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PETITIONER: BRAHMANAND

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. KAUSHALYA DEVI & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/04/1977

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1198            1977 SCR  (3) 485  1977 SCC  (3)   1  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1988 SC 452  (9)

ACT:             Eviction on the ground of arrears of rent--Tenant due to         strained relations deposits rent in the Court--Whether  such         deposit  shall  be  deemed  that  the  rent  has  been  duly         paid--United  Provinces  (Temporary)  Control  of  Rent  and         Eviction Act 1947. S. 3(1)(a) r/w. s. 7-C(v) and (6)  inter-         pretation of.

HEADNOTE:             Section  3(1)(a)  of the  United  Provinces  (Temporary)         Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, permits ejectment on         the ground of arrears of-rent when the tenant is in  arrears         of rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the         same  to the landlord within one month of the  service  upon         him of a notice of demand.  Section 7-C(1) enables  deposits         of  rent  to be made when a landlord refuses to  accept  any         rent lawfully paid to him by a tenant and s. 7-C(6)  enjoins         that  "in any case where a deposit has been made  as  afore-         said, it shall be deemed that the rent has been duly paid by         the tenant to the landlord."             The  appellant-tenant had extremely  strained  relations         with  his  landlady leading to criminal cases.  He deposited         the  rent payable by him in the court regularly.  The  trial         court  as well as the High Court, taking the view that  such         prompt  deposits  of rent in the court did not  satisfy  the         provisions  of s. 3(1)(a) of the United  ’Provinces  (Tempo-         rary)  Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, since  it  is         not  equivalent to payment of rent to the landlord,  granted         the ejection application filed by the respondent-landlady.         Allowing the appeal by special leave and remanding the case,         the court,             HELD:  (1 ) The construction pot by the courts below  on         s.  7-C  is  too narrow and a liberal  construction  of  the         expression "paid to him by a tenant" in s. 7-C (1) is neces-         sary. [487 B-D]             (2)  A correct interpretation of s. 7 has to  be  condi-         tioned by the circumstances prevailing between the  parties.         In a situation where not merely bitterness and friction  but         potentially  violent terms mar the life of the  parties,  s.

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       7-C  of  the Act has to be read realistically.   It  is  not         necessary  for the tenant to create a situation  of  tension         and violence by physically giving the rent into the hands of         the  landlord. It is an idle ritual to insist or a  physical         tender  of payment of rent where the circumstances  make  it         impracticable.   But harassing the landlord by  straightaway         depositing  the  rent  in court without  fulfilment  of  the         conditions  required by s. 7-C(1) is also unwarranted.  [486         G-H, 487 A, D]              The  expression  "where the deposit has  been  made  as         aforesaid" in s. 7-C (6) means that the deposit is permissi-         ble  only when the condition in s. 7-C(1) is complied  with.         If the landlord refuses to accept rent paid to him a deposit         is  permissible but payment need not be by  physical  tender         person  to  person.  It can be by money  order  or   through         messenger  or by  sending a  notice to the  landlord  asking         him to nominate a bank into which the rents may be regularly         paid to the credit of the landlord.  If the landlord refuses         under  these circumstances then a court deposit will be  the         remedy.   In  the  instant case the courts  below  have  not         considered whether the circumstances which drove the  appel-         lant  into  the  depositing of rent in court  were  such  as         eliminated  the other possibilities of direct payment.  [487         E-F, A]         Observation             It  would  be a far more satisfactory  solution  of  the         situation between two neighbours who have fallen out, if the         parties would come to terms at the gentle suggestion of  the         court below as to what it considers Just aided by the activ-         ist  endeavours of counsel, than a mere adjudication of  the         points  of fact and law raised which will leave the  parties         as  bitter  neighbours. [The court  directed  the  appellate         court  to take .the initiative in the matter with a  caution         to-be totally non-aligned in the process. [488 A-B]         486

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDCTION: CIVIL Appeal No. 711 of 1976.             (Appeal  by  Special Leave from the Judgment  and  Order         dated  the 28-4-1976 of the Allahabad High Court  in  Second         Appeal No. 1719 of 1972)             Yogeshwar  Prasad, Miss Rani Arora and Meera  Bali,  for         the appellant.              S.L. Bhatia and H.K. Puri, for respondent No. 1.             The Judgment of the’ Court was delivered by             KRISHNA  IYER, J. The defendant-tenant is the  appellant         and the appeal is by special leave.  The landlord sued’  for         ejectment on the ground of arrears of rent as provided in s.         3  of the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of  Rent  and         Eviction  Act, 1947.  Section 3(1) (a) states, among one  of         the grounds of eviction,                             "that  the tenant is in arrears of  rent                       for  more than three months and has failed  to                       pay the same to the landlord within one  month                       of  the   service upon  him of a   notice   of                       demand."           ’         In the  present  case,  the complaint  of the plaintiff  was         that  the  rent was not paid but was  deposited  into  court         regularly.   The trial court as well as the High Court  took         the  view that such prompt deposits of rent into  court  did         not  satisfy  the provisions of s. 3(1)(a) since it  is  not         equivalent  to payment of rent to the landlord. Counsel  for         the   appellant  contends.  that s.    7-C(6)  of  the   Act

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       strikes a different note.   It reads:                             "In  any case where a deposit  has  been                       made,  as aforesaid, it shall be  deemed  that                       the rent has been duly paid by the  tenant  to                       the  landlord.   (emphasis supplied)"         S.  7-C(1)enables  deposits  of rent to be   made   when   a         landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully paid to him  by         a tenant.   In the present case the facts are glaring.   The         relations  between  the  parties  appears  to  be  extremely         strained  and they are living in adjacent  premises.   There         was  a criminal case by the tenant against the  landlord  as         early as 1969 for offences under ss. 323, 504, 506, 352, 354         and  452  I.P.C.   The case ended in an  acquittal  but  the         relations  did  not improve. Even now there  is  a   pending         prosecution by  the tenant of the landlord for offences of a         serious  nature.   It is common ground that not merely  bit-         terness and  friction but potentially  violent terms mar the         life  of these parties.  In such a situation s. 7-C  of  the         Act has to be .read realistically. It is not. necessary  for         the tenant to create a situation, of tension and Violence by         physically offering the rent into the hands of the landlord.         We  are satisfied that a correct interpretation of s. 7  has         to  be conditioned by the circumstances  prevailing  between         the. parties:  In the case we are concerned with, the  rela-         tions between the parties being Very estranged it is an idle         487         ritual  to insist on a physical tender of payment   of   the         rent   where  the  circumstances make  it  impractical  and,         therefore, subject to what we have said later, prima  facie,         s.  7-C(1)  is attracted and in such cases s.  7-C(6)  makes         court  deposit  equivalent to payment by the tenant  to  the         landlord.  Of course, in the absence of special and adequate         grounds the tenant cannot drive the landlord to collect  his         rent  every  time through the court with all  the  attendant         inconvenience and expense.              We consider the construction put by the courts below on         s.  7-C  too narrow.  The High Court has  proceeded  on  the         footing that a deposit under s. 7-C can be made only if  the         landlord  refuses to accept the rent tendered to him or,  if         there is any dispute as to the person who is actually  enti-         tled to receive the rent. "None of the conditions existed in         the instant case... and the plaintiff had asked  the defend-         ant  not  to deposit the rent in court but to  pay  her  the         same.   The  defendant was accordingly required to  pay  the         rent to her, not to deposit the same in court.  The deposit,         accordingly,  could  not constitute payment of rent  to  the         plaintiff and the defendant, consequently, was in arrears of         rent... ".              As we have earlier pointed out, a liberal  construction         of  the expression paid to him by a tenant in s.  7-C(1)  is         necessary.   Physically offering payment when the  relations         between the parties are strained is to  ask for trouble  and         be impractical.   But harassing the landlord by  straightway         depositing  the  rent  in court without  fulfilment  of  the         conditions  required by s. 7-C(1) is also unwarranted.  Sec-         tion  7-C(6) by using the expression ’where the deposit  has         been made as aforesaid’ takes us back to s. 7-C(1).  That is         to  say, the deposit is permissible only when the  condition         in  s. 7-C(1) is complied with.  If the landlord refuses  to         accept  rent paid to him a deposit is permissible. But  pay-         ment  need not be by physical tender, person to person.   It         can be by money order, or through messenger or by sending  a         notice  to the landlord asking him to nominate a  bank  into         which  the rents may be regularly paid to the credit of  the         landlord.   If  the  landlord refuses  under  these  circum-

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       stances, then a court deposit will be the remedy.              In  the present case, on account of the bad  blood  be-         tween  the  parties a physical tender of the rent  is  ruled         out.  At the same time the courts below have not  considered         whether  the  circumstances which drove the  appellant  into         depositing  the  rent in court were such as  eliminated  the         other possibilities of direct payment we have indicated.  It         is  therefore  fair to set aside the finding of  the  courts         below  and  remand  the case to the  lower  appellate  court         (which.  is the final court of fact under  ordinary  circum-         stances)  to  ascertain whether any of the  alternatives  we         have  indicated, or may otherwise be made out by the  tenant         as  equivalent to payment of rent, is present in  the  case.         If no such circumstance is made out by the tenant justifying         deposit  of  rent  in court, the decree  for  eviction  will         stand.   Otherwise, the petition for eviction will  be  dis-         missed.         488         It  may  well  be that having regard to the  fact  that  the         respondent,the  landlady  belonging to the weaker  sex,  has         necessarily to live  as adjacent occupant of the  appellant,         a  fairly affluent doctor, and taking note of the fact  that         the  relations between the parties are so embittered  as  to         lead  to   criminal cases, it may be furtherance of  justice         if  the appellate court tries to settle the dispute  without         taking  sides. If the parties are able to come to  terms  at         the  gentle suggestion of the court as to what it  considers         just,   aided  by the activist  endeavours  of  counsel,  it         would  be a far more satisfactory solution of the  situation         between two neighbors who have fallen out than a bare  adju-         dication  of  the points of fact and law raised  which  will         leave  the parties as bitter neighbors.  We therefore  think         it proper to direct the appellate court to take the  initia-         tive in the matter but  caution it to be totally non-aligned         in the process.             With these observations we allow the appeal’ and  remand         the  case to the lower appellate court.  Parties  will  bear         their own costs upto now incurred.          S.R.                          Appeal allowed.         489