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PETITIONER: C.P. SIKH REGULAR MOTOR SERVICE ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/09/1974

BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN RAY, A.N. (CJ) KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1905            1975 SCR  (2)  10  1974 SCC  (2) 579  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1976 SC1731  (4)

ACT: Motor Vehicles Act-1939-ss. 2(1); 2(28) and 68 C-Scope of.

HEADNOTE: Section  68C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 says that  where ally  State Transport Undertaking is of opinion that  it  is necessary  in  the  public  interest  that  road   transport services  in general should be run and operated by the  Road Transport  Undertaking  it  may  prepare  a  scheme   giving particulars of the area or route proposed to be covered  and shall  cause  every  such  scheme to  be  published  in  the official  gazette.  Section 2(1) says that unless  there  is anything repugnant in the subject or context in relation  to any provision of the Act. area means such area as the  State Government may, having regard to that provision, specify  by notification in the official gazette.  The State  Government established the Road Transport Corporation under s. 3 of the Road  Transport  Corporation  Act  1950.   The   Corporation prepared  a  scheme  proposing  to  operate  stage  carriage services in the entire State and on all routes and  portions thereof  falling  within  the  said  area  to  the  complete exclusion of all other persons.  The scheme approved by  the State   Government  was  published  in  the  gazette.    The appellants  who  were  transport  operators  in  the   State challenged  the  validity  of the scheme.   The  High  Court dismissed the writ petitions. On  appeal  to  this  Court it was  contended  that  it  was necessary  for  the State Government to have  specified  the area by notification because wherever the word ’area’ Occurs in  the Act the meaning to be given to that word is the  one given in s. 2(1) unless there is something repugnant in  the context or the subject matter in s. 68C. Dismissing the appeals, HELD : (a) In the context of s. 68C the word ’area’ does not mean  an  area  specified  by  the  State  Government  in  a notification   in  the  gazette  in  accordance   with   the substantive part of the definition clause 2(1).  The context in  which  the  word occurs makes  the  application  of  the substantive part of the definition repugnant. [13F]

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(b)  The word ’area’ concurring in s. 68C does not have  the same  meaning as the word ’route’ in the section.   A  route postulates  an area; but for that reason it cannot  be  said that  the legislature made no distinction between  the  two. ’Area’  is  defined in S.2(1) and that definition  does  not speak of any route.  Route is defined in S.2(28) of the Act. In  fact  "area" and "route" are  distinct.   Otherwise  the legislature  would not have found it necessary to provide  a separate definition clause for route. [14D; G] (e)  If  in respect of a scheme in relation to  a  route  or routes, it is not necessary that the State Government should make a notification specifying the route or routes, there is no  reason why the State Government should specify the  area by  a  notification in the gazette for framing a  scheme  in relation  to  an area.  It is impossible to  understand  the rationale behind the distinction why when a scheme is framed in  relation  to  an  area a  notification  in  the  gazette specifying its extent is necessary and why when it is framed in  relation to a route or routes a notification  specifying the route or routes is not required. [15B-C]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 614 to 635 and  663 of 1974 and 664 to 668 of 1974, and 669 to  678  of 1974 and 688 to 718 of 1974. Appeals  by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order  dated the  19th and 22nd March of 1974 and 2nd April, 1974 of  the Bombay 11 High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Special Civil Applications Nos. 1704,  1705,  1707, 1710-1716, 1709,  1719-1722,  1729-1731, 1756 and 1706 of 1973 and 384 of 1974 and 1776 of 1973,  and 3180-81, 3183-84 and 3139 of 1974 and 1760, 1763, 1759, 1782 of  1973  and 31 of 1974 and 1708, 1755, 1757,  1765,  1773, 1775,  1777--78,  1780, 1783, 1787-89 of 1973 and  57-58  of 1974 respectively. Special Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos. 1389-1390 of 1974. From the judgment and order dated March 19, 1974 of the Bom- bay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in ’Special Civil  Application Nos. 1789 of 1973 and 61 of 1974. M.   N.  Phadke,  G.  L.  Sanghi, P.  H.  Palshikar,  C.  G. Madkholkar and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellants in C.A. Nos. 614 to 635, 664 to 678, 689 to 717 of 1974. G.   L. Samghi, P. H. Palshikar, C. G. Madkholkar, and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellants in C.A. Nos. 688 and 718/74. K.   B. Rohatgi, for the appellant in C.A. No. 663/74. A.   -G.  Ratnaparkhi,  for the petitioners in  S.L.P.  Nos. 1389-90/74. Niren De, Attorney General for India, Santosh Chatterji,  V. R.  Manohar  and G. S. Chatterji, for respondent No.  2  (In C.A. 614/74). Santoshi Chatterjee, V. R. Manohar and G. S. Chatterjee, for respondent No. 2 in C.A. Nos. 615-635, 663-668 of 1974. F.   S.  Nariman, Additional Solicitor General of India  and M.  N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1, 3 to 6 (In C.As. Nos. 614, 663 and 718 of 1974). Niren  De, Attorney General for India and M. N.  Shroff  for Union of India in C.As. 614, 663, 688 & 718/74. M.   N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1, 3 to 6 in C.As. Ncs. 6114 to, 635, 663 to 678, 688 to 718 of 1974. S.   Govind Swaminathan, A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashni,  for interveners. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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MATHEW, J. In these Civil Appeals and Petitions for  Special Leave   to  appeal,  the  question  for  consideration   are practically  the same.. They are, therefore, disposed of  by this common judgment. The  appellants  filed petitions before the  High  Court  of Bombay (at Nagpur and Bombay) challenging the validity of  a scheme  framed under s. 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act,  1939 (hereinafter  referred  to as ’the Act’).   The  High  Court dismissed the petitions and these appeals and petitions  for special leave to appeal are directed against those orders. Section  68C  under which the scheme was  framed  occurs  in Chapter  IVA of the Act.  That chapter was added by Act  100 of 1956 12 which  came  into  effect  from  February  16,  1957.    The Maharashtra  State Road Transport  Corporation  (hereinafter called  ’the Corporation’ is a corporation  established  for the whole of the State of Maharashtra under S. 3 of the Road Transport  Corporations  Act,  1950,  and  it  is  a  ’state transport  undertaking’ within the meaning of s.  68A(b)  of the Act. By  the  scheme, the Corporation proposes to  operate  stage carriage and contract carriage services in the entire  State of  Maharashtra  and  on all  routes  and  portions  thereof falling  within the said area to the complete  exclusion  of all other persons subject to the exceptions mentioned in the scheme.   The  scheme,  as approved, was  published  in  the Gazette  dated November 29, 1973 and was to come into  force with  effect from January 1, 1974.  It was the  validity  of this  scheme that the appellants challenged before the  High Court by their petitions. In  these appeals and petitions for special leave to  appeal we  are concerned only with two questions,  namely,  whether the  area  in relation to which the scheme has  been  framed should have been specified by a notification in the official Gazette  by the State Government under S. 2(1) of  the  Act; and  whether the scheme was invalid for the reason  that  it did  not specify the minimum and maximum number of  vehicles to  be put on a route as also the minimum and maximum  trips on each route. It  was  submitted for the appellants that no  valid  scheme under s. 68C could be framed without specifying the area  in relation   to  which  the  scheme  has  been  framed  by   a notification  by  the  State  Government  in  the   official gazette.   This submission is founded on s. 2(1) of the  Act which was inserted in the Act by Act 56 of 1969 :               "2.  In  this Act, unless  there  is  anything               repugnant in the subject or context,-               (1)   ’area’  in relation to any provision  of               this  Act,  means  such  area  as  the   State               Government   may,   having   regard   to   the               requirements  of  that provision,  specify  by               notification in the Official Gazette". Section  68C  did not require that the area in  relation  to which the scheme has been framed should have been  specified by  notification  in  the  official  gazette  by  the  State Government  before the insertion of s.2(1) by the  Amendment Act  56 of 1969.  Therefore, the question for  consideration is whether, after its insertion in the Act, it was necessary for  the  State  Government to have specified  the  area  by notification  in  the  official gazette in  order  that  the Corporation may frame a scheme in relation to that area. The  appellants  contended  that wherever  the  word  ’area’ occurs it] any of the provisions of the Act, the meaning  to be  given  to the word is the one given in  S.  2(1)  unless

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there  is  something  repugnant in the  context  or  subject matter and, as there is nothing in the context of or subject matter in s. 68C, which, by necessary implication, excludes  13 the  meaning  given  in the definition clause  to  the  word ’area’  occurring  in  the  section,  the  meaning  must  be assigned to the word. On  the other hand, the learned Attorney General,  appearing for  the Corporation, submitted that the  definition  clause does not require the State Government to specify the area by a notification in the gazette merely because the word ’area’ occurs  in  a section of the Act.  He submitted that  it  is only  if  the  State  Government  is  of  opinion  that  the provisions  of  a  section so require  it,  that  they  need specify the area by a notification in the gazette.  In other words,  the argument was that in order that  the  definition clause  may come into play, it is necessary that  the  State Government  should  from an opinion,, having regard  to  the requirement  of  the particular section in  which  the  word ’area’ occurs, that it is necessary, to specify the area  by a notification in the gazette. We are not quite sure whether the language of the definition clause  is susceptible of the construction contended for  by the learned Attorney General.  We are inclined to think that the  discretion  that is vested in the State  Government  is only with respect to the specification of the extent of  the area in the notification having regard to the requirement of the   section  in  which  the  word  ’area’  occurs.    That discretion has nothing to do with the necessity or otherwise of a notification specifying the area.  In other words,  the decision  of  the  State  Government  is  confined  to   the specification  of the extent of’ the area, having regard  to the requirement of the section where the word ’area’  occurs and not to the necessity or otherwise of the notification in the gazette specifying the area. Be that as it may, we do not think it necessary, to  resolve this question in this case as, in our view, the word  ’area’ occurring  in  s.  68C does not,  in  the  context,  require specification by a notification in the. gazette by the State Government.  To put it differently, we do not think that  in the  context of s. 68C the word ’area’ means an area  speci- fied  by  the  State Government in  a  notification  in  the gazette  in  accordance  with the substantive  part  of  the definition  clause.   The context in which the  word  occurs makes  the  application  of  the  substantive  part  or  the definition repugnant. Section  3  of  the Road Transport  Corporation  Act,  1950, provides that the State Government may, by a notification in the,   official   gazette,  establish   a   Road   Transport Corporation for the whole or any part of the State.  Section 18 of that Act provides that it shall be the general duty of a Corporation so to exercise its powers as progressively  to provide  an  efficient, adequate,  economical  and  properly coordinated  system of road transport services in the  State or part of the State for which it is established and in  any extended  area  and  s.  19  specifies  the  powers  of  the Corporation.   Sub-section (2) (c) of that section  empowers the  Corporation to prepare schemes for the acquisition  of, and  to acquire the whole or any part of any undertaking  of any  other  person  to the extent to  which  the  activities thereof consist of the operation of road transport  services in that State or in any extended area- 14               Section 68C of the Act says :               "Where  any State transport undertaking is  of

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             opinion  that for the purpose of providing  an               efficient,  adequate, economical and  properly               coordinated  road  transport  service,  it  is               necessary  in  the public interest  that  road               transport   services   in   general   or   any               particular  class of such service in  relation               to any area or route or portion thereof should               be  run  and operated by the  State  transport               undertaking,   whether   to   the   exclusion,               complete  or  partial,  of  other  persons  or               otherwise, the State transport undertaking may               prepare  a  scheme giving particulars  of  the               nature   of  the  services  proposed   to   be               rendered,  the  area or route proposed  to  be               covered and such other particulars  respecting               there to as may be prescribed, and shall cause               every  such  scheme  to be  published  in  the               Official Gazette and also in such other manner               as the State Government may direct". It is clear that a scheme under s. 68C can be framed only in relation  to  an  area or route or  part  thereof  see  Dosa Satyanarayanamurty,  etc. v. The Andhra  Pradesh-State  Road Transport Corporation(1). We do not think that the word ’area’ occurring in s. 68C has the  same meaning as the word ’route’ in the section.   When s. 68C talks of ’area’ or ’route’ or part thereof, it is not to  be  presumed that the legislature  made  no  distinction between  ’area’  and  ’route’.   No  doubt,  a  route   must necessarily  run  over  an area but, for  that  reason,  one cannot  equate an area to a route.  An area  simpliciter  is certainly  not a route.  Its potentially to become  a  route would  not  make  it  a route.  A  route  is  an  area  plus something more.  At any rate, there is no justification  for making an assumption that the legislature, in the context of s.  68C did not want to make any distinction between  ’area’ and  ’roue’.  In Dosa Satyanamurty’s Case(1), Subba Rao,  J. observed :               "  Under s. 68C of the Act the scheme  may  be               framed in respect of any area or a route or  a               portion  of any area or a portion of a  route.               There is no inherent inconsistency between  an               ’area’ and a route. The proposed route is also               an  area limited to the route  proposed.   The               scheme  may  as  well  propose  to  operate  a               transport  service in respect of a new,  route               from  point A to point B and that route  would               certainly be an area within the meaning of  S.               68C". There  can  be no dispute that a route postulates  an  area. But,  for  that  reason,  as we said,  it  is  difficult  to maintain  that the legislature made no  distinction  between the  two.   In s.2(1), the definition is only  of  the  word ’area’.   That definition does not speak of any  route.   By Act  56 of 1969, the legislature has defined the  expression ’route’ in s.  2(28A).  That reads               "route’ means a line of travel which specifies               the  highway which may be traversed by a  moor               vehicle between one               terminus and another".               (1)   [1961] 1 S.C.R. 642, 664.                15 Certainly,  the line of travel which specifies  the  highway which  may be traversed by a motor vehicle is an  area,  but nevertheless,   the  two  are  distinct.    Otherwise,   the legislature  would not have found it necessary to provide  a

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separate. definition clause for ’route’. If, therefore, in respect of a scheme in relation to a route or  routes,  it is not necessary that the  State  Government should  make a notification specifying the route or  routes, we  fail to understand the reason why the  State  Government should specify the area by a notification in the gazette for framing a scheme in relation to an area.  In other words, it is  impossible  to  understand  the  rationale  behind   the distinction  why when a scheme is framed in relation  to  an area a notification in the gazette specifying its extent  is necessary  and why when it is framed in relation to a  route or  routes a notification specifying the route or routes  is not  required.  When s. 68C says "where any State  Transport Undertaking is of opinion that...... it is necessary in  the public  interest that road transport services in general  or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or  route or portion thereof should be run and  operated  by the  State transport undertaking", it means, in the  context of  the present case,, that the Corporation has to  form  an opinion whether it is necessary in the public interest  that road transport service should be nationalized in relation to any area Or route.  We are aware of a plausible construction of the section which would enable the Corporation to form an opinion only as to the necessity in the public interest of a scheme in relation to an area specified in the  notification by  the  State Government.  But we think, it  comports  more with  the  legislative  purpose  to  hold  that  the  ’State transport  undertaking  is invested with the  discretion  to select  the  area  in relation to which it  will  frame  the scheme than to hold that  discretion has been vested in  the State Government.  If, in forming an opinion with respect to the necessity  of a  scheme  in relation to a route or routes,  the  power  of ’State   transport  undertaking’  and,  therefore,  of   the Corporation, is untrammeled by an outside authority like the State  Government,  we  fail to see why it  cannot  form  an opinion  as to the necessity of a scheme in relation to  any area in the State. As the Corporation here was established for the whole of the State  of  Maharashtra, it was within its power to  form  an opinion as to necessity of a scheme in relation to any  area or  route  within  the  State.  We hold  that  there  is  no substance in the first contention of the appellant. The second point urged can behalf of the appellants was that a  scheme  framed  under  s.  68C  should  specify  all  the necessary particulars and as it did not specify the  minimum and maximum number of vehicles to be put on a route as  also the minimum and maximum trips in respect of each route,  the scheme  was  invalid.   The  decision of  this  A  Court  in Aswathamarayan Singh v. State of Mysore(1) was relied on  in support of this contention. (1)  [1966] 1 S.  C. R. 87, at 92 and 94. 16 In the first place, this contention was not taken before the State  Government in the objections filed by the  appellants to  the Scheme.  Quite apart from that, we think that  there is  no factual foundation for the contention.  The  approved scheme specifies the minimum and maximum number of  vehicles to  be put on a route as also the minimum and maximum  trips in respect of each route. We  dismiss the appeals without costs.  We also dismiss  the petitions for special leave to appeal. P.B.R.                  Appeals dismissed. 17

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