1996
Supreme Court
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CHIEF COMMISSIONER, UNION TERRITORY, CHANDIGARH Vs JANGI LAL JAIN & ANR. ETC.

Bench: K. RAMASWAMY,G.B. PATTANAIK
Case number: Appeal (civil) 3537 of 1979


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PETITIONER: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, UNION TERRITORY, CHANDIGARH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JANGI LAL JAIN & ANR. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       08/10/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      These appeals  by special leave arise from the judgment dated 19.2.1979  of the  Division Bench  of the  Punjab  and Haryana High  Court holding  that the delegation of power to levy property  tax in  favour of  the Chief Administrator of Union Territory  of Chandigarh  Administration was in excess of legislative  power. The  operation of  Schedule II of the Capital of  Punjab (Development  and Regulation)  Act, 1952, (27 of  1952), as  amended by Punjab Act 37 of 1957, offenda the provisions  of the  Constitution. On  the facts  of this case, we  think that  it is  not  necessary  to  decide  the question on  account of diverse reasons. There is some force in the  contention of  Shri Madhava  Reddy,  learned  senior counsel for  the appellant,  that the view taken by the High Court is  not correct  in law.  But, prior to 1994 Amendment under Section  62 read  with Section 61 and 68 of the Punjab Municipal Act 1911, the assessment of the property tax shall be annual  basis and  revisable every year. Now, it is valid for five  years and  amount for  quinquinial. In  this case, since it was struck down revision was not effected. Moreover even tile  limitation for recovery of the amount due also is now barred  by limitation except for six months. That apart, the  Punjab   Municipal  Corporation   Law   (Extension   to Chandigarh) Act, 1994 (45 of 1994) which has come into force with effect  from hay  24, 1994, displaces the effect of Act 27 of  1952 as  amended by  Act 37  of 1957.  The  Municipal Corporation, as enjoined under Section 4 of 1994 Act has yet to be  constituted. After coming into force of the 1994 Act, the Chief  Administrator has  been denuded  of the  power to levy property  tax. In  view of these subsequent changes, it is unnecessary,  rather academic,  to  decide  the  question decided by  the High  Court in the impugned order. Moreover, the connected  appeals C.A.  Nos.3536, 3539,3541-43/79 filed against the  main judgment  were dismissed by this Court for non-prosecution on  May 10,  1995 and  became  final.  Under these circumstances,  we think  that these  are  not  proper cases to go into the question.      The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.

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