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PETITIONER: CHARAN SINGH AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DARSHAN SINGH AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/12/1974

BENCH: UNTWALIA, N.L. BENCH: UNTWALIA, N.L. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BHAGWATI, P.N.

CITATION:  1975 AIR  371            1975 SCR  (3)  48  1975 SCC  (1) 298  CITATOR INFO :  D          1991 SC 221  (9)

ACT: Section  92  of  C.P.C.-Consent  of  Advocate  General   for instituting  a suit-Whether allegations in the plaint to  be seen  for  determining  whether the suit is  of  the  nature mentioned  in section 92-Whether substance of the nature  of the  suit  to be taken  into  consideration-Whether  reliefs mentioned in section 92 should be present in the plaint. Suit  filed in a representative capacity whether  abates  on the death of one of the plaintiffs.

HEADNOTE: The  respondents  field a suit against appellant No.  1  for permanent  injunction restraining him from interfering  with the Guru Garanth Saheb, for religious recitals in the Darbar Saheb  as well as restraining him from interfering with  the rights  of reciting the Guru Garanth Sahib and  holding  and joining  the  religious congregations and  Satsang  in  the Gurudwara.   The  villagers dedicated certain  land  to  the Granth Saheb in the year 1897.  Several persons succeeded as the  trustees,  the  appellant being the  last  one  at  the relevant time.  The grievance made in the suit was that  the appellant was committing a breach of trust by not using  the Dera  in  general  and Darbar Saheb in  particular  for  the purposes for which the same was dedicated.  The Trial  Court held  that the suit was not maintainable in the  absence  of the  consent of the Advocate General as required by  section 92  of the Civil Procedure Code.  The First Appellate  Court affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.  The Single  Judge of  the  High Court in Regular Second Appeal  dismissed  the plaintiff’s  appeal on the ground that the suit was  hit  by section  92 of the Civil Procedure Code.  On grant of  leave under  clause  10 of the Letters Patent. Bench  allowed  the appeal and remitted back the case to the Trial Court holding that the suit was not barred by section 92 of the Code. On  appeal  by Special Leave it was  contended  before  this Court that (1) The judgment of the High Court in relation to section  92 of the Code is erroneous in law.  The  suit  was barred  under  the said provision of the Code;  (2)  On  the death  of  one  of  the  plaintiffs  appellants  during  the

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pendency of the second appeal in the High Court the whole of the appeal abated and ought to have been dismissed as such. Allowing the appeal. HELD  :  Since the suit has been filed in  a  representative capacity  on the death of one of the plaintiffs it  did  not abate.  The decision in Raja Anand Rao followed. [53C] HELD FURTHER : The plaint alleges breach of duty on the part of  the  trustee  and the plaintiffs seek  the  court’s  aid against  the  trustee  for  forcing  him  to  discharge  his obligations  by due performance of his duties.  The  present suit  was a suit for a decree under section 92 of  the  Code and   since  it  was  not  filed  in  conformity  with   the requirements   of   that  provision  of  law  it   was   not maintainable.   It is well settled that the  maintainability of  the suit under section 92 of the Code depends  upon  the allegations  in  the plaint and does not fall  for  decision with  reference to the averments in the  written  statement. The plaintiffs in their plaint did not in terms ask for  the one or the other reliefs mentioned in section 92(1).   They, however,  alleged  acts of breach of  trust,  mismanagement, undue  interference,  with the right of the  public  in  the worship of Granth Saheb.  They wanted a decree of the  court against the appellants to force him to carry out the objects of the trust and to perform his duties as a trustee. [57A-B]                          ARGUMENTS For  the  Appellants  : On reading  the  entire  plaint  the reliefs  claimed are covered by s. 92(1)(a) to (h)  Code  of Civil Procedure. (i)The plaint clearly shows that the property involved  is trust  property  and  that the trust is a  public  trust  or charitable and religious nature. 49 (ii)The  plaint also shows that the aim was for benefit  of the public. (iii)  Reliefs claimed fall within Sub-Clause (e)-The  place where Guru Granth Sahib was placed was called "Darbar Sahib" where it was to be recited and where Sat Sang and Amrit  Pan Ceremony  were  to be held.  The reach alleged is  that  the appellant  is not using the "Darbar Sahib,, for the  purpose for  which  it  ’was dedicated and  further  says  that  the villagers  have a right to recite and worship  Granth  Sahib installed  in  the  Dera  in general  and  Darbar  Sahib  in particular and that the appellant has stopped the  villagers from doing so.  Relief claimed is that the Defendants should be  restrained  from  interfering with  the  maintaining  of Granth  Sahib for religious recitations in the Darbar  Sahib in the Dharamsala or Dera. Therefore, the respondents required directions of the  court to  demarcate the exact location of Darbar Sahib within  the Dera  Jaimal Singh where Granth Sahib is to be  located  and worshipped etc. Such a suit relates to the administration of the said  trust and falls within subclause (e) of s. 92(1). Further the directions required involve framing of a  scheme for  time  for  worshipping  the Granth  Sahib  or  for  its recitation and for holding Sat Sang and Amrit Pan  Ceremony. Therefore, the suit falls within s. 92(1)(g). In  any  case  the suit  falls  within  Sub-clause  (h).-The defendants  contention is that the scope of s.  92(1)(a)  to (h)  should  involve administration of the  Trust  Property. Sub-Clause  (a) to (g) describe some of  the  administrative problems  arising in a particular case as all such  problems could  not be easily stated in a statutory  provision.   Any suit filed to establish existence of a trust or to establish title  of  the  trust to a piece of property  would  not  be

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covered by any sub-clause of s. 92. The plaintiffs did not contest that the suit was not covered by  clause (h) before the First Appeal Court, and also  vide Judgment  of the High Court.  In substance the complaint  is that the appellant contrary to purpose of the Trust is  pre- venting  the  villagers etc, from worshipping  and  reciting Granth  Sahib  in the Darbar Sahib and  is  preventing  them access  there to hold Sat Sang and other ceremonies.   These breaches  are obviously in the course of the  administration of  the Trust. and must be held to be covered by  sub-clause (h). Some of the plaintiffs have died during the pendency of  the Second   Appeal   in  the  High  Court   and   their   legal representatives were not brought on the record.   Therefore, the  appeal had abated against them.  Defendants had  argued that  the  appeal  had  abated in toto  but  this  plea  was rejected  by the Single Judge.  The defendant-, filed  cross objection  against this decision before the  Letters  Patent Bench but the same were dismissed without discussion. If it be held that the suit was filed for public benefit  in a  representative  capacity then this point is  conceded  to have no force.  However, if it be held that the suit was  to enforce individual rights then the appeal had abated in toto as  otherwise there will be conflicting decisions whether  a suit is covered by s. 92 or not. Under s. 5 of the Punjab Common Lands (Regulation) Act 18 of 1961  all Shamlat Lands vest in the village Panchayat.   The land  in dispute is Shamlat land, therefore, the  plaintiffs or villagers could not file a suit relating to this  Shamlat land.  Plaintiffs case is that under s. 2(g) (ix) this  land is used as a place of worship and, therefore, is not covered by  this  Act.   The defendants case  is  that  the  present institution is not a place of worship as Radha Swamis do not carry on worship at all at any place. For the respondents : The substance of the plaint is (1) (a) that  the  defendant is not using the Dera  in  general  and Darbar  Sahib  in particular for the purpose for  which  the same  are  dedicated. (b) that the  defendant  alleges  that "maintenance  of the Guru Granth Sahib and Darbar Sahib  and access  of the people to Dera and Darbar Sahib"  depends  on his sweet will and discretion. (c) that the defendant has  a right not to allow any person to enter Dera and recite -L379Sup CI/75 50 Granth  Sahib.  (d)  that the plaintiffs  have  a  right  to worship  in Dera and Dar bar Sahib and recite Granth  Sahib. (e)  that the plaintiffs have a right to set that  Dharmsala Dera and Gurdwara is used for the purpose and fulfilment  of which  the same is established. (2) In the plaint  thus  the existence  of  a trust and its denial by the  defendant  not only by not using it for the purpose of dedication but  also openly  asserting a hostile right that it is his sweet  will to  permit  even access to the Dera are alleged.   Thus  the allegation  in substance and form is that the  existence  of trust  and reciting Granth Sahib is denied by defendant  and he   places   obstruction  to  the  free   access   of   the beneficiaries of trust. (3)The  relief claimed is for injunction to  restrain  the defendant  from interfering with maintenance of Guru  Granth Sahib  in Darbar Sahib and from reciting the same; which  it is submitted is not covered by any of the sub clauses of  s. 92(1) C.P.C. and therefore s. 92 C.P.C. is not attracted. (4)That since the said relief could not be covered by  any other  sub-clause  an attempt was made by the  appellant  to bring the relief under sub-clause (h) of s. 92(i) which read

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as under "granting such further or other relief as the nature of  the case may require." This clause as held by Privy Council in 1928 PC. 16 must  be read not in isolation from but ejusdem generis to the  other clauses of the sub-section.  It is intended to cover up such other reliefs that may be necessary in order to  effectively grant  any one of the reliefs mentioned therein the  earlier clauses  something ancillary or akin to them or some  relief which follows as a necessary corallary flowing therefrom. It cannot be construed to mean some such relief which in its nature  and substance something wholly different  from  them and not covered by any of the earlier sub clause (a) to (g). It  if were so then it would cover all the  various  reliefs that  can  conceivably  be claimed in a suit  based  on  the allegation  of  breach  of trust.  That  could  not  be  the intention  of  the legislature otherwise  nothing  would  be easier for the legislature to say that for the grant of  any relief  based  on  the allegations of breach  of  trust  the sanction of advocate General would be a precondition for the institution of such a suit. The  intention  appears to be clear that in suits  based  on allegations   of  breaches  of trust  of  charitable   and religious  nature  where some. what may  be  termed  drastic reliefs  as contemplated in sub-clause (a) to (g) of  s.  92 (1)  C.P.C.  are prayed then in only such  cases  would  the sanction be needed. Thus suits for declaration of trust are out side the purview of s. 92, so also sents for declaration and possession.   On principle  there  is no difference in relief  of  injunction from that of declaration.  In fact relief of injunction  has been held to be not covered among the relief contemplated in sub-clauses (a) to (h). 5.A distinction was sought to be made between suits where allegations  of  total denial by defendant of  existence  of trust  are  made in a plaint from suits  where  breaches  by defendant  of  trust or duties only are alleged and  it  was suggested  that for the former suits no sanction needed  and for the latter sanction was necessary. The said contention is not enable; firstly the denial of the existence  of trust is also a breach of trust. and  secondly nothing would be easier to circumvent the said condition  by alleging denial by the defendant of the trust in the  plaint and thereafter seeking reliefs which admittedly fall  within sub  clauses (a) to (g) of s. 92(1).  To put  it  conversely and can it be suggested that where the allegations are  that defendant  is  denying the trust but relief  prayed  for  is removing the trustee which is clearly covered by sub  clause (a), no sanction would be needed. It  is submitted that the emphasis in section 92  C.P.C.  is not  on  the  manner in which breach  of  trust  is  alleged whether  it  is  by denial of existence of  trust  or  which admitting  the  existence of trust or  while  admitting  the existence of trust the defendant does not perform his duties but  the  emphasis is on the reliefs sough for  purposes  of sanction. 51 6.It  is  further  submitted that  though  allegation  in plaint  are primarily to be looked at for this  purpose  but where  parties have led evidence reference to the same  have also been made to find out the real nature of the suit. (see 1974 Vol. 2, S.C.C. Part X 695). In  the present case defendant in his written statement  has denied the existence of trust for reciting Granth Sahib.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 505 of 1974. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order dated  the 13th  December, 1973 of the Punjab & Haryana High  Court  in L.P.A. No. 573 of 1971. Bishan  Narain,  M. C. Bhandare, Nandtal  Balkrishan  Lulla, Nishat  Singh Garewal and K. J. Johan of J. B. Dadachanji  & Co., for the Appellants. B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by UNTAWALIA,  J.-The  plaintiffs respondents, in  this  appeal filed by the defendants appellants by special leave of  this Court  from the decision of the High Court of Judicature  of Punjab  and  Haryana  instituted a suit  in  the  year  1963 against  appellant  no.  1 alone (for the  sake  of  brevity described  as  the appellant hereinafter in  this  judgment) praying for a decree for permanent injunction against him to restrain  him ’from interfering with the maintaining of  the Guru Granth Sahib for religious recitals in the Darbar Sahib in  the Dharmsala also known as Dharmsala Dera  Baba  Jaimal Singh  situated  in  village Balsarai  Tehsil  and  District Amritsar  as also restraining him from interfering with  the plaintiffs and other satsang is rights of reciting the  Guru Granth   Sahib  and  holding  and  joining   the   religious congregations  and Satsang in the above  mentioned  Gurdwara Baba Jaimal Singh." About 70 years prior to the institution of the suit one Sant Baba  Jaimal  Singh used to reside  and  practise  spiritual sadhana  at the place aforesaid.  The residents  of  village Balsarai  held  him  in great respect because  of  his  high spiritual   achievements  and  noble  living.   He   got   a Dharamsala  built  which came to be known  as  Gurdwara  and according  to the case of the plaintiffs Guru  Granth  Sahib was   also  installed  there.   The  villagers  gifted   and dedicated  11  kanals,  16 marlas of  land  out  of  village Shamilat  to  the Granth Sahib in the  year  1897.   Several persons  succeeded  as the Manager/Trustee or  Head  of  the Institution  so  established one after the other  after  the demise  of  Sant Baba Jaimal Singh the appellant  being  the last one at the relevant time.  The plaintiffs who filed the suit in a representative capacity on behalf of the  devotees of  the  Gurdwara  in  the  first  instance  had  wanted  to institute  the  suit  after obtaining  the  consent  of  the Advocate-General of Punjab in accordance with section 92  of the  Civil  Procedure Code-hereinafter referred  to  as  the Code.   But  they  failed  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the Advocate-General.   Later on the plaintiffs  instituted  the suit endeavouring to frame it in such a manner so as to take it  out  of  the  ambit of section  92  of  the  Code.   The grievance  of the plaintiffs in the suit has been  that  the appellant Was committing a breach of trust by 52 not  using  the,  Dera  in  general  and  Darbar  Sahib   in particular for the purpose for which the same was dedicated. He had started denying the rights of the people to the  Dera and  Darbar  Sahib  and Guru  Granth  Sahib  asserting  that allowing  them  to  do so depend, upon his  sweet  will  and discretion.   The  plaintiffs,  claiming  a  right  in   the institution  for the Granth Sahib made a grievance that  the appellant  was  interfering  with their right  and  was  not discharging his duties as he ought to do in accordance  with the  objects of the religious institution in  question.   In substance  the  relief claimed against the appellant  is  to

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prevent  him from committing any breach of the trust and  to direct him to perform his duties as a Manager or Trustee  of the religious institution to carry out its objects. Several  pleas were raised by the appellant in  his  written statement  to resist the suit.  Many of them were by way  of preliminary  objections to the maintainability of the  suit. Tirlok  Singh, appellant no. 2 and two others were added  as defendants 2 to 4 in the suit at their instance.  ’The Court of the Subordinate Judge, Second Class at Amritsar framed as many  as  7 preliminary issues and decided most of  them  in favour  of the plaintiffs.  But the issue as to whether  the suit  was  competent in the absence of the  consent  of  the Advocate-General  under section 92 of the Code  was  decided against  the  plaintiffs.  So the suit was  dismissed.   The fact that the institution was a Public Trust of a  religious nature and that the suit had been filed by the plaintiffs in a representative capacity are no longer in dispute.  One  of the  pleas  taken  by the appellant was that  the  suit  was barred  in  view of the provisions of law contained  in  the Punjab  Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961,  Punjab Act  No.  18  of 1961.  But this plea was  rejected  by  the ’Trial  Court.   From the dismissal of the  suit  plaintiffs went  up in appeal.  The first Appellate Court affirmed  the decision  of  the Trial Court.  They went up  in  a  regular second appeal before the High Court.  A learned Judge of the High  Court  dismissed the plaintiffs appeal on  the  ground that  their suit was hit by section 92 of the Code.  One  of the  plaintiffs  and  two of  the  added  defendants  namely defendants  3 and 4 died during the pendency of  the  second appeal in the High Court.  Their heirs were not substituted. The  appellant’s plea that the appeal had abated as a  whole was not accepted by the learned single Judge.  He also  held against him on the point of the suit being allegedly  barred under Punjab Act 18 of 1961.  On grant of leave under clause 10  of the Letters Patent the case was taken further  before the  Letters Patent Bench.  The learned Judges  constituting the  Bench have allowed the Letters Patent appeal,  remitted back  the case to the Trial Court holding in favour  of  the respondents that the suit is not barred under section 92  of the Code.  The surviving two defendants have come up to this Court. Mr. Bishan Narain, learned counsel for the appellant,  urged the following points in support of the appeal :               (1)   The  judgment  of  the  High  Court   in               relation   to  section  92  of  the  Code   is               erroneous  in law.  The suit was barred  under               the said provision of the Code.                53               (2)   The  plaintiffs had no locus  standi  to               institute  the  suit  as the  property  of  the               institution  vested  in  the  Panchayat  under               Punjab Act 18 of 1961.               (3)   On  the death of one of  the  plaintiffs               appellants  during the pendency of the  second               appeal  in  the High Court the  whole  of  the               appeal abated and ought to have been dismissed               as such. The last two points may be shortly disposed of as they  have to  be  stated  merely to be rejected.  Point  no.  (2)  was eventually   given  up  as  it  was  completely  devoid   of substance. since the suit had been filed in a representative capacity,  it  is  clear that on the death of  one,  of  the plaintiffs  it did not abate.  In Raja Anand Rao  v.  Ramdas Daduram and others(1) it has been said Lord Dunadin at  page 16  "There was also a point that the person  who  originally

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raised  the suit and got the sanction having died  the  suit could  not go on, but there does not seem any force in  that point  either,  it being a suit which is not  prosecuted  by individuals for their own interests, but as  representatives of  the general public.  It is plain that the second  appeal did  not  lose  its competency on the death of  one  of  the plaintiffs  appellants.   The  only  point  which   requires discussion  and determination in this appeal is whether  the suit filed by the plaintiffs was barred under Subsection (2) of section 92 of the Code. It  is well-settled that a suit of the nature  envisaged  by section 92(1) of the Code to obtain a decree for any one  or more of the reliefs enumerated in clauses (a) to (h) of the Code has to be filed by the Advocate-General or two or  more persons having an interest in the Trust with the consent  in writing  of the Advocate-General.  Subsection  (2)  provides that  save  under  certain  circumstances.........  no  suit claiming  any  of the reliefs specified in  sub-section  (1) shall  be  instituted  in respect of any such  trust  as  is therein referred to except in conformity with the Provisions of  that  sub-section." Out of the 3  conditions  which  are necessary to be fulfilled for the application of section 92, two are indisputably present in this case viz. (1) the  suit relates to a Public Charitable or Religious Trust; (2) it is founded  on  an  allegation of a breach  of  trust  and  the direction of the Court is required for administration of the trust.  The debate and dispute between the parties  centered round  the  requirement  of  the  fulfilment  of  the  third condition namely whether the reliefs claimed are those which are mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 92 of the  Code. A  suit  may be instituted under section 92(1) to  obtain  a decree-               (a)   "removing any trustee;               (b)   appointing a new trustee;               (c)   vesting any property in a trustee;               (cc)directing a trustee who has been removed               or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to               deliver  possession of any trust  property  in               his  possession to the person entitled to  the               possession of such property; (1)  48 I.A.R 12.                              54 .lm15 (d)  directing.accounts and inquiries-, (e)  declaring-what  proportion of the trust-property or  of the  interest therein shall be allocated to  any  particular object of the trust; authorizing  the whole or any part of the trust-property  to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; (g)  settling a scheme; or (h)  granting such further or other relief as the nature  of the case may require." The  High Court in the Letters Patent appeal has  taken  the view  that the relief sought for in the suit does  not  fall under  any  of the clauses (a) to (h) of section 92  of  the Code.   Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed  this view  and submitted that the relief sought for  falls  under clause (e) or (g) or in any event under clause (h).  In  our judgment  the  relief  sought  for in  this  case  does  not strictly  or squarely fall within clause (e) or (g)  but  is very  much  akin  to  either and hence  is  covered  by  the residuary clause (h). Lord Sinha delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee of  the Privy Council in Abdur Rahim and others v. Syed  Abu Mahomed Barkat Ali Shah and others(1) rejected the  argument

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that  the words "such further or other relief as the  nature of  the  case may require" occurring in clause (h)  must  be taken,  not in connection with the previous clauses  (a)  to (g)  but  in connection with the nature of  the  suit.   The argument  was that any relief other than (a) to (g)  in  the case  of  an alleged breach of an  express  or  constructive trust  as  may  be  required in  the  circumstances  of  any particular case was covered by clause (h).  It was  repelled on the ground that the words "further or other relief"  must on  general  principles  of construction be  taken  to  mean relief of the same nature as clause (a) to (g) , It would be noticed  that  the  word used after clause  (g)  and  before clause  (h) is "or".  It may mean "and" in the  context,  or remain  "or’ in the disjunctive sense in a given  case.   If any  further relief is asked for in addition to any  of  the reliefs mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) as the nature of the case may require, then the word "or" would mean "and".   But if  the relief for is other relief which is not by way of  a consequential  or additional reliefs in terms of clause  (a) to (g), then the word "or" will mean "or".  The other relief however,  cannot be of a nature which is not akin to  or  of the  same nature as any of the reliefs mentioned in  clauses (a)  to (g).  According to the plaintiffs’ case one  of  the objects  of  the religious trust was the worship  of  Granth Sahib  and its recital in congregations of the  public.   In the  suit  a  decree declaring what  portion  of  the  trust property  should  be allocated to the said object  could  be asked  for under clause (e).  The plaintiffs could also  ask for  the  settling  of a scheme under  clause  (g)  alleging mismanagement  of  the religious trust on the  part  of  the trustees.  In the settlement of the scheme could be included the  worship  and recital of Granth Sahib the  holy  Granth. The plaintiffs in their plaint did not (1)  A.I.R. 1928 Privy Council, 16: 55 Indian Appeals 96. 55 in  terms. ask for the one or the. other.   They.,  however, alleged  acts  of  breach  of  trust,  mismanagement,  undue interference with the right of the public in the worship  of Granth Sahib.  They wanted a decree of the Court against the appellant to force him to carry out the objects of the trust and to perform his duties as a Trustee.  Reading the  plaint as  a whole it is not a suit where the plaintiffs  wanted  a declaration of their right in the, religious institution  in respect  of the Granth Sahib.  But it was a suit where  they wanted  enforcement of due performance of the duties of  the trustee in relation to a particular object of the trust.  It is  well-settled that the maintainability of the suit  under section  92 of the Code depends upon the allegations in  the plaint and does not fall for decision with reference to  the averments in the written statement. In Mahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji v. Patel Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai  and others(1) it was pointed out at page  517  by Mukherjea, J, as he then was, speaking for the Court "A suit under  section  92,  Civil Procedure Code, is a  suit  of  a special  nature which presupposes the existence of a  public trust of a religious or charitable character.  Such suit can proceed  only  on the allegation that there is a  breach  of such  trust or that directions from the court are  necessary for the administration thereof, and it must pray for one  or other of the reliefs that are specifically mentioned in  the section.   It  is only when these conditions  are  fulfilled that  the suit has got to be brought in conformity with  the provision  of  section  92, Civil Procedure  Code.   As  was observed  by  the  Privy Council in Abdur  Rahim  V.  Barkat Ali(2),  a  suit  for a declaration  that  certain  property

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appertains  to a religious trust may lie under  the  general law but is outside the scope of section 92, Civil  Procedure Code."  In  a  very recent  decision,  this  Court  speaking through  one  of  us  (Mathew,  J)  in  the  case  of  Swami Paramatma. nand Saraswati and another v. Ramji Tripathi  and another(3)  has reiterated the same view in paragraph 10  at page  699  wherein  it  has  been  further  added  "It   is, therefore,  clear that if the allegation of breach of  trust is not substantiated or that the plaintiff had not made  out a   case  for  any  direction  by  the  court   for   proper administration  of the trust, the very foundation of a  suit under  the  section would fail; and, even if all  the  other ingredients  of a suit under section 92 are made out, if  it is clear that the plaintiffs are not suing to vindicate  the right  of the public but are seeking a declaration of  their individual or personal rights or the individual or  personal rights  of  any  other person or persons in  whom  they  are interested,  then  the suit would be outside  the  scope  of Section 92." Mr.  B. P. Maheshwari, learned counsel for  the  respondents placed  strong  reliance upon a decision of the  Patna  High Court  in  Ganpat Pujari v. Kanaiyalal  Marwari(4)  and  the decision of this Court in Harendra Nath Bhattacharya &  ors. v. Kalimaram Das-dead by (1) [1952] S.C.R.513. (2) (1928) 55 Indian Appeals, 96. (3) [1974] 11 S.C.C. 695.  (4) A.I.R. 1933 Patna. 246. (5)[1972] 2 S.C.R. 492. 56 Lrs.(5) In the Patna case the first relief asked for in  the suit  was  for an adjudication of the property in  the  suit belonging  to  the general public and for a  declaration  of their right to that effect.  The Thakurbari in question  was claimed  to be a public property to which the  entire  Hindu community  was  entitled  to go  and  worship.   The  appeal arising  out of the suit came up before Wort and Fazal  Ali, JJ as they then were.  There was a difference of opinion  as to  the application of section 92 of the Code between  them, the  latter taking the view that section 92 of the Code  was not a bar.  On reference to the third learned Judge, Kulwant Sahay,  J. agreeing with the view of Fazal Ali, J held  that the  relief claimed in the suit was not covered  by  clauses (a) to (h) of section 92.  The facts of the instant case are different and the Letters Patent Appeal Bench of the  Punjab High  Court committed an error in applying the ratio of  the Patna case to the facts of the present case.  In the case of Harendra  Nath Bhattacharya & Ors. v. Kalimram Das  Dead  by L.Rs.  (supra),  Grover, J delivering the judgment  of  this Court referred to the analysis made by the High Court as  to the reliefs claimed in the plaint of that suit.  In the main there  were 4 reliefs as enumerated at pages 498 and 499  of the  report.  Reliefs (1) (2) and (4 ) were clearly  outside the  scope of section 92 of the Code.  Learned  counsel  for the  respondents submitted that relief no. 3 which was  very much akin to the relief in the present suit was also held to be a relief not covered by any of the clauses of sub-section (1)  of  section  92  of  the  Code.   In  our  opinion  the contention  is not sound and cannot be accepted.  The  third relief  in  that case as analysed by the Court  was  in  the following terms               "(3)" For a declaration that the plaintiffs as               Bhakats of the Satrawas  entitled to  possess               their own Basti and paddy landsand   that               they  had a right to access to the use of  the               Satra for various religious purposes." There  were two parts of the said relief-one  a  declaration

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that the plaintiffs as Bhakats of the Satra were entitled to possess  their own Basti and paddy lands and the other  that they  had  a  right to access to the use of  the  Satra  for various  religious purposes.  Such a relief could  not  come under  clause (h) because it was mainly concerned  with  the establishment  of the rights of the plaintiffs in the  lands as  well as in the religious institution.  In the plaint  of the instant case the relief claimed is not primarily for the establishment  of the right of the public to  the  religious institution.   It recites the facts as to the right  without mentioning any appreciable dispute concerning it, mainly 57 alleges  breach of duty on the part of the trustee, and  the plaintiffs  seek  the court’s aid against  the  trustee  for forcing him to discharge his obligations by due  performance of  his duties.  In our judgment therefore the Courts  below were  right in taking the view that the present suit  was  a suit for a decree under section 92 of the Code and since  it was not filed in conformity with the requirement of the Code and   since  it  was  not  filed  in  conformity  with   the requirement  of  the  said  provision  of  law  it  was  not maintainable.  The contrary view taken by the Division Bench of  the  High  Court in the Letters  Patent  Appeal  is  not correct. In the result the appeal succeeds, the judgment of the  High Court  dated  the 13th December, 1973 in L.P.A. No.  573  of 1971  is set aside.  In the circumstances, we make no  order as to costs in this appeal. P.H.P.           Appeal allowed. 58