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PETITIONER: C. PADMA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE DY. SECRETARY TO THE GOVT.OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       22/11/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      We have heard the counsel on both sides.      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court, made on June 29, 1993 in W.A. No.712/93.      The  admitted   position  is   that  pursuant   to  the notification  published  under  Section  4(1)  of  the  Land Acquisition Act,  1894 [for  short,  the  "Act"]  in  G.O.R. No.1392 Industries dated October 17, 1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram village Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District  in  Tamil  Nadu  was  acquired  under Chapter VII  of the  Act for  the manufacture  of  Synthetic Rasina by  Tvl. Reichold  Chemicals India  Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings  had become  final and possession of the land  was taken  on April  30,  1964.  Pursuant  to  the agreement executed  by the  company, it  was handed  over to Tvl. Simpson  and General  Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold  Chemicals India  Ltd. It would appear that at a request made  by the  said company,  66 cents of land out of one acre  37  cents  in  respect  of  which  the  appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in G.O.M.S. No.816 Industries  dated  March  24,  1971  in  favour  of  another subsidiary company.  Shri Rama  Vilas Service  Ltd., the 5th respondent which  is also  another subsidiary of the Company had requested from two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be  assigned on  lease hold basis by the Government after resumption in  terms of  the agreement  in  G.O.M.S.  No.439 Industries dated May 10, 1985. In G.O.M.S. No.546 Industries dated March  30, 1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants  challenged  the  original  G.O.M.S.  No.1392 Industries dated  October 17, 1962 contending that since the regional purpose  for which the land was acquired had ceased to  be   in  operation,   the  appellants  are  entitled  to restitution of  the possession  taken from them. The Learned single Judge  and the  Division Bench  have  held  that  the acquired land  having already  vested in  the  state,  after receipt of  the compensation  by the predecessor-in-title of the  appellants,   they  have  no  right  to  challenge  the notification. Thus  the writ  petition and  the writ  appeal

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came to be dismissed.      Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants,  contends that  when by operation of Section 44-B read  with Section  40 of  the Act,  the public purpose ceased to  be  existing,  the  acquisition  became  bad  and therefore, the  G.O. was bad in law. We find no force in the contention. It is seen that after the notification in G.O.R. 1392 dated  October 17,  1962 was published, the acquisition proceeding had  become final,  the compensation  was paid to the appellants’ father and thereafter the lands stood vested in the  State. In  terms of the agreement as contemplated in Chapter VII of the Act, the company had delivered possession subject to  the terms  and conditions thereunder. It is seen that one  of the  conditions was  that on  cessation of  the public purpose,  the lands  acquired would be surrendered to the Government. In furtherance thereof, the lands came to be surrendered to the Government for resumption. The lands then were allotted  to SRVS  Ltd., 5th respondent which is also a subsidiary amalgamated  company  of  the  original  company. Therefore, the public purpose for which acquisition was made was substituted  for another  public purpose.  Moreover, the question stood final settled 32 years ago and hence the writ petition cannot  be entertained  after three  decades on the ground that  either original  purpose was not public purpose or the land cannot be used for any other purpose.      Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court was right in refusing to entertain the writ petition.      The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.