A ·. CijANDIGA~.AJ?M1NIST&ATIONAND ANR:  

B  . '  

v.  JAGllT SINGH AND ANR. ETC.  

, JANUARY 10, 1995 ,.,,; ,. : ' ', .,  •i - L, ' , -,' : ' ' .' .·< ' -, '  

[~.P.'JEEVAN REDDY AND MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, JJ.)  

, . . Co~titutio11. ;f1~dia-o4rt. l2~Wrti Petiti~n-Lease-Cancel/a­ ti~;:.::A.110ttees, pe;sistent defaul!frs-:flem111 of arl)ounr depositetf-Writ Feti-

.- ! 1 ~ I - • >' .. : , " • . · : · • : . I j · . .' , ' : - : ·' ·· : - · . • . · , ·  

ti~rlX~r re~r~~a,(i~~ <?l!!i<?t?411pwcd pn ground rha1 in another case,  C; A/ii}ilj!s~a,~~~.?a~;r~~lf!r~4 plot t~ h~~lea off.liscri"!cination-£ach case to  

/te decided on its merits facmal and legal-Writ not to be issued on the basis  of order passed in some other cases.  

Rule of Law-fssuing writ on plea of discrimination on basis of order  passed in case of:1PJ.olhfJ'p,erson.similarly.situatedc--Vtdidity of otYkfpassed  

QI in favour of other person to be investigated first before it can be directed to  . b~fiAW~dgaf or unwananted orders passed in another case cannot be  

made basis of issuing writ against authority.  .,  

An auction was held by the Chandigarh Administration in Septem- E her 1975 wherein the respondents were the highest bidders in respect of a  

plot. The right sold in auction was the lease-hold right. The respondents  deposited 25% of the money immediately. The balance consideration was  payable in three equal instalments. The respondents defaulted in paying  the same. A notice calling upon the Respondents to show canse why the  lease in their favout he not cancelled wrui. issued. After giving due oppor·  

F tunity of hearing to the respondents, the lease was cancelled, While forfeit- ing 10% of the premium amount. An apJieal was filed. before the Chief  Administrator which was dismissed. However, the Administrator reduced  the aI11ount of forleiture. Revision rited against the order was dismissed.  The Respondents applied to the Estate Officer for refund of the amount  

G paid by them. The amount was refunded in full. Having taken back the  amount, they filed successive review petitions before the Chief Commis- sioner seeking restoration of the plot. Second review petition was· allowed  permitting respondents to pay the entire amount Within sixty days. The  respondents failed to avail of the said concession in the.year 1985.  

Ii In 1990, the respondents filed a writ petition offering to pay the  126

CHANDIGARHADMN, v. t SINGH 127  

amount with 12% interest. The petition was. dismissed b;olding, tlipt ~iuce . A  the respondents were persistent defaulters .and :also becanse, ot.ril!~.in  prices, they are not entitled to any reJb!f. Anotller writ petition .wa,s,fded  for a direction to tbe Administrator to implellltnt the alleged polky oUhe  govemment to restore the plot by .charging a forfeiture atoollllt of15V..:J'lie  petition was allowed on the ground that in.another<1aoe.pertaini111ttoiSnat. , B  Prak.ash Rani, the administrator had restored .the ,pi!)H.O:Jwr .Wea ,after · 1  

her writ petition was dismissed, the. sBJile b'eotetlleat •hticextenlled.te.the  

Respondent. Hence .dlis appeal. ". ,1 , 1 """"'  

Allowing the app~ this Cotltt  c  

HELD 1.1. lo the instant case; the hllsis hr the principle oil \ithich  the writ petition has been allbWed by the 'High· Court was· unsilstallla~ in  law and Indefensible in principle. The mere fact that the t'espiindent  authority had passed a partlcnlar order in the case of another person  similarly situated conld never be the ground fur issuing a wirit ill' faVOllr • D  of the Jietitioner on the plea of discrimi.nation. 'fhe order in favour of the  other person might be legal and valid o~ it mi~t not be. Tb,a(had to be  investigated first before it could be directed to. be followed in the ease of  the petitioner. H the order in favou~ ~r tJie oth~ person W&s 'i~U'nii' to' be  contrary to' law or not warranted in the facts 'and' ClrcuO:stances of hiS qise,  

: . ' ' ; : . I ; ' ' : . •: '. ,,,., " • . iE  such. illegal or unwarranted order could not .be loilde the ba5is ol issning  a writ compelling the ~sp~nciJ!nt-aptborlty t~ rypeat the,i~~~1! ·~~ .• to  pass another unwarranted order. The extra-ordinary and dlscretlonitry  power of the High Court cannot be exercised for snch a purpose. Merely  because the respondent-anthorify had pass~d one' lilegal/iniwarranted  order, it did not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to llt>tat ! F  that illegality over and over again. The illegal/unwarranted action.must be  corrected, if it can be done according 'to law; When ev~r lfls 'possible, the  court should direct the appropriate authorlty'to corred such Wl-ong orders  in accordance with law - but even if It cannot be con:ected, it cannot be  made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the authority to repeat .G  the illegality, the court is not illondol!ing the .!"lrijer illegal act/order nor,  can such illegal order constitute the basis for legitimate complaint of  discrimination. Giving effect to suth- pleas lllluld. be: prejudicial to the  interests of law and will do incalcnlable llliscliief to pilblic intereat. It Will  be a negation of law and the rule of law. If in case the order in favour of  the other person is found to be a laWful andJustlfled·one Kcim befolloweMcH

128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 S.C.R.  

A and similar reHef can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the  petitioner's case is similar to the other person's case. Since the case of the  other person can not to be examined in his absence, it is more appropriate  and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the  court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case  

B rather than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action  taken in another person's case. Such a course-barring exceptional situa- tions • would neither be advisable nor desirable. The High Court cannot  ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction  and hold that becanse in one case a particular order bas been passed or  a particnlar action bas been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective  

C of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise.  Each case most be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accord- ance with relevant legal principles. The order and actions of the authorities  cannot be equated to the judgment of the Snpreme Court and High Courts  nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as nnderstood in  

D the jndicial world. (133-E-H, 134-A-E)  

1.2. In this case, the High Court fell in grave error in importing the  theory of discrimination in such a situtation. Question of discrimination  could have arisen only if two findings were recorded by the High Court,  viz (1) the order in favour of Prakash Rani was a legal and vaHd one and  

E (2) the case of the writ petitioners was similar in material respects to the  case of Prakash Rani but she bas not been accorded the same treatment.  No svdl findings had been recorded by the High Court in this ease.  

(133-H, 134-A]  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 674 of  F 1995.  

G  

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.10.93 of the Punjab &  Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 3394 of 1992.  

With  

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15931 of 1994.  

From the Judgment and Order dated. 30.11.93 of the Punjab &  Haryana in C.W.P. No. 7760 of 1993.  

H Swaraj Kaushal, K. Madhava Reddy, Mrs. Naresh Bakshi and Ms.

CHANDIGARH ADMN. v. J. SINGH [JEEV AN REDDY, J.] 129  

Kamini Jaiswal for the Appellants.  

K.K. Venugopal, D.V. Sehgal, Vimal Dave, Neelam Kalsi, Ashok  Mathur and Sanjay Sarin for the Respondents.  

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by  

B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. S.L.P. (C) 11609 of 1994.  

Leave granted. Heard counsel for the parties.  

A  

B  

This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Punjab and  Haryana High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondents, C  Jagjit Singh and Jaswant Singh. The fact leading to the filing of the writ  petition are not in dispute and may be stated. Indeed, they speak for  themselves.  

An auction was held by the Chandigarh Administration on Septem- ber 29, 1975 wherein the respondents were the highest bidders in respect D  of a plot admeasuring 338 sq. yrds. in Sector 31A, Chandigarh for a sum  of Rs. 34,500. The right sold in auction was the lease-hold for ninety nine  years. An allotment letter was issued on November 27, 1975. The respon- dents deposited 25% of the money immediately. The balance consideration  was payable in three equal instalments, the first of which fell due on E  September 27, 1976. The respondents defaulted in paying the same  whereupon the Estate Officer issued a notice to show cause as to why the  lease in their favour be not cancelled. After giving due opportunity to the  respondents, the lease was cancelled, at the same time forfeiting a sum of  Rs. 3,450 representing 10% of the premium. The respondents preferred an  appeal to the Chief Administrator against the said action which was F  

dismissed on May 2, 1978. The Chief Administrator, however, reduced the  amount of forfeiture from 10% to 21'2%. A revision preferred against the  Chief Administrator's order was dismissed by the Chief Commissioner on  January 1, 1979. The respondents then applied to the Estate Officer for  refund of the amount paid by them. After deducting the amount forfeited, G  the amount deposited by them was refunded in full on April 25, 1979.  

Having obtained the refund of their amount, the respondents filed a  review petition before the Chief Commissioner seeking review of his order  dated January 1, 1979. It was dismissed on January 10, 1980. A second  review petition, however, met with success. The Chief Commissioner H

130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 1 S.C.R.  

A directed that the plot shall be restored to the respondents provided they  make the entire payment within sixty days from the date of his order. He  directed that in default of such payment, the review petition shall stand  dismissed, vide Chief Commissioner's order dated May 9, 1985. Instead of  paying the amount within the time prescribed, the respondents queried  

B how the amount of Rs. 1.02 lakhs (directed to be deposited by the Chief  Commissioner in his order dated May 9, 1985) was arrived at. Be that as  it may, they failed to comply with the order of the Chief Commissioner,  with the result that the second review petition filed by them also stood  .~mi,s~ed The respondents then filed yet another petition, styling it as a  JI!ercy, petition, before the advisor to the Administrator which too was  

C . dismissed  

On December 3, 1990, the respondents started yet another round by  filing W.P. No. 15477 of 1990 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana  offering to pay the amount aforesaid with 12% interest. The High Court  

· D recorded the· respondents' offer and directed them to bring a draft for the  full amount on the next day of the hearing. The respondents produced a  draft in a sum of Rs. 1,72,402.56p before the court on January 15, 1991  which was kept in safe custody of the Registrar. The writ petition was,  however, dismissed on March 18, 1991 holding that since the respondents  were persistent defaulters and also because the prices of plots have gone  

E up steeply meanwhile, the plot cannot be restored to them. A review  •petition filed by the .respondents was dismissed by the court on July 29,  1991.  

Having failed in the High Court, the respondents approached the  F Estate Officer yet again to settle their case in the light of an alleged policy  

of the government to restore the plots to defaulters by charging forfeiture  amonnl' of 5%. This request was rejected by the Estate Officer on October  18, 1991. After all this, the respondents approached the High Court once  again with W.P. (C) No. 3394 of 1992 for a direction to the respondents to  

G implement the alleged policy of the Chandigarh Administration to restore  the plot by charging a forfeiture amount of 5%. They also challenged the  cancellation of lease (effected in the year 1977) in this writ petition. They  deposited a slim of Rupees two lakhs purporting to be under the orders of  · tb.e' High Court. The writ petition has been allowed by the High Court on  October 14, 1993 on the ground that inasmuch as in another case pertaining  

·. H to Smt. Prakash Rani, the Administrator had restored the plot to her even

CHANDIGARH ADMN. v. J. SINGH [JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 131  

after her writ petition was dismissed by the High Court, the respondents A  must also be restored the plot on the same terms. The High Court pointed  out that Prakash Rani's matter was settled before the Lok Adalat and the  Estate Officer agreed to waive the forfeiture by charging 5% of the  premium amount by his orders dated September 4, 1991 but when the  respondents' case was taken up by Estate Officer on October 1, 1989, he  rejected the respondents' case, which says the the High Court amounts to B  discriminatory treatment. When it was pointed out by the counsel for the  Administration that the case of Prakash Rani was diferent inasmuch as in  that case the amount paid by the allottee was never returened to her as has  been done in the case of respondents, the High Court merely brushed aside  the argument and allowed the writ petition directing the appellants herein C  (respondent to the writ petition) to restore the site to the respondents (writ  petitioners) inasmuch as they had already paid up the entire amount of  auction money including penal interest. The court observed that if on  taking an account, any further amount is found due, a demand can be  raised against the respondents according to rules. It is this order which is D  questioned in this appeal.  

In our opinion, the writ petition could not have been allowed by the  High Court for more than one reason, viz., (1) on the default of the  respondents to pay the first instalment on the prescribed date, the lease in  their favour was cancelled after due notice and hearing as far back as 1977. E  They also took back the amount deposited by them minus the amount  forfeited. This happened in 1978-79. Having taken back the amount, they  could not have agitated their right to the plot by filing consecutive review  petitions before the Chief Commissioner - or by filing writ petition - seeking restoration of the plot. Not only the lease was cancelled but they F  had acquiesed in it by taking back the money; (2) Be that as it may, when  their second review petition was allowed by the Chief Commissioner per- mitting them to pay the entire amount within sixty days, the respondents  failed to avail of the said concession. This happened in the year 1985; (3)  Their writ petition filed in the year 1990 (W.P. No. 15477 of 1990) seeking  restoration of the plot was dismissed on the ground that they were persist- G  ent defaulters and also on the ground that because of the rise in prices,  the plot cannot be restored to them. This happened in March, 1991. Even  a review petition filed by the respondents' was rejected by the High Court.  The filing ofW.P. (C) No. 3394of1992 (from which this appeal arises) in  the above circumstances was thus nothing but a desparate gamble. The only H

132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 S.C.R.  

A ostensible reason given for filing this second writ petition was .the alleged  policy of the Administration to restore lhe plots to defaulters on their  paying 5% of the premium amount. It is, however, significant that the writ  petition has not been allowed on the basis of the said policy, if any, but on  a different ground altogether. It is thus : inasmuch as in the case of Prakash  

B Rani, the plot was restored to her on charging 5% of the premium amount  notwithstanding the dismissal of her writ petition by the High Court, the  plot of the respondents should also be restored to them. Firstly, the  judgment of the High Court does not show that the High Court has  investigated the facts and circumstances of Prakash Rani's case nor has it  recorded any finding that her case is identical in all respects to the  

C respondents' case. The High Court does not also say that the point of  distinction pointed out by the Administration's counsel, viz., that the said  lady had never taken back her amount and that her amount was lying with  the Administration, is not correct. And yet her case has been made the  basis for allowing the respondents' writ petition upholding the plea of  

D discrimination.  

E  

F  

We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be  called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court  is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come  across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas  at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent- authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly  situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner  on the plea of discriminatio11. The order in favour of the other person might  be legal and valid or it might not be. 71iat has lo be investigated first before  it can be directed to be follow1'd in the case of the petitioner. If the order in  favour of the oth"r person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in  the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or  unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the  respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to puss another unwarranted  order. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court  

G cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent- authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the  High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and  again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done  according to law - indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct  

H the appropriate authority to correct such wrong 01 ders in accordance with  

•

CHANDIGARH ADMN. v. J. SINGH (JEEV AN REDDY,J.) 133  

law - but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be A  made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent- authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier  illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a  legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would  be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to  public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course,  if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful  and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the  petitioner if it is found that the petitioners' case is similar to the other  persons' case. But then why examine another person's case in his absence  rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the  court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to  examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief  asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into  the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case,  which other person is not before the case nor is his ca.e. In our considered  

B  

c  

i opinion, such a course - barring exceptional situations - would neither be  D -'  

' advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court carmot ignore the  law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say  that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular  action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact  whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case E  must be decided on its own mertis, factual and legal, in accordance with  relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities carmot  be equated lo the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor  can they be elevated lo the level of the precedents, as understood in the  judicial world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by  authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no opinion.  That can be dealt with when a proper case arises.)  

F  

Coming back to the facts of this case, if only the High Court had  looked to the facts ot this case instead of looking to the facts of some other  case, we are sure, it would have dismissed the writ petition in view of the G  several facts stated hereinbefore. The High Court fell in grave error in  allowing the writ petition on the said ground and in importing the theory  of discrimination in such a situation. Question of discrimination could have  arisen only if two findings were recorded by the High Court, viz., (I) the order  in favour of Prakash Rani was a legal and valid one and (2) the case of the H

134 SUPREME CoURT REPORTS (1995).1 S.C.Jlt..  

A writ petitioners was similar in material respects to the case of Prakash Rani  but she has not been accorded the same treatment. No such findings have  been recorded by the High Court in this case.  

The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment under appeal  set aside. The respondents shall pay the costs of the appellant, which are  

B assessed at Rs.10,000.  

S.L.P.(C) No. 15931 OF 1994:  

The facts of this case, if anything, are worse. The respondent was the  C highest bidder in respect of a plot in the auction held on July 13, 1974. She  

paid the first 25% amount but defaulted in paying the first instalment. A  show cause notice was issued to her proposing to cancel the lease in her  favour. Pursuant to the show cause notice, the respondent appeared and  expressed her inability to pay the amount, whereupon the lease in her  favour was cancelled and an amount of 10% of the premium amount  

D forfeited. The respondent filed an appeal before the Chief Administrator  contending only that the amount forfeited is high and that it should be  reduced and the balance refunded to her. The Chief Administrator allowed  her appeal and reduced the amount forfeited. The respondent accordingly  took back her amount minus the forfeited amount, in December, 1976.  

E Seventeen years later, she filed the writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana  High Court, being CWP No. 77(:1.J of 1993, from which this appeal arises,  challenging the order of cancellation dated March 30, 1976. The Writ  petition has been allowed by the High Court on the ground that the matter  is covered by the High Court's earlier decision in Jaswant Singh v. Chan- digarh Administration, (1992) PU 522.  

F  Inasmuch as the respondent's writ petition has been allowed on the  

only ground that it is covered by the decision in Jaswant Singh, it is  necessary to notice whether the principle of the said decision governs the  facts of this case. The two grounds urged by the writ petitioner in Jaswant  Singh, as recorded in Para (3) of the judgment, are: "(1) the authorities  

G under the Act have no jurisdiction to order forfeiture of 25% of the  premium; (2) that when during the time allowed by the Chief Administrator  to deposit the amount of forfeiture the review had been filed and the Chief  Commissioner had ordered stay of the operation of the order, while  disposing of the reivew petition, it was incumbent upon the Chief Ad-

H ministrator to grant time for deposit of the amount due." A perusal of the  

..  •

CHANDIGARH ADMN. v. J. SINGH [JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 135  

facts of the case stated in Paras (2) and (3) of the judgment clearly A  discloses that there is absolutely no similarity in the facts of that case and  the present case. The facts of that case are altogether different. It is in  those facts and circumstances that that writ petition was •allowed. We are  unable to see any relevance of the principle of the said decision to the case  before us. By saying this, we may not be understood to say that the decision B  in Jaswant Singh is correct. We express no opinion thereon since it is not  necessary for us to do so in this case.  

So far as the case before us is concerned, the fact remains that when  the lease was cancelled on the respondent expressing her inability to pay  the first or other instalments, the only contention raised by her in appeal C  was for reduction of the amount forfeited. She never questioned the  cancellation of the lease. On the amount forfeited being reduced, she coolly  took back the money and kept quiet for a period of seventeen years. It is  only after the lapse of 17 years that she woke up - evidently in view of the  rise in prices - and approached the High Court more in the nature of a  gamble than for vindicating her legitimate rights. The explanation given by D  her for her seventeen years' slumber was that she had filed a revision before  the Administration and was awaiting its result. The. respondents have  denied the receipt of any such revision. The appellant is not able to  substantiate her plea. Moreover, if indeed she had filed a revision, she has  not explained why did she wait for seventeen years without making any E  'enquiry about its progress and without malting any efforts to have it  disposed of. It is evident that the said plea is a false one, invented for the  purpose of the writ petition. It, therefore, follows that the High Court was  in enot in allowing this writ petition as well. Accordingly, this appeal too  is allowed and the judgment under appeal set aside The appellants shall  be entitled to their costs from the respondent, quantified at Rs.10,000. F  

A.G .. Appeal allowed.