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PETITIONER: CHERAN TRANSPORT CORPORATION LTD.COIMBATORE.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITYCOIMBATORE & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       19/01/1996

BENCH: KIRPAL B.N. (J) BENCH: KIRPAL B.N. (J) VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1180            1996 SCC  (7) 343  JT 1996 (1)   597        1996 SCALE  (1)397

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T KIRPAL, J.      Leave granted.      The challenge  in these  appeals by special leave is to the common  judgment of  the  Madras  High  Court  in  Civil Revision Petition  Nos. 1852-1854  & 1886  of 1982 which set aside the  order of  the State  Transport Appellate Tribunal (which in turn confirmed the order of the Regional Transport Authority)  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ’the  Tribunal’) granting stage carriage permits to the appellant.      Since all  these appeals  involve a  common question of law, it  is sufficient  to give in detail the facts relating to the case of respondent No. 2 N.T. Arasu.      Respondent No. 2 was an existing operator for the route Coimbatore to  Kottur. On  the  expiry  of  the  permit,  it applied for  renewal for  a further  period  of  five  years w.e.f. 10.4.1978.  The appellant  herein, which  is a  State Transport Undertaking  in the  state  of  Tamilnadu  made  a counter application for the grant of a stage carriage permit for the said route in its favour.      The Regional  Transport Authority  applying its marking system, determined  the marks  as 11 marks for the appellant herein and  6 marks for respondent No. 2 which was a private operator. The  said  Authority,  accordingly,  rejected  the renewal application  of Respondent  No. 2  and  granted  the permit in favour of the appellant.      The Tribunal  vide its  order  dated  31.3.1982,  while dismissing the  appeal filed  by respondent No. 2 upheld the grant of a stage carriage permit in favour of the appellant, after considering  various questions  involved on merits. It came to  the conclusion that the grant of the stage carriage permit  in  favour  of  the  appellant  was  in  the  public interest.      Being aggrieved  by the aforesaid order, the respondent filed Revision Petition before the Madras High Court and, by

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virtue of  the interim  orders which  were passed,  both the respondent No.  2 as  well as the appellant herein continued to ply their vehicles on the route in question.      The said  Revision Petition came up for hearing and was ultimately decided by the judgment dated 28.8.90 of the High Court. The  learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that inasmuch as  respondent No.  2 had been permitted to operate continuously for  a period  of  ten  years  along  with  the appellant herein,  the Revision  Petition should be allowed. It was  not disputed  that the appellant had more marks than the respondent  No. 2  but the learned Judge referred to the decision   of    this   Court    in   M.   Chinnaswamy   Vs. Dhandayuthanpani Roadways,  AIR 1977  S.C. 2095 and observed that when  travelling public  was accustomed to a particular pattern of service for a number of years, that should bot be disturbed lightly.  It was,  accordingly, directed  that the status quo or both the parties would continue, the effect of which  was  that  both  were  allowed  to  ply  their  stage carriages on the same route.      Challenging  the   aforesaid  judgment,   it  has  been contended that  as there was only one permit which had to be issued the  High Court  erred in  directing  that  both  the appellant  and  respondent  No.  2  could  ply  their  stage carriages on the same route primarily on the ground that for a period  of ten  years, respondent No. 2 had been operating the  said   route  and  the  travelling  public  had  become accustomed to  it. This  can be no ground, it was submitted, for the  Court directing  that  instead  of  one,  both  the carriers could ply their stage carriages.      The decision  in the case of Chinnaswamy’s case (supra) was sought  to be  relied in  the subsequent  case  of  S.V. Sivaswami Vs.  Motor Transport  (Firm), 1990(3)  SCR 802. In Sivaswami’s case  (supra) also  by  reason  of  the  interim orders which were passed by the High Court, both the parties were allowed  to operate on the same route. A common request was made  in this  Court that  an order similar to one in M. Chinnaswamy’s case (supra) be passed and both the parties be allowed  to  operate  on  the  said  route.  This  Court  in Sivaswami’s case  (supra) (to  which one  of us was a party) referred to  the observations  made  in  Chinnaswamy’s  case (supra) as  well as  another similar  order which  had  been passed in  Civil Appeal  No. 136  of 1980,  and observed  as follows:      "With respect,  we are  unable to accept      this common  request made  to us  in the      present case.  It is  obvious  from  the      above quoted  orders on which the common      request is  based that  in none of them,      any  point  of  law  was  considered  or      decided and  the order  permitting  both      the claimants  to operate  on the route,      even though the permit to be granted was      only one,  was made without adverting to      the legal implications of such an order.      In the first place, grant of a permit is      to be  made primarily  with reference to      the object  of serving  the interests of      the general  public  and  it  cannot  be      treated as  a dispute  relating to grant      of a  permit between the rival claimants      only. It  is not  in the nature of a lis      for    adjudication    of    conflicting      interests of  private individuals alone.      It is, therefore, not a matter which can      be decided  merely on  the basis  of  an

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    agreement   between    the   two   rival      claimants  who   alone  out  of  several      claimants remain  in  the  lis  at  this      stage. The  question of  grant of permit      is to be decided primarily by the R.T.A.      having regard primarily to the interests      of  the   general   public   and   other      prescribed relevant factors. That apart,      under  Section   47  (3)  of  the  Motor      Vehicles Act,  1939, the R.T.A. is first      required  to  determine  the  number  of      stage carriages  for the  route and then      to  grant   permits  according  to  that      determination made earlier. Grant of any      permit  in   excess  thereof   was   not      permissible without first making a fresh      determination and increasing the number,      if necessary.  It is, therefore, obvious      that an  order of  this kind  cannot  be      made unless  the grant  of a  permit  to      both the rival claimants would be within      the limit  fixed by  the R.T.A.  at  the      relevant time.  There is  nothing in any      of these above quoted orders to indicate      that this aspect was even adverted to or      that there was material to indicate that      the consent order so made was within the      limit fixed by the R.T.A."      In this case the grant of permit to respondent No. 2 is challenged by  the appellant.  In Chinnaswamy’s case (supra) it was  a consent order which was passed but that consent of the parties is lacking in the present case. Apart from that, there was  only one  permit which  was to  be given  and the Regional  Transport   Authority  and  the  Tribunal,  having determined that  the marks  of the  appellant were more than that of respondent No. 2, had rightly come to the conclusion that the  route could  be awarded  only  to  the  appellant. Following the  ratio of Sivaswami’s case (supra), it must be held that  the mere fact that the travelling public had been using the  carriages run by the appellant and the respondent No. 2 can, by itself, not be a ground for following the said respondent to continue to ply the carriages.      Counsel for  the respondent  then  submitted  that  the respondent No. 2 has been granted renewal of the permit upto 6.11.1996. While  referring to  Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles (Special Provisions) Act, 1992, it was sought to be  contended that  because of  the said provision, there can be  no challenge  to the  permit of  the said respondent which has  now been  renewed. The  said Section  10 reads as under:      "Notwithstanding anything  continued  in      Chapter V  or VI including Section 98 of      the Motor  Vehicles Act, 1988 all orders      passed granting  permits or  renewal  or      transfer  of   such   permits   or   any      variation,  modification,  extension  or      curtailment  of   the  route  or  routes      specified in  a  stage  carriage  permit      during the  period commencing on the 4th      day of  June 1976  and ending  with  the      date of  the publication  of this Act in      the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, shall      for all  purposes be deemed to be and to      have always  been  taken  or  passed  in      accordance with  the provisions  of this

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    Act as  if this Act had been in force at      all material times."      We fail  to appreciate as to how the said provision can be of  any assistance  to  the  said  respondent.  All  that Section 10  provides is  that  the  orders  passed  granting permits or  renewal  etc.  under  the  provisions  of  Motor Vehicles Act,  1988  are  deemed  to  have  been  passed  in accordance with  the provisions  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  Motor Vehicles (Special Provisions) Act, 1992. The said Section 10 does not validate any permit which was initially invalid. It is a  provision which  continues the  permits etc. which had been validly  granted under  the old Act. As no valid permit could have  been granted  to respondent No. 2 from the route Coimbatore to  Kottur, the  provisions of  Section 10 cannot give a  right to the respondent No. 2 to get the permit when it had  only six marks. When there was only one permit to be given for  the said  route and  the marks  obtained  by  the appellant were  much more  than that  of respondent  in  our opinion, the appellant Tribunal had rightly upheld the order of the  Regional  Transport  Authority  granting  the  stage carriage permit  to the  appellant and  in not  renewing the permit of the respondent No. 2.      For the  aforesaid reasons,  these appeals  are allowed and the  judgment of  the Madras  High Court  in C.R.P. Nos. 1852-54 and 1856 of 1982 which is under appeal, is set aside and  the   decision  dated  31.3.1982  of  the  Tribunal  is restored.  The   appellant  will   be  entitled   to   costs throughout.