http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3  

PETITIONER: CHANAN SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: REGISTRAR, CO-OP. SOCIETIES, PUNJAB & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/03/1976

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 1821            1976 SCR  (3) 685  1976 SCC  (3)  36

ACT:      Imputation of  misconduct against bank-employee-Enquiry by Secretary  of bank-Explanation  accepted and  proceedings dropped-Revival  of   proceedings  by  Managing  Director-No present   grievance   of   punitive   action-Writ   petition premature.

HEADNOTE:      Misconduct  was   imputed  to   the  appellant  by  his employer, the  second respondent.  The then Secretary of the bank enquired  into the  allegations and,  after  issuing  a notice  to   the  appellant   for  showing   cause   against punishment,  accepted   his  explanation   and  dropped  the proceedings. Thereafter,  the Managing  Director of the Bank opined that the said Secretary was not empowered to punish a bank -employee,  and therefore,  the proceedings culminating in the  exoneration  of  the  appellant  were  invalid.  The proceedings were  revived, and  the appellant was suspended. His writ  petition under  Arts. 226 and 227 was dismissed by the High  Court. On  appeal by  special leave, the appellant challenged the  revival of  the proceedings  against him, as illegal and opposed to natural justice.      Dismissing the appeal, the Court. ^      HELD: (1)  There is  no present  grievance of  punitive action which  can be  ventilated in court. The writ petition is premature since no action has been taken finally, against the appellant. [687A]      (2) The co-operative bank has not been able to show any power to  suspend an employee pending an enquiry. If that be so, the  suspension of  the appellant is plainly without the pale of law. [687B]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE; JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1137 of 1976.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated the  14-8-75 of  the Punjab  and Haryana High Court in C.W. No. 3995 of 1975.      J. Ramamurthi for the Appellants.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3  

    Janendra Lal and B. R. Agarwala for Respondents 2 and 3      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER,  J. This  appeal, by special leave, lends itself to  a quick burial in view of the brief facts set out below.      The appellant  has  been  an  employee  of  the  second respondent. A  notice was  issued to  him to  show cause why disciplinary action  should not  be taken  against  him  for certain  items  of  misconduct  imputed  to  him.  The  then Secretary of  the bank, Shri Daljit Singh, enquired into the allegations. Thereafter,  on April  1,  1975  the  Secretary issued a  notice to the appellant to show cause why his next increment should  not be  stopped by  way of  punishment;  A reply was  sent by  the appellant  by way of explanation and the  Secretary   accepting  the   explanation  dropped   the proceedings by order dated April 9, 1975 686 (Annexure III). Thereafter, the Managing Director taking the view that  Shri Daljit  Singh, Secretary,  had no  power  to inflict punishment  on the  employees of  the bank  and that therefore the  proceedings culminating in the exoneration of the appellant  were invalid  issued a fresh memorandum which concluded thus:           "After considering  the said  enquiry report along      with other  relevant documents,  I am  provisionally of      the view to impose upon you a penalty of dismissal from      bank services.  Before doing  so, you are asked to show      cause  within   21  days   from  the  receipt  of  this      memorandum, why  on account  of findings  of  the  said      Enquiry Officer,  into the  charges, you  should not be      dismissed from  the bank  services. In case no reply is      received within  the  prescribed  period,  it  will  be      presumed that  you have no reply in this behalf and the      proposed punishment will be imposed." The appellant was also suspended on the same date, viz., 7th July 1975.      Thereupon, a  writ petition  under  Arts.  226/227  was moved by  the  appellant  challenging  the  revival  of  the proceedings against  him as  illegal and  opposed to natural justice.      The first  point raised  in  objection  by  the  second respondent is  that the  writ petition is premature since no action has  been taken  finally against  the appellant,  the disciplinary  proceedings   are  still   pending   and   the explanation of  the appellant  is under consideration. It is only in  the event  of the appellant being punished that any grievance can  arise for  him to  be agitated  in the proper forum.      Other obstacles  in the  way of  granting the appellant relief were  also urged before the High Court and before us, but we  are not  inclined to  investigate them for the short reason that  the writ petition was in any case premature. No punitive action  has yet  been taken.  It  is  difficult  to state, apart  from speculation,  what  the  outcome  of  the proceedings will  be. In  case the appellant is punished, it is certainly  open to  him  either  to  file  an  appeal  as provided in  the relevant rules or to take other action that he may  be advised  to resort  to. It  is not for us, at the moment, to  consider whether  a writ  petition will  lie  or whether an industrial dispute should be raised or whether an appeal to  the competent  authority under  the rules  is the proper remedy, although these are issues which merit serious consideration.      We are  satisfied that,  enough unto  the day being the evil thereof,  we need  not dwell  on problems  which do not

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3  

arise in the light of the 687 view we  take that there is no present grievance of punitive action which can be ventilated in court. After all, even the question of  jurisdiction to re-open what is claimed to be a closed enquiry will, and must, be considered by the Managing Director. On  this score,  we dismiss the appeal but, in the circumstances, without costs.      Before parting with this case, we would like to make it clear that  counsel for  the co-operative  bank has not been able to  show any  power to  suspend an  employee pending an enquiry. If  that be  so, the suspension of the appellant is plainly without  the pale of law and he would be entitled to his salary  during the  period till final orders are passed. Since the  matter has  been  pending  long  enough,  we  are assured by  counsel for the respondent that final orders may be passed within one month from to-day. M.R.                                       Appeal dismissed. 688