REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.15071 of 2009)

Chanmuniya  ..Appellant(s)

Versus  

Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha & Anr.  ..Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1.Leave granted.

2. One Sarju Singh Kushwaha had two sons, Ram Saran  

(elder  son)  and  Virendra  Kumar  Singh  Kushwaha  

(younger  son  and  the  first  respondent).  The  

appellant, Chanmuniya, was married to Ram Saran and  

had 2 daughters-Asha, the first one, was born in  

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1988  and  Usha,  the  second  daughter,  was  born  in  

1990. Ram Saran died on 7.03.1992.  

3. Thereafter,  the  appellant  contended  that  she  was  

married  off  to  the  first  respondent  as  per  the  

customs  and  usages  prevalent  in  the  Kushwaha  

community  in  1996.  The  custom  allegedly  was  that  

after  the  death  of  the  husband,  the  widow  was  

married off to the younger brother of the husband.  

The appellant was married off in accordance with the  

local  custom  of  Katha  and  Sindur.  The  appellant  

contended  that  she  and  the  first  respondent  were  

living  together  as  husband  and  wife  and  had  

discharged  all  marital  obligations  towards  each  

other.  The  appellant  further  contended  that  after  

some time the first respondent started harassing and  

torturing the appellant, stopped her maintenance and  

also  refused  to  discharge  his  marital  obligations  

towards her.  

4. As a result, she initiated proceedings under Section  

125  of  the  Cr.P.C.  for  maintenance  (No.20/1997)  

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before the 1st Additional Civil Judge, Mohamadabad,  

Ghazipur. This proceeding is pending.     

5. She  also  filed  a  suit  (No.42/1998)  for  the  

restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of  

the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  in  the  Court  of  1st  

Additional District Judge, Ghazipur.   

6. The Trial Court decreed the suit for restitution of  

conjugal  rights  in  favour  of  the  appellant  on  

3.1.2004 as it was of the opinion that the appellant  

had remarried the first respondent after the death  

of Ram Saran, and the first respondent had deserted  

the  appellant  thereafter.  Thus,  it  directed  the  

first  respondent  to  live  with  the  appellant  and  

perform his marital duties.  

7. Hence, the first respondent preferred a first appeal  

(No.110/2004) under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage  

Act. The main issue in appeal was whether there was  

any evidence on record to prove that the appellant  

was the legally wedded wife of the first respondent.  

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The High Court in its judgment dated 28.11.2007 was  

of the opinion that the essentials of a valid Hindu  

marriage, as required under Section 7 of the Hindu  

Marriage  Act,  had  not  been  performed  between  the  

first respondent and the appellant and held that the  

first  respondent  was  not  the  husband  of  the  

appellant  and  thus  reversed  the  findings  of  the  

Trial Court.

8. Aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  judgment  of  the  High  

Court, the appellant sought a review of the order  

dated 28.11.2007. The review petition was dismissed  

on 23.01.2009 on the ground that there was no error  

apparent on the face of the record of the judgment  

dated 28.11.2007.

9. Hence, the appellant approached this Court by way of  

a special leave petition against the impugned orders  

dated 28.11.2007 and 23.01.2009.  

10.One  of  the  major  issues  which  cropped  up  in  the  

present  case  is  whether  or  not  presumption  of  a  

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marriage  arises  when  parties  live  together  for  a  

long  time,  thus  giving  rise  to  a  claim  of  

maintenance  under  Section  125  Cr.P.C.   In  other  

words, the question is what is meant by ‘wife’ under  

Section  125  of  Criminal  Procedure  Code  especially  

having regard to explanation under clause (b) of the  

Section.  

11.Thus, the question that arises is whether a man and  

woman living together for a long time, even without  

a  valid  marriage,  would  raise  as  in  the  present  

case, a presumption of a valid marriage entitling  

such a woman to maintenance.

12.On the question of presumption of marriage, we may  

usefully refer to a decision of the House of Lords  

rendered  in  the  case  of  Lousia  Adelaide  Piers  &  Florence A.M. De Kerriguen v. Sir Henry Samuel Piers  [(1849)  II  HLC  331],  in  which  their  Lordships  

observed that the question of validity of a marriage  

cannot  be  tried  like  any  other  issue  of  fact  

independent of presumption.  The Court held that law  

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will  presume  in  favour  of  marriage  and  such  

presumption  could  only  be  rebutted  by  strong  and  

satisfactory evidence.  

13.In Lieutenant  C.W. Campbell v.  John A.G. Campbell  [(1867)  Law  Rep.  2  HL  269],  also  known  as  the  

Breadalbane  case,  the  House  of  Lords  held  that  

cohabitation, with the required repute, as husband  

and  wife,  was  proof  that  the  parties  between  

themselves had mutually contracted the matrimonial  

relation. A relationship which may be adulterous at  

the  beginning  may  become  matrimonial  by  consent.  

This may be evidenced by habit and repute.  In the  

instant  case  both  the  appellant  and  the  first  

respondent were related and lived in the same house  

and by a social custom were treated as husband and  

wife.  Their marriage was solemnized with Katha and  

Sindur.   Therefore,  following  the  ratio  of  the  

decisions of the House of Lords, this Court thinks  

there  is  a  very  strong  presumption  in  favour  of  

marriage.   The  House  of  Lords  again  observed  in  

Captain De Thoren v. The Attorney-General [(1876) 1  AC 686], that the presumption of marriage is much  

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stronger  than  a  presumption  in  regard  to  other  

facts.  

14.Again in  Sastry Velaider Aronegary & his wife v.  Sembecutty Viagalie & Ors. [(1881) 6 AC 364], it was  held that where a man and woman are proved to have  

lived  together  as  man  and  wife,  the  law  will  

presume, unless the contrary is clearly proved, that  

they were living together in consequence of a valid  

marriage, and not in a state of concubinage.

15.In India, the same principles have been followed in  

the case of  A. Dinohamy v.  W.L. Balahamy [AIR 1927  P.C. 185], in which the Privy Council laid down the  

general proposition that where a man and woman are  

proved to have lived together as man and wife, the  

law will presume, unless, the contrary is clearly  

proved,  that  they  were  living  together  in  

consequence of a valid marriage, and not in a state  

of concubinage.

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16.In  Mohabbat Ali Khan v.  Muhammad Ibrahim Khan and  Ors. [AIR 1929 PC 135], the Privy Council has laid  down that the law presumes in favour of marriage and  

against  concubinage  when  a  man  and  woman  have  

cohabited continuously for number of years.

17.In the case of  Gokal Chand v.  Parvin Kumari [AIR  1952 SC 231], this Court held that continuous co-

habitation of man and woman as husband and wife may  

raise  the  presumption  of  marriage,  but  the  

presumption  which  may  be  drawn  from  long  co-

habitation  is  rebuttable  and  if  there  are  

circumstances  which  weaken  and  destroy  that  

presumption, the Court cannot ignore them.

18.Further, in the case of Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director  of  Consolidation  &  Ors. [(1978)  3  SCC  527],  the  Supreme Court held that a strong presumption arises  

in favour of wedlock where the partners have lived  

together  for  a  long  spell  as  husband  and  wife.  

Although  the  presumption  is  rebuttable,  a  heavy  

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burden  lies  on  him  who  seeks  to  deprive  the  

relationship of legal origin.  

19.Again, in Tulsa and Ors. v. Durghatiya & Ors. [2008  (4)  SCC  520],  this  Court  held  that  where  the  

partners lived together for a long spell as husband  

and wife, a presumption would arise in favour of a  

valid wedlock.

20.Sir James Fitz Stephen, who piloted the Criminal  

Procedure Code of 1872, a legal member of Viceroy’s  

Council, described the object of Section 125 of the  

Code (it was Section 536 in 1872 Code) as a mode of  

preventing  vagrancy  or  at  least  preventing  its  

consequences.   

21.Then came the 1898 Code in which the same provision  

was in Chapter XXXVI Section 488 of the Code. The  

exact provision of Section 488(1) of the 1898 Code  

runs as follows:

“488. (1) If any person having sufficient  means neglects or refuses to maintain his  wife  or  his  legitimate  or  illegitimate  child  unable  to  maintain  itself,  the  

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District  Magistrate,  a  Presidency  Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or  a Magistrate of the first class may, upon  proof  of  such  neglect  or  refusal,  order  such  person  to  make  a  monthly  allowance  for the maintenance of his wife or such  child, at such monthly rate, not exceeding  five hundred rupees in the whole as such  Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same  to such person as the Magistrate from time  to time directs.”  

22.In Jagir Kaur & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh [AIR 1963 SC  1521], the Supreme Court observed with respect to  

Chapter XXXVI of Cr.P.C. of 1898 that provisions for  

maintenance of wives and children intend to serve a  

social purpose. Section 488 prescribes forums for a  

proceeding to enable a deserted wife or a helpless  

child,  legitimate  or  illegitimate,  to  get  urgent  

relief.

23.In  Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal & Ors.  [1969 (3) SCC 802], the Supreme Court, discussing  

Section 488 of the older Cr.P.C, virtually came to  

the  same  conclusion  that  Section  488  provides  a  

summary  remedy  and  is  applicable  to  all  persons  

belonging to any religion and has no relationship  

with the personal law of the parties.

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24.In  Captain     Ramesh Chander Kaushal   v. Veena Kaushal  and Ors. [AIR 1978 SC 1807], this Court held that  Section 125 is a reincarnation of Section 488 of the  

Cr.P.C. of 1898 except for the fact that parents  

have also been brought into the category of persons  

entitled  for  maintenance.  It  observed  that  this  

provision is a measure of social justice specially  

enacted to protect, and inhibit neglect of women,  

children,  old  and  infirm  and  falls  within  the  

constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by  

Article 39. Speaking for the Bench Justice Krishna  

Iyer observed that- “We have no doubt that sections  

of statutes calling for construction by courts are  

not petrified print but vibrant words with social  

functions to fulfill. The brooding presence of the  

constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like  

women and children must inform interpretation if it  

is  to  have  social  relevance.  So  viewed,  it  is  

possible  to  be  selective  in  picking  out  that  

interpretation out of two alternatives which advance  

the cause- the cause of the derelicts.” (Para 9 on  

pages 1809-10)

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25.Again in Vimala (K) v. Veeraswamy (K) [(1991) 2 SCC  375], a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that  

Section 125 of the Code of 1973 is meant to achieve  

a  social  purpose  and  the  object  is  to  prevent  

vagrancy and destitution.  Explaining the meaning of  

the word ‘wife’ the Court held:  

“…The  object  is  to  prevent  vagrancy  and  destitution. It provides a speedy remedy  for  the  supply  of  food,  clothing  and  shelter  to  the  deserted  wife.  When  an  attempt is made by the husband to negative  the claim of the neglected wife depicting  her  as  a  kept-mistress  on  the  specious  plea  that  he  was  already  married,  the  court would insist on strict proof of the  earlier  marriage.  The  term  ‘wife’  in  Section  125  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure, includes a woman who has been  divorced by a husband or who has obtained  a  divorce  from  her  husband  and  has  not  remarried. The woman not having the legal  status of a wife is thus brought within  the  inclusive  definition  of  the  term  ‘wife’ consistent with the objective... “

26.Thus, in those cases where a man, who lived with a  

woman for a long time and even though they may not  

have  undergone  legal  necessities  of  a  valid  

marriage, should be made liable to pay the woman  

maintenance if he deserts her. The man should not be  

allowed  to  benefit  from  the  legal  loopholes  by  

enjoying  the  advantages  of  a  de  facto marriage  

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without undertaking the duties and obligations.  Any  

other  interpretation  would  lead  the  woman  to  

vagrancy  and  destitution,  which  the  provision  of  

maintenance in Section 125 is meant to prevent.

27.The Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System,  

headed by Dr. Justice V.S. Malimath, in its report  

of 2003 opined that evidence regarding a man and  

woman living together for a reasonably long period  

should be sufficient to draw the presumption that  

the  marriage  was  performed  according  to  the  

customary rites of the parties. Thus, it recommended  

that the word ‘wife’ in Section 125 Cr.P.C. should  

be amended to include a woman who was living with  

the man like his wife for a reasonably long period.  

28.The  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Mohammad  Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors. reported in  [(1985)  2  SCC  556],  considering  the  provision  of  

Section 125 of the 1973 Code, opined that the said  

provision  is  truly  secular  in  character  and  is  

different from the personal law of the parties. The  

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Court  further  held  that  such  provisions  are  

essentially  of  a  prophylactic  character  and  cut  

across the barriers of religion. The Court further  

held that the liability imposed by Section 125 to  

maintain  close  relatives,  who  are  indigent,  is  

founded  upon  the  individual’s  obligation  to  the  

society to prevent vagrancy and destitution.

29.In a subsequent decision, in Dwarika Prasad Satpathy  v. Bidyut Prava Dixit & Anr. [(1999) 7 SCC 675],  this  Court  held  that  the  standard  of  proof  of  

marriage  in  a  Section  125  proceeding  is  not  as  

strict  as  is  required  in  a  trial  for  an  offence  

under  Section  494  of  IPC.  The  learned  Judges  

explained the reason for the aforesaid finding by  

holding that an order passed in an application under  

Section 125 does not really determine the rights and  

obligations  of  parties  as  the  section  is  enacted  

with a view to provide a summary remedy to neglected  

wives to obtain maintenance. The learned Judges held  

that maintenance cannot be denied where there was  

some  evidence  on  which  conclusions  of  living  

together could be reached. (See para 9)

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30.However,  striking  a  different  note,  in  Yamunabai  Anantrao  Adhav v.  Anantrao  Shivram  Adhav  and  another, reported in AIR 1988 SC 644, a two-Judge  Bench of this Court held that an attempt to exclude  

altogether  personal  law  of  the  parties  in  

proceedings under Section 125 is improper. (See para  

6).  The learned Judges also held (paras 4 & 8) that  

the expression ‘wife’ in Section 125 of the Code  

should be interpreted to mean only a legally wedded  

wife.  

31.Again  in  a  subsequent  decision  of  this  Court  in  

Savitaben Somabhat Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat and  others, reported in AIR 2005 SC 1809, this Court  held however desirable it may be to take note of  

plight  of  an  unfortunate  woman,  who  unwittingly  

enters into wedlock with a married man, there is no  

scope to include a woman not lawfully married within  

the expression of ‘wife’. The Bench held that this  

inadequacy  in  law  can  be  amended  only  by  the  

Legislature. While coming to the aforesaid finding,  

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the learned Judges relied on the decision in the  

Yamunabai case (supra).

32.It is, therefore, clear from what has been discussed  

above that there is a divergence of judicial opinion  

on the interpretation of the word ‘wife’ in Section  

125.  

33.We  are  inclined  to  take  a  broad  view  of  the  

definition  of  ‘wife’  having  regard  to  the  social  

object of Section 125 in the Code of 1973. However,  

sitting  in  a  two-Judge  Bench,  we  cannot,  we  are  

afraid, take a view contrary to the views expressed  

in the abovementioned two cases.

34.However, law in America has proceeded on a slightly  

different  basis.  The  social  obligation  of  a  man  

entering  into  a  live-in  relationship  with  another  

woman, without the formalities of a marriage, came  

up for consideration in the American courts in the  

leading case of  Marvin v. Marvin [(1976) 18 Cal.3d  660].  In  that  context,  a  new  expression  of  

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‘palimony’ has been coined, which is a combination  

of ‘pal’ and ‘alimony’, by the famous divorce lawyer  

in the said case, Mr. Marvin Mitchelson.

35.In the Marvin case (supra), the plaintiff, Michelle  

Marvin, alleged that she and Lee Marvin entered into  

an  oral  agreement  which  provided  that  while  "the  

parties  lived  together  they  would  combine  their  

efforts and earnings and would share equally any and  

all  property  accumulated  as  a  result  of  their  

efforts whether individual or combined." The parties  

allegedly further agreed that Michelle would "render  

her services as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper  

and cook." Michelle sought a judicial declaration of  

her  contract  and  property  rights,  and  sought  to  

impose a constructive trust upon one half of the  

property  acquired  during  the  course  of  the  

relationship.  The Supreme Court of California held  

as follows:

(1) The provisions of the Family Law Act do not  govern  the  distribution  of  property  acquired  during  a  non-marital  relationship;  such  a  relationship remains subject solely to judicial  decision.  

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(2) The courts should enforce express contracts  between non-marital partners except to the extent  that the contract is explicitly founded on the  consideration of meretricious sexual services.  

(3) In the absence of an express contract, the  courts  should  inquire  into  the  conduct  of  the  parties  to  determine  whether  that  conduct  demonstrates  an  implied  contract,  agreement  of  partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit  understanding between the parties. The courts may  also employ the doctrine of quantum meruit, or  equitable  remedies  such  as  constructive  or  resulting trusts, when warranted by the facts of  the case.  

36.Though in our country, law has not developed on the  

lines of the  Marvin case (supra), but our social  

context also is fast changing, of which cognizance  

has  to  be  taken  by  Courts  in  interpreting  a  

statutory  provision  which  has  a  pronounced  social  

content like Section 125 of the Code of 1973.

37.We  think  the  larger  Bench  may  consider  also  the  

provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic  

Violence Act, 2005. This Act assigns a very broad  18

and  expansive  definition  to  the  term  ‘domestic  

abuse’ to include within its purview even economic  

abuse.  ‘Economic  abuse’  has  been  defined  very  

broadly in sub-explanation (iv) to explanation I of  

Section 3 of the said Act to include deprivation of  

financial and economic resources.

38.Further, Section 20 of the Act allows the Magistrate  

to direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to  

the aggrieved person, who is the harassed woman, for  

expenses incurred and losses suffered by her, which  

may  include,  but  is  not  limited  to,  maintenance  

under Section 125 Cr.P.C. [Section 20(1)(d)].

39.Section 22 of the Act confers upon the Magistrate,  

the  power  to  award  compensation  to  the  aggrieved  

person, in addition to other reliefs granted under  

the Act.

40.In terms of Section 26 of the Act, these reliefs  

mentioned  above  can  be  sought  in  any  legal  

proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a  

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criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and  

the respondent.

41.Most  significantly,  the  Act  gives  a  very  wide  

interpretation to the term ‘domestic relationship’  

as  to  take  it  outside  the  confines  of  a  marital  

relationship,  and  even  includes  live-in  

relationships in the nature of marriage within the  

definition of ‘domestic relationship’ under Section  

2(f) of the Act.

42.Therefore, women in live-in relationships are also  

entitled to all the reliefs given in the said Act.

43.We  are  thus  of  the  opinion  that  if  the  

abovementioned monetary relief and compensation can  

be awarded in cases of live-in relationships under  

the Act of 2005, they should also be allowed in a  

proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. It seems to  

us that the same view is confirmed by Section 26 of  

the said Act of 2005.

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44.We believe that in light of the constant change in  

social  attitudes  and  values,  which  have  been  

incorporated into the forward-looking Act of 2005,  

the  same  needs  to  be  considered  with  respect  to  

Section  125  of  Cr.P.C.  and  accordingly,  a  broad  

interpretation of the same should be taken.

45.We, therefore, request the Hon’ble Chief Justice to  

refer the following, amongst other, questions to be  

decided  by  a  larger  Bench.  According  to  us,  the  

questions are:

1. Whether the living together of a man and woman  

as husband and wife for a considerable period  

of time would raise the presumption of a valid  

marriage  between  them  and  whether  such  a  

presumption  would  entitle  the  woman  to  

maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C?

2. Whether strict proof of marriage is essential  

for a claim of maintenance under Section 125  

Cr.P.C.  having  regard  to  the  provisions  of  

Domestic Violence Act, 2005?

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3. Whether  a  marriage  performed  according  to  

customary  rites  and  ceremonies,  without  

strictly fulfilling the requisites of Section  

7(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, or any  

other personal law would entitle the woman to  

maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.?

46.We are of the opinion that a broad and expansive  

interpretation should be given to the term ‘wife’ to  

include even those cases where a man and woman have  

been  living  together  as  husband  and  wife  for  a  

reasonably long period of time, and strict proof of  

marriage  should  not  be  a  pre-condition  for  

maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C, so as  

to  fulfil  the  true  spirit  and  essence  of  the  

beneficial  provision  of  maintenance  under  Section  

125.  

47.We also believe that such an interpretation would be  

a just application of the principles enshrined in  

the  Preamble  to  our  Constitution,  namely,  social  

justice and upholding the dignity of the individual.

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.....................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

.....................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi   October 07, 2010

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