14 September 1978
Supreme Court
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CHANDRAKANT SAHA & ORS. ETC. Vs UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.

Bench: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. (CJ),BHAGWATI, P.N.,FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA,SHINGAL, P.N.,DESAI, D.A.
Case number: Writ Petition (Civil) 1135 of 1977


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PETITIONER: CHANDRAKANT SAHA & ORS. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/09/1978

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. SHINGAL, P.N. DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1979 AIR  314            1979 SCR  (1) 751  1979 SCC  (1) 285

ACT:      Rice  Milling   Industry  (Regulation)  Act,  1958,  as amended by  the Amending  Act 29 of 1968-Section 3(d)(i) and (ii), whether to be read conjunctively in the  light of Sec. 3A,  3(gg)  of  the  Act-Interpretation  of  Sections  3(d), 3(gg),3A, 5  and 6 - Whether classification as Rice Miller & Rice  Huller   discriminatory  offending   Art.14   of   the Constitution-Whether the  provisions of the Act which insist on the  rice-hullers to  take licences  is  an  unreasonable restriction on  their right  to carry  on the  business  and violative of Articles 19 and  301 of the Constitution.

HEADNOTE:      The Rice  Milling Industry  (Regulation) Act was passed in 1958,  the object  and reasons  of which were to preserve and protect  the indigenous  and hand  pounding industry  of rice growers so as to provide sufficient employment to rural population and  to ensure  the modernisation of conventional type of  rice mills  with a  view to  producing more rice of better quality  and nutritive  value. Since the original Act did not include the rice hullers, by the Amendment Act 29 of 1968, Sec.  3(d) was substituted viz. "Milling rice, with it grammatical variation,  means (i)  recovering  rice  or  any produce thereof from paddy; (ii) polishing rice with the aid of power".  Under  Section  5  read  with  Section  3A,  the petitioners were  required to  take licences  for  operating their husking mills. The petitioner, therefore, assailed (a) that the  requirement of taking licences for operating their mills amounted  to complete destruction of their fundamental rights to  carry on  business and (b) that the provisions of the Act  further contain  unguided and uncanalised powers so as to violate the provisions of Art. 14.      Dismissing the petitions, the Court ^      HELD: (1)  An analysis  of the  provisions of  Sections 3(d), 3A, 5, 6 and 7 indicates that the provisions contained sufficient guidelines  and do  not amount  to exercise of an arbitrary power. [759B]      (2) Having  regard to the setting in which Sec. 3(d) is

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placed and  the dominant  object of  the Amending  Act 29 of 1968, the  intention of  the Legislature  was to  widen  the purpose and  scope of  the definition  of milling  rice.  If Clause (i)  and (ii)  are read  conjunctively then,  it will defeat the  very purpose of the Act and would in fact become meaningless because  clause (i)  which means recovering rice or any  product thereof  from paddy  could include  products like chura  etc. which  do not  require polishing and yet if the two clauses are read conjunctively chura will have to be polished within the meaning of Section 3(d), which could not have been  contemplated  by  the  legislature.  Furthermore, polishing rice  under Section  3(gg) includes the process of removal of  bran from  the kernel  of rice  with the  aid of power and  that is  what the rice hullers do. Thus on a true interpretation of  Sec. 3(d)  clauses (i)  and (ii) and (gg) there can  be absolutely  no doubt that the section includes the 14-549 SCI/78 752 operation carried out by the rice hullers. Though it was not necessary for  the legislature  to have  added Sec. 3(A), it was done  in  order  to  put  the  matter  beyond  doubt  or controversy. [760B-D, E, 761D-E]      (3) Rice-millers and rice hullers constitute a separate class having  regard to  the nature  of their  functions the classification is reasonable, because (1) it to the objects, sought to  be achieved  by the Act namely, the protection of the domestic  hand-pounding industry  and improvement of the quality of  the rice  domestic  hand-pounding  industry  and improvement of the quality of the rice and ensuring its easy and quick  distribution. The  contention  that  the  Act  by bringing the  rice hullers  and rice millers within the same fold seems to treat unequals as equals, because rice hullers cannot be equated with rice-millers is not correct. [762B-C]      (4) Sections  5 and  6 of  the  Rice  Milling  Industry (Regulation)  Act,   1958  do  not  amount  to  unreasonable restrictions on  the right  of the  petitioners to  carry on their trade  and business. In the first place, the licensing provisions is  in public  interest and is meant to carry out the purpose  of the  Act. Secondly,  sections 5  and  6  are purely  regulatory   in  character  and  do  not  amount  to unreasonable restriction. [762C-D, 763C]      Narendra Kumar  & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1960] 2 SCR 375; Daruka & Co. v. Union of India, [1974] 1 SCR 570; Glass Chatons  Importers &  Users’ Association  v. Union  of India, [1962] 1 SCR 862 referred to.      (5) In view of the language of section 6 with which the rice hullers  are concerned,  the  question  of  uncanalised powers being  conferred on  the licensing authority does not arise. Under Section 6(3) once an application is received by the licensing  officer he  shall grant  a  licence  or  such condition as  he may  impose. The  statute does not have any discretion in the licensing officer to grant or to refuse to grant licence.  He has  a mandatory  duty to  perform,  and, therefore, there  is no  question of  the licensing  officer having been  conferred or  uncanalised powers under the Act. [763D-E]      (6) Sub-section  (4) of  Sec. 5  columns as many as six guidelines for  the grant  of permit.  The power  is  to  be exercised by  such a  high authority  as the  Central  Govt. Furthermore under S. 12 an appeal lies against a decision of the licensing officer under Sec. 6 or Sec. 7 to an appellate officer nominated by the Central Government. [763F-G]

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JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION  : Writ Petitions Nos. 1135-1155, 1544-1758, 1759-1949, 1952-1991, 1993-2199, 2216-2220, 2274- 2325 of  1977, 592-607,  849-862 and  1898-1908/78 and 1577- 1605/78.                             And      Writ Petitions Nos. 955 and 966/77.                             And      Writ Petitions Nos. 1222/77 and 4-176 and 2359/78 753                             And      Writ Petitions  Nos. 967,  1128/77,  314-591,  901-950, 1870-1887,2240-2294, 2367, 2390/78, 3063-3081/78, 1223-1526/ 77, 177-313,  871-900, 2319, 2358 & 2326-2430/77, 1807-1869, 1239-1312, 1584-1592, 1737-1749, 2296-2311, 2312-2318, 2392- 2472, 2937-2951,  3380-3464/78,-  609-821,  979-1237,  1543- 1583, 1956-2111,  2810-2936/78, 2986-2998/78, 2953-2968/78 & 2472A-2472B of 1978.                             And      Writ Petitions  Nos.  823,3514-3574,824-826,975,  1617- 1627, 1628-1725, 1915-1942/78, 2366, 2610, 3088, 3576, 1313- 1542, 2112-2203,  3131-3340, 1760-1806/78,  2231-2234, 2235- 2236, 2237-2238,  2475, 2476, 2975-2985 of 1978, 3465. 3466- 3513/78, 3622-3641/78,3766, 3801 & 3786-3788/78      A. K.  Ganguli for  the Petitioners  in W.P. Nos. 1135- 1155, 1544-1758,  2274-2325 &  966/77,  3622-3641/78,  1898- 1908/78, 967-1128/77,  314-591,  901-950,  2240-2294,  2367- 2398, 3063-3081/78.      N. R.  Choudhury for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 2216- 2220, 592-607,  312-318, 2472A,  2472B/78, 849-862/78, 1239- 1312. 1584-1592, 1737-1759, 1870-1887, 2296-2318, 2392-2472, 2937- 2951, 3380-3464/78.      A. K.  Sen (In W.P. 1759-1949), D. P. Mukherjee (in all W.Ps.), R.  P. Roy  and A. K. Ganguli (In 1759-1949) for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1759-1949 and 955/77.      Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1952- 1991/77, 1313-1542, 2112-2203, 3131-3340/ 78      M. M.  Kshatriya for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1993- 2199/77.      S. S. Ray (In 1597-1606 and 1760-1806) Dr. Debi Pal (In 1759, 2125-2128/78).      S. R.  Agarwal, A. T. Patra, Praveen Kumar (In all Writ Petitions except 2125-2128) for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1597-1606/78. 1760-1806  and  Applicant/Intervener  in  W.P. Nos. 1759-1949/77 and in W.P. Nos. 1222/77 and 2125-2128/78.      Y. S.  Chitle (In  1223-1526, 1222)  and Prodyot  Kumar Chakravarty, for  the Petitioners  in W.P.  Nos.1222/77  and 4/78,1223-1526, 5-176,177-313,871-900,2319-2358. 754      P.K. Mukherjee for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 2359/78.      P. K.  Gupta for  the Petitioners  in W.P.  Nos.  2326- 2430/77 and 1807-1869 of 1978      D. P.  Mukherjee for  the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 609- 821, 979-1237,              1543-1583, 1956-2111, 2810-2936, 2953-2968, 2986-29998/78.      Majumdar and  Mrs . Laxmi Arvind for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos.  823, 3514-3574,  824, 826,  975, 1617-1627, 1628- 1723, 1915-1942, 2366, 2610, 3088, 3576/78 and 3766/78.      Amlan Ghosh  and Ravinder  Bahl for  the Petitioners in W.P. Nos.2231-2234, 2235-2236, 2237-2238, 2475 & 2476, 2975- 2985/78, 3744-3768, 3801 and 3840/78.      Rathin Das for the Petitioner in W.P. 3465/78.      J. M.  Khanna for  the Petitioners  in W.P.  Nos. 3466- 3513/78.      S. K.  Bisaria, for  the  Petitioners  in  W.Ps.  3786-

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3788/78.      S. N. Kacker, Sol. Genl. (In W.P. 1135, 1759, 1943, and 2216/77  )  R.  N.  Sachthey  and  Miss  A.  Subhashini  for Respondents in  W.Ps.  1898-1908,  177-313,  1584-1592,1313- 1542/78 and  for Respondents  No. 1  in  Rest  of  the  W.P. excepting in W.P. Nos. 1222 and 2359/ 78.      A  P.   Chatterjee  and  G.  S.  Chatterjee  for  other appearing respondents in all W.P. Nos. excepting 2359/78.      Somnath Chatterjee  (In W.P.  2359), S.  S.  Reyin  (In 2216), Samir  Kumar Ghosh  (In 2359  and 2216),  Shib  Kumar Shahu and  P. Keshava  Pillai, for  Respondent No. 5 in W.P. 2359/78 and  Applicant intervener  in 1759/77,  1949/77  and 2216.      P. Chatterjee (In W.P. 955), D. Mookerjee (In 1759) and Sukumar Ghosh  for the  applicant/Intervener  in  W.P.  Nos. 1759-1949 and 955/77.                            ORDER      We discharge  the rule  in all  of these Writ Petitions and dismiss  the same  with costs  in one set. We vacate the Stay orders  in all  the Petitions. We will give our reasons for this Order later. 755      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J.-A large batch of writ petitions has been filed in  this Court challenging the constitutional validity of the  Rice-Milling  Industry  (Regulation)  Act,  1958  as amended in  1968, on  the ground that some of the provisions of the aforesaid Act are clearly violative of Articles 14 19 and 301  of the  Constitution of  India.  Serious  objection appears to  have been  taken to  those provisions of the Act which require the petitioners who are owners of Rice Husking Mills or  Rice Hullers  to take  out a  licence for  husking rice.      We propose to take up the writ petitions of Bijoy Kumar Majhi &  Ors. (Writ  Petitions No.  1759-1949 of  1977). The main contention  of the  petitioners has been that there are as many  as 18,000  husking  mills  owned  and  operated  by various persons  in the  State of  West Bengal and each mill employs 4  or 5  persons. The  provisions of  the Act  which require the  petitioners to  take licences for operating the mills amount  to a  complete destruction  of the fundamental right of  the petitioners  to  carry  on  business  and  the provisions further  contain unguided  and uncanalised powers so as  to violate  the provisions  of Article 14. In all the other writ  petitions  the  arguments  put  forward  by  the petitioners in  the aforesaid petitions have been completely adopted.      Writ Petitions No. 1135 to 1155 of 1977 have been filed by Chandra  Kanta Saha  & Ors.  where the  petitioners  have merely   challenged the validity of Ordinance No. 14 of 1977 dated 9-8-1977  which has  repealed portions of Rice Milling Industry (Regulation)  West Bengal  Second Amendment  Act of 1974 and deleted section 6A of that Act.      In  order  to  appreciate  the  contentions  raised  by counsel for the parties, it may be necessary to give a brief history of  the legislation  on the subject. It appears that as far  back as  1958  Parliament  after  a  declaration  as required  by   the  Constitution  passed  the  Rice  Milling Industry (Regulation)  Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 1958  Act). The  Act was  passed on  18th May,  1958. It would appear from the object and reasons of the Act that the main purpose for passing the Act was to preserve and protect the indigenous  and hand-  pounding industry of rice growers so as  to provide sufficient employment to rural population. The  other   object  was  to  ensure  the  modernisation  of

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conventional type  of rice  mills with  a view  to producing more rice  of better  quality and nutritive value. Section 2 of the  Act contains  a declaration  which may  be extracted thus:      "Declaration as  to expediency of control by the Union:      It is  hereby declared  that it  is  expedient  in  the      public 756      interest that  the Union  should take under its control      the rice milling industry." This declaration  was obviously made as required by Entry 52 List I  Schedule VII  of the  Constitution. In  other words, Parliament declared  that  it  was  in  public  interest  to regulate the  working  of  the  Rice  Milling  Industry  and accordingly it  purported to    legislate  under  the  power contained in Schedule VII List I Entry 52 read with Entry 24 of List  II. In  these circumstances,  there cannot  be  any question of  the incompetency  of Parliament to legislate on the subject  matter of  the Act  nor was  any such  question raised before us.      The Act  of 1958  before its  amendment did not include the rice  hullers and  was completely  innocuous so  far the writ petitioners  are concerned.  It was after the amendment of 1968  that the  rice hullers  or the  owners of  the rice husking mills  have come  forward to  this  Court  with  the grievance that the Act is constitutionally invalid. The rice millers have not filed any petition assailing any provisions of the  Act of 1968. Section 3(a) of the Act of 1958 defines a ’defunct  rice mill, and section 3(b) defines an "existing rice mill".  The present Section 3(d) was substituted by the Amendment Act 29 of 1968 and reads as follows:-      "Milling rice" with its grammatical variation, means-           (i)   recovering rice  or any produce thereof from                paddy.           (ii) polishing rice,      with the aid of power". The question  is whether  this  definition  applies  to  the petitioners and  takes within  its fold  not only  the  rice millers but also the rice hullers. Section 3(A) which may be extracted is  a provision  which applies  expressly to  rice hullers attached  to or maintained by any flour, oil, dal or other mills  or pumping  sets as  they apply  to rice  mills mutatis mutandis:           "3A-The provisions of this Act shall apply to rice      hullers attached to, or maintained with, any flour, oil      dal or other mill, or pumping set as they apply to rice      mills subject to the modification that any reference to      the commencement of this Act in those provisions shall,      in their application to such rice-hullers, be construed      as a  reference to the commencement of the Rice-Milling      Industry (Regulation) Amendment Act, 1968"-      Section 5  requires permits  to be  taken for  a new or defunct rice  mill and  sub-sections (4)  and (5)  which run thus: 757           "(4) Before  granting any permit under sub-section      (3) the  Central Government  shall  cause  a  full  and      complete investigation  to be  made in  the  prescribed      manner in respect of the application and shall have due      regard to-           (a)   the number  of rice  mills operating  in the                locality;           (b)  the availability of paddy in the locality;           (c)   the availability  of power  and water supply                for the  rice mill  in  respect  of  which  a

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              permit is applied for;           (d)   whether the  rice mill in respect of which a                permit is  applied for will be of  the huller                type, sheller type or combined sheller-huller                type;           (e)   whether the  functioning of the rice mill in                respect of  which a  permit  is  applied  for                would cause  substantial unemployment  in the                locality;           (f)  such other particulars as may be prescribed.           (5) (a)  In granting  a permit  under this section      (whether for  the establishment  of a  new rice mill or      for re-commencing  rice-milling  operation in a defunct      rice  mill),   the  Central   Government   shall   give      preference-           (i)   to a  Government company  or  a  corporation                owned or  controlled by  the Government  over                every other applicant;           (ii) to a farmers’ co-operative society over every                other  applicant,   not  being  a  Government                Company or  a corporation owned or controlled                by the Government,                     Notwithstanding    that    such    other                applicant has  applied for  the  grant  of  a                permit   for    re-commencing    rice-milling                operation in a defunct rice mill.                (b) Subject  to the  provisions of clause (a)           in granting  a  permit  under  this  section,  the           Central Government  shall  give  preference  to  a           defunct rice mill over a new rice mill". lay down  the  various  factors  and  conditions  which  the licensing authority  has to consider before granting permit. Sub-section (6)  provides that  a permit  shall be valid for the periods  specified therein  or for  such period  as  the Central Government  may  extend.  The  relevant  portion  of section 6 runs thus:- 758           "6(1) Any  owner of  an existing rice mill or of a      rice mill  in respect  of which  a permit granted under      section 5  is effective  may make an application to the      licensing officer  for  the  grant  of  a  licence  for      carrying on rice-milling operation in the rice mill.           (2) Every  application under sub-section (1) shall      be made  in the  prescribed form  and shall contain the      particulars regarding  the location  of the  rice mill,      the size and type thereof and such other particulars as      may be prescribed.           (3) On  receipt of  any such  application for  the      grant of licence, the licensing officer shall grant the      licence on such conditions including such conditions as      to improvements  to existing  machinery, replacement of      existing machinery and use of improved methods of rice-      milling  as may be necessary to eliminate waste, obtain      maximum production  and improve  quality and conditions      relating to  the polishing  of rice, on payment of such      fees and  on the  deposit  of  such  sum,  if  any,  as      security for  the due  performance of the conditions as      may be prescribed".      This section  therefore  requires  every  owner  of  an existing rice  mill to  make an  application for obtaining a licence. The  application is  to  be  made  to  a  licensing officer. It  may be  pertinent to  note here  that  once  an application  is  filed  by  an  owner  of  a  rice-mill  the licensing officer  has no discretion in the matter but has a mandatory duty  to grant  a licence as  will appear from the

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word "shall"  which follows  licensing officer.  Sub-section (4) again  lays down  the period  of licence  etc. Section 7 provides the  ground on  which  the  licensing  officer  can revoke or  suspend the  licence after giving the licencee an opportunity of  showing cause against the action proposed to be taken. This section runs thus:-           "7(1)  If  the  licensing  officer  is  satisfied,      either on  a reference  made to  him in  this behalf or      otherwise, that,-           (a) a  licence granted  under section  6 has  been      obtained by  misrepresentation as to an essential fact,      or           (b) the  holder of licence has, without reasonable      cause, failed  to comply with the conditions subject to      which the  licence has  been granted or has contravened      any of  the pro  visions of  this Act or the rules made      thereunder.           then without  prejudice to  any other  penalty  to      which the  holder of  licence may  be liable under this      Act, the licensing 759      officer may,  after giving the holder of the licence an      opportunity of  showing cause,  revoke or  suspend  the      licence or  forfeit the  sum, if  any, or  any  portion      thereof deposited  as security  for the due performance      of the conditions subject to which the licence has been      granted". Thus the provisions contain sufficient guidelines and do not amount to  exercise of an arbitrary power.      As the  Amending Act  29 of  1968 had  made  vital  and substantial changes  in the Act of 1958 by bringing the rice hullers also  within the domain of the Act. We might like to consider some of the amended provisions whose constitutional validity has  been challenged  on  various grounds. To begin with, the  relevant part  of the  object and  reasons of the Amending Act runs thus:-           "First, several difficulties have been experienced      with   regard to  the control over small hullers. These      hullers are     scattered all over the country-side far      away from important markets and, in many cases, are run      along with  other power  driven plants  like flour, oil      and dal  mills or  pumping sets  etc. without obtaining      requisite permits  or licences  under  the  Act.  These      hullers sometimes operate clandestinely at night making      it  difficult   to  check   their  activities.  it  is,      therefore,  proposed   to  make   it  clear   that  the      attachment of  hullers with  other  power-driven  units      mentioned above  would amount to establishment of rice-      mill   and to  tighten  at  the  same  time  the  penal      provisions in respect of running of unlicensed hullers.      Secondly, it  is possible under the Act for existing or      new rice  mills to  stop rice-milling  operations for a      considerable  period  and  thereby  affect  the  supply      position. It is, therefore, proposed to provide that if      any mill  ceases to  operate for a continuous period of      exceeding one year, it would become a defunct rice-mill      and would require a fresh permit for recommencing rice-      milling operations  ...........  Moreover,  removal  of      bran popularly  known as  polishing of  rice after  its      recovery from paddy is also pro- posed to be covered by      the  term   ’milling  rice’  which  at  present  covers      recovery  of   rice  from   paddy.  This   will   check      unauthorised milling  which is  done  in  the  name  of      polishing of rice". It would  thus appear that the rice hullers were practically

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performing   the same  functions as rice millers but without any control  having been  exercised on  them, as a result of which the poor rice growers were 760 exploited and the hand-pounding industry suffered. Sometimes the supply position of the rice also suffered.      Coming now to the merits of the amendments of 1968.  it was argued  in the  first place  that  the  introduction  of section 3A unmistakably shows that the definition in section 3(d) &  (gg) did  not include  the rice hullers. It was also argued that  clauses (i)  and (ii)  of section  3(d) must be read conjunctively  and not disjunctively are however unable to agree  with these arguments. Having regard to the setting in which  section 3(d)  is placed and the dominant object of the Amendment  Act the  intention of  the Legislature was to Widen the  purport and  scope of  the definition  of milling rice. If  clauses (i) and(ii) are read conjunctively then it will defeat  the very  purpose of  the Act and would in fact become meaningless because clause (i) which means recovering rice  or  any  product  thereof  from  paddy  would  include products like  chura etc. which do not require polishing and yet if  we have  to read the two clauses conjunctively chura will have  to be  polished to  fall within  the  meaning  of section 3(d)  which, in  our opinion,  could not  have  been contemplated by  the Legislature. Furthermore the definition of polishing in section 3(gg) runs thus:-           "  ’polishing’  in  relation  to  rice  means  the      removal  of bran from the kernel of rice. Polishishing rice  therefore includes the process of removal of bran  from the  kernel of  rice with  the aid of power in what the  rice hullers  do. In  this  connection,  we  might mention that  the process  of removing husk from the rice as defined in  Encyclopaedia Britannica  Col. 19 Page 284 which is as follows:-           "Preparation of  rice: The  kernel of  rice as  it      leaves the  thresher is  enclosed by  the hull or husk,      and is known as paddy or rough rice. Rough rice is used      for seed  and feed  and livestock,  but most  of it  is      milled for  human consumption.  Rice is  a good  energy      food, and is consumed in vast quantities in the orient.      In the  western hemisphere,  however, rice  is not  the      staple cereal  food, except  in certain  Caribbean  and      South Pacific  Islands. A  diet limited largely to well      milled rice renders eastern people on a restricted diet      liable to  beriberi, a  deficiency disease  caused by a      shortage  of   essential  thiamin   (Vitamin  B1)   and      minerals. This  disease, however,  can  be  avoided  by      adding legumes,  fish, fruits  and  vegetables  to  the      diet. Rough  rice that  is preboiled and dried prior to      milling  retains   more  thiamin   and  minerals   than      untreated  rice.   and  hence  is  less  apt  to  cause      beriberi. It 761      appears  that  in  preboiling  the  thiamin,  which  is      largely in   the  germ and  bran layers  of the kernel,      diffuses into and is fixed in the starchy endosperm.           Most of the rice is milled in or near the areas in      which it is produced. In modern mills, special machines      are used  for removing  the hull  from the  kernel, for      removing the  bran layers  by attrition, for polishing,      for coating and for grading The object in milling is to      remove the  hull and the bran layers of the kernel with      as little  breakage as  possible for  the most valuable      product is  the whole  kernel.  Milled  rice  often  is      coated with  glucose and  talc, or with vegetable oils,

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    to improve  its appearance.  The by-products,  bran and      polish, are used as feed for livestock, the broken rice      for brewing,  distilling,  and  the  manufacturing;  of      starch and  rice flour.  The hulls are used for fuel or      packing, and  the straw  is used  for feed, for bedding      livestock, for thatching roofs, and for mats, garments,      packing and broom straws". Thus, on  a true  interpretation of section 3(d) clauses (i) and (ii)  and (gg) there can be absolutely no doubt that the section includes  the operation  carried  out  by  the  rice hullers. In view of this interpretation it was not necessary for the  Legislature to have added section 3(A) but this was done in order to put the matter beyond doubt or Controversy.      Counsel for  the petitioners  assailed these provisions of the  Act on  three grounds,  viz., (1)  that the  Act  by bringing the  rice hullers  and rice millers within the same fold seems to treat unequals as equals, because rice hullers cannot be equated with rice millers, (2) that sections 5 and 6 contained  uncanalised and  unguided powers  so as  to  be violative of  Article 14  of the  Constitution of India, and (3) that  the provisions  compelling the petitioners to take licences is  too harsh  in nature  and  is  an  unreasonable restriction on  the right  of   the petitioners  to carry on their business.      So far  as the  first contention  is concerned,  it  is absolutely without  any  substance.  Having  regard  to  the process in  which the  rice is milled or dehusked by machine there is  not much of a difference between a rice miller and a rice  huller. Both  resort to  machines driven by power to effectuate the  result. In  fact, a  husking mill  with  one huller not only dehusks paddy but simultaneously polishes it by suitable  adjustment of  the blade,  a function  which is almost similar to that performed by the rice millers. Having regard to  the object contained in the statement and reasons mentioned  above  it  cannot  be  said  that  there  is  any discrimination between the rice millers and the rice hullers 762 both of  whom are obliged to take licences before conducting their business.  The whole  idea is that the indigenous hand pounding industry  may not  be wiped  out   by allowing rice huller to  take all  the licences  of de-husking  so  as  to render the hand-pounding industry completely nugatory. Thus, in our  opinion, in  the first  place, rice millers and rice hullers constitute  a separate  class and  secondly,  having regard to  the nature  of their functions the classification is reasonable,  because (1)  it is founded upon intelligible differentia, (2)  the defferentia  has rational  relation to the objects  sought to  be achieved  by the Act, namely, the protection  of  the  domestic  hand  pounding  industry  and improvement of the quality of the rice and ensuring its easy and quick  distribution. The  first contention raised by the writ petitioners is, therefore  overruled.      It was  next contended  that the  provisions of the Act which insist  on the  rice hullers  to take  licences is  an unreasonable restriction  on their  right to  carry  on  the business. In  the first place, the licensing provision is in public interest and is meant to carry out the purpose of the Act. Secondly,  sections 5  and 6  are purely  regulatory in character and  do not amount to unreasonable restriction. It has been  held by  this Court  that canalization  of  export through  selected  licences  causing  elimination  of  other traders  amounts   to  a  reasonable  restriction.  In  this connection, in  the case of Narendra Kumar and ors. v. Union of India & ors.(1) this Court observed as follows:-           "The first  evil sought  to be remedied by the law

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    being thus the rise in price.. The essential subsidiary      step therefore  was to introduce a system of permits so      that the  persons acquiring  copper could  be known.  A      system of  permits would  also  be  of  great  help  in      ensuring that  the  raw  material  would  go  to  those      industries where it was needled most and distributed in      such quantities  to  several  industries  in  different      parts of  the country  as would  procure  the  greatest      benefit to the general Public".      To the same effect is the decision of this Court in the case of  Daruka &  Co. v.  Union of India(2) where Ray, C.J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:-           "This Court  in Glass  Chatons.    case  (1962)  1      S.C.R. 862  held that  if the scheme of canalization of      imports is  in the  interest of  the general public the      refusal of licence to out- 763      siders would  also be  in the  interest of  the general      public. The   canalisation of import was held to be per      se not  an unreason able restriction in the interest of      the general public.           Policies of  imports or  exports are fashioned not      only with  reference to internal or international trade      but  also   on  monetary  policy,  the  development  of      agriculture and  industries and  even on  the political      policies. If  the Government decides an economic policy      that import  or export  should be by a selected channel      or through selected agencies the court would proceed on      the assumption  that the decision is in the interest of      the general public unless the contrary is shown". For these  reasons, therefore,  we are  unable to  hold that sections 5  and 6 amount to unreasonable restrictions on the right of  the  petitioners  to  carry  on  their  trade  and business.      It was  next argued  that  sections  5  and  6  contain unguided and  uncanalised power  and suffer from the vice of excessive delegation  or powers. In the first place, in view of the  language of  section 6  with which the existing rice hullers are  concerned, the  question of  uncanalised powers being conferred  on the  licensing authority does not arise. It would be seen that under section 6(3) once an application is received  by the  licensing  officer  he  shall  grant  a licence on  such conditions  as he  may impose.  The statute does not  leave any  discretion in  the licensing officer to grant or  to refuse  to grant  a licence. He has a mandatory duty to perform, and, therefore, there is no question of the licensing officer  having  been  conferred  unrestricted  or uncanalised powers under the Act. It was, however, submitted that although  the grant  of licence is mandatory under sub- section (3)  of section  6 yet this can be granted only if a permit has  been granted  under section  5 sub-section  (6). There is  no pleading  before this  Court that  any  of  the petitioners was  not granted  permits at  all. Even  so,  as indicated above,  sub-section (4)  of section  5 contains as many as six guidelines for the grant of permit. The power is to be  exercised by  such a  high authority  as the  Central Government. Furthermore,  under section  12 an  appeal  lies against a  decision of the licensing officer under section 6 or section  7 to  an  appellate  officer  nominated  by  the Central Government.      For the reasons, given above Writ Petitions No. 1135 to 1155 and  1759 to  1949 of  1977 are  dismissed, but  in the circumstances with costs, one set. 764      For the  reasons given  in Writ  Petitions No.  1135 to

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1155 and 1759 to 1949 of 1977, Writ Petitions No. 1544-1758, 1952-1991, 1993-2199, 2216-2220, 2274-2325 of 1977, 592-607, 849-862, 1898 1908/78, 1597-1606/78, 955-956/77, 1222/77, 4- 176 &  2359/78, 967-1128/77,  314-591,  901-950,  1870-1887, 2240-2294, 2367-2390,  3063-3081/78, 1223-1526/77,  177-313, 871-900 2319-2358/78, 2326-2430/77,1807-1869 1239-1312,1584- 1592, 1737-1759, 2296-2311, 2312-2318, 2392-2472, 2937-2951, 3380-3464, 609-821, 979-1237,1543-1583,1956-2111, 2810-2936, 2986-2998,2953-2968/78, 2472A-2472B/78, 823, 3514-3574, 824- 826, 975,  1617-1627, 1628  1725, 1915-1942/78,  2366, 2610, 3088, 3576,  1313-1542, 2112-2203,  3131-3340, 1760-1806/78, 2231-2234, 2235-2236,  2237-2238, 2475,  2476, 2975-2985/78, 3465, 3466-3513/78,  3622-3641/78, 3766,3801  & 3786-3788/78 are dismissed  but without  any order as to costs. These are the reasons for our orders pronounced on 5-5-1978. S.R.                                    Petitions dismissed. 765