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PETITIONER: C. F. ANGADI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: Y. S. MRANNAYYA

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/11/1971

BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1972 AIR  239            1972 SCR  (2) 515  1972 SCC  (1) 191

ACT: Compromise  decree-Party to decree given time to do  an  act within  a  specified  period or  by  a  specified  day-Party failing  to  do  it  on  the  ground  of  impossibility   of performance  on  the  last day  specified-Principles  to  be applied-Compromise decree, construction of according to law- Does  not amount to varying of decree-Decree though  in  the nature  of  contract,  different  consideration  apply  when embodied in Judge’s order.

HEADNOTE: Under a compromise decree the respondent plaintiff agreed to deposit  in  court  the  sale amount  by  January  1,  1960. December  31, 1959 and January 1, 1960 were  holidays.   The respondent made the deposit on January 2, 1960 and sought to enforce his right under the decree compelling the  appellant defendant  to execute the conveyance.  The  appellant  filed execution  for  cost  on  the  basis  that  the  suit  stood dismissed  as per the provision in the compromise decree  on the  failure  of  the respondent lo deposit  the  amount  by January  1,  1960., The Court held that the  respondent  had made the deposit in substantial compliance with the  decree. appeals against this order were also dismissed.  In  appeals to  this  Court it was contended (i) where a  party  had  to perform  an act within a certain of by a certain  date,  the law  would not take notice of the circumstance that the  act became  incapable of performance by reason of  circumstances beyond  his control on the last day of the period; (ii)  the executing court had no right to alter or modify the terms of the decree and hold that the deposit made on January 2, 1960 had to be deemed to be a deposit made on January 1, 1960 and (iii) a compromise decree was a contract notwithstanding the fact  that  an  order of court was superadded to  it  and  a provision in a contract that an act had to be done within  a certain  period  or  by  a particular day  by  a  party  was absolute dismissing the appeal. HELD  : (i) The respondent had the right or the  liberty  to deposit  the amount in court till and including  January  1, 1960.   That  being so, the fact that be did not  choose  to make  the  deposit  earlier would not affect  his  right  or liberty  to deposit the amount in court on January 1,  1960. [518 F-G]

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Halsbury  vol.  37 3rd Edn. p. 96; Fateh Khan v.  Chhajju  & Ors., A.I.R. 1931 Lah. 386, referred to. It  is a generally recognised principle of law that  parties who are prevented from doing a thing in court on  particular day,  not by an act of their own, but by the  court  itself, are  entitled to do it at the first subsequent  opportunity. [520 G] Halsbury  Vol. 37, 3rd Ed. p. 97, para 172, Muhammad Jan  v. Shiam  Lal;  I.L.R. XLVI All. 328  (1924);  Shooshee  Bushan Rtidro  v.  Gobind  Chander Roy, I.L.R.  Cal.   Vol.   XVIII (1891)  231, Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasaini Reddi,  I.L.R.  22 Mad.  (1899)  179 and Mayor v. Harding, [1867] 2  Q.B.  410, referred to. The   present  case  is  concerned  with  a   decree   which specifically provided that the respondent should deposit the amount  in court.  He had, therefore, no option to  pay  the same to the appellant [520 C-D] Kunj Bihari v. Bitndeshri Prasad, I.L.R. vol. 51, 1929, All. 527,  Roshan Lal v. Ganpat Lal.  A.I.R. 1938 All., Indal  v. Chaudhary 516 Ram  Nidh, A.I.R. 33 [1946] oudh. 156 and Rain Kinkar  Singh V.   Smt.   Kamal  Basini  Devi,  A.I.R.  1938   Pat.   451, distinguished. Chatlapali  Suryaprakasa  Rao  v.  Polisetti  Venkataratnam, A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 523, referred to. (ii)The  executing  court  has the right  to  construe  the decree in the light of the applicable provisions of law,  If in  this case, on such a construction. the court found  that the  deposit made by the respondent on January 2, 1960,  was according  to law a deposit in compliance with the terms  of the  decree, then, the executing court was not  varying  the terms  of the decree but executing the decree as  it  stood. [522 E] (iii)Although  a  contract is not the less  a  contract because  it is embodied in a Judge’s order, it is  something more than a contract.  Different considerations would  apply when a contract is embodied in a Judge’-.; order [523 C] Wentworth v. Bullen, E.L.R. 141 769, Charles Hubert Kinch v. Fdward Keith Walcott, A.I.R. 1929 Journal & P.C. 289, Govind waman  v..  Murlidhar Shrinivas, A.I.R. 1953  Bom,  412  and Morris v. Barret, E.I.R. 141, 768, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 174 and 175 of 1967. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated June  16,  1966  of the Mysore High Court  in  Ex.   Regular Appeals Nos. 33-34 of 1961. V.S.  Desai,  Naunit  Lal and Swaranjit  Sodhi,  for  the appellant (in both the appeals). D.V.  Patel,  O.  P. Malhotra, P. C.  Bhartari,  for  the respondent (in both the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mathew, J. These two appeals, by special leave, are from the common judgment passed by High Court of Mysore on  16-6-1966 confirming  the  order  of the  District  Court,  Bangalore, allowing  an  application for execution  of  the  compromise decree passed on 24-6-1959 in appeal from the decree in O.S. 85 of 1949-50 of that court. The appellant was the defendant in the suit and the  respon- dent  the plaintiff.  As matter in controversy  between  the parties  in  the appeal turns upon the construction  of  the

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compromise decree, it is necessary to set out its terms :               (i)   The defendant agrees to receive from the               plaintiff   a   lakh   of   rupees   paid   as               consideration for the sale of the property No.               44,  Mahatma Gandhi Road, Bangalore,  together               with  stamp  charges of  Rs.  3,300/-  (rupees               three thousand               517               and  three hundred only) with interest at  six               per cent per annum of the above two sums  from               16-3-1947 up-to-date together with Rs. 7,000/-               (rupees  seven thousand only) deducted by  the               Corporation minus the rent received viz.,  Rs.               22,500/- (rupees twenty two thousand and  five               hundred  only) and give up all rights  to  the               said property.  The plaintiff will be entitled               to the materials lying on the premises.               (ii)The period of time fixed for the payment               by  the  plaintiff to the  defendant  of  this               amount stated above is till 1-1-1960.               (iii)The  plaintiff  agrees  to  deposit  the               amount in court for payment to the defendant.               (iv)On  failure of the plaintiff to  deposit               the  amount in court by 1-1-1960 his suit  now               in   appeal  will  be  dismissed  with   costs               throughout.               (v)   It is agreed by the parties that time is               the  essence  of the contract and  no  further               extension  of  time would be allowed  and  the               dismissal  of  the suit with  costs  would  be               automatic. The respondent applied for challan on 22-12-1959 to  deposit the  amount and a challan was issued to him  on  24-12-1959, the  last working day before the court closed for  Christmas holidays.   December  31,  1959 and January  1,  1960,  were holidays.  Neither the lower courts nor the banks were  open on these days.  The respondent made the deposit on  2-1-1960 and  sought  to  enforce  his  right  under  the  decree  by compelling the appellant to execute the conveyance in  terms of   the   compromise  decree  by  filing   execution   case No.25/1960.  The appellant also filed execution case No.  45 of 1960 for cost on the basis that the suit stood  dismissed as  per  the provision in the decree on the failure  of  the respondent  to  deposit the amount by  1-1-1960,  These  two petitions were heard together, and the court passed an order holding  that  the  respondent  had  made  the  deposit   in substantial   compliance  with  the  decree   and   allowing execution case No. 25 of 1960 and dismissing execution  case No.  45  of 1960.  Against this order, the  appellant  filed appeals  33 and 34 of 1960 before the High Court of  Mysore. A  Division Bench of the High Court, by its  judgment  dated 16-6-1966, dismissed the appeals with costs. The  short  question for consideration in these  appeals  is whether  the deposit made by the respondent on 2-1-1960  was within the time specified in the compromise decree and would 518 enable him to compel the appellant to execute the sale  deed in accordance with the provisions of the compromise decree. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the respondent had practically six month’s time to deposit the amount, that he  should  not have waited for the last day of  the  period allowed to him by the decree to deposit the amount and if he was  not  diligent to deposit the amount  earlier,  he  must suffer  the consequences if the court happened to be  closed on  the last. day on which he should have made the  deposit.

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Counsel  said  that there is a distinction  between  a  case where  under a decree an act has to be performed by a  party on a day certain and a ease where the party has the  liberty to  perform the act within a certain time  a  certain  day-. that in the former case, if the act cannot be pet-formed  by reason  of  circumstances  beyond his control,  he  will  be relieved  against the consequences of his default by  reason of the maxim Lexnon cogit ad impossibility (the law does not cornpel  a man to do that which he cannot possibly  perform) if  he performs the act at the next  available  opportunity, but where he has to per-form an act within a certain  period or by a certain date, as in this case, the law will not take notice of the circumstance that the act became incapable  of performance by reason of circumstances beyond his control on the last day of the period.  Whether there is any logical or reasonable  basis for making the distinction, we clear  that in this case the respondent had the right or, perhaps,  more accurately, the liberty to deposit the amount in court  till and including 1-1-196O.  In Halsbury’s Laws of England  vol. 37, 3rd Edition, page 96, :it is observed                "Subject  to certain exceptions, the  general               rule  is that, when an ,let may be done  or  a               benefit enjoyed  benefit enjoyed upto the last               moment of the last of that period." if  the respondent had the right or liberty to  deposit  the amount III court on 1-1-1960 under the compromise decree the fact  that  he did not choose ’Lo make the  deposit  earlier would not affect his right or liberty to deposit the  amount in  court on 1-1-1960. In Fateh Khan and another v.  Chhajju and  others(1), an argument similar to the one addressed  by counsel   for  the  appellant  was  advanced  but  was   not countenanced  by  the court.  That was a case where  a  pre- emptor was unable to deposit the purchase money in court  on the last day of the period allowed by the decree; the period expired  when the court was closed for the vacation  and  he deposited  the amount on the reopening day.  It  was  argued that  the  decree  allowed the preemptor a  period  of  time within  which  to  deposit the amount, that  he  could  have deposited (1)  A.I.R. 1931 Lahore 386. 519 the amount earlier, that he should not have waited till  the last day of the period and that if the last day happened  to be a holiday, he can take no advantage of that circumstance. The  court  repelled  the argument by  saying  that  if  the argument  is accepted it will have the effect of  curtailing the days allowed to him by the decree without any reason. It was next contended for the appellant that it was open  to the respondent to pay the amount to the appellant either  on December  31, 1959, or January 1, 1960, and that  he  should not have waited till the 2nd to deposit the amount in court. Counsel   submitted  that  under  Order  XXI  Rule  1,   the respondent  could have paid the amount to the  appellant  on January 1, 1960, or earlier, that he should not have  waited till the 2nd to deposit the amount in court and if the  last day  of the period happened to be a day on which  the  court was  closed, that is not a circumstance which would  relieve the respondent from his obligation to pay the amount  within the  time  specified.  In support of this  argument  counsel referred  to Kunj Bihari and others v. Bindeshri Prasad  and others(1), Roshan Lal v. Ganpat Lal (2), Indal v.  Chaudhary Ram Nidh(3), and Ram Kinkar Singh and another v. Smt.  Kamal Basini  Devi(4), Kunj Behari and others v. Bindeshri  Prasad and  others(1)  was  a  case  where  an  installment  decree provided that the first installment was payable on a certain

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date; the date specified expired during the vacation of  the court  and  the  amount was deposited in court  on  the  re- opening day.  It was held that the judgment debtors had  the power to make the payment direct to the decree holder,  that depositing in court was not the only course open to them and so they could not take advantage of the fact that the  court was  closed  on the specified date and the payment  made  by them  was  not made in time.  The other cases cited  are  to the, same effect.  The Principle underlying these  decisions is  that when the judgment debtor has the option to pay  the decree  amount  to  the decree holder or to  deposit  it  in court,  he cannot choose one of them and act in a manner  so as  to  prejudice the rights of the other  party.   Although under Order XXI, Rule 1. it is open to a judgment debtor  to pay the amount direct to the decree holder or to deposit  in court,  he  cannot  choose the alternative  when  that  will prejudice the decree holder. Even  here  there is a conflict of opinion  among  the  High Courts.    In  Chatlapali  Suryaprakasa  Rao  v.   Polisetti Venkataratnam and others(5), the compromise decree there  in question provided that the decretal amount should be paid in certain yearly (1) I.L.R. Vol. 51, 1929 Allahabad 527. (2) A.I,R, 1938 Allahabad 199 (3) A.I.R. (33) 1946 Oudh 156. (4) A.I.R. 1938 Patna 451. (5)  A.I.R. 1938 Madras 523. 520 instalment  on certain fixed date in each year.  The  decree further  provided that in case of default of two  successive instalments the whole amount would be recovered.  The decree however  did not provide to whom the money was to  be  paid. The judgment debtor failed to pay the first instalment.   On a  day previous to that on which the second  instalment  was due he obtained a challan.  The day on which the  instalment was due being a holiday, he paid the instalment next day  in the  Bank.   It was held by the Madras High Court  that  the judgment  debtor  did not commit default in payment  of  the second  instalment and consequently there was no default  of two successive instalments.  This is also the view that  was taken  in Premchand Bhikabhai v. Ramdeo  Sukdeo  Marwadi(1). It  is not necessary to resolve the conflict of  opinion  on this  aspect;  as  we  are concerned  with  a  decree  which specifically provided that the respondent should deposit the amount  in court.  He had, therefore, no option to  pay  the same to the appellant and the appellant, perhaps, would have been  within his right if he refused a tender of the  amount to  him.  Ile parties, for obvious reasons, agreed that  the amount should be deposited in court and that was made a rule of  the court and, therefore, the principle of the  decision in Kunj Behari and others v. Bindeshri Prasad and others and the other cases cannot be applied here. The  question then arises as to what is the principle  which should  be  applied  in a case where a party  to  a  consent decree is given time to do an act within a specified day  or by  a  specified (lay and fails to do it on  the  ground  of impossibility  of performance on the last day specified  but does  it on the next practicable day.  This  question  arose for consideration in Muhammad Jan v. Chiam Lal(2).  There  a decree in a pre-emption suit gave the plaintiff a period  of one  month  within which to deposit the  purchase  money  in order to obtain the benefit of the decree in his favour, and the  period expired on a date on which the court Was  closed for  the vacation and the plaintiff made the deposit on  the day  on  which the court re-opened.   Piggott,  Lindsay  and

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Sulaiman,  JJ. held that the deposit was in time  under  the terms  of the decree.  They said that there is  a  generally recognised  principle  of law under which  parties  who  are prevented  from doing a thing in court on a particular  day, not  by  an act of their own but by the  court  itself,  are entitled to do it at the first subsequent opportunity.   The court  quoted with approval the decision in Shooshee  Bhusan Rudro  and  another v. Gobind Chunder Roy(3)  where  it  was observed  that  the  broad principle is  that  although  the parties  themselves cannot extend the time for doing an  act in court, yet (1)  A.I.R. (36) 1949 Nagpur 141. (2)  I.L.R. Allahabad Series, Vol.  XLVI, 1924, p. 328. (3)  I.L.R. Calcutta, Vol.  XVIII (1891) p. 231. 521 If  the delay is caused not by any act of their own, but  by some  act of the court itself-such as the fact of the  court being  closed-they are entitled to do the act on  the  first opening day.  In Satnbasiva Chari v. Ramasami Reddi(1),  the Madras High Court held that there is a generally  recognised principle of law under which parties who are prevented  from doing  a thing in court on a particular day, not by any  act of their own, but by the court itself, are entitled to do it at  the  first  subsequent  opportunity.   We  have  already referred  to  Fateh Khan and another v. Chhajju  and  others where the Lahore High Court applied this principle to a pre- emption decree.  Mayor v. Harding(2) is a case in point.  In that  case the appellant had applied to justices to state  a case under the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857.  He  received the case from them on Good Friday, and transmitted it to the proper  court on the following Wednesday.  It was held  that he had complied sufficiently with the requirement of the Act directing  him to transmit the case within three days  after receiving  it, as it was impossible for him to transmit  the case  earlier  than  he did because of the  closure  of  the offices  of the court from Friday till  Wednesday.   Mellor, J., dealt with the matter as follows :               "Here  it was impossible for the appellant  to               lodge  his  case within three  days  after  he               received  it.  As regards the conduct  of  the               parties   themselves,   it  is   a   condition               precedent.   But this term is  sometimes  used               rather   loosely.   I  think  it   cannot   be               considered  strictly  a  condition   precedent               where  it  is  impossible  of  performance  in               consequence of the offices of the court  being               closed, and there being no one to receive  the                             case.    The  appellant  lodge  the case   on               Wednesday,  that  is, he did all that  it  was               practicable for him to do."               In  Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol.  37,  3rd               Edition, page 97, para 172, it is observed :               "172.   The  fact  that  the  last  day  of  a               prescribed  period is a Sunday or  other  non-               juridical day does not as a general rule  give               the person who is called upon to Act an  extra               day;  it is no excuse for his omission  to  do               the act on some prior day.               This general rule does not hold good where the               effect  of it would be +Lo render  performance               of the act impossible.  This would be the case               if   the  whole  of  the   prescribed   period               consisted  of holidays, in Which case the  act               may lawfully be done on the next possible day.

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             (1)  I.L.R. 22 Madras (1899) p. 179               (2) [1867] 2 Q.B. 410.               522               Again  the  general rule does  not  hold  good               where the last day is a Sunday and the act  be               done  is  one the performance of  which  on  a               Sunday is prohibited by the Sunday  Observance               Act,  1677, or where the act has to  be  done,               not by the party only, but by the court or  by               the  party in conjunction with the court.   In               such  cases  the act may, when  the  last  day               limited  for the performance of it happens  to               be  a  day  when the court or  its  office  is               closed, be done on the next practicable day." We  think  that  the second exception to  the  general  rule stated in the passage and in effect followed in the  rulings cited above must apply to the facts here. But  counsel  for the appellant argued that  the  compromise decree provided that on default of the respondent to deposit the  amount  in  court  on 1-1-1960,  there  was  to  be  an automatic  dismissal  of the suit by virtue  of  clause  (v) thereof  and  the execution court had no right to  alter  or modify  the  terms of the decree and hold that  the  deposit made  on  2-1-1960 shall be deemed to be a deposit  made  on 1-1-1960,  and  order the execution of the  decree  on  that basis. A court executing the decree shall execute it as it  stands. It  cannot  modify  or vary the terms  of  the  decree.   No exception  can be taken to that general principle.  But  the execution  court has the right to construe a decree  in  the light  of  the applicable provisions of law and if  in  this case  on  a construction of the decree in the light  of  the applicable provision of law, it found that the deposit  made by the respondent on 2-1-1960 was according to law a deposit in  compliance  with  the  terms of  the  decree,  then  the execution court was not varying the terms of the decree  but executing  the  decree  as it stood  after  considering  the effect of the deposit in the light of the relevant law. Counsel then contended that a compromise decree is none  the less  a contract, notwithstanding the fact that an order  of court  is super-added to it and, a provision in  a  contract that  an act shall be done within a certain period or  by  a particular  day  by  a party is absolute.   In  other  words counsel  said  that  duties are either  imposed  by  law  or undertaken by contract and the ordinary rule of law is  that when  the  law creates a duty and a party is  disabled  from performing  it  without  any default of  his  own,  the  law excuses him, but when a party by his own contract imposes  a duty  upon  himself,  he  is bound  to  make  it  good  not- withstanding any accident by inevitable necessity .  Counsel in  this  connection referred to the passage  in  Halsbury’s Law,-,  of  England Volume XIV, page 622,  para  151,  which reads as under 523               "  1151.  Where under a contract,  conveyance,               or  will a beneficial right is to  arise  upon               the performance by the beneficiary of some act               in a stated manner, or a stated time, the  act               must  be  performed accordingly  in  order  to               obtain the enjoyment of the right, and in  the               absence of fraud, accident or surprise, equity               will  not  ,relieve against a  breach  of  the               terms". Although a contract is not the less a contract because it is embodied in a judge’s order, or, as said by Parke J. in Went

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worth  v.  Bullen(1) B. & C. 840, 850 "the contract  of  the parties  is  not  the less a contract, and  subject  to  the incidents  of a contract. because there is  super-added  the command  of  a judge". still we think it is  something  more than a contract. The  Judicial  Committee  of the Privy  Council  in  Charles Hubert Kinch v. Edward Keith Walcott and others (2) observed               "’An  order  by  consent,  not  discharged  by               mutual agreement and remaining unreduced is as               effective  as  an  order  of  the  court  made               otherwise  than by consent and not  discharged               on  appeal.  A party bound by a consent  order               must when once it has been completed, obey it,               unless  and until he can get it set  aside  in               proceedings duly constituted for the  purpose.               The only difference in this respect between an               order  made by consent and one not so made  is               that  the first stands unless and until it  is                             discharged by mutual agreement or is s et  aside               by  another  order of the court :  the  second               stands  unless and until it is  discharged  on               appeal." In  Govind Waman v. Murlidhar Shrinivas and  others(3),  the Bombay  High  Court held that a consent decree passed  by  a court  of  competent jurisdiction cannot be treated  on  the same  footing  as  a  contract  between  the  parties,  that although  it  is true that before a court passes  a  consent decree,  it  can  and  should  examine  the  lawfulness  and validity  of the terms of the proposed compromise, but  when once  that stage is passed and a decree  follows,  different considerations  arise  and  therefore,  where  I  compromise decree  contains a term against alienating certain  property and  gives the other party right to its possession  on  such alienation, the decree is not a nullity in spite of the fact that  the term is opposed to S. 10, T.P. Act.  And the  fact that  it  is contrary to law would not  affect  its  binding character,   unless  it  is  set  aside  by  taking   proper proceedings.  That different conside- (1)  English Law Reports, 141, P. 769. (2)  A.I.R. 1929 journal & Privy Council, P. 289. (3)  A.I.R. 1953 Bombay 412. 524 ration would apply when a contract is embodied in a  judge’s order is also clear from Morris v. Barret(1).  In that  case by  a  consent order it was provided that, upon  payment  of 341., the debt and  costs as agreed, in installments on  the 28th of May, on the 25th of  June and on the 25th  of  every succeeding month until the    whole  is  paid,  all  further proceedings in the cause be stayed.     The  order   further provided that, in case default be made in    any payment  as aforesaid,  the  plaintiff  be  at  liberty  to  sign  final judgment  for the said sum of 341., and issue execution  for the amount unpaid.  The first and two following installments were  duly paid.  The 25th of October, the day on which  the fourth  installment  became  payable, being  a  Sunday,  the defendant  called at the office of the planitiff’s  attorney on  Monday the 26th, and offered to pay it, but was told  he was  too  late,  and  that judgment  had  been  signed.   No judgment,  however, was signed until the following  morning. The defendant took out a summons to set aside the  judgment, on  the round that under the circumstances he had the  whole of  Monday  to pay the money, and that the  judgment  signed after  the money was offered was irregular.  The court  held that the defendant had the whole of Monday to pay the money.

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One  of the arguments advanced in that case was that as  the judge’s  order was a consent order, the principle  governing contract  must regulate the rights of parties and  therefore the  defendant was not excused from performing the  contract by  the  accident of the day being a Sunday.   In  repelling this contention Erle, C.J. said :-               "I  desire not to be understood as giving  any               decision  as to the rights of parties under  a               contract : but, in arriving at the  conclusion               I  come to, I seek only to give effect to  the               duty which the law imposes upon a party who is               directed by a judge’s order to pay money......               The defendant was ready and offered to pay  it               on Monday; but the plaintiff, conceiving  that               the  offer came too late. declined to  receive               it,  and  on  the  following  day  signed  the               judgment  for  the  balance  due.    Confining               myself to the judge’s order and the remedy and               duty thereon and to what ought to be the  fair               meaning and understanding of the instrument, I               find   no  authority  for  saying   that   the               defendant was bound to search for his creditor               and pay him the money on the Sunday."               Crowder, J. said :               "This  is  not like the case  of  an  ordinary               contract;  and I de-sire not to be  understood               as at all interfering                (1) English Law Reports 141, p. 768.                     525               with any of the cases which have been referred               to  with  reference to contracts.   The  cases               upon  the  construction of statutes  are  also               founded    upon    an    entirely    different               consideration." We  may  also state that there is no evidence in  this  case that  at  the  time when the compromise  was  entered  into, either  of the parties knew that the 31st of December,  1959 and the 1st of January, 1960, would be holidays. In these circumstances we think that the deposit made by the respondent  on  2-1-1960 was in substance and  in  effect  a deposit made in terms of the compromise decree and that  the High  Court  was right in its conclusion.   We  dismiss  the appeals  but  in the circumstances without any order  as  to costs. K.B.N.                           Appeals dismissed. 3- L643SupCI/72 526