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PETITIONER: BRIJ SUNDER KAPOOR ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: IST ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/10/1988

BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR  572            1988 SCR  Supl. (3) 558  1989 SCC  (1) 561        JT 1988 (4)   529  1988 SCALE  (2)1418  CITATOR INFO :  D          1990 SC 560  (13,30,32,33)

ACT:      Uttar  Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of  Letting, Rent  and Eviction) Act (Act 10 of 1972)--Provisions of  Act whether  applicable to cantonments situated in the State  of Uttar  Pradesh--Effect  of Notification dated  September  1, 1973  and February 17, 1982--Legislation  by  incorportion-- What is--Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act 46 of  1957-Section  3--Effect of notification dated  April  3, 1972 extending provisions of Uttar Pradesh Temporary Control of  Rent and Eviction Act 3 of 1957 to cantonment  areas  in Uttar Pradesh.

HEADNOTE:      In  this group of cases a common question of  law  that falls  for  Determination  by  the  Court  is  whether   the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings  (Regulation of  Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, Act No. 13 of 1972  are applicable to cantonments situated in the State of U.P.  The High  Court has answered this question in  the  affirmative. Hence  these  appeals by tenants. The  main  judgment  under appeal  is in the case of Brij, Sunder Kapoor v.  Additional District  Judge  & Ors., [1980], All India Rent  cases  3I9. Brief facts of that case are therefore stated below  showing how  the said question arose. It may be mentioned  that  the Allahabad  High Court reiterated the same view later in  the case of Lekh Raj v. 4th Addl. Distt. Judge, Meerut, AIR 1982 All 265.      Jhansi  is a cantonment in Uttar Pradesh.  Brij  Sunder Kapoor, the appellant is a tenant of Premises No. 103, Sadar Bazar, Jhansi of which Respondent No. 3 Bhagwan Das Gupta is the  landlord.  In 1975, the landlord filed  an  application before the prescribed authority under Section 21 of the  Act praying  that  he  required the premises  for  his  personal occupation  and  that  the  same be  released  to  him.  The appellant-tenant contested the application. The  application was dismissed by the prescribed authority but, on appeal  by the  landlord,  it was allowed by  the  Additional  District Judge.   The   tenant  thereupon  filed  a   writ   petition which  was dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court  of

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Allahabad.  The  appellant-tenant has therefore  filed  this appeal.      In  order  to  judge the legality of  the  point  urged regarding  applicability  of the Act to cantonment  area  in                                                   PG NO 559 U.P.,  the  Court first referred to the history  of  tenancy legislation in the State of U.P. where the Rent and Eviction Control  Legislation was initiated by the  United  Provinces (Temporary)   Control   of  Rent  and   Eviction   Ordinance promulgated  on 1.10.1946, followed by U.P. Act III of  1947 which was made retrospective w.e.f. 1.10.1946. Both the  Act and the Ordinance applied to cantonment area. By a later Act U.P.  (Amendment)  Act  44 of 1948,  cantonment  areas  were excluded from the purview of Act III of 1947 perhaps in view of  Cantonments (House Accommodation) Act, 1923.  Consequent upon  the receipt of various representations  demanding  the applicability  of  Act III of 1947 to cantonment  area,  the State  promulgated Ordinance 5 of 1949, which, however,  was allowed  to lapse. In the meantime the Allahabad High  Court in  Smt. Ahmedi Begum v. Distt. Magistrate, [1961]  ALJ  669 ruled  that  the  State  Legislature  was  in-competent   to regulate accommodation lying in cantonments since that was a subject   in  which  Parliament  alone  was   competent   to legislate.  This  view was later approved by this  Court  in Inder  Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi. [1970] 1 SCR  443. Thereupon, Parliament enacted the U.P. Cantonments  (Control of  Rent  and Eviction Act 1952) (Act 10 of 1952).  In  1957 Parliament  enacted  the  cantonments  (Extension  of   Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 Act 22 of 1972 gave it retrospective operation  from  26.1.1950 which provided for  extension  to contonments  of  State law relating to control of  rent  and regulation of house accommodation. As a consequence of this, Act  III of 1947 became applicable to the  cantonment  area, even  though Act 10 of 1952 was in force. In order to  avoid any  complication  U.P.  Cantonments (Control  of  Rent  and Eviction) Repeal Act 1971 was enacted. A notification  under Section  3  of Act 46 of 1957 extending Act III of  1947  to cantonments  in  U.P.  was  issued  in  3.4.1972;  but  soon thereafter  Act III of 1947 was repealed by U.P. Act  13  of 1972   which   came  into  operation  On   15.7.1972   which necessitated  the  issuance of  another  notification  under Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 extending the provisions of  Act 13  of 1972. Accordingly, a notification dated 1.9.1973  was issued. It was in view of this notification that  Respondent No.  3  filed his application under Section 21 of  the  Act, which has given rise to these proceedings.      Counsel  for  the  appellants  raised  three  principal contentions viz:      (1) Whether Act 46 of 1957 applied at all to the  State of  U.P. in view of Act 10 of 1952 which  contained  special provisions applicable to cantonments in the State of U.P.      (ii) Did not the power of the Central Government  under Section  3  of  Act  46  of  1957  get  exhausted  when  the                                                   PG NO 560 notification  dated  3rd April, 1972 was  issued,  by  which provisions  of Act III of 1947 were extended to  cantonments in  U.P.  If  yes, was not  the  second  notification  dated 1.9.1973 illegal and non-est on that account?      (iii) Does not Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 suffer  from the  vice of excessive delegation of legislative powers  and is it not consequently void and inoperative?      Dismissing the appeals, this Court,      HELD:  Once it is the avowed policy of Parliament  that cantonment areas in a State should be subjected to the  same tenancy  legislation as the other areas therein, it  follows

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that  the decision involves also that future  amendments  in such State legislation should become effective in cantonment area as well. In some rare cases where Parliament feels that such  subsequent  amendments need not  apply  to  cantonment areas   or   should  apply  with  more  than   the   limited restrictions and modifications permitted by s. 3, it is open to Parliament to legislate independently for such cantonment areas.  But  the  decision  that in  the  main,  such  State legislation  should apply is unexceptionable and  cannot  be said to constitute an abdication of its legislative function by Parliament. [585G-H; 586A]      Amended  section  3 of Act XLVI of 1957,  on  a  proper construction,  validly empowers the Central  Government,  by notification, to extend the provisions of Act 13 of 1972  to the  cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh, not only  in the  form  in  which  it  stood on  the  date  of  the  said notification but also along with its subsequent  amendments. [589D-E]      Act  10  of  1952 was a  detailed  statute,  which  was applicable to cantonments in the State of U.P. [566C]      Parliamentary legislation Act 68 of 1971 terminates the applicability   of   Act  10  of  1952  in   Uttar   Pradesh cantonments. [567B]      It  enacts that Act 10 of 1952 shall stand repealed  in its application to the State of U.P. on and from the date on which  Act III of 1947 was extended to the cantonment  areas in  the State by a notification under section 3 of Act  XLVI of 1957. [567E]      A  notification was issued on 3.4.1972 under section  3 of Act XLVI Of 1957, extending the provisions of Act III  of 1947,   with  certain  modification  set  out  therein,   to                                                   PG NO 561 cantonments  in the State of Uttar Pradesh. On and from  3rd April,  1972, therefore, Act 10 of 1952 ceased to  apply  to cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh. [566E-F]      In view of this, there was, at least on and after  that date,  no  obstacle  in the way of Act  III  of  1947  being operative  in the cantonments of the State of U.P. as  well. [566F]      The  provisions of Act 68 of 1971 have rendered Act  10 of  1952  inoperative  as  and  from  3.4.1972  leaving  the provisions of Act I11 of 1947 in the field only until it was replaced by Act 13 of 1972. [567C]      Notification dated 1.9.1973 extended to the  cantonment areas only the provisions of Act XIII of 1972 as they  stood in  that  date.  It  was  only  17.2.1982  that  a   further notification was issued superseding the notifi-cation dated 1.9.1973  by which the provisions of Act XIII of 1972 as  in force  in the State of Uttar Pradesh were also  extended  to the  cantonment  areas.  The purpose  of  this  notification obviously  was that, since there had been amendments to  Act XIII of 1972 in 1974 and again in 1976, it was necessary and desirable  that  the  amended  provisions  should  also   be extended to the cantonment areas. [573D-E]      Gurcharan Singh & Ors. v. V. K. Kaushal, [1980] 4,  SCC 244.      The delegation of a power to extend even future laws of another State will not be bad so long as they are laws which are  already in force in the said areas and so long  as,  in the  process and under the character of the law or a  change of it in essential particulars is not permitted. [582H;583A]      Mahindra & Mahindra v. Union, [1979] 2 SCR 1038; Lachmi Narain  v.  Union, [1976] 2 SCR 785; Delhi  laws  Act  case, [1951] SCR 747; Raj Narain Singh’s case [1955] I SCR 74;  B. Shama  Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, [1967]  2  SCR

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650;  Gwalior  Rayon’s  Case  [1974] 2  SCR  879;  Sita  Ram Bishambher  Dayal v. State of U.P., [1972] 2 SCR  141;  Smt. Bajya  v. Smt. Gopikabai & Another, [1978] 3, SCR  561;  Jai Singh  Jairam  Tyagi etc. v. Mamanchand Ratilal  Aggarwal  & Ors., [1980] 3 SCR 224 and S.P. Jain v. Krishna Menon  Gupta JUDGMENT:

&      CIVIL   APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:  Civil   Appeal   Nos. 2606/80, 6944/83, 3779/88 and 3780/88.                                                   PG NO 562      From  the Judgments and Orders dated 23.1.80,  26.4.83, 22.11.82  and 1.8.1984 of the Allahabad High Court  in  C.M. Writ No. 549/1979 C.M.W.P. No. 6942/81, C.M.W.P. No. 8383 of 1989 and C.M.W.P. No. 11203/1980 respectively.      S.N.  Kacker,  B.D. Aggarwal R.K. Jain,  Dalip  Tandon, Rajiv Dutta, K.K. Patel, K.K. Mohan, P.K. Jain, R.K.  Khanna and Pankaj Kalra for the Appellants.      Manoj Swarup, Ms. Lalita Kohli, Anil Kumar Gupta,  S.K. Mehta,  S.M.  Sarin,  Dhruv  Mehta,  Aman  Vachher  and   R. Jagannath Goulay for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      RANGANATHAN,  J.  The  civil appeals  as  well  as  the special  leave  petitions  raise a  common  question  as  to whether the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Urban  Buildings (Regulation  Of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, Act no.  13 of   1972,  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ’the  Act)   are applicable  to  cantonments situated in the State  of  Uttar Pradesh. Since the two civil appeals are already pending  on the  issue,  we  grant special leave in  the  special  leave petitions  as  well and proceed to dispose of all  the  four matters  by this common judgment. The main judgment  of  the High  Court under consideration is that in the case of  Brij Sunder Kapoor v. Additional District Judge & Ors., (reported in  1980  All  India  Rent Cases  319)  which  answered  the question  in the affirmative. The Allahabad High  Court  has reiterated  the same view i its latter decision in Lekh  Raj v. 4th Addl. Dt. Judge, Meerut, AIR 1982 All. 265, which, we are told, is also under appeal to this Court.      It is sufficient to set out certain brief facts in  the matter  of Brij Sunder Kapoor, (C.A. 2606 of 1980) in  order to   appreciate  the  question  of  law  that   arises   for consideration. Jhansi is a cantonment in Uttar Pradesh. Brij Sunder Kapoor is a tenant of premises No. 103, Sadar  Bazar, Jhansi  of which respondent no. 3 Bhagwan Das GUpta  is  the landlord.  In 1975, the landlord Bhagwan Das Gupta filed  an application before the prescribed authority under section 21 of the Act praying that he needed the above premises for his personal  occupation  and that the same may be  released  to him.  The tenant contested the application. The  application was  dismissed by the prescribed authority but  allowed,  on appeal,  by  the  Additional  District  Judge.  The   tenant preferred  a  writ petition which has been  dismissed  by  a learned  single Judge of the Allahabad High Court and  hence the  present appeal. We are not concerned with  the  factual                                                   PG NO 563 aspects  of the controversy between the parties.  The  short point urged by learned counsel before us, which is common to all  these appeals and which was also  argued  unsucessfully before  the  High Court, was that the Act did not  apply  to cantonments in Uttar Pradesh and that, therefore, the  order of release made by the appellate authority under section  21 of the said Act was a nullity.

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    In  order to appreciate the point urged by the  learned counsel  for the appellants, it is necessary to set  out  at some length the history of tenancy legislation in the  State of  Uttar Pradesh. In this State, rent and eviction  control legislation   was   initiated  by   the   United   Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Ordinance promulgated on 1.10.1946. This Ordinance was followed by U.P. Act III of 1947   which  was  made  retrospective  with   effect   from 1.10.1946.  Both  the  Act  and  the  Ordinance  applied  to cantonment  areas  as  well as other  parts  of  the  State. Subsequently, the above Act was amended by U.P.  (Amendment) Act 44 of 1948. By this Act, cantonment areas were  excluded from  the  purview of Act III of 1947.  This  amendment  was introduced perhaps as it was felt that the cantonment  areas were to be governed by the Cantonments (House Accommodation) Act,  1923 and that the simultaneous application of Act  III of 1947 to cantonment areas may create problems.      It   appears   that,   subsequently,   a   number    of representations  were made by residents of  cantonments  for extending  the provisions of Act III of 1947  to  cantonment areas as well. Perhaps because of such representations, U.P. Ordinance 5 of 1949 was promulgated on 26th September, 1949. But this ordinance was allowed to lapse. In the meantime the Allahabad  High  Court  in Smt.  Ahmedi  Begam  v.  District Magistrate,  Agra, [1951] A.L.J. 669 took the view that  the State Legislature was incompetent to regulate  accommodation lying  in  cantonments  since that was a  subject  on  which Parliament  alone was competent to legislate, a  view  which was subsequently been approved by this court in Indu Bhushan Bose  v. Rama Sundri Devi, [1978] I S.C.R.  443.  Thereupon, Parliament enacted the U.P. Cantonments (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1952 (Act 10 of 1952). Though this was an Act of Parliament, its operation was confined to cantonments  in Uttar Pradesh.      In 1957, Parliament enacted the Cantonments  (Extension of  Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 (Act XLVI of 1957). Act  22 of  1972  gave it retrospective effect  from  26.1.1950.  It provided for the extension, to cantonments in each State, of                                                   PG NO 564 laws relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation  prevalent in the particular State in  respect of  areas other than cantonments. The Statement  of  Objects and  Reasons  of this Act specifically states that  the  Act became necessary because the power to make laws with respect to rent control and house accommodation in cantonment  areas is  exclusively vested in Parliament. Section 3 of this  Act originally read thus:      ’The  Central  Government may by  notification  in  the official  gazette,  extend  to  any  cantonment  with   such restrictions  and  modifications  as  it  thinks  fit,   any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation  of house  accommodation  which  is  in force  on  the  date  of notification  in  the  State  in  which  the  cantonment  is situated.      The  words  "on the date of the  notification"  in  the section were omitted  by section 3 of Central Act 22 of 1972 with full retrospective effect.      The  promulgation  of  this  Act  created  a   somewhat anomalous  position  so  far  as  the  State  of  U.P.   was concerned. As we have already mentioned, Act 10 of 1952  was already  in force in the cantonment areas of the  State  and the  issue  of  a notification  by  the  Central  Government purporting to apply Act III of ]947 also to the  cantonments in  U.P. would create complications. If Act III of 1947  had to  be extended to cantonment areas in U.P. in place of  Act

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10  of 1952, it was necessary that the provisions of Act  10 of  1952  should be repealed by a  parliamentary  enactment. This  was done by enacting the U.P. Cantonments (Control  of Rent and Eviction) (Repeal) Act, 1971 (Act 68 of 1971).  The object  of passing the Act, as given in its long title.  was to       provide  for  the repeal of U.P. Act  10  of  1952. Section 2 of this Act reads as under:      "On  and  from the date on which the  United  Provinces (Temporary)  Control  of  Rent and  Eviction  Act,  1947  is extended by notification under section 3 of the  Cantonments (Extension   of  Rent  Control  Laws)  Act,  1957   to   the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Uttar Pradesh Cantonments (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1952, Act l0 of 1952 shall stand repealed."      It  was only on April 3, 1972 that a  notification  was issued by the Central Government under section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 extending the provisions of U.P. Act III of 1947  to the  cantonments  in the State of Uttar  Pradesh.  But  soon                                                   PG NO 565 after the above notification was issued U.P. Act III of 1947 itself  was  repealed and replaced by U.P. Act 13  of  1972, which came into force on 15th July, 1972. This  necessitated the  issue  of another notification under section 3  of  Act XLVI  of 1957 extending the provisions of Act 13 of 1972  to the  cantonments in Uttar Pradesh. This  notification  dated 1.9.1973, and gazetted on 29.9.1973, reads as follows:      "In  exercise of the powers conferred by section  3  of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act,  1957, (Act 46 of 1957), and in supersession of the notification of the  Government  of India in the Ministry  of  Defence,  No. S.R.O.  8,  dated 3rd April, 1972,  the  Central  Government hereby extends to all the cantonments in the State of  Uttar Pradesh  the  U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation  of  Letting, Rent  and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act XIII of 1972  as  in force  on  the date of this notification, in  the  State  of Uttar  Pradesh  with the  following  modifications,  namely,      It   was  in  view  of  the  above  notification   that respondent  No. 3 filed his application under section 21  of the   said  Act,  which  has  given  rise  to  the   present proceedings.      Three  questions  were posed by Shri  S.N.  Kacker  who opened arguments for the appellants (but unfortunately could not  complete  them due to his unexpected demise)  and  Shri Agarwal who followed him. These were:      (i) Does Act XLVI of 1957 apply to the State of U.P. at all  in  view of the fact that Act 10 of 1952, which  was  a detailed   and   elaborate  enactment,   contained   special provisions applicable to cantonments in this State?      (ii) Did not the power of the Central Government  under section  3  of  Act  XLVI of 1957  get  exhausted  when  the notification dated 3rd April, 1972 was issued, by which  the provisions  of Act III of 1947 were extended to  cantonments in  U.P.?  If  yes, was not the  second  notification  dated 1.9.1973  purporting to extend the provisions of Act  13  of 1972 to cantonments in U.P. illegal and non-est?      iii) Does not section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 suffer from the  vice of excessive delegation of legislative powers  and                                                   PG NO 566 is it not consequently void and inoperative?      Apart  from these principal questions, it  was  pointed out by Shri Tandon (appearing for the petitioner in SLP  No. 6944 of 1983) that, in his case, the landlord was trying  to resort to provisions of Act 13 of 1972 as amended by Act  28 of  1976. It was submitted that, while Act 13 of 1972 as  in force  on  1.9.73 was extended to U.P.  cantonments  by  the

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notification   dated   1.9.1973,  there   was   no   further notification  applying the provisions of the  Acts  amending the same to the cantonments till 17.2.1982. It was therefore contended that in any event the amended provisions would not be applicable to the cantonment areas of U.P.      So far as the first contention is concerned, we do  not think there is any substance in it. It is true that Act  1() of  1952  was a detailed statute, which  was  applicable  to cantonments  in the State of U.P. It is also true that  this enactment  which  was  a  Central  enactment  could  not  be rendered  inoperative  by the mere issue of  a  notification under  section  3 of Act XLVI of 1957 and that it  could  be repealed  or made inoperative only by an Act of  Parliament. But in this case there is a parliamentary legislation  which terminates  the  applicability of Act 10 of  1952  in  Uttar Pradesh  Cantonments. This is Act 68 of 1971. Section  2  of this Act has already been reproduced. It enacts that Act  10 of 1952 shall stand repealed in its application to the State of  U.P. on and from the date on which Act III of  1947  was extended  to  the  cantonment  areas  in  the  State  by   a notification under section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957. As we have already  mentioned,  a notification was issued  on  3.4.1972 under  section  3  of  Act  XLVI  of  1957,  extending   the provisions  of Act III of 1947, with  certain  modifications set  out  therein,  to cantonments in  the  State  of  Uttar Pradesh.  On and from 3rd April, 1972, therefore, Act 10  of 1952  ceased to apply to cantonments in the State  of  Uttar Pradesh.  In view of this, there was, at least on and  after that  date, no obstacle in the way of Act III of 1947  being operative  in the cantonments of the State of U.P. as  well. Perhaps  releasing this, a contention was put  forward  that Act XLVI of 1957, promulgated at a time when Act 10 of  1952 was  in force in U.P., should be construed as  an  enactment applicable  to all States in India other than the  State  of Uttar Pradesh. It is not possible to accept this  contention for two reasons. In the first place the language of the  Act does  not justify any such restriction. Secondly, since  the Act  has been given retrospective effect from 26.1.1950,  it should  be deemed to have been in force from that  date.  On that  date Act 10 of 1952 was not in force in the  State  of U.P. and so the terms of Act 46 of 1957 would be  applicable to contonments in all States including U.P. This takes  away                                                   PG NO 567 the  entire basis of the argument. Again, there  might  have been  some difficulty If, by a notification under section  3 of this Act, the Central Government had sought to apply  Act III  of 1947 to cantonments in the State of  Uttar  Pradesh, without  there  being a repeal of Act 10 of 1952.  But  this possible  repugnancy between two legislations  operating  in the   State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  (one  by  virtue   of   the notification under section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 and the other by  virtue  of the provisions of Act 10 of  1952)  has  been obviated  by  the  provisions  of  Act  68  of  1971.  These provisions  have rendered Act 10 of 1952 inoperative as  and from  3.4.1972 leaving the provisions of Act III of 1947  in the field only until it was replaced by Act 13 of 1972.      One  more, somewhat different, argument which seems  to have  been addressed before the High Court on the  basis  of Act  68  of 1971 is that, on the issue of  the  notification dated  3.4.1972, the provisions of Act III of 1947,  subject to  the modifications mentioned in the  notification,  stood bodily  lifted and incorporated in Act 68 of 1971  and  that the  repeal thereafter, of Act III of 1947 did not have  any bearing  in  respect of cantonments in the  State  of  Uttar Pradesh.  In  other words, the argument is that Act  Ill  of

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1947  continues, to be in operation in the cantonment  areas even  now.  The  appellants  obviously  have  in  mind   the principles  of  referential  legislation  by   incorporation outlined in Mahindra & Mahindra v. Union, [1974] 2 SCR  1038 and  other  cases. We, agree, however, with the  High  Court that  s.  2  of  Act  68 of  1971  is  not  an  instance  of legislation  by incorporation. The only purpose of  1947  to cantonment areas was already there in Act XLVI of 1957.  But there was a hurdle in the issue of a notification under s. 3 of  that Act in that Act 10 of 1952 was already in force  in such areas. Act 68 of 1971 merely removed this obstacle  and enacted that Act 10 of 1952 would stand repealed on the date of   issue  of  the  notification  under  s.  Once  such   a notification  was  issued,  Act 68 of 1971  had  served  Its purpose  out and had no further impact. It did not have  the further effect of incorporating within itself the provisions of the extended law. If that had been the intention, s. 2 of Act 68 of 1971, as pointed out by the High Court, would have read something like this:      "On and from the date of commencement of this Act,  the provisions of U.P. Act III of 1947 shall be applicable to be cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh and Act 10 of 1952 shall stand repealed."                                                   PG NO 568      It  will  be  noticed  that  the  above  argument  also overlooks the effect of later notifications under s. 3 which have  superseded the effect     of the one dated  3.4.1972. To get over this difficulty, it is argued that s. 3 empowers the Government to issue a notification thereunder only  once and  that, once the notification dated 3.4.1972 was  issued, the  power  got exhausted. The further  notifications  dated 1.9.1973  and 17.2.1982 are, it is said, null and void.  The argument  is  based on a short passage in Lachmi  Narain  v. Union,  [1976] 2 SCR 785. This case has a relevance  on  the third contention also to which we shall advert later. So far as  the aspect presently under discussion is concerned,  its relevance arises in this way. In that case, s. 2 of the Part C  States (Laws) Act, 1950 empowered the Central  Government to  extend, by notification in the official gazette, to  any Part C State or part of it, any enactment in a Part A State. The Central Government, in exercise of this power, issued  a notification in 1951, extending the provisions of the Bengal Finance  (Sales Tax) Act, l941 to the then Part C  State  of Delhi  with certain modifications set out in s. 6. In  1957, the Central Government issued another notification, again in purported exercise of the powers conferred by s. 2, by which an  additional  modification of s. 6 of the Bengal  Act  was introduced  in  the 1951 notification as a result  of  which certain   exemptions  available  to  the   petitioner   were withdrawn  at shorter notice than was permissible under  the modifications notified in I951. The notification of 1957 was held  to be invalid and ineffective on several grounds,  one of which was thus stated at page 801:      "The  power given by s. 2 exhausts itself on  extension of  the enactment, it cannot be exercised be  repeatedly  or sub-sequently  to such extension. It Can be  exercised  only once  simultaneously  with the extension of  the  enactment. This  is  one  dimension  of  the  statutory  limits   which circumscribe the power."      This  was  elaborated  further by  the  learned  Judge, Sarkaria,  J.  at p. 802, contrasting a clause of  the  kind under  consideration with a "Removal of  Difficulty  Clause" which permits removal of difficulties felt in the  operation of an Act from time to time. The learned Judge observed:      "Firstly,   the   power   has   not   been    exercised

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contemporaneously with the extension or for the purposes  of the extension of the Bengal Act to Delhi. The power given by s.  2 of the Laws Act had exhausted itself when  the  Bengal Act  was  extended,  with  some  alterations,  to  Delhi  by                                                   PG NO 569 Notification dated 28.4.1951. The impugned notification  has been  issued  on 7.12.1957, more than six and a  half  years after the extension.      There is nothing in the opinion of this Court  rendered in  Re:  Delhi  Laws Act (supra) to  support  Mr.  B.  Sen’s contention  that  the power given by s. 2 could  be  validly exercised within one year after the extension. What  appears in  the  opinion of Fazal Ali J. at page 850,  is  merely  a quotation  from  the report of the Committee  on  Minister’s Powers  which  considered the propriety of  the  legislative practice  of inserting a "Removal of Difficulty  Clause"  in Acts  of  British Parliament, empowering  the  executive  to modify  the Act itself so far as necessary for origining  it into  operation. This device was adversely  commented  upon. While  some critics conceded that this device is  "partly  a draftsman’s  insurance  policy, in case  he  has  overlooked something"  (e.g.  Sir  Thomas Carr, page  44  of  his  book "concerning  English  Administrative Law"),  others  frowned upon  it, and nicknamed it as "Henry VIII Clause" after  the British  Monarch  who  was a  notorious  personification  of absolute despotism. It was in this perspective that the Com- mittee  on  Minister’s  Powers examined  this  practice  and recommended:      "  ........ first, that the adoption of such  a  clause ought on each occasion when it is, on the initiative of  the Minister in charge of the Bill, proposed to Parliament to be justified  by  him  upto  the  essential.  It  can  only  be essential  for the limited purpose of bringing an  Act  into operation  and  it  should accordingly be  in  most  precise language  restricted to those purely machinery  arrangements vitally  requisite for that purpose; and the  clause  should always contain a maximum time-limit of one year after  which the power should lapse."      It  may be seen that the time-limit of one year  within which  the  power  under  a  Henry  VIII  Clause  should  be exercisable,  was  only  a recommendation,  and  is  not  an inherent attribute of such power. In one sense, the power of extension-cum-modification given under s. 2 of the Laws  Act and the power of modification and adaptation conferred under                                                   PG NO 570 a usual ’Henry VIII Clause’ are kindred powers of fractional legislation,  delegated  by the  legislature  within  narrow circumscribed   limits.   But  there  is   one   significant difference  between the two. While the power under s. 2  can be exercised only once when the Act is extended, that  under a ’Henry VIII Clause’ can be invoked, if there is nothing to the  contrary in the clause--more than once, on the  arising of  a difficulty when the Act is operative. That is to  say, the  power under such a clause can be exercised  whenever  a difficulty  arises  in  the working of  the  Act  after  its enforcement,  subject of course to the time-limit,  if  any, for its exercise specified in the statute.      Thus, anything said in Re: Delhi Laws Act, (supra),  in regard  to the time-limit for the exercise of power under  a ’Henry  VIII Clause’, does not hold good in the case of  the power  given by s. 2 of the Laws Act. Fazl Ali J.,  did  not say      anything indicating that the power in question  can be  exercised  within  one year of  the  extension.  On  the contrary, the learned Judge expressed in unequivocal  terms, at page 849:

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    ’Once  the  Act  became operative  any  defect  in  its provision  cannot be removed until amending  legislation  is passed’."      Basing   himself  on  this  passage,  learned   counsel contended that, once the notification dated 3rd April,  1972 was issued, the power under s. 3 had got exhausted, and  the section   could  not  have  been  invoked  by  the   Central Government  once  again  to issue the  notification  of  Ist September, 1973 extending Act 13 of 1972 to the  cantonments of U.P.      It  will  be  at  once clear  that  there  is  a  basic difference  between the situation in Lachmi  Narain  (supra) and  that  in  the present case. In both  cases,  the  power conferred is to extend the provisions of another         Act with  modifications considered necessary. In  Lachmi  Narain this  had  been done by the 1951  notification.  The  Bengal Finance  (Sales  Tax) Act, had been extended to  Delhi  with certain  modifications. The object of the 1957  notification was  not to extend a Part A legislation to Delhi; it was  to modify the terms of an extension notified earlier. This  was held  to be impermissive in as much as all that the  section permitted was an extension of the laws of a part A State  to Delhi, which, ex facie, had already been done in 1951.  Here the  nature  of  the  legislation  in  question  is  totally different.  As we shall explain later, the whole purpose  of                                                   PG NO 571 Act XLVI of 1947 was to ensure that the cantonment areas  in a State have the same rent laws as the other areas  thereof. This when Act III of 1947 ceased to be in force in the  rest of  the State, no purpose would be served by its  continuing in  force  in the cantonment areas alone. So also  when  the provisions  of  the law in force in the State  got  amended, there  should  be a power to extend the amended law  in  the cantonment.  This was, obviously, the reason why Act  22  of 1972 amended S. 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 to omit the words  "on the   date   of  the  notification"   retrospectively.   The provisions  of S. 3 of the Act XLVI of 1957 should,  in  the circumstances be construed so as to achieve this purpose and as  enabling the Central Government to  issue  notifications from  time  to  time  and  not  as  exhausted  by  a  single invocation  as in the case of the statute considered in  the Delhi  Laws  Act case, (supra). S. 3  could,  therefore,  be invoked  from  time  to  time  as  occasion  arise  and  the notifications  dated  1.9.1973 and 17.2.1982 are  valid  and intra  vires. In such a situation, we think, the  limitation suggested  in  the above decision will not operate.  On  the other hand, the provisions of s. 14 and s. 21 of the General Clauses Act will apply and it will be open to the Government to  extend  another legislation or further  legislations  to cantonments in place of the one that had been repealed.     The above conclusion can also be supported on the  ratio of  decision in Gurcharan Singh and Others v. V.K.  Kaushal, [1980]   4   S.C.C.  244,  also  a   case   concerned   with notifications under s. 3 of Act XLVI of 1957. In exercise of this  power the Central Government issued on 2  1.11.1969  a notification extending the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949,  to  cantonments  in the State  of  Punjab  &  Haryana Subsequently,  after  the amendment of s. 3 of Act  XLVI  of 1957 by Act 22 of 1972, another notification was issued,  on 24.1   1974,  superseding  the  earlier   notification   and extending  the East Punjab Act afresh to cantonments in  the State of Punjab & Haryana with a modification of s. 1(3)  of the  said  Act  with retrospective effect  from  26.1  1950. Upholding the validity of this notification and repelling an argument  similar  to the one now advanced  before  us,  the

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Court observed:    "Two  points  are  raised on  behalf  of  the  appellants against  that conclusion. The first is that the power  under section  3  of the Cantonments (Extension  of  Rent  Control Laws) Act, 1957 having been exercised once, that is to  say, by  the notification dated November 21, 1969, the  power  of extension stood exhausted and could not be availed of again, and  therefore the Notification dated January 24,  1974  was with-our  statutory sanction and invalid We are referred  to                                                   PG NO 572 Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, [1976] 2 SCR 785. That  was a  case  where  this Court held that  a  notification  under Section 2 Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 having been  issued in  1951  by  the Central Government  extending  the  Bengal Finance  (Sales  Tax) Act, 1941 to the State of  Delhi,  the power  given by section 2 exhausted itself on the  extension of the enactment and could not be exercised again to  enable the  issue  of a fresh notification modifying the  terms  in which  the  Bengal  Act was extended. The  case  is  clearly distinguishable.  The  power under  which  the  notification dated  January  24, 1974 has been issued is a  separate  and distinct power from that under which the notification  dated November  21, 1969 was made. The power now exercised  passed into  the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws)  Act, 1957 when it was amended in 1972. In its nature and  quality it  is  not  identifiable with the power  vested  under  the unamended Act. A power conferred by statute is distinguished by the character and content of its essential components. If one  or  more material components characterising  the  power cannot  be  identified  with  the  material  components   of another,  they  are  two  different  and  distinct   powers. Although  broadly  the power envisaged in section 3  of  the amended  Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control  Laws)  Act, 1957  is  a  power of extension even as  it  was  under  the unamended  Act,  there  is a  vital  qualitative  difference between  the  two. The power under the unamended Act  was  a limited  power. It could operate prospectively  only.  There was  no  choice  in the matter.  After  amendment,  the  Act provided   for   a   power   which   could   be    exercised retrospectively. The power extended to giving  retrospective effect to an enactment in force in the State in the form  in which  that enactment was in force on the date on which  the extension  was  made. It was a power whose reach  and  cover extended  far beyond what the power under the unamended  Act could achieve.     We  are  of the view that in  issuing  the  notification dated January 24, 1974 and thereby extending the East Punjab Urban   Rent  Restriction  Act  to  the  Ambala   Cantonment retrospectively  with  effect  from January  26,  1950,  the Central  Government  exercised a power not available  to  it when it issued the notification dated November 21, 1969. The contention that the issue of the notification of January 24,                                                   PG NO 573 1974  amounted to a further exercise of power  conferred  by section  3  of the Cantonments (Extension  of  Rent  Control Laws)  Act, 1957, under which the earlier  notification  was issued is without force and must be rejected. (underlining ours)     This principle will also apply in the present case  for, while the notification dated 3.4.1972 was issued in exercise of  the  power  under  the unamended s.  3,  the  one  dated 1.9.1973  was issued in exercise of the new power  available after the amendment of Act 22 of 1972 which came into  force on 2nd June, 1972, though there is a distinction between the two cases in that the latter notification, unlike the second

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notification in the other case, did not purport to give  any retrospective effect to the extended legislation.     It  should  be mentioned here  that  notification  dated 1.9.1973   extended  to  the  cantonment  areas   only   the provisions  of Act XIII of 1972 as they stood on that  date. It  was  only on 17.2.1982 that a further  notification  was issued superseding the notification dated 1.9.1973 by  which the provisions of Act XIII of 1972 as in force in the  State of Uttar Pradesh were also extended to the cantonment areas. The  purpose of this notification obviously was that,  since there  had been amendments to Act XIII of 1972 in  1974  and again  in  i976,  it was necessary and  desirable  That  the amended provisions should also be extended to the cantonment areas. The question raised above on behalf of the appellants regarding  the validity of the notification dated  1.9.1973, has   to  be  considered  also  in  the  context   of   this notification  dated  17.12.1982. For the  reasons  discussed above,  we  are of the opinion that the  Central  Government acted   within   its  powers  in  issuing   the   subsequent notification  dated  17.2.1982 as well. This also is  not  a case  like the one in Lachmi Narain v. Union, [ l976] 2  SCR 785,  where  the purpose of the second notification  was  to modify  without  any provocation the contents of  the  first notification issued for the purposes of extension. Here  the subsequent    notification    became    necessary    because subsequently  the enactments had amended the  provisions  of the  Act, which had been extended previously.  Moreover.  as the  original Act l3 of 1972 has already been extended,  the real  purpose  of  this  notification  was  to  extend   the provisions  of  Act 19 of 1974 and Act 28 of  1976  also  to those areas. In our view, the provisions of sections 14  and 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, clearly apply for  this reason as well as for the reason given in Gurcharan  Singh’s case.  The validity of the notification dated 17.2.1982  is, therefore, upheld.                                                   PG NO 574     Shri  S.K.  Mehta  also  contended  that,  even  if  the notification  of  l.9.1973  is  left  out  of  account,  the notification  of 3.4. 1972 was itself sufficient to  achieve the present purpose. He submitted that, since Act 13 of 1972 repealed  and re-enacted the provisions of Act Ill of  1947, all  references  in  Act  28  of 1971  as  well  as  in  the notification  dated  3.4.1972  to Act III of  1947  and  its provisions  should be construed as references to Act  13  of 1972  and its corresponding provisions as amended from  time to  time. He relied on S. 8 of the General Clauses  Act.  In the view we have taken above, we consider it unnecessary  to deal with this contention or express any opinion thereon.     Now to turn to the principal contention in the case: the contention  is that Act XLVI of 1957 does not  itself  enact any  provisions  in respect of house  accommodation  in  the cantonment  areas  of  U.P. Section 3 of Act  XLVI  of  1957 purports only to empower the Central Government to legislate for  such areas. It is true that the Central  Government  is not  given  carte blanche to do whatever it  likes  in  this respect and that its power of notification is restricted  to merely  extending to cantonment areas the provisions of  the corresponding laws in force in the other areas of the  State of  Uttar  Pradesh.  But this itself  amounts  to  excessive delegation of legislative power for three reasons:     (a)  On  the date of the enactment of Act  46  of  1957, Parliament could not predicate what type of provisions  will be  in  operation in the other areas of the States  on  some future  date (s) on which the Central Government  may  issue notifications under s. 3 in respect of various States. S.  3

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thus   authorises   the  introduction,   on   a   Government notification,   of,  a  law  to  the  provisions  of   which Parliament has had no occasion to apply its mind at all;     (b)  There  is a further vitiating element in  that  the Central  Government under section 3 is empowered  to  direct not merely  that the provisions of a State enactment,  which may  be  in  force  in the State on the  date  of  the  such notification,  should apply to the cantonment areas  in  the State as well. The amendment to section  3 by Act 22 of 1972 goes  one  step further to make it clear that  the   Central Government  can make a general notification that any   State enactment  in force in the State would apply to  cantonments as  well.  This means that, on a mere  notification  by  the Central   Government,  not  merely  the  provisions  of   an enactment which are in force on the date of the notification but also all future  enactments on this topic that may  come into   force   from  time  to  time  in  the   State   would automatically apply to cantonment areas as well. Thus,  even                                                   PG NO 575 the  notifying authority may not have had occasion to  apply its mind at all to the provisions of the law that are to  be made applicable to the cantonments. Thus, for instance,  the amendments  in  1976 to Act 13 of 1972 can be sought  to  be made  applicable  though,  on  the  date  of  issue  of  the notification  under section 3, the Central Government  could not  at  all have anticipated that there would  be  such  an amendment; and     (c)  The Central Government has been empowered to  apply such  laws, with such restrictions and modifications, as  it thinks  fit. Such an unrestricted power may well  result  in the  notification  modifying  the  State  law  in   material respects and enacting a law of its own for cantonment areas, which  is  not permissible. Learned Counsel  submitted  that there  is  not  even a broad  indication  in  the  principal statute  viz.  Act  XLVI of 1957 as to  the  nature  of  the provisions  of  the  enactment which it  would  like  to  be applied  to cantonments. A mandate to the Government  for  a blind application, at its choice, of an enactment,  existing or future, to cantonment areas within a State merely because such  an  enactment happens to be operative  in  respect  of other areas in the State, it is said, amounts to a  complete abdication  of legislative Power by Parliament which is  not permissible under our Constitution.     We  may  at  once  deal  with  limb  (c)  of  the  above contention,  a  direct answer to which is furnished  by  the decision  in Lachmi Narain’s case, [1976] 2 SCR 785  already discussed.  Referring to the judgment in the Delhi Laws  Act case,  [1951] SCR 747 and Rajnarain Singh’s case,  [1955]  1 SCR 219 on the scope of expressions such as "subject to such restrictions  and modification as it thinks fit",  Sarkaria, J. observed:    "Bearing in mind the principles and the scope and meaning of the expression ’restrictions and modifications’ explained in Delhi Laws Act, let us now have a close look at s. 2.  It will be clear that the primary power bestowed by the section on  the  Central Government, is one of extension,  that  is, bringing into operation and effect, in a Union Territory, an enactment  already  in  force in  a  State.  The  discretion conferred   by  the  section  to  make   ’restrictions   and modification’ in the enactment sought to be extended, is not a  separate  and  independent  power.  It  is  an   integral constituent  of  the  powers  of  extension.  It  cannot  be exercised  apart  from  the  power  of  extension.  This  is                                                   PG NO 576 indubitably   clear  from  the  preposition   ’with’   which

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immediately  precedes  the  phrase  ’such  restrictions  and modifications’  and conjoins it to the principal  clause  of the section which gives the power of extension. According to the  Shorter  Oxford  Dictionary, one meaning  of  the  word ’with’  (which accords here with the context), is  ’part  of the same whole’.     The power given by s. 2 exhausts itself on extension  of the  enactment;  it cannot be exercised repeatedly  or  sub- sequently to such extension. It can be exercised only  once, simultaneously with the extension of the enactment. This  is one dimension of the statutory limits which circumscribe the power.  The  second is that the power cannot be used  for  a purpose  other  than that of extension. In the  exercise  of this  power, only such ’restrictions and modifications’  can be validly engrafted in the enactment sought to be extended, which are necessary to bring it into operation and effect in the Union Territory. Modifications’ which are not  necessary for,  or  ancillary  and  subservient  to  the  purpose   of extension,    are   not   permissible.   And,   only    such ’modifications’  can  be  legitimately  necessary  for  such purpose  as  are  required to adjust,  adapt  and  make  the enactment  suitable to the peculiar local conditions of  the Union  Territory for carrying in into operation and  effect. In  the context of the section, the words ’restrictions  and modifications  do  not cover such alterations as  involve  a change  in  any essential feature. of the enactment  or  the legislative  policy  built  into  it.  This  is  the   third dimension of the limits that circumscribe the power.     It  is  true  that  the  words  ’such  restrictions  and modifications as it thinks fit’, if construed literally  and in  isolation, appear to give unfettered power  of  amending and  modifying the enactment sought to be extended.  Such  a wide construction must be eschewed lest the very validity of the  section  becomes vulnerable on account of the  vice  of excessive delegation. Moreover, such a construction would be repugnant  to  the context and the content of  the  section, read  as  a whole, and the statutory limits  and  conditions attaching to the exercise of the power. We must,  therefore, confine   the   scope  of  the   words   ’restrictions   and modifications’ to alterations of such a character which keep the  inbuilt policy, essence and substance of the  enactment                                                   PG NO 577 sought  to  be extended, in tact, and  introduce  only  such peripheral  or insubstantial changes which  are  appropriate and necessary to adapt and adjust it to the local conditions of the Union Territory. "     These observations make it clear that, though apparently wide  in scope, the power of the Central Government for  the extension  of laws is a very limited one and  cannot  change the basic essential structure or the material provisions  of the law sought to be extended to cantonment areas.     The   principal  decision  on  which  counsel  for   the appellants placed reliance in support of the other limbs  of his contention is the decision of this court in B. Shama Rao v. The Union Territory of Pondicherry, [1967] 2 S.C.R.  650. In  that  case  the  legislative  assembly  for  the   Union Territory  of  Pondicherry passed  the  Pondicherry  General Sales  Tax Act (10 of 1965) which was published on June  30, 1965.  Section 1(2) of the Act provided that it  would  come into force on such date as the Pondicherry Government may by notification appoint. Section 2(1) of the Act provided  that the  Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, as in force in  the State  of Madras immediately before the commencement of  the Pondicherry Act, shall be extended to Pondicherry subject to certain  modifications. The Pondicherry Government issued  a

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notification   under  section  1(2)  on  Ist  March,   1966, appointing April 1, 1966 as the date of commencement of  the Act. It so happened that, between 30th of June 1965 when the Pondicherry Act was published and the Ist April 1966,  which was  the  notified  date for its  commencement,  the  Madras legislature had substantially amended the Madras Act. It was the  Madras Act, as amended upto Ist April 1966,  which  was brought  into force in Pondicherry. When the Act  came  into force the petitioner was called upon to register himself  as a dealer under the Act. He filed a writ petition challenging the  validity of the Act. After the petition was filed,  the Pondicherry  legislature  passed an  amendment  Act  whereby section  1(2) of the principal Act was amended to read  that the  principal Act shall come into force on the  Ist  April, 1966 and also contained a validating provision in respect of all  proceedings  taken  in between.  The  majority  of  the Constitution  Bench, which heard the matter, held (Shah  and Bhargava, JJ. dissenting) that the Act of 1965 was void  and still  born and could not be revived even by  the  amendment Act  passed in 1966. The dissenting judges did  not  express any  view on the contention th4t the principal Act  was  bad for  excessive delegation of powers when it was enacted  and published,  as  they were of the view  that  the  subsequent                                                   PG NO 578 amendment Act passed by the Pondicherry Legislature had  the effect  of  bringing into force in Pondicherry a  valid  Act under  which the proceedings sought to be taken against  the petitioner were fully justified. We are here concerned  with the   majority  view  on  the  question  of  abdication   of legislative  functions. After referring to  certain  earlier decisions of the court and in particular the decision in the case  of  Delhi  Laws Act, [1951] S.C.R.  747,  Shelat,  J., speaking for the Court observed as follows:     "The  question then is whether in extending  the  Madras Act  in the manner and to the extent it did under sec.  2(1) of the  principal Act the Pondicherry legislature  abdicated its  legislative power in favour of the Madras  legislature. It  is  manifest that the Assembly refused  to  perform  its legislative  function entrusted under the  Act  constituting it.  It  may  be  that a mere  refusal  may  not  amount  to abdication  if the legislature instead of going through  the full  formality  of  legislation  applies  its  mind  to  an existing statute enacted by another legislature for  another jurisdiction, adopts such an Act and enacts to extend it  to the  territory under its jurisdiction. In doing so,  it  may perhaps  be  said that it has laid down a policy  to  extend such an Act and directs the executive to apply and implement such  an  Act. But when it not only adopts such an  Act  but also provides that the Act applicable to its territory shall be the Act amended in future by the other legislature, there is  nothing for it to predicate what the amended  Act  would be.  Such a case would be clearly one of non-application  of mind and one of refusal to discharge the function  entrusted to it by the Instrument constituting it. It is difficult  to how such a case in not of abdication or effacement in favour of another legislature at least in regard to that particular matter.     But  Mr.  Setalvad contended that the validity  of  such legislation  has  been  accepted in Delhi  Laws  Act’s  case [1951] S.C.R. 747 and particularly in the matter of  heading No. 4 as summarised by Bose, J. in Raj Narayan Singh’s  case [1955] 1 S.C.R. 290. In respect of that heading the majority conclusion no doubt was that authorisation in favour of  the executive  to  adopt laws passed by another  legislature  or legislatures including future laws would not be invalid.  So

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far  as that conclusion goes Mr. Setalvad is  right. But  as                                                   PG NO 579 already stated, in arriving at that conclusion each  learned Judge  adopted  a  different  reasoning.  Whereas  Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ. accepted the contention that the  plenary legislative power includes power of delegation and held that since such a power means that the legislature can make  laws in  the manner it liked if it delegates that power short  of an abdication there can be no objection. On the other  hand, Fazl  Ali  J.  upheld  the laws  on  the  ground  that  they contained a complete and precise policy and the  legislation being thus conditional the question of excessive  delegation did not arise. Mukherjea J. held that abdication need not be total but can be partial and even in respect of a particular matter and if so the impugned legislation would be bad. Bose J.  expressed  in  frank language his  displeasure  at  such legislation  but  accepted  its validity on  the  ground  of practice  recognised ever since Burah’s ease 5 I.A. 178  and thought that that practice was accepted by the Constitution- makers  and  incorporated  in  the  concept  of  legislative function  There  was  thus  no  unanimity  as  regards   the principles upon which those laws were upheld.     All  of them however appear to agree on  one  principle, viz.,  that  where  there is abdication  or  effacement  the legislature concerned in truth and in fact acts contrary  to the  Instrument  which  constituted it and  the  statute  in question would be void and still-born.     In  the  present case it is clear that  the  Pondicherry legislature  not only adopted the Madras Act as it stood  at the  date when it passed the Principal Act but also  enacted that  if the Madras legislature were to amend its Act  prior to the date when the Pondicherry government would issue  its notification it would be the amended Act which would  apply. The legislature at that stage could not anticipate that  the Madras Act would not be amended nor could it predicate  what amendment or amendments would be carried out or whether they would  be of a sweeping character or whether they  would  be suitable in Pondicherry. In point of fact the Madras Act was amended and by reason of section 2(1) read with section 1(2) of  the  Principal  Act it was the  amended  Act  which  was brought  into operation in Pondicherry. The result was  that the Pondicherry legislature accepted the amended Act  though it was not and could not be aware what the provisions of the                                                   PG NO 580 amended  Act  would be. There was in these  circumstances  a total  surrender in the matter of sales tax  legislation  by the Pondicherry Assembly in favour of the Madras legislature and  for that reason we must agree with Mr. Desai  that  the Act was void or as is often said ’still-born’.     It was however argued that the Act cannot be said to  be still-born as it contained certain provisions independent of the  Madras  Act, viz., the section which provides  for  the Appellate Tribunal and the said Schedule. But the core of  a taxing statute is in the charging section and the provisions levying  such a tax and defining persons who are  liable  to pay  such  tax.  If  that  core  disappears  the   remaining provisions have no efficacy. In our view, Act l0 of 1965 was for the reasons aforesaid void and still-born.     It may appear that there is a great similarity  between1 the  facts in Shama Rao (supra) and in the cases before  us. In  each  of them, the provisions of the  enactment  of  one legislature  enact  that the provisions of an  enactment  of another  legislature  should  apply  within  the   territory subject  to its jurisdiction, on the issue of  a  Government notification  and  the first legislature does not  know  the

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details  of  the provisions of the enactment of  the  second legislature  that will become applicable in  consequence  of the  Government notification. We are not, however,  able  to accept  the  contention that the ratio of Shama  Rao’s  case will  govern the situation in the present case also. We  say this for two reasons.     In the first place, the principles regarding  delegation of  legislative  powers  have  been  discussed  in   several decisions of this Court, the leading decision being the  one in  the case of Delhi Laws Act, [1951] SCR 747. In the  last mentioned authority separate judgments were delivered by the various  learned  judges  of  this  Curt  and,  instead   of referring  to  each of them individually,  the  best  course would  be to adopt the summary of Vivan Bose J. at page  298 in  Raj  Narain Singh’s case, [1955] 1 SCR  290.  That  case concerned   a  Bihar  Act  which  permitcertain   areas   by notification . The validity of this statutory provision  was upheld  but  the notification issued was held  to  be  ultra vires  the provision. In the course of the  discussion,  the learned Judge said:    "The Court (in the Delhi Laws Act case) had before it the                                                   PG NO 581 following  problems. In each case, the  Central  Legislature had  empowered an executive authority under its  legislative control  to apply, at its discretion, laws to an area  which was  also  under  the legislative sway of  the  Centre.  The variations  occur  in the type of laws which  the  executive authority was authorised to select and in the  modifications which it was empowered to make in them. The variations  were as follows:     (l) Where the executive authority was permitted, at  its discretion,  to apply without modification (save  incidental changes  such as name and place), the whole of  any  Central Act  already  in existence in any part of  India  under  the legislative sway of the Centre to the new area:     This was upheld by a majority of six to one.     (2) Where the executive authority was allowed to  select and apply a Provincial Act in similar circumstances:     This  was  also upheld, but this time by a  majority  of five to two.     (3)  where  the  executive authority  was  permitted  to select future Central laws and apply them in a similar way:     This was upheld by five to two.     (4)  Where  the  authorisation  was  to  select   future Provincial laws and apply them as above.     This was also upheld by five to two.     (5)  Where the authorisation was to repeal laws  already in force in the area and either substitute nothing in  their places or substitute other laws, Central or Provincial, with or without modification.     This was held to be ultra vires by a majority of four to three.     (6) Where the authorisation was to apply existing  laws, either   Central   or  Provincial,  with   alterations   and modifications; and                                                   PG NO 582     (7)  Where  the authorisation was to apply  future  laws under the same conditions:     The  views of the various members of the Bench were  not as  clear  cut  as in the first five cases, so  it  will  be necessary to analyse what each Judge said."     As  to categories (6) and (7) mentioned above, Bose  J., after referring to the opinion of each of the other  learned Judges in the Delhi Laws Act case (supra), concluded with  a reference to his own observations in the earlier decision:

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   "Bose  J. contented himself at page 1121 by saying  that the  delegation cannot extend to the "altering in  essential particulars  of laws which are already in force in the  area in question." But he added at page 1124--    "My answers are, however, subject to this  qualification. The power to ’restrict and modify’ does not import the power to make essential changes. It is confined to alterations  of a  minor  character  such as are necessary to  make  an  Act intended  for one are applicable to another and to bring  it into harmony with laws already in being in the State, or  to delete portions which are meant solely for another area.  To alter  the essential character of an Act or to change it  in material  particulars is to legislate, and that, namely  the power  to legislate, all authorities are agreed,  cannot  be delegated by a Legislature include a change of policy."      In our opinion, the majority view was that an executive authority  can  be authorised to modify either  existing  or future  laws but not in any essential feature. Exactly  what constitutes  an  essential feature cannot be  enunciated  in general  terms, and there was some divergence of view  about this  in  the former case, but this much is clear  from  the opinions  set  out  above: it cannot  include  a  change  of policy"     In other words, the delegation of a power to extend even future laws of another State will not be bad so long as they are laws which are already in force in the said area and  so long  as, in the process and under the guise  of  alteration and  modification, an alteration of the essential  character                                                   PG NO 583 of the law or a change of it in essential particulars is not permitted.  This interpretation of the Delhi Laws  Act  case (supra) was placed before the Bench which decided Shama  Rao but,  without  dissenting from this  approach,  the  learned Judges did not choose to apply it perhaps as they felt  that the  Pondicherry legislature, in the case before  them,  had completely   abdicated   its   functions   to   the   Madras Legislature.  There  was also, it should  be  remembered,  a substantial  difference between the Madras Act to which  the Pondicherry legislature had applied its mind and the  Madras Act  which actually became applicable by a deferment of  the date  of  commencement. Such a vast change, within  a  short time, could not at all have been in the contemplation of the Pondicherry  legislature  and this is perhaps  what  heavily weighed   with   the   Judges.  This   decision   has   been distinguished  in the Gwalior Rayon’s case,[1974] 2 SCR  879 by  Khanna  J.  and Mathew J.  who  delivered  separate  but concurring judgments. Khanna J.observed:    "It  would  appear from the above that the  reason  which prevailed with the majority in striking down the Pondicherry Act  was  the  total surrender in the matter  of  sales  tax legislation by the Pondicherry Legislature in favour of  the Madras  Legislature.  No such surrender is involved  in  the present case because of the Parliament having adopted in one particular  respect  the  rate of local sales  tax  for  the purpose of central sales tax. Indeed, as mentioned  earlier, the  adoption  of the local sales tax is in pursuance  of  a legislative policy induced by the desire to prevent  evasion of  the payment of central sales tax by discouraging  inter- State sales to unregistered dealers. No such policy could be discerned  in the Pondicherry Act which was struck  down  by this Court.     Another  distinction, though not very material, is  that in  the  Pondicherry case the provisions of the  Madras  Act along with the subsequent amendments were made applicable to an area which was within the Union Territory of  Pondicherry

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and  not  in Madras State. As against that, in  the  present case  we  find that the Parliament has adopted the  rate  of local  sales tax for certain purposes of the  Central  Sales Tax  Act only for the territory of the State for  which  the Legislature  of that State had prescribed the rate of  sales tax. The central sales tax in respect of the territory of  a State is ultimately assigned to that State under article 269                                                   PG NO 584 of  the Constitution and is imposed for the benefit of  that State. We would, therefore, hold that the appellants  cannot derive much assistance from the above mentioned decision  of this Court.     Mathew J. had this to say:     "We think that the principle of the ruling in Shama  Rao v. Pondicherry, (supra) must be confined to the facts of the case. It is doubtful whether there is any general  principle which  precludes  either Parliament or a  State  legislature from  adopting  a law and the future amendments to  the  law passed respectively by a State legislature or Parliament and incorporating  them in its legislation. At any  rate,  there can  be no such prohibition when the adoption is not of  the entire  corpus of law on a subject but only of  a  provision and  its future amendments and that for a special reason  or purpose.     Secondly,  we think that the facts of the  present  case are  also distinguishable from those in Shama Rao,  (supra). Parliament  was  faced with the problems of  enacting  laws relating  to house accommodation in cantonments  in  various States. Earlier an attempt had been made to have a  separate Act for U.P. Cantonments but it was then considered that  it would  be better to have a uniform policy of legislation  in respect of all cantonments in India. These cantonments  were located  in  the heart of various cities  in  the  different States  and  unlike  the position that  prevailed  in  early years, had ceased to be a separate and exclusive colony  for army   personnel.  It  was,  therefore,  but  natural     for Parliament  to  decide, as a matter of  policy.  that  there should   be  no  difference,  in  the  matter   of   housing accommodation, between persons  residing in cantonment areas of  a State and those residing in other parts of the  State and  it is this policy that was given effect to by Act  XLVI of  1957.  Having decided upon this policy, it was  open  to Parliament  to  do  one  of  two  things:  pass  a  separate enactment  in respect of the cantonment areas in each  State or to merely extend the statutes prevalent in other parts of the  respective  States by a single  enactment.  The  second course  was  opted upon but there was  one  difficulty.  The enactments  in  force in the various States  may  need  some modifications or changes before they could be fitted to  the requirements  of the cantonments. We have already  explained that  the expression ’restrictions and modifications’ has  a very limited connotation. If this is borne in mind, it  will be  clear that the nature of modifications  or  restrictions                                                   PG NO 585 each statute would require can only be a matter of detail of drafting,  of not much significance or importance, once  the general  policy was clear. It is only this matter of  detail that  has  been delegated to the Central  Government  to  be attended to while passing appropriate notifications in  each case.  As pointed out in Sita Ram Bishambher Dayal v.  State of  U.P.,  [1972]  2  SCR  141  in  the  context  of  a  tax legislation:     "In  a  Cabinet  form of Government,  the  Executive  is expected  to reflect the views of the Legislatures. In  fact in  most  matters  it gives the  lead  to  the  Legislature.

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However  much one might deplore the "New Despotism"  of  the Executive, the very complexity of the modern society and the demand it makes on its Government have set in motion  forces which have made it absolutely necessary for the Legislatures to  entrust more and more powers to the Executive.  Textbook doctrines evolved in the Nineteenth Century have become  out of   date.  Present  position  as  regards   delegation   of legislative  power may not be ideal, but in the  absence  of any  better  alternative, there is no escape  from  it.  The Legislatures  have  neither  the  time,  nor  the   required detailed information nor even the mobility to deal in detail with  the  innumerable problems arising time and  again.  In certain  matters  they  can only lay  down  the  policy  and guidelines in as clear a manner as possible."     For  the  same  reasons the scope  of  delegation  in  a measure  like  this should have a degree of  flexibility  to deal with minor variations and details of statutory adoption having  regard  to  the situation differing  from  State  to State.  The  legislature hardly has the time to  enter  into this arena. We, therefore, think that there was no infirmity in the delegation of power contained in s. 3 of Act XLVI  of 1957.     The  further  argument  that, in  any  event,  the  1976 amendments  of Act 13 of 1972 will not get attracted has  to be  rejected  on  the same line of  reasoning  as  has  been indicated above. Once it is the avowed policy of Parliament that  cantonment areas in a State should be subject  to  the same  tenancy  legislation as the other  areas  therein,  it follows   that  the  decision  involves  also  that   future amendments in such State legislation should become effective in  cantonment  areas  as  well. In  some  rare  case  where Parliament  feels that such subsequent amendments  need  not apply to cantonment areas or should apply with more than the limited restrictions and modifications permitted by s. 3, it is  open to Parliament to legislate independently  for  such                                                   PG NO 586 cantonment  areas. But the decision that, in the main,  such State legislation should apply is unexceptionable and cannot be  said  to  constitute an abdication  of  its  legislative function by Parliament.     But  here the difficulty arises not so much  because  of the language of section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 as on  account of the language of the notification issued on Ist September, 1973.  The  wording of this notification has  been  set  out earlier.  It  reads  that, in supersession  of  the  earlier notification  of  3rd April, 1972,  the  Central  Government extends to the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh the "Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,  Rent and  Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act XIII of 1972) as in force on  the  date of this notifications, in the State  of  Uttar Pradesh  with the following modifications . . ." It must  be pointed  out in this connection that this  notification  was issued after Act XLVI of 1957 had been amended by Act 22  of 1972  and  a  power  had  been  conferred  on  the   Central Government to issue the notification without the restriction previously  contained  in  section  3(1)  that  the  statute proposed to be extended should be as in force on the date of the notification. In other words depsite the enlarged  power conferred  by  amending Act 22 of 1972 the  notification  is couched  in the same way as the earlier notification of  3rd April,  1972 and purports to extend to the cantonments  only the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 as in force on the date  of the  notification, that is, as on 1.9.1973.  The  restricted language of the notification, therefore, makes applicable to cantonments  only the provisions of Act 13 of 1972  as  they

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stood on 1.9. 1973 and not its subsequent amendments.     Act  13,  of  1972, as initially  enacted,  required  an application   under  section  21  to  be  made  before   the Prescribed Authority. "Prescribed Authority ’ was defined by section 3(e) to mean:     "a  Magistrate  of  the  first  class,  having  3  years experience   as  such,  duly  authorised  by  the   District Magistrate to exercise, perform and discharge all or any  of the powers, functions and duties of the Prescribed Authority under this Act     Act 19 of 1974 amended this definition w.e.f. 20.7  1974 to mean:     "an  officer not less than three years experience  as  a Munsif   Magistrate  of  the first  class  or  as  Executive Magistrate authorised as aforesaid by the State Government .                                                   PG NO 587     Still  later on 5.7.1976, Act 28 of 1976  substituted  a new  clause (e) for previous one. Under the new clause,  the definition read:     "Prescribed Authority means a Civil Judicial Officer  or Judicial  Magistrate  authorised by the  District  Judge  to exercise,  perform and discharge all or any of  the  powers, functions and duties of the Prescribed Authority under this Act ....     As  explained in the judgment of the District  Judge  in the  case  under appeal, different types  of  officers  were contemplated under the different definitions. Initially  the Prescribed  Authority  had to be a Magistrate of  the  first class under the old Code of Criminal Procedure and had  also to  be  a nominee of the District Magistrate.  This  had  to change  because first class Magistrates subordinate  to  the District  Magistrate  had ceased to exist  after  31.3.1974. Thereafter there were only Executive Magistrates subordinate to the District Magistrates and Judicial Magistrates of  the first and second class under the District Judges. Therefore, the  amended section gave power to the State  Government  to authorise   Munsifs,  Judicial  Magistrates   or   Executive Magistrates  to discharge duties of a Prescribed  Authority. This  must  have  meant  a very  heavy  load  on  the  State Government  and  hence a third change  was  effected  w.e.f. 5.7.1976.  Thereafter,  a  nominee and  subordinate  of  the District Judge was to be the Prescribed Authority.     In Civil Appeal No. 6944 of 1983, to which we have  made reterence  earlier,  the landlord had made  his  application under  section 21 of Act XIII of 1972 before the  Prescribed Authority on 20.12.1975. It was made before Shri Khem Karan, who  had  been  appointed as  the  Prescribed  Authority  on 11.9.1975.  However, when the definition was amended by  Act 28  of  1976,  Shri S.C. Srivastava  was  appointed  as  the Prescribed Authority and the application of the landlord was transferred to him and he disposed it off by his order dated 27.9.1977. It may be mentioned that both Shri Khem Karan and Shri  Srivastava were Munsifs. While Shri Khem Karan  was  a Prescribed Authority appointed by the State Government under section  3(e)  as  amended in 1974, Shri  Srivastava  was  a Prescribed Authority authorised by the District Judge  after 5th of July, 1976.     In  this state of facts the argument urged on behalf  of the  tenant  before  the  High Court,  in  addition  to  the principal  argument  that  Act 13 of 1972  was  not  at  all applicable  to  cantonment areas, was that  Sri  Srivastava,                                                   PG NO 588 appointed in pursuance of the amendment Act 28 of 1976,  was not  the Prescribed Authority authorised in accordance  with the  provisions of the Act as they stood on  Ist  September,

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1973,  and  therefore had no jurisdiction to  entertain  the application  made  by the landlord under section 21  of  the Act.  Though  the dates and facts of other cases  were  also similar,  this  point was taken only in this  case  at   the earlier  stages. This argument was accepted by  the  learned District  Judge, who set aside the order of  the  Prescribed Authority on 2.2.1981. The High Court, in the writ  petition filed by the tenant, did not, however, accept this argument. The learned single Judge who heard the writ petition was  of the  opinion that the District Judge was in error  and  that the  argument  put forward on behalf of the tenant  was  not tenable. He observed:     "Section  3 of Act 22 of 1972 inter alia  provided  that section 3 of the Principal Act, namely, Act 46 of 1957 shall be renumbered as sub-section I thereof, and in sub-section I as so renumbered the words "on the date of the notification" shall  be, and shall be deemed always to have been  omitted. The  effect of the words "on the date of  the  notification" being omitted from section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 in the manner contemplated  by  section 3 of Act 22 of 1972 was  that  the aforesaid  words  would  be  deemed  not  to  have  been  in existence  in section 3 of the Act 46 of 1957 from the  very inception.  As  such  section 3 of Act 46 of  1957  did  not confer  on  the  Central Government the  power  to  issue  a notification under that section to extend to any  cantonment an enactment relating to the control of rent and  regulation of house accommodation which was inforce "on the date of the notification"  in  the  State in  which  the  cantonment  is situated.  The  use  of  the words  "on  the  date  of  this notification"  after the words "as in force" and before  the words  "in the State of Uttar Pradesh" in  the  notification dated Ist September, 1973, were, therefore, beyond the power conferred  on the Central Government by section 3 of Act  46 of  1957  and  will  accordingly be  deemed  to  be  not  in existence  in  the  aforesaid notification and  have  to  be ignored."     After referring lo the decision of the Supreme Court  In Bajya  v. Smt. Gopikabai and another, [1978] 3  S.C.R.  561, the learned Judge observed:    "Section  3 of Act 46 of 1957 after its amendment by  Act 22  of  1972  as aforesaid on the face of it  comes  in  the                                                   PG NO 589 latter  category  referred  to  in  the  decision  of  Bajya (supra).   Consequently,   the  definition   of   the   term "Prescribed  Authority"  as it was subsequently  amended  by U.P. Act 28 of 1976 is applicable for finding out as to  who is  the  Prescribed Authority to  entertain  an  application under  section  21  of  the Act  even  in  regard  to  those buildings  which are situated within a cantonment area.  The view  taken  to the contrary by the District  Judge  in  the impugned  order  suffers from a manifest error  of  law  and deserves to be quashed."     He,  therefore, held that the application  preferred  by the  landlord had rightly been dealt with by Sri  Srivastava and  therefore remanded the matter to the  learned  District Judge  for disposing of the appeal filed before him  by  the tenant on its merits.     It is against the order of the learned single Judge that C.A.  No. 6944 of 1983 has been preferred. We are unable  to support  the line of reasoning adopted by the learned  Judge to  uphold  the  order passed  by Sri  Srivastava.  We  have already expressed our opinion that amended section 3 of  Act XLVI of 1957, on a proper construction, validly empowers the Central   Government,   by  notification,  to   extend   the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 to the cantonments in the State

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of Uttar Pradesh, not only in the form in which it stood  on the  date of the said notification but also along  with  its subsequent  amendments. But, for the Central  Government  to have such power is one thing and for the Central  Government to exercise such power is a totally different thing. Despite the fact that Act 22 of 1972 with full retrospective  effect omitted the words "as on the date of the notification"  from section  3  of  Act  46 of 1957, the  terms  of  the  actual notification  on  1.9.1973  purported  to  extend  only  the provisions  of  Act  13  of 1972 as on  the   date  of  such notification. We are unable to agree with the learned single Judge  that this restricted notification was ultra vires  or travelled beyond the provisions of section 3 of Act XLVI  of 1957.  What  happened was that the section  in  the  statute conferred  a larger power on the Central Government but  the Central  Government  utilised the said power  in  a  limited manner.  That  was perfectly within the scope of  the  power delegated  to it under section 3. We cannot uphold the  view that the words "as on the date of this notification" in  the notification dated Ist September, 1973 can be ignored or  be deemed  to have been omitted merely because those words  had been omitted from the section.     Nonetheless,  we are of the opinion that the  conclusion reached  by the learned single Judge has to be  upheld.  For                                                   PG NO 590 this,  there  are two reasons. The first is  the  effect  of section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 as amended by Act 22 of  1972. This Act amended s. 3 in more respects than one. Apart  from omitting  the words "as on the date of the notification"  in section  3 and re-numbering section 3 as 3(1), it  added  to section  3  certain  other sub-sections so  that  after  the amendment, section 3 read as follows:     3.  Power  to  extend to cantonments  laws  relating  to control of rents and regulation of house accommodation--     (1)  The Central Government may, by notification in  the Official  Gazette,  extend  to  any  cantonment  with   such restrictions  and  modifications  as  it  thinks  fit,   any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation  of house accommodation which is in force in the State in  which the cantonment is situated.     Provided  that  nothing contained in  any  enactment  so extended shall apply to-     (a) any premises within the cantonment belonging to  the Government;      (b) any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Government in respect of premises within  the cantonment   taken   on  lease  or  requisitioned   by   the Government; or     (2) The extension of any enactment under sub-section (l) may be made from such earlier or future date as the  Central Government may think fit:     Provided  that  no such extension shall be made  from  a date earlier than--     (a) the commencement of such enactment, or     (b) the establishment of the cantonment, or     (c) the commencement of this Act,     whichever is later:                                                   PG NO 591     (3)  Where any enactment in force in any State  relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation is  extended  to a cantonment from a date earlier  than  the date on which such extension is made (hereafter referred  to as the "earlier date"), such enactment, as in force on  such earlier date, shall apply to such cantonment and, where  any such  enactment  has  been amended at  any  time  after  the

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earlier date but before the commencement of the  Cantonments (Extension  of Rent Control Laws) Amendment Act, 1972,  such enactment,  as amended shall apply to the cantonment on  and from the date on which the enactment by which such amendment was made came into force.     (4)  Where, before the extension to a cantonment of  any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation  of house  accommodation therein (hereafter referred to  as  the "Rent Control Act"),     (i)  any  decree  or order for  the  regulation  of  for eviction  from, any house accommodation in that  cantonment, or     (ii)  any order in the proceedings for the execution  of such decree or order, or     (iii) any order relating to the control of rent or other incident of such house accommodation,     was  made by any court, tribunal or other  authority  in accordance  with  any  law  for  the  control  of  rent  and regulation  of  house accommodation for the  time  being  in force  in  the State in which such cantonment  is  situated, such  decree or order shall, on and from the date  on  which the  Rent  Control Act is extended to  that  cantonment,  be deemed to have been made under the corresponding  provisions of the Rent Control Act, as extended to that cantonment,  as if the said Rent Control Act, as so extended, were in  force in  that  cantonment, on the date on which  such  decree  or order was made.     It  has been mentioned earlier that, on  17.2.1982,  the Central  (Government  issued a  further  notification  under section  3 of Act 46 of 1957 in supersession of its  earlier notification dated Ist September, 1973. By this notification                                                   PG NO 592 the  Central Government extended to all cantonments  in  the State  of Uttar Pradesh provisions of Act 13 of 1972  as  in force   in   the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh   with   certain modifications.  Considering that Act 13 of 1972 had  already been extended, this really meant the extension of Act 19  of 1974  and  Act 28 of 1976 to cantonment areas.  If,  in  the light of this fact, we read section 3(4) of Act XLVI of 1957 it will be  seen that the order of Sri Srivastava has to  be upheld.  The provisions of Act 13 of 1972 as amended by  Act 28  of  1976 have been extended to the  cantonments  in  the State of Uttar Pradesh only with effect from 17.2.1982.  But notwithstanding this, the order passed by Sri Srivastava  on 27.9.1977 was passed by an authority in accordance with  the law  which was, for the time being (i.e. as on 27.9.77),  in force in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Under section 3(4),  it should,  therefore,  be deemed to have been made  under  the corresponding provision of the Rent Control Act (as extended by that notification i.e. as amended in 1976) as if the said amended  Rent  Control Act as so extended were in  force  in that  cantonment on the date on which such order  was  made. That this will be the position is clear from the decision of this  court  in the case of Jai Singh Jairam Tyagi  etc.  v. Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal and Ors., [1980] 3 S.C.R. 224. It is  not necessary to refer to the decision in detail. It  is sufficient  to  refer  to the  following  passage  from  the judgment:    "Shri  V.M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for  the  appellant urged  that sub-section 4 had to be read in the  context  of sub-sections  2 and 3 and that it was to be applied only  to cases  where a notification issued under sub-section  1  was given  retrospective  effect under the  provisions  of  sub- section  2.  We  see  no  justification  for  confining  the applicability of sub-section 4 to cases where  notifications

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are  issued with retrospective effect under  sub-section  2, sub-section 4 in terms is not as confined. It applies to all cases  of decrees or orders made before the extension  of  a State  Legislation to a cantonment area irrespective of  the question whether such extension is retrospective or not. The essential  condition to be fulfilled is that the  decree  or order  must have been made as if the State  Legislation  was already in force, although, strictly speaking, it was not so in  force. In our view sub-section 4 is wide enough to  save all  decrees and orders made by the wrong application  of  a State rent control and house accommodation legislation to  a cantonment area, though such State Legislation could not  in law have been applied to cantonment areas at the time of the                                                   PG NO 593 passing  of the decrees or order. We, therefore,  hold  that the  decree  obtained  by the respondents is  saved  by  the provisions  of  s.  3,  sub-section  4  of  the   Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act of 1957, as amended by Act 22 of 1972."     From the above decision it will be seen that sub-section 4  is  independent of sub-sections 2 and 3  and  has  effect whether or not the extension of laws made to the  cantonment is  made retrospective. Even though the extension of Act  22 of  1972 as amended by Act 28 of 1976 is  not  retrospective and  will  be effective only from 5.7.1976,  the  effect  of section 3(4) of Act XLVI of 1957 is that even orders  passed prior to such extension should be deemed to have been passed under  the  extended amended Act. Judged by this  test,  the order  passed  by  Sri Srivastava  who  was  the  Prescribed Authority  after  the amendment of Act 28 of  1976  will  be valid.     We  should also like to refer in this connection to  the judgment  of this Court in S.P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan  Gupta and  others, [1987] 1 S.C.C. 191. In that case the  landlord moved  an application under section 24-C of Act 13 of  1972. Section  24-C  formed part of Chapter IV-A, which  had  been inserted  in Act 13 of 1972 only by the amendment Act 28  of 1976.  The  application  of  the  landlord  was  allowed  no 17.8.1981 by what was then called the "Delegated Authority". Revision application to the District Judge failed. Thereupon the  tenant filed a writ petition before the High Court  and contended  that since Chapter IV-A of the Act had been  made applicable  to  cantonment areas only  by  the  notification dated 17.2.1982 that is, after the filing of the application under section 24-C by the landlord-section 24-B and 24-C  of the  U.P.  Rent Act were inapplicable. This  contention  was rejected  by  a Bench of this Court (which included  one  of us).  After  pointing  out that on the  date  on  which  the application  was filed as well as on the date on  which  the order was made. the cantonment area did not come within  the ambit  of  the Act in question and that it was only  by  the date  on  which  the  revisional order  was  passed  by  the Additional District Judge that the building in question came within the purview of the Act by reason of the  notification dated 17.9.1982, the court observed:     In  view  of  the  ratio of  Jaisingh  Jairam  Tyagi  v. Mamanchand  Ratilal  Agarwal, [1980] 3 SCC 162, it  must  be held that the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Act would be applicable.  The  amending Act was passed  for  the  express                                                   PG NO 594 purpose  of  saving decrees which had already  been  passed. Therefore action under section 24-C of the Act in this  case was  justified.  The High Court did not  decide  this  point because it was of the opinion that the second point which we shall  note presently, the High Court was in favour  of  the

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respondent.  We are, however, of the opinion that the  first point  urged on behalf of the respondent cannot be  accepted in view of the position in law as discussed hereinbefore. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that section  24-B gave  substantive rights to the appellant and  section  24-C was  the procedure for enforcing those  substantive  rights. Therefore, these were not only procedural rights. Therefore, there  was  no question of retrospective operation  to  take away  vested right. We are, however, of the opinion that  it would  be  an  exercise in futility if  the  application  is dismissed on this ground, it can be filed again and in  view of  the subsequent legislation as noted hereinbefore it  was bound  to  succeed  on  this  point.  In  exercise  of   our discretionary  power under Article 136 of the  Constitution, it  would  not  be  proper to interfere  in  the  facts  and circumstances of the case on this ground. In the premises in view of the ratio of the decision of this Court in  Jaisingh case and reason mentioned hereinbefore this contention urged on behalf of the respondent must be rejected. "     In  our opinion the ratio of this case squarely  applies to the facts of the case in C.A. No. 6944 of 1983.     We are therefore unable to accept any of the contentions urged  on  behalf  of  the  appellants.  The  appeals   are, therefore,  dismissed  but in the circumstances we  make  no order as to costs.     Y. Lal                                        Appeals dismissed.