REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1174 OF 2003

Chaman Lal & Ors. ..Appellants

Versus

State of Punjab & Anr. ..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single judge

of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the Criminal Revision i.e.

Criminal  Revision No.512 of  2000 filed by nine petitioners,  who are the

appellants in this Appeal.  Before the High Court the challenge was to the

order  passed  by  learned  Additional  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Ludhiana

framing  charges  for  alleged  commission  of  offences  punishable  under

Section 409 read with Section 120B and Section 420 read with Section 120

B of the Indian Penal  Code,  1860 (in short  the ‘IPC’).  The High Court

dismissed  the  revision  petition  on  the  ground  that  there  are  sufficient

grounds  to  presume  that  the  unrebutted  evidences  of  the  complainant

constitute triable offences.

2. Background  facts  as  projected  by  appellants  in  a  nutshell  are  as

follows:

In  February,  1987  the  complainant  and  his  five  family  members

executed  General  Power  of  Attorney  (in  short  the  ‘GPA’)  at  Canada  in

favour of Manvinder Singh and subsequently the said GPA was registered

with the Commissioner of Ferozepur, Punjab. The GPA stated that the GPA

holder can do anything on behalf of the complainant which he can lawfully

do. The GPA does not contain any condition or restriction.  

In August, 1989 the GPA holder met the appellants with a proposal

to sell a plot of land of the complainant admeasuring 4840 square yards

comprised  in  Khasra  No.  1085  situated  at  Village  Barewal  Awana,

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Ludhiana. The GPA holder demanded a price of Rs.5 lakhs for the said

property.

On 4.10.1989 the appellants by an oral agreement-agreed to purchase

the said property and paid Rs.1 lakh by way of four demand drafts to the

GPA holder.

On 7.11.1989 the aforesaid oral agreement was reduced into writing

and the balance sum of Rs.4 lakh was also paid (Rs.1 lakh in cash and Rs.3

lakhs by bank drafts). Upon receipt of entire consideration, the GPA holder

executed four SPAs in favour of appellant Nos.1 (Chaman Lal) 2 (Daljander

Kaur)  3 (Narinder Kaur) and 7 (Balwant Singh).

On 5.12.1989  by virtue  of  the  aforesaid  5  SPAs dated  7.11.1989

appellant Nos.1, 2, 3 & 7 executed and registered 5 sale deeds in favour of

appellant Nos.2 to 6.

In the  middle  of  December,  1989 the appellants  suddenly came to

know that  the complainant  had filed a suit  No.120/89 dated 28.11.1989

against  Petitioner  Nos.1,  2,  3  and  7  for  declaration  that  the  said  GPA

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holder (Manvinder Singh) had no authority to sell the said property and/or

to permanently alienate and dispose of the said property.  

The appellants also came to know that in the said suit for declaration,

an ex-parte injunction order/status quo was granted on 02.12.1989, though

the appellants  in the absence of  knowledge- of  such ex-parte injunction

order  had  already  executed  the  sale-deeds  and  got  them  registered  on

05.12.1989.

On  14.06.1990  the  learned  Senior  Subordinate  Judge  passed  an

order in the aforesaid suit, restraining the appellants from dispossessing

the complainant from the said property and to maintain status quo with

regard  to  ownership  of  the  said  property  pending  disposal  of  the  suit,

whereas  in  fact  the  appellants  were  already  in  possession  of  the  said

property since 07.11.1989.

On 20.8.1990 and 21.11.1990 the appellants preferred an Appeal No.

274/67 in the Court  of the learned Additional  District  Judge,  Ludhiana

praying, inter alia, to maintain the status quo with regard to the ownership

and possession of the said property and vide order dated 21.11.1990, the

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parties were ordered, during pendency of the main suit, to maintain status

quo with regard to ownership and possession of the property.

On 30.6.1995 the complainant lodged a complaint with the Deputy

Commissioner, Ludhiana - Shri S.S. Channi, I.A.S., who summoned the

appellants at his residence and asked them to cancel the sale-deeds and

concede  to  the  claim  of  the  complainant  in  the  civil  suit.  The

Commissioner also threatened the appellants with dire consequences by

implicating them in false criminal cases.  The said officer is related to the

complainant.

On 31.08.1995 after a period of about 6 years, on a complaint lodged

by the complainant, an FIR No. 183, Police Station Division No.5 District

Ludhiana was registered only against Shri Sadhu Singh, Naib Tehsildar,

Ludhiana and Shri Banta Singh, Patwari of Village Barewal Awana under

Sections 420, 468,, 471, 120 B IPC.  

On 13.3.1996  on  application  of  the  complainant,  an  inquiry  was

initiated and marked to the SP City, Ludhiana.

On 29.5.1996 the SP City,  Ludhiana  submitted  his  Report  to  the

SSP,  Ludhiana  stating  therein  that  the  FIR  was  the  handiwork  to

pressurize  the  appellants  and  further  that  no  such  offence  had  been

committed by the appellants.

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On 14.10.1996 despite the aforesaid report of the SP City, Ludhiana

and in spite of the note of the A.D.A. (Legal)  that  no criminal  case was

made out against the appellants, a charge sheet under Section 173 Cr.P.C.

was filed against the appellants for commission of alleged offences under

Sections 420, 468, 467, 471,120B IPC.

On  11.12.1999  the  Ld.  ACJM,  Ludhiana  framed  charges  under

Sections 120B read with Section 409 IPC and under Sections 120B/420

IPC against the appellants.

The appellants preferred a Criminal Revision No. 512 of 2000 in the

Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court  challenging  the  maintainability  of  the

charges framed against them and the learned Single Judge of the High

Court  dismissed  the  prayer  of  the  appellants  by  the  impugned  order

holding that there was sufficient ground to presume that the unrebutted

evidence of the complainant constitute triable offences.

3. According to learned counsel for the appellant a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-

was paid as earnest money.  The power of attorney was drawn up at Canada

and was registered on 19.3.1987 by accused No.1 at Firozepur, Punjab. The

factual  scenario  described  above  goes  to  show  that  the  complaint  was

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nothing but the abuse of the process of court.  The ingredients necessary for

constituting offences punishable under Sections 409, 420 and 120B IPC are

not made out.  In any event the complaint was lodged after about six years

and this itself is sufficient to show lack of bonafides.

4. Manvinder Singh at the relevant  point  of time had the authority to

enter into the transaction.

5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand supported the

judgments of the courts below.  

6. The High Court has found that the acts are not in dispute, the power

of attorney is the central document in the case.  The High Court noted that

significantly,  too many details  of the property in respect  of which it  was

executed were missing. The High Court observed that the power of attorney

was embossed with the stamp of Commissioner, Firozepur on 19th March,

1987 prima facie on making it a valid document.  But nevertheless a plain

reading of the power of attorney leaves one with the uncertain feeling as

regards its true import.  The High Court observed that it is possible that the

appellants were duped by the attorney who had known that his power has

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been  revoked  but  concealed  the  fact.   Thereafter  having  coming  to  this

conclusion the High Court noted as follows:

“Such  an  argument  could  have  been  validly advanced by the petitioners to establish their bonafides if the power of attorney itself had mentioned the details of the  property  in  dispute  and  had  also  mentioned specifically that the attorney had the power to alienate the property  through  sale,  mortgage  and  lease  etc.   The petitioners must have examined the document because it was from the document that the power to enter into the agreement to sell had come to vest in Manvinder Singh. If even after examining the document the petitioners went ahead with the transaction they  did so at their own peril. They lacked bonafides and were out to deprive the owner of his property by a series of transactions.”

7. It  would  be  appropriate  to  deal  with  the  question  of  conspiracy.

Section  120-B  IPC  is  the  provision  which  provides  for  punishment  for

criminal conspiracy. Definition of “criminal conspiracy” given in Section

120-A reads as follows:

“120-A. When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,—

(1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy

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unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.”

The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been stated to be: (a) an object

to be accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish

that object, (c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the

accused persons whereby, they become definitely committed to cooperate

for  the  accomplishment  of  the  object  by  the  means  embodied  in  the

agreement, or by any effectual means, and (d) in the jurisdiction where the

statute required an overt act.  The essence of a criminal  conspiracy is the

unlawful  combination  and  ordinarily  the  offence  is  complete  when  the

combination  is  framed.  From this,  it  necessarily  follows  that  unless  the

statute  so  requires,  no  overt  act  need  be  done  in  furtherance  of  the

conspiracy,  and  that  the  object  of  the  combination  need  not  be

accomplished,  in  order  to  constitute  an  indictable  offence.  Law making

conspiracy a crime, is designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief

which is  gained by a combination of the means. The encouragement and

support  which  co-conspirators  give  to  one  another  rendering  enterprises

possible  which,  if  left  to  individual  effort,  would  have  been  impossible,

furnish  the  ground  for  visiting  conspirators  and  abettors  with  condign

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punishment. The conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to all its

members  wherever  and  whenever  any member  of  the  conspiracy acts  in

furtherance of the common design. (See  American Jurisprudence, Vol. II,

Sec. 23, p. 559.)  For  an  offence  punishable  under  Section  120-B,  the

prosecution  need  not  necessarily  prove  that  the  perpetrators  expressly

agreed to  do  or  caused to  be done  an illegal  act;  the  agreement  may be

proved by necessary implication. The offence of criminal conspiracy has its

foundation in an agreement to commit an offence. A conspiracy consists not

merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more

to do an unlawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in

intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the

very plot is an act in itself, and an act of each of the parties, promise against

promise,  actus  contra  actum,  capable  of  being  enforced,  if  lawful,

punishable if for a criminal object or for use of criminal means.

8. No  doubt  in  the  case  of  conspiracy  there  cannot  be  any  direct

evidence.  The  ingredients  of  the  offence  are  that  there  should  be  an

agreement  between  persons  who  are  alleged  to  conspire  and  the  said

agreement should be for doing an illegal act or for doing by illegal means an

act  which  itself  may  not  be  illegal.  Therefore,  the  essence  of  criminal

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conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can

be  proved  either  by direct  evidence  or  by circumstantial  evidence  or  by

both, and it is a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove

conspiracy is rarely available. Therefore, the circumstances proved before,

during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the

complicity of the accused.

9. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (vide 4th Edn., Vol. 11, p. 44, para  

58), the English law as to conspiracy has been stated thus:

“58. Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.  It  is  an indictable offence at common law, the punishment for which is imprisonment or fine or both in the discretion of the court.

10. The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by

agreement. The agreement may be express or implied, or in part express and

in part implied. The conspiracy arises and the offence is committed as soon

as the agreement is  made;  and the offence continues to  be committed so

long as the combination persists, that is until the conspiratorial agreement is

terminated  by  completion  of  its  performance  or  by  abandonment  or

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frustration  or  however  it  may be.  The  actus  reus  in  a  conspiracy  is  the

agreement to execute the illegal conduct, not the execution of it. It is not

enough that two or more persons pursued the same unlawful object at the

same time or in the same place; it is necessary to show a meeting of minds, a

consensus to effect an unlawful purpose. It is not, however, necessary that

each conspirator should have been in communication with every other.”

11. The  High  Court  has  rightly  observed  that  the  charges  have  to  be

established beyond reasonable  doubt  before  the prosecution  can succeed,

but  at  that  stage  the  challenge  can  be  made.   There  was  no  scope  for

intereference.  We are in agreement with the view expressed by the High

Court.  However, we make it clear that the observations made by the High

Court while dismissing the petition before it shall not be considered to be

conclusive  and  determined.   It  has  been  rightly  noted  that  Manvinder

accepted  the  factum  of  cancellation  but  thereafter  executed  the  special

power of attorney.  Therefore, we find no infirmity in the order of the High

Court  to  warrant  interference.   However,  we  request  the  trial  court  to

explore  the  possibility of  early  disposal  of  the  case.   If  any petition  for

exemption is filed, needless to say the same shall be considered keeping in

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view sub section 2 of Section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(in short the ‘Cr.PC.’).

12. The appeal is dismissed.

……………… …..........................J.

(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

   …………………………...............J. (LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA)

…………………………...............J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

New Delhi, March 31, 2009  

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