CHARANJIT LAMBA Vs COMMNDNG.OFFICER,SOUTHERN COMMAND .
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001027-001027 / 2002
Diary number: 1180 / 1999
Advocates: JAGJIT SINGH CHHABRA Vs
B. V. BALARAM DAS
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1027 OF 2002
Charanjit Lamba …Appellant
Versus
Commanding Officer, Southern …Respondents Command & Ors.
J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, J.
1. This appeal by special leave arises out of an order
dated 15th September, 1998 passed by the High Court of
judicature at Bombay whereby Criminal Writ Petition No.489
of 1997 filed by the appellant has been dismissed and the
order of dismissal from service on proved misconduct
affirmed. The factual matrix giving rise to the disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant and his eventual dismissal
from service has been set out by the High Court in the order
under appeal. We need not, therefore, re-count the same
over again. Suffice it to say that the appellant who at the
relevant time was serving as a Major in the Indian Army was
consequent upon a finding recorded against him in a Court
of Inquiry brought up for trial before a General Court Martial
(GCM for short) on the following two distinct charges:
FIRST CHARGE ARMY ACT SECTION 52(f).
SUCH AN OFFENCE AS IS MENTIONED IN CLAUSE (f) OF SECTION 52 OF THE ARMY ACT, WITH INTENT TO CAUSE WRONGFUL LOSS TO A PERSON
In that he, at field on 30th Jul 92, with intent to cause wrongful gain to himself, improperly claimed Rs.16,589.30 (Rs. Sixteen thousand five hundred eighty nine and paise thirty only) from CDA (Q) Pune on account of moving his household luggage and car to Chandigarh, well knowing that he was legally not entitled to the same.
SECOND CHARGE, ARMY ACT SECTION 45
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BEING AN OFFICER BEHAVING IN A MANNER UNBECOMING HIS POSITION AND THE CHARACTER EXPECTED OF HIM
In that he, at Pune, between 03 Sep 92 and Jun 93, improperly failed to pay the final electricity bill dated 03 Sep 92 amounting to Rs.8132.35 (Rs. eight thousand one hundred thirty two and paise thirty five only) to Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) in respect of H No.12-B Kohun Road, Pune-1 which was allotted to him.”
2. Evidence adduced before the GCM eventually led to the
appellant being held guilty for improperly claiming
Rs.16,589.30 on account of transfer of his household
luggage and car to Chandigarh. The GCM found that the
family of the appellant had continued to occupy government
accommodation at Pune even after his posting to the field
area and that the agency who is alleged to have transported
the luggage and the car of the appellant did not exist at the
given address. The evidence given by the appellant in his
defence was also found by the GCM to be unreliable on
account of material contradictions in the deposition of the
defence witnesses. The GCM on proof of the said charge
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sentenced him to forfeiture of ten years past service for
purposes of pension. In so far as the second charge, viz.
non-payment of electricity bill was concerned, the GCM
declared the appellant not guilty. In its opinion the appellant
had never refused to pay the electricity bill which was at any
rate a matter between him and the Maharashtra State
Electricity Board. The GCM took the view that the default of
the petitioner could not be termed as conduct unbecoming of
an official subject to the Army Act to call for any penal
action.
3. Aggrieved by the findings and the sentence awarded to
him by the GCM the petitioner filed an appeal before the
General Officer Commanding, Maharashtra and Gujarat Area
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘GOC M & G Area’) who
happened to be the confirming authority also. The GOC M &
G Area, however, took the view that the sentence awarded
to the appellant on the first charge was lenient inasmuch as
the offence committed by the appellant was serious and
involved moral turpitude. It also noted that the appellant
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had past convictions to his credit which ought to be kept in
view. The finding recorded by the GCM in regard to the
second charge framed against the appellant was also found
to be untenable by GOC M & G Area as according to him the
conduct of the appellant fell within the ambit of Section 4E
of the Army Act which made his behaviour unbecoming of an
officer. The GOC M & G Area accordingly remanded the
matter back to the GCM for re-consideration on the question
of sentence to be awarded to the appellant on the first
charge and whether the appellant could be held guilty on the
second charge. The order made it clear that the GOC M & G
Area did not intend to interfere with the discretion vested in
the GCM which was free to decide the matter in the manner
it liked.
4. The GCM accordingly assembled again to consider the
matter and while sticking to the reasons given by it in
regard to the first charge found the second charge also to
have been proved. The GCM on that basis revoked the
earlier sentence and sentenced the appellant to dismissal
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from service which order was after confirmation by the
competent authority assailed by the appellant before the
High Court at Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No.489 of
1997 as already noticed earlier.
5. Before the High Court several contentions appear to have
been urged on behalf of the appellant which were examined
and repelled by the High Court while dismissing the writ
petition in terms of the order impugned in this appeal. The
correctness of the view taken by the High Court on the
grounds urged before it has not been assailed before us
except in so far as the High Court has held that the
punishment of dismissal imposed upon the appellant was in
no way disproportionate to the gravity of the offence
committed by him.
6. Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant argued that the order of dismissal of the
appellant from service was in the facts and circumstances of
the case disproportionate to the gravity of the charges
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framed against the appellant. He relied upon the decisions of
this Court to which we shall presently refer to submit that
judicial review of the order of dismissal would justify
intervention by a Writ Court in cases where punishment was
disproportionate to the nature of misconduct proved against
the delinquent. The present was according to him one such a
case that called for the Court’s intervention to either reduce
the punishment or to direct the same to be reduced by the
competent authority.
7. In Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v.
Employees Assn. (2007) 4 SCC 669 this Court declared
that the doctrine of proportionality has not only arrived in
our legal system but has come to stay. With the rapid
growth of the administrative law and the need to control
possible abuse of discretionary powers by various
administrative authorities, certain principles have been
evolved by reference to which the action of such authorities
can be judged. If any action taken by an authority is
contrary to law, improper, irrational or otherwise
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unreasonable, a court competent to do so can interfere with
the same while exercising its power of judicial review.
8. This Court referred with approval to the decision of the
House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Union v.
Minister for Civil Service (1985 AC 374) where Lord
Diplock summed up the grounds on which administrative
action was open to judicial review by a Writ Court. Lord
Diplock’s off-quoted passage dealing with the scope of
judicial review of an administrative action may be gainfully
extracted at this stage:
“Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the ground on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say that further development on a case-by-case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’…..”
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9. The doctrine of proportionality which Lord Diplock saw
as a future possibility is now a well recognized ground on
which a Writ Court can interfere with the order of
punishment imposed upon an employee if the same is so
outrageously disproportionate to the nature of misconduct
that it shocks conscience of the Court. We may at this stage
briefly refer to the decisions of this Court which have over
the years applied the doctrine of proportionality to specific
fact situations.
10. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh
(1983) 2 SCC 442 this Court held that if the penalty
imposed is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct,
it would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
11. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors. (1987) 4
SCC 611, this Court was dealing with a case where the
petitioner had made a representation about the
maltreatment given to him directly to the higher officers. He
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was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year for
that offence. While serving the sentence imposed upon him
he declined to eat food. The summary court martial
assembled the next day sentenced him to undergo
imprisonment for one more year and dismissal from service.
This Court held that the punishment imposed upon the
delinquent was totally disproportionate to the gravity of the
offence committed by him. So also in Ex-Naik Sardar
Singh v. Union of India & Ors. (1991) 3 SCC 213
instead of one bottle of brandy that was authorized the
delinquent was found carrying four bottles of brandy while
going home on leave. He was sentenced to three months
rigorous imprisonment and dismissal from service which was
found by this Court to be disproportionate to the gravity of
the offence proved against him.
12. The decision of this Court in Hind Construction &
Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (AIR 1965 SC 917)
dealt with a situation where some workers had remained
absent from duty treating a particular day as a holiday.
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They were for that misconduct dismissed from service. This
Court held that the absence of the workmen could have
been treated as ‘leave without pay’ and they could also be
warned and not fined. Reversing the order of punishment
this Court observed:
“It is impossible to think that any other reasonable employer would have imposed the extreme punishment of dismissal on its entire permanent staff in this manner.
13. Reference may also be made to Management of the
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and
Industry v. Workman, Shri R.K. Mittal (1972) 1 SC 40)
where the employer had issued a legal notice to the
federation and to the international chamber of Commerce
which brought discredit to the petitioner-employer. A
domestic inquiry was held in which he was found guilty and
his services terminated. This Court held that the punishment
was disproportionate to the misconduct alleged observing:
“The Federation had made a mountain out of a mole hill and made a trivial matter into one involving loss of its prestige and reputation.”
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14. We may refer to the decision of this Court in M.P.
Gangadharan & Anr. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (2006) 6
SCC 162, where this Court declared that the question of
reasonableness and fairness on the part of the statutory
shall have to be considered in the context of the factual
matrix obtaining in each case and that it cannot be put in a
straitjacket formula. The following passage is in this regard
apposite:
“34. The constitutional requirement for judging the question of reasonableness and fairness on the part of the statutory authority must be considered having regard to the factual matrix obtaining in each case. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It must be considered keeping in view the doctrine of flexibility. Before an action is struck down, the court must be satisfied that a case has been made out for exercise of power of judicial review. We are not unmindful of the development of the law that from the doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness, the court is leaning towards the doctrine of proportionality………”
15. That the punishment imposed upon a delinquent should
commensurate to the nature and generally of the
misconduct is not only a requirement of fairness, objectivity,
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and non-discriminatory treatment which even those form
quality of a misdemeanour are entitled to claim but the
same is recognized as being a part of Article 14 of the
Constitution. It is also evident from the long time of
decisions referred to above that the courts in India have
recognized the doctrine of proportionality as one of the
ground for judicial review. Having said that we need to
remember that the quantum of punishment in disciplinary
matters is something that rests primarily with the
disciplinary authority. The jurisdiction of a Writ Court or the
Administrative Tribunal for that matter is limited to finding
out whether the punishment is so outrageously
disproportionate as to be suggestive of lack of good faith.
What is clear is that while judicially reviewing an order of
punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee the Writ
Court would not assume the role of an appellate authority. It
would not impose a lesser punishment merely because it
considers the same to be more reasonable than what the
disciplinary authority has imposed. It is only in cases where
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the punishment is so disproportionate to the gravity of
charge that no reasonable person placed in the position of
the disciplinary authority could have imposed such a
punishment that a Writ Court may step in to interfere with
the same.
16. The question then is whether the present is indeed one
such case where the High Court could and ought to have
interfered with the sentence imposed upon the appellant on
the doctrine of proportionality. Our answer is in the
negative. The appellant was holding the rank of a Major in
the Indian Army at the time he committed the misconduct
alleged and proved against him. As an officer of disciplined
force like the Army he was expected to maintain the highest
standard of honesty and conduct and forebear from doing
anything that could be termed as unbecoming of anyone
holding that rank and office. Making a false claim for
payment of transport charges of household luggage and car
to Chandigarh was a serious matter bordering on moral
turpitude. Breach of the rule requiring him to clear his
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electricity dues upon his transfer from the place of his
posting was also not credit worthy for an officer. The
competent authority was therefore justified in taking the
view that the nature of the misconduct proved against the
appellant called for a suitable punishment. Inasmuch as the
punishment chosen was dismissal from service, the
competent authority, did not in our opinion, take an
outrageously absurd view of the matter. We need to
remember that the higher the public office held by a person
the greater is the demand for rectitude on his part. An
officer holding the rank of Major has to lead by example not
only in the matter of his readiness to make the supreme
sacrifice required of him in war or internal strife but even in
adherence to the principles of honesty, loyalty and
commitment. An officer cannot inspire those under his
command to maintain the values of rectitude and to remain
committed to duty if he himself is found lacking in that
quality. Suffice it to say that any act on the part of an officer
holding a commission in the Indian Army which is subversive
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of army discipline or high traditions of the Army renders
such person unfit to stay in the service of the nation’s Army
especially when the misconduct has compromised the values
of patriotism, honesty and selflessness which values are too
precious to be scarified on the altar of petty monetary gains,
obtained by dubious means.
17. In the result this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
………………………….……….…J. (DALVEER BHANDARI)
……………………….………….…J. (T.S. THAKUR)
New Delhi July 6, 2010
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