26 November 2010
Supreme Court
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CEN.PUB.INFORMATION OFFICER,SCI . Vs SUBHASH CHANDRA AGARWAL

Bench: B. SUDERSHAN REDDY,SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-010044-010044 / 2010
Diary number: 36624 / 2009
Advocates: B. KRISHNA PRASAD Vs PRASHANT BHUSHAN


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  10044   OF 2010 ARISING OUT OF

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 32855 OF 2009

CENTRAL PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA … APPELLANT

VERSUS

SUBHASH CHANDRA AGRAWAL … RESPONDENT

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10045  OF 2010 ARISING OUT OF

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 32856 OF 2009

CENTRAL PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA & ANR. … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

SUBHASH CHANDRA AGRAWAL … RESPONDENT

WITH

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2683 OF 2010

SECRETARY GENERAL, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA … APPELLANT

VERSUS

SUBHASH CHANDRA AGRAWAL … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.

Special Leave Petition (c) Nos. 32855 of 2009

1. Leave granted.

2.  This appeal is directed against the impugned order dated  

24th November,  2009  passed by the  Central  Information  

Commission (CIC) whereby and whereunder the CIC having  

allowed the appeal preferred by Subhash Chandra Agrawal,  

respondent herein, directed the Central Public Information  

Officer  (CPIO),  Supreme  Court  of  India  to  furnish  

information as sought by him.  

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3. The respondent Subhash Chandra Agarwal requested the  

CPIO, Supreme Court of India to arrange to send him a  

copy  of  “complete  file/s  (only  as  available  in  Supreme  

Court)  inclusive  of  copies  of  complete  correspondence  

exchanged  between  concerned  constitutional  authorities  

with file notings relating to said appointment of Mr. Justice  

HL Dattu, Mr. Justice AK Ganguly and Mr. Justice RM Lodha  

superseding seniority of Mr. Justice P Shah, Mr. Justice AK  

Patnaik and Mr. Justice VK Gupta as allegedly objected to  

Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) also”. He further requested  

the  CPIO  not  to  invoke  Section  6(3)  of  the  Right  to  

Information Act (for short ‘the Act’).

4. The CPIO, Supreme Court of India promptly replied to the  

application so filed under the said Act duly informing the  

respondent  that  the  Registry  does  not  deal  with  the  

matters pertaining to the appointment of Hon’ble Judges of  

the  Supreme  Court  of  India.  Appointments  of  Hon’ble  

Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts are made by  

the President of India as per the procedure prescribed by  

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law and the matters relating thereto are not dealt with and  

handled by the Registry of the Supreme Court of India. The  

CPIO  accordingly  informed  the  respondent  that  the  

information  sought  by  him  is  “neither  maintained  nor  

available in the Registry”.

5. The respondent Subhash Chandra Agrawal preferred appeal  

before  the  appellate  authority  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  

India  challenging the said  order.  The appellate  authority  

dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the CPIO.  

Thereafter,  the  respondent  preferred  a  further  appeal  

before the CIC purported it to be under Section 19 of the  

Act.  The CIC having set  aside the orders passed by the  

authorities,  directed the CPIO, Supreme Court  to furnish  

the information sought by the respondent. It is that order  

which is under challenge before us.

6. The CIC mainly relied upon the order passed by the learned  

Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition No.  

288  of  2009  titled  Central  Public  Information  Officer,  

Supreme Court of India Vs. Subhash Chandra Agarwal. Of  

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course, the CIC also relied on the decision of this Court in  

S.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India1.  

7. The learned Attorney General  appearing on behalf of the  

appellants while placing strong reliance upon the decision  

of  this  Court  in  Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record  

Association Vs. Union of India2 inter alia submitted that  

the ratio of the decision in S.P. Gupta (supra) is required  

to  be  understood  and  appreciated  in  the  light  of  the  

observations  made  by  this  Court  in  Supreme  Court  

Advocates-on-Record  Association  inasmuch  as  

S.P.Gupta’s case has been explained by the larger Bench.  

The  submission  was  that  disclosure  of  the  information  

sought for by the respondent cannot be furnished in public  

interest. It is in the public interest to keep the appointment  

and  transfer  from “needless  intrusions  by  strangers  and  

busybodies  in  the  functioning  of  the  judiciary”.  Learned  

Attorney General placed particular reliance on the following  

paragraph of the said decision.

1  (1981) Supp SCC 87 2 (1993) 4 SCC 441

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“This  is  also  in  accord  with  the  public  interest  of  excluding  these  appointments  and  transfers  from  litigative  debate,  to  avoid  any  erosion  in  the  credibility of the decisions and to ensure a free and  frank  expression  of  honest  opinion  by  all  the  constitutional  functionaries,  which  is  essential  for  effective  consultation  and  for  taking  the  right  decision. The growing tendency of needless intrusion  by strangers and busybodies in the functioning of the  judiciary under the garb of public interest litigation…”

8. It was further submitted that the appointment of Judges is  

essentially a discharge of constitutional trust as laid down  

by this Court in  Subhash Sharms Vs. Union of India3.  

The submission was that the information made available to  

the  Chief  Justice  of  India  in  respect  of  appointment  of  

Judges of the High Court and as well as the Supreme Court  

is  held  by  him  in  trust  and  in  fiduciary  capacity.  This  

submission  of  the  learned  Attorney  General  received  

considerable support from the various High Courts of the  

country except the High Court of Guwahati  as is evident  

from their response filed pursuant to the notices issued by  

this Court.

3 (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 574

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9. The  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  Mr.  Prashant  

Bhushan placed heavy reliance on paragraphs 83, 84 and  

85 of the decision of this Court in S.P. Gupta.  

10.That on a holistic reading of the said judgment, it appears  

to us that the Court was mainly dealing with the question  

as  to  whether  any  immunity  could  be  claimed  from  

production of the records in respect of the correspondence  

between the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India and  

the  relevant  notings  made  by  them  in  regard  to  the  

transfer of a High Court Judge including the Chief Justices  

of  the  High  Court  which  were  extremely  material  for  

deciding whether there was full and effective consultation?  

It  is  observed  at  more  than  one  place  that  the  non-

disclosure of the said documents would seriously handicap  

the petitioner therein in showing that there was no full and  

effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India or that  

the transfer was by way of punishment and not in public  

interest. It is observed:

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“It  would  become  almost  impossible  for  the  petitioner, without the aid of these documents, to  establish his case, even if it be true.”  

The  Court  felt  that  “all  relevant  documents  should  be  

produced before the court  so that the full  facts may come  

before  the  people,  who  in  a  democracy  are  the  ultimate  

arbiters”. The Court further observed : “We do not see any  

reason why, if the correspondence between the Law Minister,  

the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of  

India  and  the  relevant  notes  made  by  them,  in  regard  to  

discontinuance  of  an  Additional  Judge  are  relevant  to  the  

issues  arising  in  a  judicial  proceeding,  they  should  not  be  

disclosed.  …  Where  it  becomes  relevant  in  a  judicial  

proceeding, why should the Court and the opposite party and  

through them, the people not know what are the reasons for  

which  a  particular  appointment  is  made  or  a  particular  

Additional  Judge  is  discontinued  or  a  particular  transfer  is  

effected.  We fail  to  see  what  harm can be caused by the  

disclosure  of  true  facts  when  they  become  relevant  in  a  

judicial proceeding”.

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11.Whether the said decision would be applicable when such  

information is sought under the provisions of the Right to  

Information Act is an important question that is required to  

be gone into.

12.Having  heard  the  learned  Attorney  General  and  the  

learned  counsel  for  the  respondent,  we  are  of  the  

considered opinion that a substantial question of law as to  

the  interpretation  of  the  Constitution  is  involved  in  the  

present  case  which  is  required  to  be  heard  by  a  

Constitution  Bench.  The  case  on  hand  raises  important  

questions  of  constitutional  importance  relating  to  the  

position  of  Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice  of  India  under  the  

Constitution and the independence of the Judiciary in the  

scheme of the Constitution on the one hand and on the  

other,  fundamental  right  to  freedom  of  speech  and  

expression. Right to information is an integral part of the  

fundamental  right  to  freedom of  speech  and  expression  

guaranteed by the Constitution. Right to Information Act  

merely  recognizes  the  constitutional  right  of  citizens  to  

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freedom  of  speech  and  expression.  Independence  of  

Judiciary forms part of basic structure of the Constitution of  

India. The independence of Judiciary and the fundamental  

right to free speech and expression are of a great value  

and both of them are required to be balanced.

13.The  Constitution  is  fundamentally  a  public  text—the  

monumental character of a Government and the people—

and Supreme Court is required to apply it to resolve public  

controversies. For, from our beginnings, a most important  

consequence of the constitutionally  created separation of  

powers has been the Indian habit, extraordinary to other  

democracies, of casting social, economic, philosophical and  

political questions in the form of public law remedies, in an  

attempt  to  secure  ultimate  resolution  by  the  Supreme  

Court.  In  this  way,  important  aspects  of  the  most  

fundamental  issues  confronting  our  democracy  finally  

arrive in the Supreme Court for judicial determination. Not  

infrequently,  these  are  the  issues  upon  which  

contemporary society is most deeply divided. They arouse  

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our  deepest  emotions.  This  is  one  such  controversy.  

William  J.  Bennan,  Jr.  in  one  of  his  public  discourse  

observed:

“We current Justices read the Constitution in the  only  way  that  we  can:  as  twentieth-century  Americans.  We look to the history of the time of  framing  and  to  the  intervening  history  of  interpretation.  But the ultimate question must be,  what do the words of the text mean in our time?  For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any  static meaning it might have had in a world that is  dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great  principles  to  cope  with  current  problems  and  current  needs.  What  the  constitutional  fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times  cannot be the measure to the vision of our time.  Similarly, what those fundamentals mean for us,  our descendants will learn, cannot be the measure  to the vision of their time. This realization is not, I  assure  you,  a  novel  one  of  my  own  creation.  Permit me to quote from one of the opinions of  our Court, Weems V. United States, 217 U.S. 349,  written nearly a century ago:

“Time  works  changes,  brings  into  existence new conditions and purposes.  Therefore,  a principle  to be vital  must  be capable of wider application than the  mischief  which  gave  it  birth.  This  is  peculiarly true of constitutions. They are  not ephemeral enactments, designed to  meet  passing  occasions.  They  are,  to  use  the  words  of  Chief  Justice  John  Marshall,  “designed  to  approach  immortality  as  nearly  as  human  

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institutions can approach it.” The future  is their care and provision for events of  good  and  bad  tendencies  of  which  no  prophesy  can  be  made.  In  the  application of  a constitution,  therefore,  our  contemplation  cannot  be  only  of  what has been, but of what may be.”

14.The  current  debate  is  a  sign  of  a  healthy  nation.  This  

debate on the Constitution involves great and fundamental  

issues.  Most of  the times we reel  under the pressure of  

precedents.  We look to the history of the time of framing  

and  to  the  intervening  history  of  interpretation.  But  the  

ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text  

mean in our time?  

15.Following  substantial  questions  of  law  as  to  the  

interpretation of the Constitution arise for consideration:

1. Whether the concept of independence of judiciary requires  

and  demands  the  prohibition  of  furnishing  of  the  

information  sought?  Whether  the  information  sought  for  

amounts to interference in the functioning of the judiciary?

2. Whether the information sought for cannot be furnished to  

avoid any erosion in the credibility of the decisions and to  

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ensure a free and frank expression of honest opinion by all  

the  constitutional  functionaries,  which  is  essential  for  

effective consultation and for taking the right decision?

3. Whether  the  information  sought  for  is  exempt  under  

Section 8(i)(j) of the Right to Information Act?

16.The  above  questions  involve  the  interpretation  of  the  

Constitution raise great and fundamental issues.

17.For the aforesaid reasons, we direct the Registry to place  

this  matter  before Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice  of  India  for  

constitution  of  a  Bench  of  appropriate  strength.  Let  the  

papers  be  accordingly  placed  before  Hon’ble  the  Chief  

Justice of India.

18.Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 32856 of 2009   

Leave  granted.  Tag  with  Civil  Appeal  arising  out  of  

S.L.P.(c) No. 32855 of 2009.

19.Civil Appeal No. 2683 of 2010   

Tag with Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P.(c) No. 32855  

of 2009.

……………………………………………………J. (B. SUDERSHAN REDDY)

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NEW DELHI,                   …………………………………………………….J. NOVEMBER 26, 2010      (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)

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