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PETITIONER: CHAIRMAN, TAMIL NADU HOUSING BOARD, MADRAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: T.N. GANAPATHY

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/02/1990

BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (J) BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (J) RAMASWAMY, K.

CITATION:  1990 AIR  642            1990 SCR  (1) 272  1990 SCC  (1) 608        JT 1990 (1)   172  1990 SCALE  (1)134

ACT:     Code  of  Civil Procedure, 1908: Order 1 Rule  8  --Suit filed  in representative capacity--Interest to be common  or common grievance to be redressed--Persons need not have same cause of action.

HEADNOTE:     In pursuance of a Housing Scheme the Tamil Nadu  Housing Board,  Madras had allotted residential plots over the  land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, to different groups of  applicants including the low-income group on  terms  and conditions stipulated in the lease deed Exh. B-3 sometime in the  year 1963. After a lapse of more than a decade  of  the allotment,  fresh  demands were made from the  allottees  in 1975.  Objecting to the same, the respondent herein filed  a suit  for  self and on behalf of all the allottees  of  low- income group settled in the Colony named Ashok Nagar,  pray- ing  for a permanent injunction restraining the  Board  from enforcing the demand.     The defendant-Board questioned the very  maintainability of  the suit in a representative capacity and  also  pleaded that it was entitled to finally determine the correct prices for  the plots after taking into account the final award  of the compensation for acquired land and until then the prices were  tentative. The trial court negatived the objection  to the maintainability of the suit but dismissed it on  merits. The  first appellate court confirmed the decree.  On  second appeal,  the High Court reversed the finding on merits.  The High  Court held that it was open to the Board to  determine within a reasonable time what portion of the demand included the excess on account of compensation awarded by the  courts for  acquisition  of  the land and realize  the  same  after serving fresh demand notices. But since the impugned  demand included both the excess amount of compensation as also  the additional  developmental charges injunction was granted  in regard  to  the entire demand as the two  amounts  were  not separately  mentioned. Dismissing the appeal of  the  Board, this Court,     HELD:  The  provisions of Order 1 of Rule  8  have  been included  in the Code in the public interest so as to  avoid multiplicity  of  litigation. The  condition  necessary  for

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application of the provisions is that the 273 persons on whose behalf the suit is being brought must  have the  same interest. In other words either the interest  must be  common or they must have a common grievance  which  they seek to get redressed. [276C-D]     The  Court,  while considering whether leave  under  the Rule should be granted or not, should examine whether  there is sufficient community of interest to justify the  adoption of the procedure provided under the Rule. [276E]     Persons who may be represented in a suit under Order  I, Rule 8 need not have the same cause of action. [277F]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3002  of 1983.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  20.8.1982  of  the Madras High Court in S.A. No. 83 of ’1982.     G. Ramaswamy (N.P.), Mrs. Anjani and K. Ramkumar for the Appellant. P.S. Poti and K.V. Sreekumar for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SHARMA, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of  a suit filed by the respondent in representative capacity  for permanent injunction against the appellant Tamil Nadu  Hous- ing  Board from demanding and collecting from the  allottees any additional amount for settlement of lands with buildings in the colony Ashok Nagar fully described in the plaint.     2. In pursuance of a Housing Scheme the  appellant-Board proceeded  to settle a large number of residential plots  to different  groups of applicants including one  described  as low-income  group.  A  number of  allottees,  including  the plaintiff-respondent, were selected and settlement in  their favour  was  made in 1963.A copy of  the  document  executed separately in respect to the plots is on the record of  this case  as Exh. B-3, setting out the terms and  conditions  of the  lease. The term as mentioned in the 15th clause,  which is  quoted  below, has been referred to by  the  parties  in support of their respective cases: "15. The Lessor agrees to sell the property more particu- 274 larly described in the schedule hereunder to the Lessee  for such  price as the Administrative Officer of the Lessor  may at  any time in his sole discretion fix, and at  which  time the  Administrative  Officer of the Lessor  is  entitled  to consider  details  regarding development  charges,  cost  of amenities, cost of buildings, etc., and whether the price of the  land acquired under the Land Acquisition  Act  together with  suitable modifications thereto by the local  laws  has become  final  by a conclusive adjudication thereon  by  the concerned  Tribunals and Courts. The final decision  of  the Administrative  Officer of the Lessor as to the final  price of  the property as determined under these presents is  con- clusive  and binding on the Lessee and the Lessee agrees  to purchase  the property from the Lessor at the said price  on the terms and conditions hereinafter mentioned.           Excepting the fixation of price with reference  to the  claim or compensation adjudicated or awarded by  courts finally  and conclusively with regard to the lands  acquired under  the  scheme, the Lessor shall fix the  price  of  the property  after  taking into consideration  the  development charges,  cost  of amenities and buildings  etc..  within  a period  of three years from the date of allotment and  which

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price  is  subject only to a revision on account  of  excess compensation  if  any  awarded by courts for  the  lands  as aforesaid." Tentative  price  for the property was fixed, subject  to  a final  determination  within a stipulated period  under  the agreement and the allottees occupied the properties on  that basis.  After  a lapse of more than a decade  fresh  demands were made in 1975 threatening dispossession in case of  non- payment,  which led to the filing of the suit. It is  stated in  the plaint that the cases of all the allottees  in  low- income  group of Ashok Nagar made under the lease deeds  are identical and the plaintiff was representing them in  asking for permanent injunction restraining the Board from  enforc- ing the belated supplementary demands.     3.  Besides,  objecting to the  maintainability  of  the suit,  the defendant-Board pleaded that it was  entitled  in law  to finally determine the correct price for the  settle- ment  of the properties even belatedly, and  the  challenged demands  were perfectly valid. It was stated that  the  land for the scheme had been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, and until the final award of the 275 compensation  for the acquired lands was made, the value  of the  lands was not capable of being ascertained.  The  trial court overruled the technical pleas, but, dismissed the suit on merits. The first appellate court confirmed the decree.     4.  The  plaintiff filed a second appeal to  the  Madras High Court, and the Housing Board a cross-objection  against the  adverse findings. The High Court while  confirming  the maintainability  of the suit reversed the finding on  merits and passed a decree. The impugned demand included the excess compensation  awarded by courts for acquisition of the  land as  also  the  development charges, cost  of  amenities  and buildings,  etc., without splitting up the two demands.  The High  Court held that it was open to the Board to  determine within  a  reasonable time what portion  of  the  additional demand  represented the excess compensation awarded for  the lands and to take steps for its realisation after service of a  demand notice on the allottee, but, granted a decree  for injunction  in  regard to the entire demand at  the  present stage as the two amounts have not been separately mentioned.     5. The learned counsel for the appellant has pressed two points in support of the appeal, namely, the decision of the High  Court  on the merits of the dispute is  erroneous  and that the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of  Civil Procedure  in any event are not applicable to the  case  and the suit, as a representative suit, is not maintainable.     6.  The second paragraph of clause 15 of the lease  deed explicitly  directs the Board to assess the final amount  on account  of the development charges, cost of  amenities  and buildings, etc. within a period of three years from the date of the allotment, and there does not appear to be any reason for construing the provisions differently. The High Court at considerable length considered this aspect, pointing out the unexplained long delay of about a decade after completion of the constructions, etc. on the part of the Board. There  was no  difficulty  at all in making the  final  calculation  in time, and taking steps for recovery of the same. We entirely agree  with the view of the High Court. ’The Court was  also right  in  permitting the Board to make a  fresh  additional demand in regard to the enhancement in the compensation  for the  acquired  lands  and the respondents do  not  have  any objection to that part.     7.  On the question of maintainability of the suit in  a representative capacity under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of

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Civil Procedure, it has been contended that since the injury complained of is in regard to 276 demand  of money and that too by a separate  demand  against each’  of the allottees, giving rise to different causes  of action,  the  Rule 1 has application.  The  learned  counsel proceeded  to say that it is not known whether each  of  the allottees in Ashok Nagar had been even served with an  addi- tional demand before the suit was filed; and further  empha- sised  that those who had been so served are  interested  in defeating only the demand individually referable to each  of them. Each one of them is not interested in what happens  to the  others. It is, therefore, suggested that only  such  of the  allottees who have already been served with  additional demands  are  entitled to maintain an action in  court,  and they  also should do it by filing separate suits. We do  not find any merit in the argument. The provisions of Order 1 of Rule 8 have been included in the Code in the public interest so  as  to avoid multiplicity of litigation.  The  condition necessary  for  application of the provisions  is  that  the persons on whose behalf the suit is being brought must have the  same interest. In other words either the interest  must be  common or they must have a common grievances which  they seek  to  get  redressed. In Kodia Goundar  and  Another  v. Velandi  Goundar  and others, |LR 1955 Madras  339,  a  Full Bench  of the Madras High Court observed that on  the  plain language  of Order 1, Rule 8, the principal  requirement  to bring a suit within that Rule is the sameness of interest of the numerous person on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit  is  instituted. The Court, while  considering  whether leave under the Rule should be granted or not, should  exam- ine  whether  there is sufficient community of  interest  to justify  the  adoption of the procedure provided  under  the Rule.  The  object for which this provision  is  enacted  is really. to facilitate the decision of questions, in which  a large number of persons are interested, without recourse  to the  ordinary  procedure.  The  provision  must,  therefore, receive an interpretation which will subserve the object for its  enactment. There are no words in the Rule to limit  its scope  to any particular category of suits or to  exclude  a suit in regard to a claim for money or for injunction as the present one.     8.  Coming to the relevant circumstances in the  present case it will be seen that all the allotments in Ashok  Nagar were  made under the same Scheme and all the relevant  facts are  common. The basis of the impugned demand of the  appel- lant is equally applicable to all the allottees and the plea of  the  plaintiff is available to all of  them.  The  trial court  was,  therefore, perfectly right  in  permitting  the plaintiff  to proceed under Order 1, Rule 8 of the  Code  of Civil  Procedure. Nobody in this situation can  complain  of any  inconvenience  or  injustice. On the  other  hand,  the appellant is being saved from being 277 involved in unnecessary repeated litigation.     9.  It is true that each of the allottees is  interested individually  in fighting out the demand separately made  or going to be made on him and, thus, separate causes of action arise  in the case, but, that does not make Order 1. Rule  8 inapplicable.  Earlier there was some doubt about  the  Rule covering  such  a  case which now stands  clarified  by  the Explanation  introduced  by  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, which reads as follows: "Explanation--For  the  purpose of determining  whether  the persons who sue or are sued, or defend, have the same inter-

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est in one suit, it is not necessary to establish that  such persons  have  the same cause of action as  the  persons  on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, they sue or are sued, or defend the suit, as the case may be." The objects and reasons for the amendment were stated below: "OBJECTS AND REASONS: Clause  55;  sub-clause (iv),--Rule  8 of Order 1 deals with representative suits. Under this rule, where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one  suit, one or more of them may, with the  permission  of the  Court,  sue or be sued, on behalf of all of  them.  The rule has created a doubt as to whether the party  represent- ing  others  should  have the same cause of  action  as  the persons represented by him. The rule is being substituted by a new rule and an explanation is being added to clarify that such persons need not have the same cause of action." There  is, therefore, no doubt that the persons who  may  be represented  in a suit under Order 1, Rule 8 need  not  have the  same  cause of action. The trial court in  the  present case was right in permitting the respondent to sue on behalf of  all the allottees of Ashok Nagar. We, therefore, do  not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs. Before closing, however, we would like to point out that the plaintiff has represented only those in the low income group in  Ashok Nagar who will be governed by this  judgment,  and nothing  what has been said or decided in this case  is  ap- plicable to any other group or colony. R.N.J.                                    Appeal dismissed. 278