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PETITIONER: C. RAVICHANDRAN IYER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JUSTICE A.M. BHATTACHARJEE & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/09/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1995 SCC  (5) 457        JT 1995 (6)   339  1995 SCALE  (5)142

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T K. Ramaswamy, J.      The petitioner,  a practising  advocate, has  initiated the public  interest litigation  under  Article  32  of  the Constitution seeking  to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction  restraining   permanently  the   Bar  Council  of Maharashtra and Goa [BCMG], Bombay Bar Association [BBA] and the  Advocates’   Association  of   Western  India   [AAWI], respondents 2  to  4  respectively,  coercing  Justice  A.M. Bhattacharjee [the  1st respondent]. Chief Justice of Bombay High Court,  to resign  from the  office as  Judge. He  also sought  an   investigation  by   the   Central   Bureau   of investigation  etc.   [respondents  8   to  10]   into   the allegations made  against the 1st respondent and if the same are found  true, to  direct the  5th respondent, Speaker Lok Sabha to  initiate action  for his removal under Article 124 (4) and  (5) read  with Article  218 of  the Constitution of India and Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 [for short, ‘the Act’]. This Court  on March 24, 1995 issued notice to respondents 2 to 4  only and  rejected the prayer for interim direction to the President of India and the Union of India [respondents 6 and 7 respectively] not to give effect to the resignation by the 1st  respondent. We  have  also  issued  notice  to  the Attorney General  for India and the President of the Supreme Court Bar  Association [SCBA].  The  BBA  filed  a  counter- affidavit  through   its  President,  Sri  Iqbal  Mahomedali Chagla. Though  respondents 2  and 4 are represented through counsel, they  did not  file any counter-affidavit. The SCBA informed the  Court that  its newly  elected office  bearers required time  to take  a decision  on the stand to be taken and we directed them to file their written submissions. Shri F.S. Nariman,  learned senior  counsel appeared  for the BBA and Shri  Harish N.  Salve, learned senior counsel, appeared for AAWI,  the 4th  respondent. The learned Attorney General also assisted  the  Court.  We  place  on  record  our  deep

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appreciation for their valuable assistance.      The SCBA,  instead of filing written submissions sent a note with  proposals to  reopen the case; to issue notice to all the Bar Associations in the country and refer the matter to a  Bench of  not less than five, preferably seven, Judges for decision after hearing them all. We do not think that it is necessary to accede to this suggestion.      The petitioner in a well-documented petition stated and argued with  commitment that  the news  published in various national newspapers  do prove  that respondents  2 to  4 had pressurised the  1st respondent to resign from the office as Judge  for   his  alleged   misbehaviour.  The  Constitution provides for  independence  of  the  Judges  of  the  higher courts, i.e., the Supreme Court and the High Courts. It also lays down  in proviso  [a] to  clause (2) of Article 124; so too in  Article 217  (1) proviso  (a) and  Article 124  (4), procedure for  voluntary resignation  by a Judge, as well as for compulsory  removal, respectively  from  office  in  the manner prescribed therein and in accordance with the Act and the Rules  made thereunder.  The acts  and  actions  of  the respondents 2  to 4  are unknown  to law,  i.e., removal  by forced resignation,  which is  not only unconstitutional but also deleterious  to the  independence of the judiciary. The accusations  against   the  1st  respondent  without  proper investigation by  an independent agency seriously damage the image of judiciary and efficacy of judicial adjudication and thereby undermine  credibility of  the judicial  institution itself. Judges  are not  to be  judged by  the Bar. Allowing adoption of  such  demands  by  collective  pressure  rudely shakes the confidence and competence of judges of integrity, ability, moral  vigour and  ethical firmness, which in turn, sadly destroys  the very  foundation of  democratic  polity. Therefore, the  pressure tactics  by the  Bar requires to be nibbed in  the bud.  He, therefore,  vehemently  argued  and requested the  Court to  adopt such  procedure  which  would safeguard the  independence of the judiciary and protect the judges from  pressure through  unconstitutional  methods  to demit the office.      Shri Chagla in his affidavit and Shri Nariman appearing for the  BBA explained the circumstances that led the BBA to pass the  resolution requesting  the 1st respondent to demit his office as a Judge in the interest of the institution. It is stated  in the  affidavit that though initially he had in his custody  the documents  to show  that the 1st respondent had negotiated  with Mr.  S.S. Musafir,  Chief Executive  of Roebuck Publishing,  London and  the acceptance  by the  1st respondent  for  publication  and  sale  abroad  of  a  book authored by him, viz., "Muslim Law and the Constitution" for two years  at a  royalty of  US$80,000 [Eighty thousand U.S. Dollars]  and  an  inconclusive  negotiation  for  US$75,000 [Seventy five thousand U.S. Dollars] for overseas publishing rights of  his book  "Hindu Law  and the  Constitution" [2nd Edn.],  he   did  not   divulge  the  information  but  kept confidential. From  about late  1994, there was considerable agitation amongst  the members  of respondents  3 and 4 that certain persons  whose names  were known to all and who were seen in  the court  and were being openly talked about, were bringing  influence   over  the  1st  respondent  and  could "influence the  course of  judgments  of  the  former  Chief Justice of  Bombay". "The names of such persons though known are not  being mentioned here since the former Chief Justice of Bombay  has resigned  as Chief  Justice and  Judge of the Bombay High  Court". It  was also  rumoured that "the former Chief Justice  of Bombay  has been paid a large sum of money in foreign  exchange  purportedly  as  royalty  for  a  book

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written by him, viz., "Muslim Law and the Constitution". The amount of royalty appeared to be totally disproportionate to what a  publisher abroad would be willing to pay for foreign publication of  a book  which might  be of academic interest within India  [since the  book was  a dissertation of Muslim Law in  relation to  the Constitution of India]. There was a growing suspicion at the Bar that the amount might have been paid for  reasons other  than  the  ostensible  reason".  He further stated that the 1st respondent himself had discussed with the  Advocate General  on February  14, 1995 impressing upon the  latter that  the Chief  Justice  "had  decided  to proceed on  leave from  the end of February and would resign in April 1995". The Advocate General had conveyed it to Shri Chagla and  other members of the Bar. By then, the financial dealings referred  to above were neither known to the public nor found mention in the press reports. Suddenly on February 19, 1995,  the advocates  found to  their surprise  a  press interview published  in Times  of India  said to  have  been given by  the  1st  respondent  stating  that  "he  had  not seriously checked  the antecedents  of the publishers and it was possible  that he  had made  a mistake  in accepting the offer". He  was not contemplating to resign from judgship at that stage  and was  merely going on medical leave for which he had  already applied for and was granted. The BCMG passed a resolution  on  February  19,  1995  seeking  "resignation forthwith" of  the 1st respondent. On February 21, 1995, the BBA received  a requisition  for holding  its  General  Body meeting to  discuss the financial dealings said to have been had by  the 1st  respondent "for  a purpose  other than  the ostensible purpose thereby raising a serious doubt as to the integrity of the Chief Justice" The meeting was scheduled to be held  at 2.15  p.m. on  February 22, 1995 as per its bye- laws. The 1st respondent appears to have rung up Shri Chagla in  the  evening  on  February  21,  1995  but  he  was  not available. Pursuant  to a  contact by  Shri W.Y.  Yande, the President of  AAWI, at  the desire  of Chief Justice to meet him, Shri  Chagla and  Shri Yande  met the 1st respondent at his  residence   at  10.00  a.m.  in  the  presence  of  two Secretaries of  the 1st  respondent, who stated thus to Shri Chagla as put in his affidavit :      "...The Bar  Council of  Maharashtra and      Goa had  already shot  an arrow and that      the wound  was still fresh and requested      me to  ensure that  he would not be hurt      any  further  by  a  resolution  of  the      Bombay   Bar    Association.   The   1st      respondent  informed   me  that  he  had      already agreed  to resign  and  in  fact      called for  and showed me a letter dated      17th February,  1995 addressed by him to      the  Honourable  the  Chief  Justice  of      India in  which he  proposed  to  go  on      medical leave  for a  month and  that at      the end  of the leave or even earlier he      proposed to tender his resignation".      They had  reminded the  1st respondent of the assurance given to  the Advocate  General  expressing  his  desire  to resign and  he conveyed  his personal  inconveniences to  be encountered etc.  The 1st  respondent assured  them that  he would "resign  within a  week  which  resignation  would  be effective some  10 or  15 days  thereafter and  that in  the meanwhile he  would  not  do  any  judicial  work  including delivery of  any judgment". Shri Chagla appears to have told the  1st  respondent  that  though  he  would  not  give  an assurance, he  would request  the members of the Association

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to postpone the meeting and he had seen that the meeting was adjourned to  5.00 p.m.  of March  1, 1995. On enquiry being made on  March 1,  1995 from  the Principal Secretary to the 1st respondent  whether the  1st respondent had tendered his resignation, it  was replied  in negative  which showed that the 1st  respondent had  not kept his promise. Consequently, after full  discussion, for  and  against,  an  overwhelming majority of 185 out of 207 permanent members resolved in the meeting held  on March  1, 1995  at 5.00  p.m. demanding the resignation of the 1st respondent.      Since the  1st respondent  has  already  resigned,  the question is  whether a  Bar Council  or Bar  Association  is entitled to  pass resolution  demanding a  judge to  resign, what is  its effect on the independence of the judiciary and whether it  is constitutionally  permissible.  Shri  Nariman contended that  the Supreme Court and the High Court are two independent constitutional institutions. A High Court is not subordinate to the Supreme Court though constitutionally the Supreme Court  has  the  power  to  hear  appeals  from  the decisions or  orders or  judgments of the High Courts or any Tribunal or  quasi-judicial authority  in the  country.  The Judges and  the Chief  Justice  of  a  High  Court  are  not subordinate   to   the   Chief   Justice   of   India.   The constitutional process  of removal of a Judge as provided in Article 124  (4) of  the Constitution  is  only  for  proved misbehaviour   or   incapacity.   The   recent   impeachment proceedings against Justice V. Ramaswami and its fall-out do indicate that  the process  of impeachment is cumbersome and the result  uncertain. Unless  corrective  steps  are  taken against judges  whose conduct  is perceived by the Bar to be detrimental to  the independence  of the  judiciary,  people would lose  faith in  the efficacy  of judicial process. Bar being  a   collective  voice  of  the  court  concerned  has responsibility and owes duty to maintain independence of the judiciary. It is its obligation to bring it to the notice of the Judge concerned the perceived misbehaviour or incapacity and if  it is  not voluntarily  corrected they  have to take appropriate measures  to have it corrected. Bar is not aware of any other procedure than the one under Article 124 (4) of the Constitution,  and the  Act. Therefore, the BBA, instead of proceeding  to the  press, adopted  democratic process to pass the  resolution, in  accordance with its bye-laws, when all attempts  made by it proved abortive. The conduct of the Judge   betrayed   their   confidence   in   his   voluntary resignation. Consequently,  the BBA  was constrained to pass the said  resolution. Thereby  it had  not transgressed  its limits. Its action is in consonance with its bye-laws and in the  best   tradition  to   maintain  independence   of  the judiciary. Shri  Nariman also  cited the  instance  of  non- assignment of  work to  four Judges of the Bombay High Court by  its  former  Chief  Justice  when  some  allegations  of misbehaviour were  imputed to  them by the Bar. He, however, submitted that  in the  present case  the  allegations  were against the Chief Justice himself, and so, he could not have been approached.  He urged  that if some guidelines could be laid down  by this  Court in  such cases,  the same would be welcomed.      The counsel  appearing for the BCMG, who stated that he is its member, submitted that when the Bar believes that the Chief Justice  has committed  misconduct, as an elected body it is  its duty  to pass  a resolution after full discussion demanding the Judge to act in defence of independence of the judiciary by demitting his office.      Shri Salve argued that independence of the judiciary is paramount. Judges  should not  be kept  under pressure. Such

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procedure which  would be conducive to maintain independence of the  judiciary and at the same time would nib the evil in the bud,  needs to  be adopted. The tendencies of unbecoming conduct on  the part  of  erring  Judges  would  betray  the confidence of  the litigant  public in  the efficacy  of the judicial process.  In the  light of the previous experience, it is  for the  Court  to  evolve  a  simple  and  effective procedure to meet the exigencies.      The  learned   Attorney  General   contended  that  any resolution passed  by any  Bar  Association  tantamounts  to scandalising the  court entailing  contempt of the court. It cannot coerce  the Judge  to resign. The pressure brought by the  Chief   Justice  of  India  upon  the  Judge  would  be constitutional but it should be left to the Chief Justice of India to  impress upon  the  erring  Judge  to  correct  his conduct. This  procedure would  yield salutary  effect.  The Chief Justice  of India  would adopt  such procedure  as  is appropriate to  the situation.  He cited the advice tendered by Lord  Chancellor of  England to  Lord Denning,  when  the latter was  involved in  the controversy over his writing on the jury  trial and  the composition of the black members of the jury, to demit the office, which he did in grace. Rule of  Law and  Judicial Independence  - Why  need  to  be preserved?      The diverse  contentions  give  rise  to  the  question whether any  Bar Council or Bar Association has the right to pass resolution  against the conduct of a Judge perceived to have committed  misbehaviour and,  if so, what is its effect on independence  of the judiciary. With a view to appreciate the contentions in their proper perspective, it is necessary to have  at the  back of  our mind  the  importance  of  the independence of  the judiciary.  In a  democracy governed by rule  of   law  under  written  Constitution,  judiciary  is sentinel on  the qui  vive to protect the fundamental rights and to poise even scales of justice between the citizens and the State  or the  States inter se. Rule of law and judicial review are  basic  features  of  the  Constitution.  As  its integral  constitutional   structure,  independence  of  the judiciary is  an essential attribute of rule of law. In S.P. Gupta vs.  Union of India [(1981) Supp. SCC 87] in paragraph 27, this  Court held  that if  there is  one principle which runs through the entire fabric of the Constitution it is the principle of  the rule of law, and under the Constitution it is the judiciary which is entrusted with the task of keeping every organ  of the  State within  the limits of the law and thereby making  the rule  of law  meaningful and  effective. Judicial review  is one  of the  most potent  weapons in the armoury of  law. The  judiciary seeks to protect the citizen against violation  of his  constitutional or legal rights or misuse or  abuse of  power by the State or its officers. The judiciary stands  between the  citizen and  the State  as  a bulwark against  executive excesses  and misuse  or abuse of power  by   the  executive.  It  is,  therefore,  absolutely essential that  the judiciary  must be  free from  executive pressure or  influence which  has  been  secured  by  making elaborate provisions  in the  Constitution with details. The independence  of  judiciary  is  not  limited  only  to  the independence from the executive pressure or influence; it is a wider  concept which  takes within  its sweep independence from  any   other  pressure  and  prejudices.  It  has  many dimensions,  viz.,  fearlessness  of  other  power  centers, economic or  political, and freedom from prejudices acquired and nourished by the class to which the judges belong. Judicial individualism - whether needs protection?      Independent judiciary  is,  therefore,  most  essential

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when liberty  of citizen  is in  danger. It then becomes the duty of the judiciary to poise the scales of justice unmoved by the  powers (actual  or  perceived)  undisturbed  by  the clamour of the multitude. The heart of judicial independence is  judicial   individualism.  The   judiciary  is   not   a disembodied abstraction.  It is  composed of  individual men and  women   who  work  primarily  on  their  own.  Judicial individualism, in  the language  of Justice  Powell  of  the Supreme Court  of  United  States  in  his  address  to  the American Bar  Association, Labour  Law Section on August 11, 1976, is  "perhaps one  of the  last citadels  of  jealously preserved  individualism....".   Justice  Douglas   in   his dissenting  opinion  in  Stephen  S.  Chandler  v.  Judicial Council of  the Tenth  Circuit of  the United States [398 US 74:26 L.Ed. 2d 100] stated:      "No  matter  how  strong  an  individual      judge’s spine,  the threat of punishment      -  the   greatest  peril   to   judicial      independence -  would project  as dark a      shadow   whether   cast   by   political      strangers or  by judicial  colleagues. A      federal judge  must  be  independent  of      every other  judge... Neither  one alone      nor any  number banded  together can act      as censor and place sanctions on him. It      is vital  to preserve  the opportunities      for judicial individualism."      He further  opined  that  to  give  the  administrative officer any  supervision or  control over  the  exercise  of purely judicial  function  would  be  to  destroy  the  very fundamentals of  the theory  of government.  An  independent judiciary   is    one   of    the    nation’s    outstanding characteristics. Once  a federal  judge is  confirmed by the Senate and  takes his oath, he is independent of every other judge. He  commonly works  with other federal judges who are likewise sovereign.  But neither  one alone  nor any  number banded together  can act  as censor  and place  sanctions on him. Under  the Constitution  the only  leverage that can be asserted against  him is  impeachment, where  pursuant to  a resolution passed  by the  House, he is tried by the Senate, sitting  as  a  jury.  The  tradition  even  bars  political impeachments  as  evidenced  by  the  highly  partisan,  but unsuccessful, effort to oust Justice Samuel of that Court in 1805.... There  is no  power under  the Constitution for one group of  federal judges  to censor any federal judge and no power to  declare him inefficient and strip him of his power to act  as a  judge. At  page 139 it was further pointed out that it  is time  that an  end be  put to  these efforts  of federal judges to ride herd on other federal judges. This is a form  of ‘hazing’  having no place under the Constitution. Federal Judges  are entitled, like other people, to the full freedom of  the First  Amendment. If  they break a law, they can be prosecuted. If they become corrupt or sit in cases in which they  have a  personal or  family stake,  they can  be impeached by Congress. But I search the Constitution in vain for any  power of  surveillance which  other federal  judges have over  those aberrations. Some judges may be displeasing to those  who walk in more measured, conservative steps. But those idiosyncrasies  can be  of no  possible constitutional concern to other federal judges. It is time to put an end to the monstrous practices that seem about to overtake us....".      In Chandler, a United States District Judge had filed a motion for  leave to  file a petition for a writ of mandamus or alternatively  a writ  of prohibition  addressed  to  the Judicial Council  of the  Tenth Circuit. His petition sought

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resolution of  questions  of  first  impression  concerning, inter alia, the scope and constitutionality of the powers of the Judicial  Councils under  28 USC  88 137  and 6 332. The Judicial Council  of each  federal  circuit  is  under  that statute, composed  of  the  active  circuit  judges  of  the circuit. Petitioner  asked the Court to issue an order under the All  Writs Act  telling the  Council to "cease acting in violation of its powers and in violation of Judge Chandler’s rights as a federal judge and an American citizen". Majority held that  in essence,  petitioner challenged  all orders of the Judicial  Council relating to assignment of cases in the Western District  of Oklahoma  and fixing  conditions on the exercise  of   his  constitutional   powers  as   a   Judge. Specifically, petitioner  urged that the Council has usurped the impeachment  power, committed by the Constitution to the Congress  exclusively.  While  conceding  that  the  invoked statute conferred  some  powers  on  the  Judicial  Council, petitioner  contended  that  the  legitimate  administrative purposes to which it may be turned, do not include stripping a judge  of his  judicial functions as, he claimed, was done there. No writ was issued.      The arch of the Constitution of India pregnant from its Preamble, Chapter  III [Fundamental  Rights] and  Chapter IV [Directive Principles] is to establish an egalitarian social order  guaranteeing   fundamental  freedoms  and  to  secure justice -  social, economic and political - to every citizen through rule of law. Existing social inequalities need to be removed and  equality in  fact is  accorded  to  all  people irrespective  of  caste,  creed,  sex,  religion  or  region subject to  protective discrimination  only through  rule of law. The  Judge cannot  retain his  earlier passive judicial rule when  he administers  the law under the Constitution to give effect  to the constitutional ideals. The extraordinary complexity of  modern litigation  requires him not merely to declare the  rights of citizens but also to mould the relief warranted under  given facts  and  circumstances  and  often command the executive and other agencies to enforce and give effect to  the order,  writ or direction or prohibit them to do  unconstitutional   acts.  In  this  ongoing  complex  of adjudicatory process, the role of the Judge is not merely to interpret the  law but  also to  lay new norms of law and to mould the  law to  suit the  changing  social  and  economic scenario to  make the  ideals enshrined  in the Constitution meaningful and  reality. Therefore, the Judge is required to take  judicial   notice   of   the   social   and   economic ramification, consistent  with the  theory of  law. Thereby, the society  demands active  judicial roles  which  formerly were considered  exceptional but  now a  routine. The  Judge must act independently, if he is to perform the functions as expected of  him and he must feel secure that such action of him will  not lead  to his own downfall. The independence is not assured for the Judge but to the judged. Independence to the Judge,  therefore, would  be both  essential and proper. Considered  judgment   of  the  court  would  guarantee  the Constitutional liberties  which  would  thrive  only  in  an atmosphere of  judicial independence. Every endeavour should be made  to preserve  independent judiciary  as a citadel of public  justice   and  public   security   to   fulfil   the constitutional role assigned to the Judges.      The founding  fathers  of  the  Constitution  advisedly adopted cumbersome  process of  impeachment  as  a  mode  to remove a  Judge from  office for only proved misbehaviour or incapacity which  implies that  impeachment process  is  not available for  minor  abrasive  behaviour  of  a  Judge.  It reinforces that  independence to  the Judge  is of paramount

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importance to  sustain, strengthen and elongate rule of law. Parliament sparingly resorts to the mechanism of impeachment designed under  the Constitution by political process as the extreme measure  only upon  a finding of proved misbehaviour or incapacity  recorded by  a  committee  constituted  under Section 3  of the  Act by way of address to the President in the manner  laid down  in Article  124 (4)  and (5)  of  the Constitution, the Act and the Rules made thereunder.      In all  common law  jurisdictions, removal  by  way  of impeachment  is  the  accepted  norm  for  serious  acts  of judicial misconduct committed by a Judge. Removal of a Judge by impeachment  was designed  to produce as little damage as possible to  judicial independence, public confidence in the efficacy of  judicial process  and to  maintain authority of courts for its effective operation.      In United  States, the  Judges appointed  under Article III of  the American  Constitution could  be removed only by impeachment  by  the  Congress.  The  Congress  enacted  the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of  1980 [the  1980 Act]  by which  Judicial Council was explicitly  empowered   to  receive   complaints  about  the judicial  conduct   "prejudicial  to   the   effective   and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or alleging that  such a  judge  or  magistrate  is  unable  to discharge all  the duties  of office  by reason of mental or physical disability".      Jeffrey  N.  Barr  and  Thomas  E.  Willging  conducted research on  the administration of the 1980 Act and in their two research  volumes, they  concluded that  "several  chief judges view  the Act as remedial legislation designed not to punish judges  but to correct aberrant behaviour and provide opportunity for  corrective action  as a  central feature of the Act".  From 1980 to 1992, 2388 complaints were filed. 95 per cent  thereof resulted in dismissal. 1.7 per cent of the complaints  ended   in  either  dismissal  from  service  or corrective action  of reprimands  - two of public reprimands and one  of private  reprimand. Two  cases were  reported to Judicial Conference by the judicial councils certifying that the grounds might exist for impeachment.      Our Constitution permits removal of the Judge only when the motion  was carried  out with requisite majority of both the Houses  of the  Parliament recommending to the President for removal.  In other  words,  the  Constitution  does  not permit any action by any agency other than the initiation of the action  under Article  124(4) by the Parliament. In Sub- Committee on  Judicial Accountability  etc. etc. v. Union of India &  Ors. etc.  [(1991) Supp.  2 SCR,  1], this Court at page 54  held that the removal of a Judge culminating in the presentation of an address by different Houses of Parliament to the  President, is  committed to the Parliament alone and no initiation  of any  investigation is possible without the initiative being  taken by the Houses themselves. At page 71 it was further held that the constitutional scheme envisages removal of  a Judge on proved misbehaviour or incapacity and the conduct  of the  Judge was prohibited to be discussed in the Parliament  by Article  121. Resultantly,  discussion of the conduct of a judge or any evaluation or inferences as to its  merit   is  not  permissible  elsewhere  except  during investigation before the Inquiry Committee constituted under the Act for this purpose.      Articles 124  (4) and  121  would  thus  put  the  nail squarely on the projections, prosecutions or attempts by any other  forum   or  group  of  individuals  or  Associations, statutory or  otherwise, either  to investigate  or  enquire into or discuss the conduct of a Judge or the performance of

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his duties  and on/off  court behaviour  except as  per  the procedure provided  under Articles  124 (4)  and (5)  of the Constitution, and  Act and  the Rules.  Thereby, equally  no other agency  or authority  like  the  C.B.I.,  Ministry  of Finance, the  Reserve Bank  of India  [respondents Nos. 8 to 10] as  sought for by the petitioner, would investigate into the conduct  or acts  or actions  of a Judge. No mandamus or direction would  be issued  to the  Speaker of  Lok Sabha or Chairman of  Rajya Sabha to initiate action for impeachment. It is  true, as  contended by  the petitioner,  that  in  K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655], majority of the Constitution  Bench upheld  the power  of the  police to investigate into  the disproportionate  assets alleged to be possessed by  a Judge,  an offence  under Section  5 of  the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 subject to prior sanction of the  Chief Justice  of India  to maintain independence of the judiciary. By interpretive process, the Court carved out primacy to  the role  of the  Chief Justice  of India, whose efficacy in a case like one at hand would be considered at a later stage. Duty of  the Judge to maintain high standard of conduct. Its judicial individualism - whether protection imperative?      Judicial office  is essentially a public trust. Society is, therefore, entitled to except that a Judge must be a man of high  integrity,  honesty  and  required  to  have  moral vigour, ethical firmness and impervious to corrupt or venial influences. He  is required  to keep most exacting standards of propriety in judicial conduct. Any conduct which tends to undermine   public   confidence   in   the   integrity   and impartiality of  the  court  would  be  deleterious  to  the efficacy of  judicial process.  Society, therefore,  expects higher standards  of conduct  and rectitude  from  a  Judge. Unwritten  code  of  conduct  is  writ  large  for  judicial officers  to  emulate  and  imbibe  high  moral  or  ethical standards expected  of a  higher  judicial  functionary,  as wholesome standard  of conduct  which would  generate public confidence,  accord  dignity  to  the  judicial  office  and enhance public  image, not  only of  the Judge but the court itself. It is, therefore, a basic requirement that a Judge’s official and  personal conduct be free from impropriety; the same must  be in tune with the highest standard of propriety and probity. The standard of conduct is higher than expected of a layman and also higher than expected of an advocate. In fact, even his private life must adhere to high standards of probity and  propriety, higher  than those deemed acceptable for others.  Therefore, the  Judge can  ill-afford  to  seek shelter from the fallen standard in the society.      In Krishna Swami v. Union of India & Ors. [(1992) 4 SCC 605 at  650-51], one  of us (K. Ramaswamy, J). held that the holder of  office of  the Judge  of the Supreme Court or the High Court  should,  therefore,  be  above  the  conduct  of ordinary mortals  in the  society. The standards of judicial behaviour, both  on and  off the  Bench, are  normally high. There cannot,  however, be  any fixed or set principles, but an unwritten  code of conduct of well-established traditions is the  guidelines for  judicial conduct.  The conduct  that tends to  undermine the  public confidence in the character, integrity or  impartiality of the Judge must be eschewed. It is expected  of  him  to  voluntarily  set  forth  wholesome standards  of   conduct  reaffirming   fitness   to   higher responsibilities.      To keep the stream of justice clean and pure, the Judge must  be   endowed  with   sterling  character,   impeccable integrity  and  upright  behaviour.  Erosion  thereof  would undermine the efficacy of the rule of law and the working of

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the Constitution  itself. The  Judges  of  higher  echelons, therefore, should  not be  mere men  of clay  with  all  the frailties and  foibles, human  failings and  weak  character which may  be found  in those  in other  walks of life. They should be  men  of  fighting  faith  with  tough  fibre  not susceptible to  any pressure,  economic,  political  or  any sort. The  actual as  well as  the apparent  independence of judiciary would  be transparent only when the office holders endow those  qualities which  would operate  as  impregnable fortress against  surreptitious attempts  to  undermine  the independence of  the judiciary.  In short,  the behaviour of the Judge  is the  bastion for the people to reap the fruits of the  democracy, liberty  and justice  and the  antithesis rocks the bottom of the rule of law. Scope and meaning of "misbehaviour" in Article 124 (4):      Article 124  (4) of  the Constitution  sanctions action for removal of a Judge on proved misbehaviour or incapacity. The word  "misbehaviour" was  not advisedly defined. It is a vague  and  elastic  word  and  embraces  within  its  sweep different facets  of conduct  as opposed to good conduct. In the Law  Lexicon by  P. Ramanatha  Aiyar, 1987  Edn. at page 821, collected  from several  decisions, the  meaning of the word ‘misconduct’,  is stated to be vague and relative term. Literally, it  means wrong  conduct or  improper conduct. It has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context  wherein the  term occurs  having regard  to the scope of  the Act or the statute under consideration. In the context of  disciplinary proceedings  against Solicitor, the word misconduct  was construed  as  professional  misconduct extending to  conduct "which shows him to be unworthy member of   the    legal   profession."    In   the    context   of misrepresentation  made   by   a   pleader,   who   obtained adjournment of  a case  on grounds  to his  knowledge to  be false a  Full Bench  of the Madras High Court in Re: A First Grade Pleader  [AIR 1931  Mad. 422  = ILR  54 Mad. 520] held that if  a  legal  practioner  deliberately  made,  for  the purpose of  impeding the  course of  justice, a statement to the court  which he believed to be untrue and thereby gained an advantage for his client, he was guilty of gross improper conduct and as such rendered himself liable to be dealt with by the  High Court  in  the  exercise  of  its  disciplinary jurisdiction. Misconduct  on the  part of  an arbitrator was construed to  mean  that  misconduct  does  not  necessarily comprehend or include misconduct of a fraudulent or improper character, but  it does comprehend and include action on the part of  the arbitrator  which is,  upon  the  face  of  it, opposed to  all  rational  and  reasonable  principles  that should govern the procedure of any person who is called upon to decide  upon questions in difference and dispute referred to him by the parties. Misconduct in office was construed to mean unlawful  behaviour or  include  negligence  by  public officer,  by  which  the  rights  of  the  party  have  been affected. In  Krishna Swami’s  case (supra),  one of  us, K. Ramaswamy, J.,  considered the  scope of  ‘misbehaviour’  in Article 124  (4) and held in paragraph 71 that "every act or conduct or  even error  of judgment  or  negligent  acts  by higher judiciary  perse does  not  amount  to  misbehaviour. Willful abuse  of judicial office, Willful misconduct in the office, corruption,  lack of integrity, or any other offence involving moral  turpitude would be misbehaviour. Misconduct implies actuation  of some  degree of  mens rea by the doer. Judicial finding  of guilt  of grave  crime  is  misconduct. Persistent failure  to perform  the judicial  duties of  the Judge or  Willful abuse  of the  office dolus malus would be misbehaviour. Misbehaviour  would extend  to conduct  of the

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Judge in  or beyond  the execution  of judicial office. Even administrative actions  or omissions  too need accompaniment of mens rea."      Guarantee  of   tenure  and   its  protection   by  the Constitution  would   not,  however,  accord  sanctuary  for corruption  or  grave  misbehaviour.  Yet  every  action  or omission by  a judicial  officer in  the performance  of his duties which  is not  a good conduct necessarily, may not be misbehaviour indictable  by impeachment,  but its  insidious effect may  be pervasive  and may produce deleterious effect on the  integrity  and  impartiality  of  the  Judge.  Every misbehaviour  in  juxtaposition  to  good  behaviour,  as  a constitutional tautology, will not support impeachment but a misbehaviour which  is not  a good behaviour may be improper conduct not  befitting to  the standard expected of a Judge. Threat of  impeachment process  itself may swerve a Judge to fall prey  to misconduct  but  it  serves  disgrace  to  use impeachment process  for minor  offences or abrasive conduct on the part of a Judge. The bad behaviour of one Judge has a rippling effect  on the  reputation of  the judiciary  as  a whole. When  the edifice  of judiciary  is built  heavily on public confidence  and respect,  the damage  by an obstinate Judge would rip apart the entire judicial structure built in the Constitution.      Bad conduct  or bad  behaviour of  a Judge,  therefore, needs correction  to prevent erosion of public confidence in the  efficacy   of  judicial   process  or  dignity  of  the institution or  credibility to  the judicial  office held by the obstinate  Judge. When  the Judge  cannot be  removed by impeachment  process   for  such   conduct   but   generates widespread feeling  of  dissatisfaction  among  the  general public, the  question would  be who  would stamp out the rot and judge  the Judge  or who  would impress  upon the  Judge either to  desist from  repetition or to demit the office in grace? Who  would be the appropriate authority? Who would be the principal  mover in  that behalf? The hiatus between bad behaviour and impeachable misbehaviour needs to be filled in to stem  erosion of  public confidence  in the  efficacy  of judicial process. Whether the Bar of that Court has any role to play either in an attempt to correct the perceived fallen standard or  is entitled to make a demand by a resolution or a group  action to pressurize the Judge to resign his office as a  Judge?  The  resolution  to  these  question  involves delicate  but   pragmatic  approach   to  the  questions  of constitutional law. Role of  the Bar  Council  or  Bar  Associations  -  whether unconstitutional?      The Advocates  Act, 1961 gave autonomy to a Bar Council of a  State or  Bar Council  of  India  and  Section  6  (1) empowers them  to make  such action  deemed necessary to set their house  in  order,  to  prevent  fall  in  professional conduct and  to punish  the incorrigible as not befitting to the noble  profession apart  from admission of the advocates on its  roll. Section  6 (1)  (c) and  rules  made  in  that behalf, Sections  9,  35,  36,  36B  and  37  enjoin  it  to entertain  and   determine  cases   of  misconduct   against advocates on  its roll.  The members  of the  judiciary  are drawn primarily  and invariably  from the  Bar at  different levels. The  high moral,  ethical and professional standards among the  members of  the Bar  are pre-conditions  even for high ethical  standard of  the Bench.  Degeneration  thereof inevitably has  its eruption  and tends to reflect the other side of the coin. The Bar Council, therefore, is enjoined by the Advocates  Act  to  maintain  high  moral,  ethical  and professional  standards.   which  of   late  is   far   from

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satisfactory. Their  power under  the Act  ends thereat  and extends  no   further.  Article   121  of  the  Constitution prohibits discussion by the members of the Parliament of the conduct of  any Judge  of the Supreme Court or of High Court in the  discharge of  his duties  except upon  a motion  for presenting an  address to  the  President  praying  for  the removal of  the Judge  as provided under Article 124 (4) and (5) and in the manner laid down under the Act, the Rules and the  rules   of  business   of  the   Parliament  consistent therewith. By  necessary implication, no other forum or fora or platform  is available for discussion of the conduct of a Judge in  the discharge  of his  duties as  a Judge  of  the Supreme Court  or the High Court, much less a Bar Council or group  of  practising  advocates.  They  are  prohibited  to discuss the  conduct of  a Judge  in the  discharge  of  his duties or to pass any resolution in that behalf.      Section 2  (c) of  the Contempt  of Courts  Act,  1971, defines "criminal  contempt" to  mean publication whether by words spoken  or written,  signs, visible representations or otherwise of  any matter  or the doing of any act whatsoever which scandalises  or tends to scandalise, lower or tends to lower the authority of any court or prejudices or interferes or tends  to interfere  with the  due course of any judicial proceedings, or  interferes or  tends to  interfere with  or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner.      In Halsbury’s  Laws of  England [4th  Ed.] Volume  9 in para 27 at page 21, it is stated that scandalising the court would mean  any act  done  or  writing  published  which  is calculated to  bring a court or a Judge into contempt, or to lower his  authority, or to interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the court. Scurrilous abuse of a Judge or court, or attacks on the personal character of a Judge,  are punishable contempts. Punishment is inflicted, not for  the purpose  of protecting  either the  court as  a whole or  the individual Judges of the court from repetition of the attack, but for protecting the public, and especially those who either voluntarily or by compulsion are subject to the jurisdiction  of the  court, from the mischief they will incur if  the authority  of the  tribunal is  undermined  or impaired.  In  consequence,  the  court  has  regarded  with particular seriousness  allegations of partiality or bias on the part  of a  Judge or  a court.  Criticism of  a  Judge’s conduct or  of the  conduct of  a  court  even  if  strongly worded,  is,   however,  not  contempt,  provided  that  the criticism is  fair, temperate  and made in good faith and is not directed  to the personal character of a Judge or to the impartiality of a Judge or court.      In Oswald’s  Contempt of  Court [3rd Edn.] 1993 at page 50 it  is stated that libel upon courts is made contempt "to keep a  blaze of glory around them, and to deter people from attempting to  render them  contemptible in  the eyes of the public.... A  libel upon  a court  is a  reflection upon the King, and  telling the  people that  the  administration  of justice is  in week  or corrupt  hands, that the fountain of justice itself  is tainted,  and consequently that judgments which stream  out  of  that  fountain  must  be  impure  and contaminated". A libel upon a Judge in his judicial capacity is a  contempt, whether it concerns what he did in court, or what he  did judicially  out of it. At page 91, it is stated that all  publications which  offend against  the dignity of the court,  or are  calculated to  prejudice the  course  of justice, will  constitute contempt.  One of  the natures  of offences is  scandalising the  courts. In  Contempt of Court [2nd Edn.]  by C.J.  Millar at  page 366,  Lord  Diplock  is

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quoted from Chokolingo v. AG of Trinidaad and Tobago [(1981) 1 All  ER 244  at 248], who spoke for the Judicial Committee summarising the  position thus: "‘Scandalising the court’ is a convenient way of describing a publication which, although it does  not relate  to any  specific case  either  past  or pending or any specific Judge, is a scurrilous attack on the judiciary as  a whole,  which is calculated to undermine the authority  of  the  courts  and  public  confidence  in  the administration of  justice." In  Borrie and  Lowe’s  Law  of Contempt [2nd  Edn.] at  page 226  it  is  stated  that  the necessity for  this branch of contempt lies in the idea that without well-regulated  laws a  civilised  community  cannot survive. It  is therefore  thought important to maintain the respect and  dignity of  the court  and its  officers, whose task it  is to  uphold and  enforce the law, because without such respect,  public faith in the administration of justice would be  undermined and  the law  itself  would  fall  into disrepute. Even in the latest Report on Contempt of Court by Phillimore Committee  to revise  the  penal  enforcement  of contempt, adverting  to Lord  Atkin’s dictum that courts are satisfied to  leave to  public opinion  attacks or  comments derogatory or  scandalous to  them, in  paragraph  162,  the Committee had  stated  that  at  one  stage  "we  considered whether such conduct should be subject to penal sanctions at all. It  was argued  that any  judge who  was attacked would have the  protection of  the law  of defamation, and that no further protection is necessary. We have concluded, however, that some  restraints are  still required,  for two reasons. First, this  branch of the law of contempt is concerned with the  protection   of  the  administration  of  justice,  and especially the  preservation of  public  confidence  in  its honesty and  impartiality; it  is only  incidentally, if  at all, concerned  with the  personal  reputations  of  Judges. Moreover,  some   damaging  attacks,  for  example  upon  an unspecified group  of judges,  may not  be capable  of being made the  subject of  libel proceedings  at  all.  Secondly, Judges commonly  feel constrained  by their  position not to take action  in reply  to criticism, and they have no proper forum in  which to  do so  such as  other public figures may have. These  considerations lead  us to  the conclusion that there  is   need   for   an   effective   remedy.....against imputations of  improper or  corrupt judicial  conduct." The Contempt of  Courts Act,  1971 engrafted suitable amendments accordingly. Freedom of expression and duty of Advocate:      It is  true  that  freedom  of  speech  and  expression guaranteed by  Article 19 [1] (a) of the Constitution is one of the most precious liberties in any democracy. But equally important  is   the  maintenance  of  respect  for  judicial independence which alone would protect the life, liberty and reputation of the citizen. So the nation’s interest requires that criticism  of the  judiciary must be measured, strictly rational, sober and proceed from the highest motives without being coloured  by partisan  spirit or  pressure tactics  or intimidatory attitude.  The Court must, therefore, harmonise constitutional values  of free  criticism and the need for a fearless curial  process and  its presiding functionary, the Judge. If freedom of expression subserves public interest in reasonable measure,  public justice cannot gag it or manacle it; but  if the  court considered the attack on the Judge or Judges scurrilous,  offensive,  intimidatory  or  malicious, beyond condonable  limits, the  strong arm  of the  law must strike a  blow on  him who  challenges the  supremacy of the rule of  the law by fouling its source and stream. The power to punish  the contemner is, therefore, granted to the court

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not because  Judges need  the  protection  but  because  the citizens need an impartial and strong judiciary.      It is  enough if  all of  us bear  this in  mind  while expressing opinions  on courts  and Judges. But the question that still  remains is  when the  Bar of the Court, in which the Judge  occupies the  seat of  office, honestly  believes that the  conduct of  the Judge  or of  the Bench  fouls the fountain of justice, or undermines or tends to undermine the dignity expected  of a  Judge and  the people are tending to disbelieve the  impartiality or  integrity of the Judge, who should bear  the duty  and responsibility  to  have  it/them corrected so as to restore the respect for judiciary?      In Brahma  Prakash Sharma & Ors. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh  [AIR   1954  SC  10]  the  Bar  Association  passed resolutions and  communicated to  the  superior  authorities that certain judicial officers were incompetent due to their conduct in the court and High Court took action for contempt of the  court. The  question was  whether the members of the Executive Committee  of the  Bar Association  had  committed contempt of  the court? This Court held that the attack on a Judge is  a wrong  done to  the public  and if  it tends  to create apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability  or fairness  of the  Judge and  to deter actual  and  prospective  litigants  from  placing  complete reliance upon  the court’s  administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties, it would be scandalising the court and be dealt with accordingly.      The   threat    of   action   on   vague   grounds   of dissatisfaction would create a dragnet that would inevitably sweep into  its  grasp  the  maverick,  the  dissenter,  the innovator,  the  reformer  -  in  one  word  the  unpopular. Insidious attampts  pave way  for removing the inconvenient. Therefore,  proper   care  should   be  taken   by  the  Bar Association concerned.  First  it  should  gather  specific, authentic and  acceptable material  which would show or tend to show  that conduct  on the  part of  a Judge  creating  a feeling in  the mind  of a  reasonable person  doubting  the honesty, integrity,  impartiality or  act which  lowers  the dignity of  the office  but necessarily,  is not impeachable misbehaviour. In  all fairness to the Judge, the responsible office bearers  should meet  him in  camera  after  securing interview and  apprise the Judge of the information they had with  them.  If  there  is  truth  in  it,  there  is  every possibility that  the Judge  would mend himself. Or to avoid embarrassment to  the Judge, the office bearers can approach the Chief  Justice of that High Court and apprise him of the situation with  material they  have in  their possession and impress upon  the Chief  Justice to  deal  with  the  matter appropriately. Primacy of the Chief Justice of India      It is  true that  this Court has neither administrative control over  the High  Court nor power on the judicial side to enquire into the misbehaviour of a Chief Justice or Judge of a  High Court.  When the  Bar of the High Court concerned reasonably and  honestly doubts  the conduct  of  the  Chief Justice of  that court, necessarily the only authority under the Constitution  that could  be tapped is the Chief Justice of India, who in common parlance is known as the head of the judiciary of  the country.  It is of importance to emphasise here that  impeachment is  meant to  be a drastic remedy and needs to be used in serious cases. But there must exist some other means to ensure that Judges do not abuse the trust the society has  in them. It seems to us that self-regulation by the judiciary  is the  only method  which can  be tried  and

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adopted. Chief  Justice of  India is  the  first  among  the Judges. Under  Articles 124(2)  and 217(1), the President of India  always  consults  the  Chief  Justice  of  India  for appointment of  the Judges  in the  Supreme Court  and  High Courts. Under Article 222, the President transfers Judges of High Courts in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. In Supreme  Court Advocates-on-Record  Association vs. Union of India  [(1993) 4 SCC 441] it was reinforced and the Chief Justice of  India  was  given  center  stage  position.  The primacy and  importance of  the office  of the Chief Justice was recognised judicially by this Court in Veeraswami’s case [supra] in  para 60 at page 709. This Court, while upholding power to  register case  against a  retired Chief Justice of the High  Court, permitted to proceed with the investigation for the alleged offence under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption  Act.   The  Constitution   Bench  per  majority, however, held  that the  saction and  approval of  the Chief Justice of India is a condition precedent to register a case and investigate into the matter and sanction for prosecution of the  said Judge  by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India.      In Sub-Committee  on Judicial Accountability [2nd case] [supra] also the same primacy had been accorded to the Chief Justice at page 72 thus:      "It would  also be  reasonable to assume      that  the  Chief  Justice  of  India  is      expected to find a desirable solution in      such a  situation to avoid embarrassment      to  the   learned  Judge   and  to   the      Institution  in   a  manner   which   is      conducive   to   the   independence   of      judiciary and  should the  Chief Justice      of India  be of  the view  that  in  the      interests   of    the   institution   of      judiciary  it   is  desirable   for  the      learned Judge  to abstrain from judicial      work  till   the  final   outcome  under      Article 124  (4), he  would  advise  the      learned Judge accordingly. It is further      reasonable to  assume that the concerned      learned Judge  would ordinarily abide by      the  advice  of  the  Chief  Justice  of      India."      International Bar  Association  at  its  19th  Biennial Conference held  at New  Delhi in  October 1982  had adopted minimum standards  for judicial  conduct.  Paras  27  to  72 relate to judicial removal and discipline. Para 31 says that "the head  of the  Court may  legitimately have  supervisory powers to control judges on administrative matters."      In "Chilling Judicial Independence", Irving R. Kaufman, Chief Judge,  U.S. Court  of Appeals  for the Second Circuit [See: Yale  Law Journal  [Vol.88] 1978-79 p.681 at page 712] stated that  it seems  unwise to  allow bureaucrats, whether lawyers or  not, to  determine, even  in part,  the fate  of Judges. The sheer magnitude of the disciplinary engine would be a  major nuisance.  Judges frequently  receive hostile or threatening  correspondence   from  disappointed  litigants. Creation of  a new  disciplinary scheme  would  transform  a minor annoyance  into a  constant threat of official action. At the very least, it would require time-consuming responses by  the  Judge.  Even  if  the  Judge  were  not  eventually condemned, the  mere invocation  of the statutory provisions might taint  him with  a devastating stigma. The vestment of authority  might   remain  but   the  aura  of  respect  and confidence so  essential to  the judicial  function would be

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forever dissipated.  He, therefore,  suggested that pressure by the peers would yield salutary effect on the erring judge and,  therefore,  judicial  system  can  better  survive  by pressure of  the peers  instead of  disciplinary actions. At page 709  he stated:  "Peer pressure  is a  potent tool.  It should not  be underestimated  because it is neither exposed to public view nor enshrined in law".      Harry T.  Edwards, Chief  Judge, U.S.  Courts of Appeal for the  District of  Columbia Circuit  [See:  Michigan  Law Review (Vol.87)  765] in  his article  "Regulating  Judicial Misconduct  and   Divining  "Good   Behaviour"  for  Federal Judges", after  the 1980 Act, suggested that "I believe that federal judges  are subject  to some  measure of  control by peers  with   respect  to  behaviour  or  intimidation  that adversely affects  the work  of the  court and that does not rise to  the level  of  impeachable  misconduct".  "I  would submit that  the  ideal  of  judicial  independence  is  not compromised when  judges are  monitored and are regulated by their own  peers". This  limited system  of  judicial  self- regulation resists  no constitutional  dilemma  as  long  as removal power remains with Congress. "I argue that judiciary alone should  monitor this bad behaviour through a system of self-regulation."  He   opined  that  self-regulation  would bridge the  hiatus between  bad  behaviour  and  impeachable conduct to yield salutary effect.      Bearing all the above in mind, we are of the considered view that  where the  complaint relates  to the Judge of the High Court,  the Chief  Justice of  that High  Court,  after verification, and  if necessary,  after confidential enquiry from his  independent source,  should satisfy  himself about the truth  of the  imputation made  by the  Bar  Association through its office bearers against the Judge and consult the Chief Justice  of India,  where deemed necessary, by placing all the  information with  him. When  the Chief  Justice  of India is seized of the matter, to avoid embarrassment to him and to  allow fairness  in the  procedure to  be adopted  in furtherance thereof,  the Bar  should  suspend  all  further actions  to   enable  the   Chief  Justice   of   India   to appropriately  deal  with  the  matter.  This  is  necessary because any  action he  may take  must not  only be just but must also  appear to be just to all concerned, i.e., it must not even  appear to  have been taken under pressure from any quarter. The  Chief Justice  of India,  on  receipt  of  the information from  the Chief Justice of the High Court, after being satisfied about the correctness and truth touching the conduct of the Judge, may tender such advice either directly or may  initiate such  action, as  is  deemed  necessary  or warranted  under   given   facts   and   circumstances.   If circumstances permit,  it may  be salutary to take the Judge into confidence  before initiating  action. On  the decision being taken by the Chief Justice of India, the matter should rest at  that. This  procedure  would  not  only  facilitate nibbing in the bud the conduct of a Judge leading to loss of public confidence  in the courts and sustain public faith in the efficacy  of  the  rule  of  law  and  respect  for  the judiciary, but  would also  avoid needless  embarrassment of contempt proceedings  against the  office bearers of the Bar Association and  group  libel  against  all  concerned.  The independence of  judiciary and  the stream of public justice would remain  pure and  unsullied. The Bar Association could remain a  useful arm  of the  judiciary and  in the  case of sagging  reputation   of  the   particular  Judge,  the  Bar Association could  take up the matter with the Chief Justice of the  High Court  and await  his response  for the  action taken thereunder for a reasonable period.

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    In case  the allegations are against Chief Justice of a High Court, the Bar should bring them directly to the notice of the Chief Justice of India. On receipt of such complaint, the Chief  Justice of  India would  in the  same way  act as stated above  qua complaint  against a  Judge  of  the  High Court, and  the Bar  would await for a reasonable period the response of the Chief Justice of India.      It would  thus be  seen that yawning gap between proved misbehaviour and  bad conduct  in consistent  with the  high office on  the part of a non cooperating Judge/Chief Justice of a  High Court  could be  disciplined  by  self-regulation through inhouse procedure. This inhouse procedure would fill in the  constitutional gap  and would yield salutary effect. Unfortunately, recourse  to this  procedure was not taken in the case  at hand,  may be,  because  of  absence  of  legal sanction to such a procedure.      Since the  1st  respondent  has  already  demitted  the office, we  have stated  as above  so that  it would  form a precedent for future.      The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.