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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  853 of 2006

PETITIONER: CHANDRAPPA & ORS

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/02/2007

BENCH: C.K. THAKKER & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

Hon. C.K. Thakker, J.

       The present appeal is filed against the judgment and  order of conviction dated November 24, 2005 passed by the  High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal No. 1008 of  1999 whereby it set aside the order dated July 14, 1999  passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Tumkur in  Sessions Case No. 16 of 1991 acquitting the accused  (appellants herein) of offences punishable under Sections  143, 147, 148, 302 and 324 read with Section 149 of the  Indian Penal Code (’IPC’ for short).         Brief facts of the case are that Accused No. 2,  Somashekhara, Accused No. 8, Thammaiah and PW 8  Krishnaiah were running a Chit Transaction in which  successful members were given articles like vessels,  watches, sarees, cloth-pieces, etc.  The said transaction  was conducted once a week in the shop of PW 8 Krishnaiah  and also at Kollapuradamma Temple at Hanumanthapura.   It is the case of the prosecution that on October 30, 1989,  one such transaction was held at about 5.30 p.m. in which  one Nagaraj, the successful bidder was given a copper  vessel (Kolaga).  Nagaraj returned the vessel with his  maternal uncle as it was old and demanded a new vessel.   But the request was refused by the proprietors of the Chit  Transaction.  It is further the prosecution case that at  about 9.30 p.m. on the same day, i.e. October 30, 1989,  near Hanumanthapura Bypass, when PW1 Veerabhadraiah  along with PWs 2, 3 and 4 (Chikkanna, Rudramurthy and  Puttiah) was proceeding, the Accused Nos. 1 to 8 who had  formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and were  armed with weapons like, knife, reapers and stones  attacked PWs 2 to 4.  The accused caused injuries to all the  three persons. It is alleged that when the quarrel was going  on and PWs 2 to 4 were injured, deceased Anjinappa came  forward and intervened and went ahead to stop the quarrel.   Accused No. 8 Thammaiah took out a button knife from his  pocket and stabbed Anjinappa on the left side of his chest,  due to which Anjinappa slumped and fell on the ground.   Complainant Veerabhadraiah along with one Krishnaiah,  s/o Oblaiah carried Anjinappa in an autorickshaw to the  hospital. On the way to hospital, Anjinappa breathed his  last.  The dead body of Anjinappa was then taken to the  General Hospital, Tumkur.  The accused persons after  committing assault, threw the clubs and rippers at the spot  and ran away.  At about 11.30 p.m., PW 13 Madhukar  Musale, Circle Inspector of Police, Tumkur received an  information about the incident of rioting that took place at

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Hanumanthapura.  On being intimated by PSI, PW 7 A.R.  Shariff about the rioting and the injured being admitted to  General Hospital at Tumkur, PW 13 went to the hospital  and learnt that Anjinappa had died and the other three  injured persons were taking treatment.  It is alleged that  PW 1, Veerabhadraiah, who was present in the hospital,  was questioned by PW 13.  The information given by him  was recorded in writing as per Ex. P-1 as complaint and  was registered as Crime No. 86 of 1989 for offences  punishable Sections 143, 147, 148, 324 and 302 read with  Section 149 IPC.  Accused No. 7 Tukaraiah died during the  pendency of the case and the trial abated against him.         Inquest over the dead body of deceased Anjinappa was  done and the dead body was sent for post-mortem  examination.  PW 11 Dr. Hanumakka who conducted the  postmortem opined that the injuries were ante mortem in  nature.  She found a punctured wound over the left 3rd  inter costal space extending from medial edge of the areola  of left nipple obliquely downwards and medially 2" x 2" size  with clean cut margin and fat protruding through the  wound the depth of which was 3= inches.  Likewise,  injuries to PWs 2 to 4 were also proved by PW 12, Dr.  Chandrasekhara Prasad.         After completion of investigation, all the accused were  charged for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147,  148, 324, 302 read with Section 149 of IPC.         In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution  examined 13 witnesses.  PWs 1 to 4 were portrayed as eye  witnesses and amongst them, PWs 2 to 4 were shown to be  injured persons.  They supported the case of the  prosecution as to Chit Transaction, the incident which took  place at about 5.30 p.m. on October 30, 1989 as also the  assault at 9.30 p.m. on the same day.         The learned Additional Sessions Judge, however,  considering contradictions and discrepancies in the  deposition of eye witnesses, non-examination of Nagraj who  was the root cause of quarrel and Krishniah, son of  Obalaiah, who accompanied deceased Anjanianappa to  hospital, conflicting version as to injury sustained by  accused No. 1 Chandrappa, presence of the deceased and  injured witnesses at the Hanumanthapura Bypass at 9.30  p.m., mudamal knife not being the same with which the  deceased was assaulted, medical evidence as to injuries  sustained by prosecution witnesses and other  circumstances, held that in the facts and circumstances of  the case, it could not be conclusively established that the  prosecution had proved the case against the accused  beyond reasonable doubt.  He, therefore, held that the  accused were entitled to benefit of doubt and accordingly  acquitted them.         In an appeal against an order of acquittal by the State,  the High Court reversed the order of the trial court.  It  observed that on careful examination of evidence of PWs 1  to 4, it was clearly established that deceased Anjaniappa  was done to death by Accused No. 8 and PWs 2 to 4  sustained injuries in the course of incident.  It was also  held by the High Court that contradictions and variations  were of minor nature which did not affect substratum of the  prosecution case and evidence of PWs 1 to 4 had remained  totally unshaken and there was a ring of truth running  through their testimony which inspired confidence  notwithstanding trivial omissions and discrepancies, which  did not go to the root of the matter.  The High Court,  accordingly, set aside acquittal recorded by the trial court  and convicted the appellants for various offences as ordered

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in the final paragraph 55 of the judgment.         Being aggrieved by the order of conviction and  sentence, the appellants have approached this Court.   Notice was issued by the Court on August 07, 2006 on  appeal as also on application for bail.  On November 17,  2006, bail was refused but the Registry was directed to post  the matter for final hearing on January 16, 2007.         We have heard the learned advocates for the parties.         Mr. Sushil Kumar, Senior Advocate for the appellant- accused contended that the accused having been acquitted  by the Trial Court ought not to have been convicted by the  High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal.  He  submitted that it is settled law that an order of acquittal  can be set aside by the High Court only if the appellate  Court is satisfied that the reasons in support of acquittal  recorded by the Trial Court are non-existent, extraneous,  perverse, acquittal palpably wrong, totally ill-founded or  wholly misconceived; the Court had ’obstinately blundered’  or reached the conclusion, ’wholly wrong’, ’manifestly  erroneous’ or ’demonstrably unsustainable’, which resulted  in miscarriage of justice.  According to him, the view taken  by the Trial Court was legal, proper and in consonance with  law and the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal,  ought not to have disturbed the order even if two views  were possible.  He, therefore, submitted that the appeal  deserves to be allowed and the appellants are entitled to  acquittal.         Mr. Hegde, learned counsel for the respondent-State  supported the order passed by the High Court.  He  submitted that once an order of acquittal is challenged by  the State, the appellate course has all the powers which  were exercised by the Trial Court and it is open to the  appellate Court to reappreciate and review such evidence  and to come to its own conclusion.  On facts, the counsel  submitted that the High Court, considering the ground  reality as to possibility of contradictions and omissions held  that they did not affect the genesis or substratum of  prosecution case and convicted the accused.  The order  does not suffer from legal infirmity calling for interference  under Article 136 of the Constitution and the appeal  deserves to be dismissed.         In view of rival submissions of the parties, we think it  proper to consider and clarify the legal position first.   Chapter XXIX (Sections 372-394) of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ’the present  Code’) deals with appeals.  Section 372 expressly declares  that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a  Criminal Court except as provided by the Code or by any  other law for the time being in force.  Section 373 provides  for filing of appeals in certain cases.  Section 374 allows  appeals from convictions.  Section 375 bars appeals in  cases where the accused pleads guilty.  Likewise, no appeal  is maintainable in petty cases (Section 376).  Section 377  permits appeals by the State for enhancement of sentence.   Section 378 confers power on the State to present an  appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal.  The  said section is material and may be quoted in extenso; 378.    Appeal in case of acquittal.\027(1) Save as  otherwise provided in sub-section (2) and subject to  the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5), the State  Government may, in any case, direct the Public  Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court  from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed  by any Court other than a High Court, or an order of  acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.

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         (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any  case in which the offence has been investigated by the  Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under  the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25  of 1946), or by any other agency empowered to make  investigation into an offence under any Central Act  other than this Code, the Central Government may  also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal,  subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), to the high  Court from the order of acquittal.           (3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave  of the High Court.           (4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any  case instituted upon complaint and the High Court,  on an application made to it by the complainant in  this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the  order of acquittal, the complainant may present such  an appeal to the High Court.           (5) No application under sub-section (4) for the  grant of special leave to appeal from an order of  acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after  the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a  public servant, and sixty days in every other case,  computed from the date of that order of acquittal.                     (6)   If, in any case, the application under sub- section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from  an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that  order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1) or  under sub-section (2).                  Whereas Sections 379-380 cover special cases of  appeals, other sections lay down procedure to be followed  by appellate courts.         It may be stated that more or less similar provisions  were found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898  (hereinafter referred to as ’the old Code’) which came up for  consideration before various High Courts, Judicial  Committee of the Privy Council as also before this Court.   Since in the present appeal, we have been called upon to  decide the ambit and scope of the power of an appellate  Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal, we have  confined ourselves to one aspect only, i.e. an appeal against  an order of acquittal.         Bare reading of Section 378 of the present Code  (Appeal in case of acquittal) quoted above, makes it clear  that no restrictions have been imposed by the Legislature  on the powers of the appellate Court in dealing with  appeals against acquittal. When such an appeal is filed, the  High Court has full power to reappreciate, review and  reconsider the evidence at large, the material on which the  order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own  conclusions on such evidence.  Both questions of fact and  of law are open to determination by the High Court in an  appeal against an order of acquittal.         It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of  acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the  accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to  him under the fundamental principle of criminal

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jurisprudence that every person should be presumed to be  innocent unless he is proved to be guilty by a competent  court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured an  acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly not  weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by  the trial Court.         Though the above principles are well established, a  different note was struck in several decisions by various  High Courts and even by this Court. It is, therefore,  appropriate if we consider some of the leading decisions on  the point.         The first decision was rendered by Judicial Committee  of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup & Ors. v. King Emperor,  (1934) 61 IA 398 : AIR 1934 PC 227(2). In Sheo Swarup, the  accused were acquitted by the Trial Court and the Local  Government directed the Public Prosecutor to present an  appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal under  Section 417 of the old Code, (similar to Section 378 of the  present Code). At the time of hearing of appeal before the  High Court, it was contended on behalf of the accused that  in an appeal from an order of acquittal, it was not open to  the appellate Court to interfere with the findings of fact  recorded by the trial Judge unless such findings could not  have been reached by him had there not been some  perversity or incompetence on his part. The High Court,  however, declined to accept the said view. It held that no  condition was imposed on the High Court in such appeal. It  accordingly reviewed all the evidence in the case and having  formed an opinion of its weight and reliability different from  that of the Trial Judge, recorded an order of conviction. A  petition was presented to His Majesty in Council for leave to  appeal on the ground that conflicting views had been  expressed by the High Courts in different parts of India  upon the question whether in an appeal from an order of  acquittal, an appellate Court had the power to interfere  with the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Judge. Their  Lordships thought it fit to clarify the legal position and  accordingly upon the ’humble advice of their Lordships’,  leave was granted by His Majesty. The case was, thereafter,  argued. The Committee considered the scheme and  interpreting Section 417 of the Code (old Code) observed  that there was no indication in the Code of any limitation or  restriction on the High Court in exercise of powers as an  appellate Tribunal. The Code also made no distinction as  regards powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal  against acquittal and an appeal against conviction. Though  several authorities were cited revealing different views by  High Courts dealing with an appeal from an order of  acquittal, the Committee did not think it proper to discuss  all the cases.         Lord Russel summed up the legal position thus; "There is in their opinion no foundation for the view,  apparently supported by the judgments of some  Courts in India, that the High Court has no power or  jurisdiction to reverse an order of acquittal on a  matter of fact, except in cases in which the lower  Court has ’obstinately blundered’, or has ’through  incompetence, stupidity or perversity’ reached such  ’distorted conclusions as to produce a positive  miscarriage of justice’, or has in some other way so  conducted itself as to produce a glaring miscarriage of  justice, or has been tricked by the defence so as to  produce a similar result".

His Lordship, then proceeded to observe:

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       "Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to  the High Court full power to review at large the  evidence upon which the order of acquittal was  founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that  evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No  limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it  be found expressly stated in the Code."                   The Committee, however, cautioned appellate courts  and stated;          But in exercising the power conferred by the  Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact,  the High Court should and will always give proper  weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the  views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the  witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour  of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened  by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3)  the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt;  and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in  disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who  had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state  this however is only to say that the High Court in  its conduct of the appeal should and will act in  accordance with rules and principles well known  and recognized in the administration of justice".                                          (emphasis supplied)

In Nur Mohammad v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 151, the  Committee reiterated the above view in Sheo Swarup and  held that in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court has  full powers to review and to reverse acquittal.  So far as this Court is concerned, probably the first  decision on the point was Prandas v. State, AIR 1954 SC 36  (Though the case was decided on March 14, 1950, it was  reported only in 1954). In that case, the accused was  acquitted by the trial Court.  The Provincial Government  preferred an appeal which was allowed and the accused  was convicted for offences punishable under Sections 302  and 323 IPC. The High Court, for convicting the accused,  placed reliance on certain eye-witnesses.  Upholding the decision of the High Court and  following the proposition of law in Sheo Swarup, a six- Judge Bench speaking through Fazl Ali, J. unanimously  stated: "It must be observed at the very outset that we  cannot support the view which has been  expressed in several cases that the High Court  has no power under Section 417, Criminal P. C, to  reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the  judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has  in some way or other misdirected itself so as to  produce a miscarriage of justice". (emphasis supplied)

In Surajpal Singh v. State, 1952 SCR 193 : AIR 1952  SC 52, a two-Judge Bench observed that it was well  established that in an appeal under Section 417 of the (old)  Code, the High Court had full power to review the evidence  upon which the order of acquittal was founded.  But it was  equally well-settled that the presumption of innocence of  the accused was further reinforced by his acquittal by the  trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the

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advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their  evidence could be reversed only for very substantial and  compelling reasons.         In Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab, 1953 SCR 418 : AIR  1953 SC 76, the accused was acquitted by the trial Court  but was convicted by the High Court in an appeal against  acquittal filed by the State.  The aggrieved accused  approached this Court.  It was contended by him that there  were ’no compelling reasons’ for setting aside the order of  acquittal and due and proper weight had not been given by   the High Court to the opinion of the trial Court as regards  the credibility of witnesses seen and examined.  It was also  commented that the High Court committed an error of law  in observing that "when a strong ’prima facie’ case is made  out against an accused person it is his duty to explain the  circumstances appearing in evidence against him and he  cannot take shelter behind the presumption of innocence  and cannot state that the law entitles him to keep his lips  sealed."         Upholding the contention, this Court said;         "We think this criticism is well-founded.  After an  order of acquittal has been made, the presumption of  innocence is further reinforced by that order, and that  being so, the trial court’s decision can be reversed not  on the ground that the accused had failed to explain  the circumstances appearing against him but only for  very substantial and compelling reasons.        (emphasis supplied)

       In Atley v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 807,  this Court said;         "In our opinion, it is not correct to say that  unless the appellate court in an appeal under S.  417, Criminal P.C. came to the conclusion that the  judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it  could not set aside that order.

       It has been laid down by this Court that it is  open to the High Court on an appeal against an  order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to  come to its own conclusion, of course keeping in  view the well established rule that the presumption  of innocence of the accused is not weakened but  strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by  the trial court which had the advantage of observing  the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have  been recorded in its presence.                  It is also well settled that the court of appeal has  as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an  appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of  an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to  the riders that the presumption of innocence with  which the accused person starts in the trial court  continues even up to the appellate stage and the  appellate court should attach due weight to the  opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of  acquittal.

       If the appellate court reviews the evidence,  keeping those principles in mind, and comes to  a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be  said to have been vitiated". (emphasis supplied)

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In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra, (1955) 2  SCR 1285 : AIR 1956 SC 217, the accused was prosecuted  under Sections 302 and 447 IPC. He was acquitted by the  trial Court but convicted by the High Court. Dealing with  the power of the High Court against an order of acquittal,  Bose, J. speaking for the majority (2:1) stated; "It is, in our  opinion, well settled that it is not enough for the High Court  to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be  substantial and compelling reasons for holding that  the trial Court was wrong" (emphasis supplied). Venkatarama Ayyar, J. (minority), in his dissenting  judgment stated: "Do the words "compelling reasons" in the above  passage import a limitation on the powers of a court  hearing an appeal under Section 417 not applicable to  a court hearing appeals against conviction? If they do,  then it is merely the old doctrine that appeals against  acquittal are in a less favoured position, dressed in a  new garb, and the reasons for rejecting it as unsound  are as powerful as those which found favour with the  Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor, AIR  1934 PC 227 and Nur Mohammad v. Emperor, A.I.R.  1945 P.C. 151. But it is probable that these words  were intended to express, as were the similar words of  Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup that the court, hearing  an appeal under section 417 should observe the rules  which all appellate courts should, before coming to a  conclusion different from that of the trial court. If so  understood, the expression "compelling reasons"  would be open to no comment. Neither would it be  of any special significance in its application to  appeals against acquittals any more than  appeals against conviction". (emphasis supplied)

In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1961) 3 SCR  120 : AIR 1961 SC 715, a three-Judge Bench considered  almost all leading decisions on the point and observed that  there was no difficulty in applying the principles laid down  by the Privy Council and accepted by the Supreme Court.  The Court, however, noted that appellate courts found  considerable difficulty in understanding the scope of the  words "substantial and compelling reasons" used in certain  decisions. Subba Rao, J., (as His Lordship then was) stated: "This Court obviously did not and could not add a  condition to s. 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code.  The words were intended to convey the idea that an  appellate court not only shall bear in mind the  principles laid down by the Privy Council but also  must give its clear reasons for coming to the  conclusion that the order of acquittal was wrong".

The Court concluded:

"The foregoing discussion yields the following results :  (1) an appellate court has full power to review the  evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded;  (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup’s case  afford a correct guide for the appellate court’s  approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal;  and (3) the different phraseology used in the  judgments of this Court, such as, (i) "substantial and  compelling reasons", (ii) "good and sufficiently cogent  reasons", and (iii) "strong reasons" are not intended to  curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in

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an appeal against acquittal to review the entire  evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in  doing so it should not only consider every matter on  record having a bearing on the questions of fact and  the reasons given by the court below in support of its  order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on  those facts, but should also express those reasons in  its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal  was not justified".

Again, in M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, (1963)  2 SCR 405 : AIR 1963 SC 200, the point was raised before a  Constitution Bench of this Court. Taking note of earlier  decisions, Gajendragadkar, J. (as His Lordship then was)  laid down the principle in the following words: "In some of the earlier decisions of this Court,  however, in emphasising the importance of adopting a  cautious approach in dealing with appeals against  acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of  innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and  so, ’the findings of the trial Court which had the  advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their  evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and  compelling reasons’ : vide Surajpal Singh v. The State  [(1952) S.C.R. 193, 201]. Similarly in Ajmer Singh v.  State of Punjab [(1953) S.C.R. 418], it was observed  that the interference of the High Court in an appeal  against the order of acquittal would be justified only if  there are ’very substantial and compelling reasons to  do so’. In some other decisions, it has been stated that  an order of acquittal can be reversed only for ’good  and sufficiently cogent reasons’ or for ’strong reasons’.  In appreciating the effect of these observations, it  must be remembered that these observations were not  intended to lay down a rigid or inflexible rule which  should govern the decision of the High Court in  appeals against acquittals. They were not intended,  and should not be read to have intended to introduce  an additional condition in clause (a) of section 423(1)  of the Code. All that the said observations are  intended to emphasise is that the approach of the  High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal  ought to be cautious because as Lord Russell  observed in the case of Sheo Swarup, the presumption  of innocence in favour or the accused ’is not certainly  weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at  his trial’. Therefore, the test suggested by the  expression ’substantial and compelling reasons’  should not be construed as a formula which has to be  rigidly applied in every case. That is the effect of the  recent decisions of this Court, for instance, in Sanwat  Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Harbans Singh v.  State of Punjab [(1962) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 104]; and so, it  is not necessary that before reversing a judgment  of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily  characterise the findings recorded therein as  perverse."                         (emphasis supplied)

       Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao  Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793, this  Court held that in India, there is no jurisdictional limitation  on the powers of appellate Court.  "In law there are no  fetters on the plenary power of the appellate Court to review  the whole evidence on which the order of acquittal is  founded and, indeed, it has a duty to scrutinize the

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probative material de novo, informed, however, by the  weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to  the accused having been converted into an acquittal the  homage our jurisprudence owes to individual liberty  constrains the higher court not to upset the holding  without very convincing reasons and comprehensive  considerations."         Putting emphasis on balance between importance of  individual liberty and evil of acquitting guilty persons,  Krishna Iyer, J. said;         "Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a  necessary social perspective in criminal cases which  suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation.  The  dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit  of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the  soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good  regardless of justice to the victim and the community,  demand especial emphasis in the contemporary  context of escalating crime and escape.  The judicial  instrument has a public accountability.  The  cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond  reasonable doubt which runs thro’ the web of our law  should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every  hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt.  The excessive  solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand  guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not  suffer is a false dilemma.  Only reasonable doubts  belong to the accused.  Otherwise any practical  system of justice will then break down and lose  credibility with the community.  The evil of acquitting  a guilty person light heartedly as a learned author  (Glanville Williams : ’Proof of Guilt’) has saliently  observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just  one guilty person has gone unpunished.  If unmerited  acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a  cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to  a public demand for harsher legal presumptions  against indicted ’persons’ and more severe  punishment of those who are found guilty.  Thus, too  frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a  ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial  protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is  true to say, with Viscount Simon, that ’a miscarriage  of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no  less than from, the conviction of innocent\005..’  In  short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for  presumed innocence must be moderated by the  pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent  and realistic.  A balance has to be struck between  chasing chance possibilities as good enough to  set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of  preponderant probability to punish marginal  innocents".   (emphasis supplied)

       In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1979) 2  SCR 363 : (1979) 1 SCC 355 : AIR 1979 SC 387, the Court  was considering the power of the High Court against an  order of acquittal under Section 378 of the present Code.  Chinnappa Reddy, J. after considering the relevant  decisions on the point stated: "The principles are now well settled. At one time it was  thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside  for ’substantial and compelling reasons’ only and  Courts used to launch on a search to discover those  ’substantial and compelling reasons’. However, the

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’formulae’ of ’substantial and compelling reasons’,  ’good and sufficiently cogent reasons’ and ’strong  reasons’ and the search for them were abandoned as  a result of the pronouncement of this Court in Sanwat  Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan. In Sanwat Singh’s  case, this Court harked back to the principles  enunciated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swamp v.  Emperor and re-affirmed those principles. After  Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, this Court has  consistently recognised the right of the Appellate  Court to review the entire evidence and to come to its  own conclusion, bearing in mind the considerations  mentioned by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup’s  case. Occasionally phrases like ’manifestly illegal’,  ’grossly unjust’, have been used to describe the orders  of acquittal which warrant interference. But, such  expressions have been used more, as flourishes of  language, to emphasise the reluctance of the  Appellate Court to interfere with an order of acquittal  than to curtail the power of the Appellate Court to  review the entire evidence and to come to its own  conclusion. In some cases (Ramabhupala Reddy &  Ors. v. State of A.P. AIR 1971 SC 460, Bhim Singh Rup  Singh v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 286), it  has been said that to the principles laid down in  Sanwat Singh’s case may be added the further  principle that "if two reasonable conclusions can be  reached on the basis of the evidence on record, the  Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of the  Trial Court". This, of course, is not a new principle. It  stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal  jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the  benefit of any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably  probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence  are possible, one must necessarily concede the  existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and  remote possibilities must be left out of account. To  entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt  arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the  possible view in favour of the accused must be as  nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the  preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare  possibility of another view will not entitle the accused  to claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore,  essential that any view of the evidence in favour  of the accused must be reasonable even as any  doubt, the benefit of which an accused person  may claim, must be reasonable".      (emphasis  supplied)          In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9  SCC 225, this Court said; "While setting in judgment over  an acquittal the appellate Court is first required to seek an  answer to the question whether the findings of the trial  Court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or  demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate Court answers  the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is  not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate Court  holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal  cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above  infirmities it can then-and then only-reappraise the  evidence to arrive at its own conclusions".     In Alarakha  K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57, referring to  earlier decisions, the Court stated; "The paramount  consideration of the court should be to avoid miscarriage of  justice. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from the

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acquittal of guilty is no less than from the conviction of an  innocent. In a case where the trial court has taken a view  based upon conjectures and hypothesis and not on the  legal evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to re- appreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for the purposes  of ascertaining as to whether the accused has committed  any offence or not. Probable view taken by the trial court  which may not be disturbed in the appeal is such a view  which is based upon legal and admissible evidence. Only  because the accused has been acquitted by the trial court,  cannot be made a basis to urge that the High Court under  all circumstances should not disturb such a finding".         In Bhagwan Singh & Ors. v. State of M.P., (2002) 4  SCC 85, the trial Court acquitted the accused but the High  Court convicted them.  Negativing the contention of the  appellants that the High Court could not have disturbed  the findings of fact of the trial Court even if that view was  not correct, this Court observed; "We do not agree with the submissions of the learned  counsel for the appellants that under Section 378 of  the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court could  not disturb the finding of facts of the trial court even  if it found that the view taken by the trial court was  not proper. On the basis of the pronouncements of  this Court, the settled position of law regarding the  powers of the High Court in an appeal against an  order of acquittal is that the Court has full powers to  review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal  is based and generally it will not interfere with the  order of acquittal because by passing an order of  acquittal the presumption of innocence in favour of  the accused is reinforced. The golden thread which  runs through the web of administration of justice in  criminal case is that if two views are possible on the  evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the  guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence,  the view which is favourable to the accused should  be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction limitation on  the appellate court but a Judge made guidelines for  circumspection. The paramount consideration of the  court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is  avoided. A miscarriage of justice which may arise  from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from the  conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial  court has taken a view ignoring the admissible  evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to  reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for the  purposes of ascertaining as to whether all or any of  the accused has committed any offence or not".         In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court  of A.P., Hyderabad, (2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court said;  "Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order  of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full  power to review the evidence to reach its own independent  conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of  acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is  possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal  presumption of inn decree in favour of the accused gets  reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be  justified to interfere with order of acquittal merely because  it feels that sitting as a trial court would have proceeded to  record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while  reversing an order of acquittal to examine and discuss the  reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and  then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make

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such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious  infirmity".         In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha, (2003) 12  SCC 606, this Court observed; "There is no embargo on the  appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order  of acquittal is based.  Generally, the order of acquittal shall  not be interfered with because the presumption of  innocence of the accused is further strengthened by  acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of  administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two  views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one  pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his  innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused  should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the  Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented.  A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of  the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an  innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a  duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the  evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted,  for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the  accused committed any offence or not".         Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P., (2006) 10 SCC 313 :  AIR 2006 SC 831, this Court stated; "While deciding an  appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is  no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals  against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power  exists to review the entire evidence. However, one  significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be  interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment  of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is  reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of  the trial court merely because a different view is possible.  The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a  presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the  accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further  if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for  differing with the decision of the trial court".    (emphasis supplied)         From the above decisions, in our considered view, the  following general principles regarding powers of appellate  Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of  acquittal emerge; (1)             An appellate Court has full power to review,  reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon  which the order of acquittal is founded; (2)             The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no  limitation, restriction or condition on exercise  of such power and an appellate Court on the  evidence before it may reach its own  conclusion, both on questions of fact and of  law; (3)             Various expressions, such as, ’substantial and  compelling reasons’, ’good and sufficient  grounds’, ’very strong circumstances’,  ’distorted conclusions’, ’glaring mistakes’, etc.  are not intended to curtail extensive powers of  an appellate Court in an appeal against  acquittal.  Such phraseologies are more in the  nature of ’flourishes of language’ to emphasize  the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere  with acquittal than to curtail the power of the  Court to review the evidence and to come to its  own conclusion. (4)             An appellate Court, however, must bear in

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mind that in case of acquittal, there is double  presumption in favour of the accused.  Firstly,  the presumption of innocence available to him  under the fundamental principle of criminal  jurisprudence that every person shall be  presumed to be innocent unless he is proved  guilty by a competent court of law.  Secondly,  the accused having secured his acquittal, the  presumption of his innocence is further  reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the  trial court.   (5)     If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the  basis of the evidence on record, the appellate  court should not disturb the finding of  acquittal recorded by the trial court.         Applying the above principles to the case on hand, we  are of the considered view that the learned counsel for the  accused is right in submitting that the High Court ought  not to have disturbed an order of acquittal recorded by the  trial Court.  For acquitting the accused and extending them  the benefit of doubt, the trial Court observed that the  prosecution had failed to examine certain persons who  could have unfolded the genesis of the prosecution case.   The trial Court indicated that the root cause of the quarrel  was refusal to exchange copper vessel (Kolaga) to Nagraj,  winner of the draw, but he was not examined.  Likewise,  Krishnaiah, son of Oblaiah, who accompanied injured  (deceased) Anjaniappa to the hospital, was not brought  before the Court.  Though it is in evidence that Accused No.  1 Chandrappa was injured and was also taken to the  hospital alongwith Anjaninappa, some witnesses had  denied the fact as to injuries sustained by the Accused No.  1.  The High Court did not give much weight to the said  circumstance observing that Accused No. 1 was neither  examined by a doctor nor a cross-complaint was filed by  him against the prosecuting party.  In our view, the  submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is well  founded that it is not material whether Accused No. 1 had  or had not filed a complaint or he was or was not examined  by a doctor, but the fact that even though it was the case of  prosecution that Accused No. 1 was injured during the  course of incident, prosecution witnesses tried to suppress  that fact which would throw doubt as to the correctness of  the case or the manner in which the incident had  happened.  The trial Court had also stated that it was  unnatural that the prosecution witnesses and deceased  Anjaninappa could have gone to Hanumanthapura Bypass  at about 9.30 p.m. when a shorter route was available for  going to their destination.  The trial Court observed that  there was inconsistency in prosecution evidence as to  availability of electric light at the time of incident.  The  Court also noted that the knife produced before the Court  as mudamal article was not the same which was used by  Accused No. 8 for inflicting injury on the deceased. There  was also no consistency in evidence as to injuries sustained  by prosecution witnesses.         In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the  trial Court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt,  the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or  contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion  that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of appellate  Court are as wide as that of the trial Court and it can  review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence  brought on record by the parties and can come to its own  conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case,

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the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused  was possible and plausible.  On the basis of evidence,  therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view  was equally possible.  But it is well-established that if two  views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and  one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial  Court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate Court.   In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution  had been taken by the trial Court which ought not to have  been disturbed by the appellate Court. The decision of the  appellate Court (High Court), therefore, is liable to be set  aside.         For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal deserves to be  allowed and is, accordingly, allowed.  The order of  conviction and sentence recorded by the High Court is set  aside and the order of acquittal passed by the Additional  Sessions Judge, Tumkur is restored.  The appellants are  hereby acquitted of the offences with which they were  charged.  They are ordered to be set at liberty forthwith  unless their presence is required in any other case.